Hawkins v. HUD ( 2022 )


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  • Case: 20-20281     Document: 00516299452         Page: 1     Date Filed: 04/28/2022
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Fifth Circuit                       United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    April 28, 2022
    No. 20-20281
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    Kenneth Wayne Hawkins; Cheryl Brown Potts;
    Kimanisha Myles; Reba Curren Jeffery; Stephanie Winn;
    Loretta Gulley; Jeannie Ware; Jamie Wasicek;
    Shealisha Adams,
    Plaintiffs—Appellants,
    versus
    The United States Department of Housing and Urban
    Development,
    Defendant—Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    USDC No. 2:18-CV-3052
    ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
    Before Wiener, Dennis, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
    Wiener, Circuit Judge:*
    *
    Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
    opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
    circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
    Case: 20-20281     Document: 00516299452        Page: 2     Date Filed: 04/28/2022
    IT IS ORDERED that the petition for rehearing is DENIED. The
    opinion, filed October 13, 2021, is WITHDRAWN, and the following is
    SUBSTITUTED:
    Plaintiffs-Appellants (“Tenants”) alleged that they were living in
    substandard conditions in a Houston, Texas “Section 8” housing project.
    They sought relocation assistance from the Department of Housing and
    Urban Development (“HUD”), insisting that HUD was obliged under
    federal law to provide such assistance. When HUD chose to continue its
    contract with the housing project and declined to offer Tenants relocation
    assistance, they sued HUD to obtain it. Tenants also alleged intentional
    discrimination under the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection component.
    We agree with the district court that we lack jurisdiction for Tenants’
    Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) and Fair Housing Act (“FHA”)
    claims because Tenants have not alleged a final agency action that is
    reviewable. We also agree on the merits that Tenants have failed to state a
    claim for which relief can be granted on their Fifth Amendment equal
    protection claim.
    I.
    Background
    Tenants are African-Americans who rent apartments in Coppertree
    Village, a privately owned complex in Houston. HUD’s relationship with
    Coppertree dates back to the early 1980s, when the agency first signed a
    housing assistant program (“HAP”) contract with Coppertree’s then-
    owner. HUD’s most recent renewal of its contract relationship with
    Coppertree was in 2013. HUD approved assignment of the contract to
    Coppertree’s current owner in 2015. The current owner was originally a
    named defendant in this lawsuit but has been dismissed voluntarily.
    The HAP contract requires the owner to maintain the rental units in
    a “decent, safe, and sanitary” condition. HUD regulations provide that the
    Case: 20-20281          Document: 00516299452      Page: 3     Date Filed: 04/28/2022
    agency “will inspect” Section 8 housing “at least annually” and “at such
    other times as HUD may determine to be necessary to assure that the owner
    is meeting his or her obligation to maintain the units and the related facilities
    in decent, safe, and sanitary condition.”1
    Two HUD inspections (in June and September 2018) revealed
    “serious deficiencies” in many of Coppertree’s rental units and in the
    property’s common features. These wide-ranging problems included
    infestations of cockroaches and spiders, leaky roofs that spawned colonies of
    mold, widespread lack of operable locks, and missing or nonfunctioning
    smoke detectors. As a result, HUD issued two Notices of Default (“NOD”)
    to Coppertree’s owner. The NODs instructed the owner to take corrective
    action and warned that failure to comply could result in HUD exercising
    “any and all available remedies.” In response, Coppertree’s owner
    submitted a survey of the property and began to undertake repairs. The
    parties disagree about whether the repair efforts have resolved the many
    issues identified in the 2018 inspections.
    Tenants criticized HUD’s decision to maintain the HAP contract
    with Coppertree and the agency’s focus on correcting the deficiencies
    revealed by the inspections. Tenants also contended that, because
    Coppertree remained in a state of disrepair, HUD was obligated to provide
    “assistance for relocation” that would help them move elsewhere. They
    specifically alleged that HUD’s failure to issue vouchers to them was
    arbitrary and capricious under the APA.2 Tenants further alleged that
    HUD’s inaction amounted to race-based discrimination in violation of the
    Fair Housing Act3 and the equal protection component of the Fifth
    1
    
    8 C.F.R. § 886.323
    (d).
    2
    
    5 U.S.C. § 701
     et seq.
    3
    
    42 U.S.C. § 3601
     et seq.
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    No. 20-20281
    Amendment.4 Contrasting Coppertree with Section 8 properties elsewhere
    in Houston, Tenants alleged that HUD’s failure to provide Tenant
    Protection Vouchers was done with the discriminatory motive of
    “maintain[ing] racial segregation and . . . disadvantag[ing] a group of
    minority households.”
    HUD moved to dismiss Tenants’ claims under Rules 12(b)(1) and
    12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The district court granted
    HUD’s motion and dismissed the Tenants’ claims. We affirm.
    II.
    Standard of Review
    We review a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss de novo.5 “To
    survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
    matter which, when taken as true, states a claim to relief that is plausible on
    its face.”6 “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
    content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
    defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”7
    A motion to dismiss that contests jurisdiction should be granted if
    “the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the
    case.”8 The burden lies with the party asserting jurisdiction to establish “that
    jurisdiction does in fact exist.”9
    4
    See Washington v. Davis, 
    426 U.S. 229
     (1976).
    5
    Ramming v. United States, 
    281 F.3d 158
    , 161 (5th Cir. 2001).
    6
    Cicalese v. Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch, 
    924 F.3d 762
    , 765 (5th Cir. 2019) (cleaned
    up).
    7
    
