Irias-Amaya v. Garland ( 2023 )


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  • Case: 22-60179         Document: 00516737174               Page: 1      Date Filed: 05/03/2023
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Fifth Circuit
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    ____________                                          FILED
    May 3, 2023
    No. 22-60179                                   Lyle W. Cayce
    ____________                                          Clerk
    Merlyn Roxana Irias-Amaya; Wilmer Astul Irias-Amaya,
    Petitioners,
    versus
    Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General,
    Respondent.
    ______________________________
    Appeal from the Board of Immigration Appeals
    Agency Nos. A206 444 380,
    A206 444 381
    ______________________________
    Before Clement, Graves, and Higginson, Circuit Judges.
    Per Curiam: *
    Merlyn Roxana Irias-Amaya and Wilmer Astul Irias-Amaya, siblings
    who are natives and citizens of Honduras, timely petition this court for
    review of a BIA decision denying asylum and withholding of removal. The
    petition is DENIED in part and DISMISSED in part.
    _____________________
    *
    This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
    Case: 22-60179      Document: 00516737174          Page: 2    Date Filed: 05/03/2023
    No. 22-60179
    Standard of Review
    On petition for review of a BIA decision, this court reviews factual
    findings for substantial evidence and questions of law de novo. Lopez-Gomez
    v. Ashcroft, 
    263 F.3d 442
    , 444 (5th Cir. 2001). The substantial evidence
    standard applies to review of decisions denying asylum and withholding of
    removal. Zhang v. Gonzales, 
    432 F.3d 339
    , 344 (5th Cir. 2005). “We review
    the BIA’s findings of facts under the substantial evidence standard, which
    requires that the decision of the BIA be based on the evidence presented and
    that the decision be substantially reasonable.” Orellana-Monson v. Holder,
    
    685 F.3d 511
    , 517–18 (5th Cir. 2012). Under this standard, reversal is
    improper unless the evidence compels a contrary conclusion. Carbajal-
    Gonzalez v. INS, 
    78 F.3d 194
    , 197 (5th Cir. 1996). “The petitioner has ‘the
    burden of showing that the evidence is so compelling that no reasonable
    factfinder could reach a contrary conclusion.’” Orellana-Monson, 
    685 F.3d at 518
     (quoting Chen v. Gonzales, 
    470 F.3d 1131
    , 1134 (5th Cir.2006)). Normally,
    this court looks only to the BIA’s decision but when the BIA adopts the IJ’s
    decision, without assigning reasons, as it did here, this court reviews the IJ’s
    decision. Majd v. Gonzales, 
    446 F.3d 590
    , 594 (5th Cir. 2006).
    Discussion
    To qualify for asylum, an applicant must demonstrate “either past
    persecution or a reasonable, well-founded fear of future persecution on
    account of” race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
    group, or political opinion. Milat v. Holder, 
    755 F.3d 354
    , 360 (5th Cir. 2014);
    see also 
    8 U.S.C. § 1101
    (a)(42)(A). Here, the IJ found that Merlyn was
    persecuted in the past, but that Wilmer was not and that neither faced harm
    on account of a protected ground. Both siblings argue that they were
    persecuted on account of a membership in a particular social group,
    2
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    No. 22-60179
    specifically, their family. 1 The proposed particular social group must be “at
    least one central reason” for the alleged persecution. 
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (b)(1)(B)(i). The IJ found that the siblings failed to establish a nexus
    between the siblings’ claims of persecution and their membership in their
    family group.
    1. Merlyn Irias Amaya’s Asylum Claim
    Merlyn Irias-Amaya testified that her uncle tried to sexually abuse her
    on several occasions when she was around 11 years old. She told her
    grandmother and parents about the attempted abuse, and, as a result, she
    never saw this uncle again. Additionally, Merlyn testified that when she was
    12 or 13 years old, she was robbed by “[d]elinquents” while she was on her
    way to school. 2
    Merlyn Irias-Amaya does not offer a compelling argument that her
    family was a central reason for her persecution. The IJ found that Merlyn
    failed to show why she was abused and noted that the record showed that
    other family members intervened to protect her. Merlyn now argues that the
    persecution only happened because of her family relationship, and while “a
    statutorily protected ground need not be the only reason for harm, it cannot
    be incidental, tangential, superficial, or subordinate to another reason for
    harm.” Shaikh v. Holder, 
    588 F.3d 861
    , 864 (5th Cir. 2009) (internal
    quotations omitted). “A protected ground will likely be incidental when it is
    but a means to an ultimate, unprotected end.” Berrios-Bruno v. Garland, No.
    _____________________
    1
    Before the IJ, the siblings also argued that they were persecuted on account of
    their memberships in groups of “young Honduran females” and “young Honduran
    male[s].” Because they do not raise this argument on appeal, we need not consider it.
    2
    Merlyn offers no explanation why being robbed would entitle her to asylum.
    3
    Case: 22-60179      Document: 00516737174          Page: 4   Date Filed: 05/03/2023
    No. 22-60179
    18-60276, 
    2021 WL 3624766
    , at *4 (5th Cir. Aug. 16, 2021) (citing Ramirez-
    Mejia v. Lynch, 
    794 F.3d 485
    , 492 (5th Cir. 2015)).
    The IJ concluded that the assault likely happened because Merlyn was
    young and vulnerable and not because of any animosity her uncle held against
    the family. Merlyn offers no legitimate argument against the finding except
    for the conclusory statement that “[w]ere it not for that blood relation, [she]
    would likely never have been persecuted.” This, however, is neither
    sufficient nor evidence. There is no evidence in the record that the IJ’s
    conclusion was not substantially reasonable, and, in fact, the only evidence
    available is that the threatened abuse stopped when Merlyn informed her
    parents and grandparents. Merlyn therefore fails to connect any past or future
    persecution to any protected grounds. The IJ’s conclusion was substantially
    reasonable.
    2. Wilmer Irias-Amaya’s Asylum Claim
    Wilmer argues that he experienced past persecution based on his
    cousin threatening to kidnap him. Wilmer fails to show why this kidnapping
    attempt was connected to the membership in his family as opposed to being
    incidental, tangential, superficial, or subordinate to another reason for harm.
    Wilmer, therefore, was not subject to past persecution.
    Additionally, Wilmer testified that he never saw his cousin again after
    this kidnapping attempt. The IJ found that there was no “reason to think that
    the cousin gang member who grabbed [Wilmer] and threatened him with
    kidnapping, and who lived elsewhere, would cause [Wilmer] any problems if
    he were to return from Honduras.” Wilmer fails to show any problems if he
    were to return to Honduras. Because of these reasons, the IJ’s conclusion was
    substantially reasonable.
    4
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    No. 22-60179
    3. Withholding of Removal
    The Irias-Amaya siblings’ withholding of removal claims fails because
    asylum is not established. Dayo v. Holder, 
    687 F.3d 653
    , 658 n3, 658–59 (5th
    Cir. 2012). The siblings now argue that the standards for establishing nexus
    have been relaxed for withholding claims. This argument is foreclosed by our
    precedent. Vazquez-Guerra v. Garland, 
    7 F.4th 265
    , 271 (5th Cir. 2021).
    Conclusion
    The petition for review is DENIED in part and DISMISSED in
    part. 3
    _____________________
    3
    The BIA decision also denied CAT protection, but Petitioners fail to brief this
    claim and it is waived. Thuri v. Ashcroft, 
    380 F.3d 788
    , 793 (5th Cir. 2004).
    5