United States v. Nicholas Albarado ( 2014 )


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  •      Case: 12-11167   Document: 00512524540   Page: 1   Date Filed: 02/06/2014
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    No. 12-11167                      February 6, 2014
    Lyle W. Cayce
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                                               Clerk
    Plaintiff – Appellee
    v.
    NICHOLAS ALBARADO,
    Defendant – Appellant
    Cons w/ No. 13–10107
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff – Appellee
    v.
    JOSHUA CISNEROS,
    Defendant – Appellant
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Texas
    USDC No. 1:11-CR-58
    Case: 12-11167      Document: 00512524540         Page: 2    Date Filed: 02/06/2014
    No. 12-11167
    c/w No. 13-10107
    Before KING, CLEMENT, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM: *
    Nicholas Albarado and Joshua Cisneros appeal from the denial of their
    motions to suppress evidence seized from a residence. For the reasons that
    follow, we AFFIRM.
    I.     Factual and Procedural Background
    Nicholas Albarado and Joshua Cisneros were indicted on multiple counts
    including conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, possession with intent
    to distribute methamphetamine, possession with intent to distribute cocaine,
    possession with intent to distribute marijuana, and possession of a firearm in
    furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. Before trial, they moved to suppress
    the drug and gun evidence seized from a residence in Abilene, Texas. They
    argued that, following an initial “knock and talk,” law enforcement agents had
    entered the residence without a warrant, without probable cause, and in the
    absence of any exigent circumstances.
    A hearing was held on the defendants’ suppression motions. Ismael
    Jaimes, an agent with the Abilene Police Department, Special Operations
    Division, testified at the hearing. He testified that, on the morning of August
    30, 2011, he and his partner planned to approach the subject residence to
    conduct a “knock and talk” investigation. This was based on a tip that another
    agent had received from a confidential informant, who claimed that the
    residence was a marijuana stash house for the “Mexican Mafia” organization.
    Agent Jaimes stated that he had been unaware of this residence or its
    occupants prior to receiving the tip. However, he testified that he knew that
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
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    the Mexican Mafia was a dangerous organization, that its members were
    involved in drug- and firearms-related crimes, and that its members and other
    narcotics traffickers often possessed firearms near any drugs.
    The agents arrived at the residence in an unmarked car, wearing plain
    clothes, and with police badges visible around their necks. Albarado answered
    their knock. Agent Jaimes testified that he immediately noticed a “strong
    odor” of burning and fresh marijuana coming from inside the residence. He
    also testified that he immediately recognized Albarado from prior drug
    investigations and that he knew from another confidential informant that
    Albarado was involved with the Mexican Mafia and the sale of illegal drugs.
    Agent Jaimes showed Albarado his badge and identified himself and his
    partner as police officers. When asked if he lived at the residence, Albarado
    answered no. Agent Jaimes then asked if the agents could come inside and
    speak with Albarado, but Albarado replied that he could not give them
    permission to enter because he was not the owner of the residence. The agents
    then asked to speak with the owner. Albarado replied that he would have to
    retrieve her from the back of the residence.
    Albarado turned away and tried to close the door. The agents stopped
    the door from closing and entered the residence. Agent Jaimes testified that
    they entered to prevent the destruction of evidence and for safety reasons. On
    cross-examination, Agent Jaimes acknowledged that Albarado did not appear
    to be a threat at that time and made no attempt to flee.
    Once inside, the agents followed Albarado to the door of a bedroom,
    where he called out to a woman lying on the floor, who was later identified as
    Ana Mar Landini. When Landini stood up, the agents identified themselves
    and showed her their badges. Agent Jaimes told Landini why they were at the
    residence, said that he could smell marijuana, and asked if there was more
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    marijuana in the house.      Landini replied that the residents had smoked
    marijuana the previous evening and that there was “a little bit” left over. She
    surrendered a partially smoked marijuana cigarette. Agent Jaimes said he did
    not believe Landini’s explanation due to the strong odor of “fresh” marijuana
    in the residence. When asked if anyone else was inside, Landini roused Joshua
    Cisneros off the bedroom floor. The agents then escorted everyone back into
    the living room.
