Gonzalez v. Gillis ( 2023 )

Case: 21-60634 Document: 00516735298 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/02/2023
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
____________ FILED
May 2, 2023
No. 21-60634 Lyle W. Cayce
____________ Clerk
Louis Gonzalez, also known as Carlos Ramos Sanchez,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Shawn R. Gillis; Stanley Crockett; Chad Wolf; William
Barr,
Defendants—Appellees.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
USDC No. 5:20-CV-104
______________________________
Before Clement, Graves, and Higginson, Circuit Judges.
Stephen A. Higginson, Circuit Judge: *
Louis Gonzalez, an immigration detainee, alleges that the warden of a
privately operated detention center and three former federal officials violated
his rights by restricting his use of the LexisNexis database. After the district
court sua sponte dismissed Gonzalez’s claims, he appealed. We agree with
the district court that Gonzalez’s claims for injunctive relief are moot and his
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*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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other claims are inadequately pleaded. However, we conclude that the
district court erred in dismissing Gonzalez’s claims with prejudice when he
had not yet been given an opportunity to amend his complaint to allege his
best case. Therefore, we REVERSE and REMAND for the district court
to enter a new order of dismissal.
I.
A.
When Gonzalez filed his complaint on April 16, 2020, he was detained
at a private facility in Washington, Mississippi (the Washington facility),
which contracts with the federal government to house immigration
detainees. 2 The complaint asserts that Gonzalez and other detainees “are
challenging their prolonged immigration detention . . . through habeas corpus
petitions.” On March 20, 2020, the Washington facility allegedly changed
“the LexisNexis law program . . . installed [on] the law library computers”
by removing “federal and immigration cases.” Gonzalez alleges that those
cases are “vital for the detainees[’] defense” and that the removal of those
cases is therefore “hindering” him and other detainees from “prepar[ing]
their cases . . . to challenge effectively the prolonged detention they are
suffering.” In addition, the Washington facility allegedly disabled the “right
click” button on mice in the library, which kept detainees from copying and
pasting and forced them “to type long paragraphs of law into their
allegations.”
Gonzalez’s complaint includes four causes of action against the
warden of the Washington facility, the Director of the New Orleans Field
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2
Gonzalez’s complaint refers to this facility as the “Adams County Detention
Center.” The federal defendants’ brief calls it the “Adams County Correctional Center,”
and the warden’s letter brief calls it the “Adams County Correctional Facility.”
2
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Office for Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security, and the Attorney General of the United
States. He brings a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the defendants
violated his federal constitutional “right of access to the courts,” claims
under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) and (3) alleging that the defendants “conspired to
interfere with [his] due process right of access to the courts,” and a state-law
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). Gonzalez seeks
declaratory relief and an injunction “immediately providing [Gonzalez] and
the class he represent[s], with the part of the LexisNexis program that was
removed[,] . . . allow[ing] the . . . right click [button] to copy and paste, and
prevent[ing] the [d]efendants from removing or modifying the system
without consulting plaintiff . . . for any removal or modification of the
computer system that may hamper [Gonzalez] and the class he represent[s]
[from] . . . present[ing] [pro se] claims in courts.” He also seeks $150,000 in
damages.
B.
In July 2020, a magistrate judge directed service on the defendants.
The federal-officer defendants moved to dismiss the case, Gonzalez filed an
opposition brief, and then Gonzalez moved to amend his complaint. In
December 2020, the federal-officer defendants filed a response to
Gonzalez’s motion stating that they did not object to the amended complaint,
and the warden filed an answer to the amended complaint.
Five months later, the magistrate judge sua sponte recommended that
the district court dismiss the case for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). The report and recommendation (R. & R.) construed
Gonzalez’s § 1983 claims as arising under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and recommended
dismissing those claims against all defendants in their official capacities.
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With respect to Gonzalez’s individual-capacity Bivens claims, the R. & R. did
not consider whether Bivens should be extended to access-to-courts claims
and instead found that Gonzalez had not adequately alleged that the
defendants caused him to lose a nonfrivolous claim. The R. & R.
recommended dismissal of Gonzalez’s § 1985(2) and (3) claims because he
failed to adequately allege a conspiracy and recommended dismissal of his
§ 1985(3) claim because he did not “mention his race” in the complaint. And
the R. & R. found that Gonzalez had not adequately alleged the elements of
an IIED claim under Mississippi law. Finally, the R. & R. concluded that
Gonzalez’s claims for injunctive relief were moot because he had been
transferred out of the Washington facility. The R. & R. recommended that
all these claims be dismissed with prejudice. Because the magistrate judge
found that Gonzalez’s proposed amended complaint did not remedy the
pleading deficiencies identified in the R. & R., the magistrate judge also
recommended that the district court deny Gonzalez’s motion to amend his
complaint.
