United States v. Dodd ( 2023 )

Case: 22-30275 Document: 00516744272 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/09/2023
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
____________ FILED
May 9, 2023
No. 22-30275
Summary Calendar Lyle W. Cayce
____________ Clerk
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Clifton Lamar Dodd,
Defendant—Appellant.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
USDC No. 2:18-CR-243-1
______________________________
Before Stewart, Duncan, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam: *
A jury convicted Clifton Lamar Dodd of four counts of conveying false
information and perpetuating a hoax concerning a biological agent, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1038(a)(1)(A). He challenges his convictions on the
grounds that the evidence was insufficient to support them; the district court
erroneously admitted evidence of his prior convictions for the same and
_____________________
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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No. 22-30275
similar offenses; and the district court violated his right to compulsory
process by denying a continuance that would have allowed him to present the
live testimony of a key defense witness and instead requiring the witness to
testify by teleconference. We decline to consider his inadequately briefed
challenge to the district court’s denial of his motion for a new trial. See United
States v. Scroggins, 599 F.3d 433, 446-47 (5th Cir. 2010); United States v.
Reagan, 596 F.3d 251, 254 (5th Cir. 2010).
We review Dodd’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence de
novo. See United States v. Brown, 727 F.3d 329, 335 (5th Cir. 2013). On de
novo review, we will affirm a jury verdict “if a reasonable trier of fact could
conclude from the evidence that the elements of the offense were established
beyond a reasonable doubt, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the verdict and drawing all reasonable inferences from the evidence to
support the verdict.” United States v. Reed, 908 F.3d 102, 123 (5th Cir. 2018)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “We do not consider
whether the jury correctly determined innocence or guilt, but whether the
jury made a rational decision.” United States v. Nolasco-Rosas, 286 F.3d 762,
765 (5th Cir. 2002).
Dodd does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a
specific element of the § 1038(a)(1)(A) offenses, such as intent or the
conveyance of false information regarding a biological agent; instead, he
argues that the Government failed to introduce sufficient evidence to
establish that he was the person who committed the charged offenses. He
contends that the testimony of the handwriting and fingerprint experts
should not have been considered and that the only other evidence supporting
his convictions should not have been admitted under Federal Rule of
Evidence 404(b). Dodd’s challenges to the testimony of the fingerprint and
handwriting experts essentially attack their credibility and the weight of their
testimony, which are issues that we cannot revisit when assessing the
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sufficiency of the evidence supporting a guilty verdict. See United States v.
Doggins, 633 F.3d 379, 383 (5th Cir. 2011). Given their testimony and other
testimony and documentary evidence presented by the Government, a
rational juror could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Dodd
committed the charged offenses. See Brown, 727 F.3d at 335; Nolasco-Rosas,
286 F.3d at 765.
Next, Dodd contends that evidence of his prior convictions and the
underlying investigations should have been excluded because it was proffered
only to prove that he had a propensity to commit the charged offenses.
“This court applies a highly deferential standard in reviewing a
district court’s evidentiary rulings, reversing only for abuse of discretion.
Even then, the error is not reversible unless the defendant was prejudiced.”
United States v. Booker, 334 F.3d 406, 411 (5th Cir. 2003). Federal Rule of
Evidence 404(b) provides that “[e]vidence of any other crime, wrong, or act
is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a
particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.”
Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). However, “[t]his evidence may be admissible
for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of
accident.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2).
Here, the similarities between the conduct underlying the prior
convictions and the charged offenses were sufficient to establish a distinct
pattern of conduct that in turn could support a jury finding of knowledge,
intent, and identity. See United States v. Williams, 900 F.2d 823, 826 (5th
Cir. 1990). Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting evidence of Dodd’s prior convictions and the underlying
investigations. See id.; Booker, 334 F.3d at 411.
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Finally, Dodd asserts that because the district court could have
continued the trial to allow a key defense witness to testify in person, its
denial of a continuance and requirement that the witness testify via
teleconference was an abuse of discretion that resulted in a miscarriage of
justice.
The district court’s decision to issue a writ of habeas corpus ad
testificandum is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Redd, 355
F.3d 866, 878 (5th Cir. 2003). However, whether a defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to compulsory process has been violated is a legal issue
that we review de novo. Id. Violations of the defendant’s right to compulsory
process are subject to harmless error review. See Janecka v. Cockrell, 301 F.3d
316, 327 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 689 (1986)).
Even if the district court violated Dodd’s right to compulsory process
by requiring the witness to testify via teleconference, an issue we do not
reach, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the
witness’s testimony was of nominal value to the defense and the witness was
thoroughly impeached. See Janecka, 301 F.3d at 327.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
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