Assn Commty Orgn Ref v. US Army Corps Engs ( 2000 )


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  •                  IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 00-30569
    Summary Calendar
    ASSOCIATION OF COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS FOR REFORM NOW,
    (ACORN),
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS; RODNEY E. SLATER,
    United States Secretary of Transportation; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
    TRANSPORTATION,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    --------------------
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Louisiana
    USDC No. 00-CV-108-K
    --------------------
    December 19, 2000
    Before SMITH, BENAVIDES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    The Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now
    (“ACORN”) appeals the district court’s summary judgment dismissal
    of its suit seeking a preliminary injunction enjoining lock-pile
    testing   and    further      construction   with    respect    to   the    lock
    replacement     and   canal    expansion   project   at   the   Inner   Harbor
    Navigational Canal (“the IHNC”) in New Orleans, Louisiana.                 ACORN
    has failed to raise on appeal, and has therefore abandoned, its
    claim that the Environmental Impact Statement prepared by the
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
    that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
    except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
    No. 00-30569
    -2-
    United States    Army     Corps    of    Engineers     failed      to   address   the
    disproportionate adverse effects the IHNC project would have on
    minority communities, in violation of the National Environmental
    Protection Act, Council on Environmental Quality regulations, and
    Executive Order 12898.      See Yohey v. Collins, 
    985 F.2d 222
    , 224-25
    (5th Cir. 1993).
    ACORN’s   only    remaining       claim   is    that   the    United   States
    Department of Transportation (“the DOT”), through the United States
    Coast Guard, violated the DOT Act by failing to conduct a § 4(f)
    analysis of the use of historic sites by the bridge phase of the
    IHNC project prior to the commencement of construction on the
    project.   Under § 4(f) of the DOT Act, now codified at 49 U.S.C. §
    303(c):
    The Secretary [of the DOT] may approve a
    transportation program or project . . .
    requiring the use of . . . land of an historic
    site of national, State, or local significance
    . . . only if–
    (1) there is no prudent and feasible
    alternative to using that land; and
    (2) the program or project includes all
    possible planning to minimize harm to the . . .
    historic site resulting from the use.
    “The United States is immune from suit except as it waives its
    sovereign immunity.”      Wilkerson v. United States, 
    67 F.3d 112
    , 118
    (5th Cir. 1995).       “Congress sets forth the terms of those waivers
    and courts may not exercise subject matter jurisdiction over a
    claim against the federal government except as Congress allows.”
    
    Id. A waiver
    of immunity “‘must be unequivocally expressed in
    statutory text . . . [and] will be strictly construed, in terms of
    its scope, in favor of the sovereign.’”              Rothe Dev. Corp. v. United
    No. 00-30569
    -3-
    States Dep’t of Defense, 
    194 F.3d 622
    , 624 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing
    Lane v. Pena, 
    518 U.S. 187
    , 192 (1996)).
    Neither ACORN’s filings in the district court nor its briefs
    in this court identify any statutory provision waiving the United
    States’ sovereign immunity with respect to this suit for injunctive
    relief.     We are left to presume that ACORN’s suit was brought
    pursuant to the waiver of immunity set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 702.
    See Rothe Dev. Corp., 
    194 F.3d 622
    at 624.      “A waiver [of immunity]
    as to injunctive relief . . . can be found in § 702 of the
    Administrative Procedure Act, which permits parties ‘suffering
    legal wrong because of agency action’ to file an ‘action in a court
    of the United States seeking relief other than money damages.’”
    
    Id. (citing 5
    U.S.C. § 702).
    The Administrative Procedure Act, however, does not subject
    every     action    by   an   agency   to    judicial   review.    See
    Taylor-Callahan-Coleman Counties Dist. Adult Prob. Dep’t v. Dole,
    
    948 F.2d 953
    , 956 (5th Cir. 1991).      “Section 704 of that Act limits
    judicial review to ‘[a]gency action made reviewable by statute and
    [to] final agency action for which there is no adequate remedy in
    a court....’"      See 
    id. (citing 5
    U.S.C. § 704).
    ACORN has not identified, and we have not discovered, a
    statute making reviewable the DOT’s failure to conduct a § 4(f)
    analysis with respect to a project it has not yet approved, such as
    the IHNC project’s bridge phase.       Moreover, ACORN has not alleged,
    nor is there an indication, that the DOT’s failure to conduct a §
    4(f) analysis of the not-yet-approved bridge phase of the IHNC
    project constituted a final agency action.       See Veldhoen v. United
    No. 00-30569
    -4-
    States Coast Guard, 
    35 F.3d 222
    , 225 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that
    a final agency action “imposes an obligation, denies a right, or
    fixes a legal relationship”).
    In light of the foregoing, ACORN has not shown that the
    defendants   waived   their   sovereign   immunity      from   suit.     See
    Taylor-Callahan-Coleman Counties Dist. Adult Prob. 
    Dep’t, 948 F.2d at 956
    .    The   district   court’s   judgment   is    AFFIRMED   on   the
    alternative ground of lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.               See
    Sojourner T v. Edwards, 
    974 F.2d 27
    , 30 (5th Cir. 1992) (court of
    appeals may affirm district court’s judgment on any basis supported
    by the record).
    AFFIRMED.