    Id.
     (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 678 (2009)).
    8
    Home Builders Ass’n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, 
    143 F.3d 1006
    , 1010 (5th Cir.
    1998) (cleaned up).
    9
    Ramming, 
    281 F.3d at 161
    .
    4
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    No. 20-20281
    III.
    Final Agency Action
    The APA provides judicial review of “final agency action” only. 10 The
    Act defines “agency action” to include the “denial of relief,” a “failure to
    act,” and a “sanction,” which includes “withholding of relief.” 11 The FHA
    has no provision for review of agency action, so Tenants’ FHA claim depends
    on the APA’s judicial-review provisions.12 Our jurisdictional analysis
    therefore pertains equally to Tenants’ claims under the APA13 and the
    FHA.14
    As a general matter, two conditions must be satisfied for agency
    action to be ‘final’: First, the action must mark the
    ‘consummation’ of the agency’s decisionmaking process—it
    must not be of a merely tentative or interlocutory nature. And
    second, the action must be one by which ‘rights or obligations
    have been determined,’ or from which ‘legal consequences will
    flow.’15
    Tenants have not adequately alleged a specific HUD action that this
    court can review. They only contend that there is nothing further HUD
    would have to do to issue relocation assistance, yet the agency has not done
    so. HUD’s continued work to salvage its contract with Coppertree Village
    10
    
    5 U.S.C. § 704
    ; see, e.g., Veldhoen v. U.S. Coast Guard, 
    35 F.3d 222
    , 225 (5th Cir.
    1994).
    11
    
    5 U.S.C. § 551
    (10)(B), (13); see also 
    id.
     § 701(b)(2) (incorporating these
    definitions into the judicial review chapter).
    12
    See Godwin v. Sec’y of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 
    356 F.3d 310
    , 312 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
    (FHA confers no cause of action against HUD); see also McCardell v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. &
    Urb. Dev., 
    794 F.3d 510
    , 522 (5th Cir. 2015) (FHA does not waive state sovereign
    immunity).
    13
    See 
    5 U.S.C. § 706
    (2)(A).
    14
    See 
    42 U.S.C. § 3608
    (e)(5).
    15
    Bennett v. Spear, 
    520 U.S. 154
    , 177–78 (1997) (citations omitted).
    5
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    No. 20-20281
    does not prevent the agency from issuing relocation assistance. There is,
    therefore, no “‘consummation’ of the agency’s decisionmaking process”
    that this court can review. The district court correctly determined that it
    lacked jurisdiction over Tenants’ APA and FHA claims.
    IV.
    Racial and Ethnic Discrimination
    Tenants also claim that HUD’s withholding of assistance constitutes
    intentional discrimination on the basis of race and ethnicity, in violation of
    the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. “[T]he Due Process Clause of the
    Fifth Amendment contains an equal protection component prohibiting the
    United States from invidiously discriminating between individuals or
    groups.”16 HUD concedes that the APA’s review provisions do not foreclose
    review of this constitutional claim.17
    “Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required” to
    show an equal protection violation.18 Discriminatory purpose “implies that
    the decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at
    least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an
    identifiable group.”19 Tenants may rely on circumstantial evidence (or
    allegations of such, at the pleading stage) to show discriminatory purpose.
    “Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating
    factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct
    evidence of intent as may be available.”20
    16
    Washington, 
    426 U.S. at 239
    .
    17
    See Webster v. Doe, 
    486 U.S. 592
    , 603–05 (1988) (holding § 701(a)(2) barred
    statutory but not constitutional claims of discrimination).
    18
    Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 
    429 U.S. 252
    , 265 (1977).
    19
    Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 
    442 U.S. 256
    , 279 (1979).
    20
    Arlington Heights, 
    429 U.S. at 266
    ; see also Veasey v. Abbott, 
    830 F.3d 216
    , 231
    (5th Cir. 2016) (listing types of evidence that may support discrimination claim).
    6
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    Tenants’ allegations of intentional discrimination rely on the fact that
    the housing units HUD subsidizes at Coppertree are in worse condition than
    HUD-subsidized units elsewhere in the Houston area. They allege that
    “Coppertree Village is located in a 0% White non-Hispanic census tract.
    Coppertree Village’ [sic] units are 87% occupied by Black or African
    American households.” Tenants further allege that HUD subsidizes housing
    in disproportionately white areas that does meet minimum standards, with
    comparable rent but vastly higher quality. Tenants reference as comparators
    several projects restricted to elderly tenants: six in the Woodlands, outside
    Houston, and two within the city limits—the only two out of forty-four
    located, in majority-white census districts. HUD does not own or operate
    those projects, but subsidizes tenants living there.
    HUD allegedly knows about these disparities but continues to make
    decisions that Tenants claim denies them relocation assistance to which they
    are entitled. Tenants characterize this disparate treatment as a “substantive
    departure” from HUD’s mission,21 and thus probative of discriminatory
    intent. We disagree.
    These allegations by Tenants fail to state a plausible claim of
    intentional racial discrimination. Even when taken as true, they show at most
    that HUD is aware of varying conditions in the numerous housing projects
    that it subsidizes in the Houston area. In no way, however, do these
    allegations support an inference that HUD has made any decision “‘because
    of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’” different conditions.22 Tenants do not allege
    any procedural irregularities in HUD’s enforcement actions at Coppertree
    nor in its consideration of relocation vouchers for Coppertree residents.
    Tenants also fail to allege that HUD has provided relocation assistance to any
    similarly situated non-minority occupants. Tenants have failed to raise a
    21
    Cf. Veasey, 830 F.3d at 231.
    22
    Feeney, 
    442 U.S. at 279
    .
    7
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    plausible inference of discriminatory purpose, so the district court correctly
    dismissed their Fifth Amendment claim.
    AFFIRMED.
    8