    Agent Jaimes explained why the agents were at the residence, read
    everyone their rights, and asked for consent to search the residence for more
    marijuana. Albarado and Cisneros said they could not give consent since they
    did not live there, and Landini said she could not give consent because her
    roommate was not present. Agent Jaimes then called for another agent to come
    to the residence to assist while he left to prepare a search warrant application.
    The residents were not handcuffed, and they were allowed to play video games
    while they waited.
    After the warrant was obtained and executed, the agents found
    approximately 324.6 grams of methamphetamine, 52 grams of cocaine, 678
    grams of marijuana, three firearms, scales, a cutting agent, and more than
    $5,700 in cash. Agent Jaimes denied conducting any search of the residence
    prior to obtaining the warrant.
    Based on this testimony, and the parties’ arguments, the district court
    denied the motions to suppress. The district court found that the entry was
    justified by safety concerns and that the agents conducted a limited protective
    sweep of the residence. Albarado then pleaded guilty to one count of possession
    with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine and one count
    of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. Cisneros
    proceeded to a bench trial and was found guilty on all counts. Each defendant
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    was sentenced to a total of 216 months’ imprisonment. The defendants timely
    appealed the denial of the suppression motions, and their appeals were
    consolidated.
    II.    Standard of Review
    “[W]here a police officer acts without a warrant, the [G]overnment bears
    the burden of proving that the search was valid.” United States v. Waldrop,
    
    404 F.3d 365
    , 368 (5th Cir. 2005). The district court’s findings on a motion to
    suppress are reviewed for clear error, and its ultimate conclusion as to whether
    the Fourth Amendment was violated is reviewed de novo. United States v.
    Scroggins, 
    599 F.3d 433
    , 440 (5th Cir. 2010).
    III.   Discussion
    On appeal, the defendants raise several challenges to the justifications
    for, and scope of, the agents’ protective sweep of the residence.      We note
    initially, however, that the defendants do not challenge the officers’ use of a
    “knock and talk” strategy, which we have recognized as a valid investigatory
    technique, not requiring a warrant, when law enforcement officials seek to gain
    consent to search or reasonably suspect criminal activity. See United States v.
    Jones, 
    239 F.3d 716
    , 720 (5th Cir. 2001).
    The defendants’ first argument is that, after conducting the “knock and
    talk,” the agents lacked probable cause to enter the residence. See 
    id. at 719
    n.2 (“In order to vindicate a warrantless search by proving exigent
    circumstances, the government must also show probable cause.”). Before they
    knocked, the agents had received a tip that the residence was a marijuana
    stash house for the Mexican Mafia. Once Albarado opened the door, the agents
    could smell the odor of burned and fresh marijuana. See United States v.
    Pierre, 
    958 F.2d 1304
    , 1310 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (finding that the smell of
    marijuana can give rise to probable cause).        The agents also recognized
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    Albarado from past drug investigations, and knew of a separate tip that
    Albarado was involved with the Mexican Mafia. We find that once the agents
    spoke with Albarado, they had probable cause to believe a crime was being
    committed.
    The defendants’ second argument is that there were no exigent
    circumstances justifying the agents’ warrantless entry into the residence. “As
    a general rule, exigent circumstances exist when there is a genuine risk that
    officers or innocent bystanders will be endangered, that suspects will escape,
    or that evidence will be destroyed if entry is delayed until a warrant can be
    obtained.” United States v. Menchaca-Castruita, 
    587 F.3d 283
    , 289 (5th Cir.
    2009). A reviewing court must consider the circumstances objectively as they
    would appear to a reasonable and prudent person. United States v. Troop, 
    514 F.3d 405
    , 409 (5th Cir. 2008). However, when reasonable minds may disagree,
    a court should “not second guess the judgement of experienced law enforcement
    officers concerning the risks of a particular situation.” 
    Menchaca-Castruita, 587 F.3d at 290
    (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A district
    court’s determination that exigent circumstances existed is a factual finding
    that this court reviews for clear error. 
    Troop, 514 F.3d at 409
    .
