Marchbanks v. Franklin ( 2001 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 01-30380
Summary Calendar
WILLIAM HENRY MARCHBANKS, Etc.; ET AL
Plaintiffs
WILLIAM HENRY MARCHBANKS, Individually and as the Father of and
on behalf of Milton Matthew Marchbanks
Plaintiff - Appellant
v.
DAWSON CLEVELAND FRANKLIN; ELMER LITCHFIELD; NUTMEG INSURANCE
COMPANY
Defendants - Appellees
- - - - - - - - - -
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Louisiana
USDC No. 97-CV-161
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October 10, 2001
Before KING, Chief Judge and DAVIS and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit
Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
William Henry Marchbanks appeals the district court’s grant
of summary judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights
complaint and supplemental state claims based on allegations of
false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, loss of
consortium, and emotional distress. The district court held that
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 01-30380
-2-
Deputy Dawson Cleveland Franklin was entitled to qualified
immunity.
Marchbanks argues that the affidavit drafted by Deputy
Franklin lacked sufficient indicia of probable cause and that a
reasonably well-trained officer would not have believed that the
affidavit and arrest warrant demonstrated probable cause to
arrest Marchbanks. He further contends that if Deputy Franklin
had obtained handwriting samples from Marchbanks, he would have
recognized that Marchbanks’ signature was forged on an agency
agreement between Marchbanks’ company, M&M Enterprises, and
Electronic Telecommunications Media, Inc. (ETM).
Marchbanks’ argument is insufficient. The issue is not
whether Deputy Franklin’s affidavit showed that he had probable
cause to arrest Marchbanks but whether there is a genuine issue
of material fact whether Franklin knowingly provided false
information to secure the arrest warrant or gave false
information in reckless disregard of the truth. See Freeman v.
County of Bexar, 210 F.3d 550, 553 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 531
S. Ct. 993 (2000).
Based on his investigation, Franklin knew that a fraudulent
scheme was being perpetrated by ETM. After he discovered the
agency agreement between ETM and M&M Enterprises, Franklin also
believed that ETM had enlisted the support of M&M Enterprises and
its president (Marchbanks) to solicit advertising contracts.
Franklin was aware that fraudulent invoices were being used for
the M&M account. He also was aware that ETM employees had been
in contact with Marchbanks by phone and by fax. Further
No. 01-30380
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investigation revealed that M&M Enterprises did not exist as a
business entity at the address listed in its documents. Rather,
the address given was a trailer in the Arizona desert where
Marchbanks was living. Based on the totality of circumstances,
Deputy Franklin reasonably concluded that Marchbanks and his
“business” conspired with ETM to fraudulently obtain money
through false invoices. Deputy Franklin’s conclusion that a
warrant should issue was reasonable based on the information that
he possessed at the time he swore out the affidavit for an arrest
warrant. See Freeman, 210 F.3d at 553.
Other than his theory about the forged signature, Marchbanks
has not identified any misstatements or omissions that possibly
would raise a genuine issue of material fact. See Morin v.
Caire, 77 F.3d 116, 122 (5th Cir. 1996). Nor does Marchbanks
dispute any of Franklin’s factual allegations that supported the
district court’s conclusion in support of qualified immunity.
Accordingly, the district court properly granted summary
judgment. Because Franklin was entitled to qualified immunity
under § 1983, he also is entitled to qualified immunity against
Marchbanks’ state claim for false arrest. See Moresi v. Dep’t of
Wildlife & Fisheries, 567 So. 2d 1081, 1093-94 (La. 1990)
(recognizing the similarity of qualified-immunity analysis
whether arising under § 1983 or Louisiana constitution).
Furthermore, Sheriff Litchfield and Nutmeg Insurance Company were
entitled to summary judgment on the state claims because of
Deputy Franklin’s qualified immunity. Accordingly, the district
court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.