United States v. Paz-Mejia ( 2022 )

Case: 20-50926 Document: 00516287006 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/20/2022
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
April 20, 2022
No. 20-50926
Lyle W. Cayce
Summary Calendar
Clerk
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Oscar Omar Paz-Mejia,
Defendant—Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. 2:20-CR-278-1
Before Smith, Stewart, and Graves, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Oscar Omar Paz-Mejia pled guilty to illegal reentry following removal
and was sentenced within the advisory guidelines range to 22 months’
imprisonment followed by three years’ supervised release. The written
judgment included nine conditions of supervised release labeled “Mandatory
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
Case: 20-50926 Document: 00516287006 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/20/2022
No. 20-50926
Conditions” and 17 conditions labeled “Standard Conditions.” Paz-Mejia
timely filed a notice of appeal. Paz-Mejia argues that the district court failed
to orally pronounce seventeen discretionary conditions of supervised release
that were included in the written judgment as “standard conditions.” The
government agrees, with one exception that we discuss below. We therefore
VACATE in part Paz-Mejia’s sentence and REMAND for the district
court to amend its written judgment in accordance with this opinion.
I.
The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause guarantees defendants
the right to be present at sentencing. A district court’s oral pronouncement
of the sentence therefore controls over the subsequent written judgment,
including with respect to conditions of supervised release. United States v.
Diggles, 957 F.3d 551, 556–57 (5th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (citations omitted),
cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 825 (2020). A district court must pronounce any
supervised release condition that does not fall within the mandatory
conditions that 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) provides. Id. at 559. A district court
satisfies the pronouncement requirement by informing the defendant at
sentencing what conditions it is imposing. Id. at 560. The court may state the
conditions or specifically adopt a list of recommended supervised release
conditions from a court-wide or judge-specific standing order, the
Presentence Investigation Report (PSR), or some other document. Id. at 560–
63 & n.5 (citations omitted). But “the mere existence of such a document is
not enough for pronouncement.” Id. at 561 n.5. “The pronouncement
requirement is not a meaningless formality.” Id. at 560. The Due Process
Clause requires the district court to afford the defendant a chance to
understand and object to release conditions at sentencing. Id. at 560–63 & n.5
If the district court fails to mention at sentencing a condition of
supervised release that must be pronounced, its inclusion in the written
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No. 20-50926
judgment can create a conflict. United States v. Vega, 332 F.3d 849, 852–53
(5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (citation omitted). When a written sentence
conflicts with an oral sentence, the oral pronouncement controls, and the
written judgment must be amended to conform with the oral
pronouncement. Diggles, 957 F.3d at 557–58. That is, when a written
judgment’s provisions conflict with the sentence as orally pronounced, those
conditions must be deleted from the judgment. Cf. United States v. Fields, 977
F.3d 358, 366–67 (5th Cir. 2020).
II.
At sentencing, the district court did not mention that Paz-Mejia would
be subject to any “standard” conditions of supervised release—i.e., those not
required by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). Although the Western District of Texas has
a standing order setting forth the mandatory and standard conditions that
were included in Paz-Mejia’s written judgment, the district court did not
reference that standing order or confirm that Paz-Mejia reviewed that order
with counsel. The district court adopted the PSR, but the PSR did not include
an appendix, reference the standing order, or set forth any standard
conditions of supervised release. We therefore review the district court’s
imposition of these conditions for abuse of discretion. United States v.
Grogan, 977 F.3d 348, 352 (5th Cir. 2020). Because neither the PSR nor the
district court at sentencing mentioned the remaining discretionary
conditions listed in the written judgment—standard conditions 1 through
16—those conditions conflict with the oral pronouncement. “Taken
together, these unpronounced, unincorporated, and un-referenced
conditions found only in [Paz-Mejia’s] written judgment, although critical to
effectuating the purposes of supervised release, are required to be excised
according to our existing precedent.” United States v. Jackson, No. 20-50922,
2022 WL 738668, at *4 (5th Cir. Mar. 11, 2022) (unpublished).
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The district court did announce, however, the standard condition that
Paz-Mejia “not come back to this country illegally.” Because Paz-Mejia had
an opportunity to object to this special condition, we review it for plain error.
Grogan, 977 F.3d at 352. The final condition imposed in the written judgment
refers to the same district-wide order addressed in United States v. Martinez,
15 F.4th 1179, 1180-81 (5th Cir. 2021). The district court referred to that
condition twice at sentencing. First, the district court warned Paz-Mejia and
the other defendants present for sentencing that it would impose the
condition that any removed defendant “not come back to this country
illegally.” Second, the district court told Paz-Mejia that it was imposing a
“condition that [he] not come back to this country illegally.” These
statements, together, provide sufficient notice under our caselaw, as they
mirror the condition in the written judgment that Paz-Mejia “not illegally
reenter the United States.” Cf. Grogan, 977 F.3d at 353 (holding that a
“shorthand reference” to a standing order or other written document can be
“adoption all the same”). We therefore hold that Paz-Mejia has not shown
any plain error in this condition’s inclusion in the written judgment.
In sum, standard conditions 1 through 16 conflict with the oral
pronouncement and should be excised from the written judgment. For the
foregoing reasons, we VACATE in part Paz-Mejia’s sentence and
REMAND for the district court to amend its written judgment in
accordance herewith.
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