    We agree with the district court that the warrantless entry was justified
    by the agents’ reasonable concern for their safety. As previously noted, when
    the agents approached the residence, they already had a tip that the residence
    was associated with the Mexican Mafia, which they knew to be a violent drug
    trafficking organization.   When the door opened, one agent immediately
    recognized Albarado from past drug investigations, knew that Albarado had
    been linked to the Mexican Mafia by another tip, and smelled marijuana inside
    the house. The agents also knew from their training and experience that drug
    traffickers often keep firearms near their drugs.
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    Additionally, permitting the door to close would have given Albarado the
    opportunity to alert the residence’s other occupants to the agents’ presence and
    would have afforded the occupants the opportunity to arm themselves.
    Albarado told the agents that there was at least one other person somewhere
    inside the house, whom the agents could not see. If, after the “knock and talk,”
    the agents had waited at the front of the house for Albarado to return, they
    would have been vulnerable to an attack. In light of these facts, the district
    court did not clearly err in determining that exigent circumstances existed
    based on the agents’ objectively reasonable belief that they were in danger from
    an unknown and likely armed person somewhere inside the residence. See
    United States v. Maldonado, 
    472 F.3d 388
    , 393–94 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding that
    there was a reasonable concern for safety justifying a protective sweep of a
    trailer where agents were in a vulnerable location), abrogated in part on other
    grounds by Kentucky v. King, 
    131 S. Ct. 1849
    (2011).
    In addition, although not relied on by the district court as justification
    for the warrantless entry, an agent also testified that the entry was based on
    a belief that the residents might try to destroy any evidence. See Sojourner T
    v. Edwards, 
    974 F.2d 27
    , 30 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating this court may affirm on
    any basis supported by the record). Albarado was aware of the presence of law
    enforcement. If allowed to reenter the house unaccompanied, he could inform
    anyone else inside. The agents knew from their training and experience that
    drug traffickers will try to destroy evidence when confronted by police. We
    conclude that the agents had an objectively reasonable belief that the residents
    would try to destroy any evidence while the agents tried to obtain a search
    warrant. See United States v. Webster, 
    750 F.2d 307
    , 326–27 (5th Cir. 1984).
    The defendants’ third argument is that the agents failed to conduct a
    proper protective sweep of the residence. The protective sweep doctrine allows
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    government agents, without a warrant, to conduct a quick and limited search
    of premises for the safety of the agents and others present at the scene. See
    United States v. Gould, 
    364 F.3d 578
    , 581 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc), abrogated
    in part on other grounds by King, 
    131 S. Ct. 1849
    . As discussed above, the
    initial entry into the residence was justified by exigent circumstances. Based
    on Albarado’s statement that someone else was present and the known
    connections between Albarado, the residence, and the Mexican Mafia, the
    agents had a reasonable suspicion that another person, most likely in
    possession of a firearm, was inside. In light of these concerns, the “sweep” in
    this case was not overly broad or long. It consisted of following Albarado to a
    bedroom, watching him wake two other persons, and then escorting everyone
    to the living room. The individuals in the residence were not handcuffed, and
    they were allowed to play video games while they waited. Once the residence
    was secured, the agents sought and received a search warrant, and conducted
    a more thorough search. We conclude that the protective sweep was proper.
    See 
    id. at 587.
          Finally, the defendants argue that the agents’ decision to knock on the
    door of the residence created any exigent circumstances. This argument is
    foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Kentucky v. King, 
    131 S. Ct. 1849
    . In that case, the Supreme Court held that a warrantless entry to prevent
    the destruction of evidence is permissible as an exigent circumstance as long
    as the officers acted reasonably and did not create the exigency through any
    actual or threatened Fourth Amendment violations. 
    Id. at 1858.
    In doing so,
    the Court rejected a rule that police may not rely on an exigency for a
    warrantless search if it was “reasonably foreseeable” that their legally
    permissible tactics would create the exigent circumstances. 
    Id. at 1859–60.
    In
    this case, the agents’ “knock and talk” investigation was a legally valid
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    investigatory tactic. Albarado voluntarily opened the door, revealing himself
    to the agents and allowing them to smell the marijuana inside. He then chose
    to answer the agents’ questions, alerting them to the presence of another
    unknown person inside the house. The actions of the agents were permissible
    and did not create any exigent circumstances. See 
    id. at 1858.
                                 IV.   Conclusion
    For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of the
    defendants’ motions to suppress.
    9