After Gonzalez failed to timely file objections to the R. & R., the
district court adopted the R. & R. and dismissed the case with prejudice.
Final judgment was entered on July 9, 2021. Eleven days later, Gonzalez filed
objections to the R. & R., and two days after that, he moved for relief from
the district court’s final order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b),
arguing that his objections were timely. On August 11, 2021, he filed a notice
of appeal.
On September 14, 2021, the district court overruled Gonzalez’s
objections. Although the district court concluded that the objections were
untimely, the district court still reviewed de novo those parts of the R. & R.
to which Gonzalez had objected. On de novo review, the district court again
adopted the R. & R. Separately, the district court issued an order denying
Gonzalez’s Rule 60(b) motion.
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II.
Dismissals under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim are
reviewed de novo. See Legate v. Livingston, 822 F.3d 207, 209 (5th Cir. 2016).
As in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, we “accept[] all well-pleaded
facts as true and view[] those facts in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff[.]” Meador v. Apple, Inc., 911 F.3d 260, 264 (5th Cir. 2018) (citation
omitted); see Legate, 822 F.3d at 209. To survive dismissal for failure to state
a claim, a complaint must “plead[] factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). However, we need not
accept “legal conclusions” as true, and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do
not suffice.” Id. “We hold pro se plaintiffs to a more lenient standard than
lawyers when analyzing complaints, but pro se plaintiffs must still plead
factual allegations that raise the right to relief above the speculative level.”
Chhim v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 836 F.3d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 2016) (per
curiam).
III.
Gonzalez’s access-to-courts claims under Bivens are not adequately
pleaded.
To begin, Gonzalez argues that the district court erred in dismissing
his Bivens claims against the federal-officer defendants in their official
capacities because sovereign immunity does not bar these claims. 3 But under
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3
Gonzalez does not appear to challenge the district court’s dismissal of the Bivens
claims against the warden in his official capacity because, as Gonzalez asserts, “he is not
suing [the private facility operator] in contract with the federal government,” but rather is
“seeking recovery from . . . [c]ustody [o]fficers in their individual capacities.” So Gonzalez
has abandoned this claim on appeal. See United States v. Arviso-Mata, 442 F.3d 382, 384
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our caselaw, Bivens “provides a cause of action only against government
officers in their individual capacities.” Affiliated Pro. Home Health Care
Agency v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 282, 286 (5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam); accord
Enplanar, Inc. v. Marsh, 11 F.3d 1284, 1294 n.12 (5th Cir. 1994). In any event,
Gonzalez’s argument appears to concern the availability of injunctive relief
against federal officials acting in their official capacities, not a damages
remedy under Bivens. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of
these claims.
Next, Gonzalez argues that he adequately pleaded an access-to-courts
claim against the defendants in their individual capacities because they
deprived him of an adequate law library and acted “with malicious intent,
without a penological reason.” 4 But neither the allegations in the complaint
nor these alternative legal theories state an access-to-courts claim.
There are two types of access-to-courts claims. Forward-looking
claims allege “that systemic official action frustrates a plaintiff or plaintiff
class in preparing and filing suits at the present time,” and backward-looking
claims allege that official action has “caused the loss or inadequate
settlement of a meritorious case, the loss of an opportunity to sue, or the loss
of an opportunity to seek some particular order of relief.” Waller v. Hanlon,
922 F.3d 590, 601 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S.
403, 413-14 (2002)). There are at least two elements of a forward-looking
claim: the plaintiff must “identify a nonfrivolous, arguable underlying claim”
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(5th Cir. 2006) (describing waiver doctrine). Gonzalez has also abandoned his § 1983 and
IIED claims.
4
Gonzalez raises additional arguments about qualified immunity and whether
Bivens should be extended to access-to-courts claims. Because the district court did not
rely on qualified immunity or the lack of a Bivens cause of action in dismissing this case, we
need not reach these arguments.
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and “the official acts frustrating the litigation.” Christopher, 536 U.S. at 415;
see Broudy v. Mather, 460 F.3d 106, 120-21 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (describing these
elements). The requirements for a backward-looking claim are more
demanding. In addition to pleading a nonfrivolous underlying claim and an
official act that frustrated the litigation of that claim, the plaintiff must
identify “a remedy that is not otherwise available in another suit that may yet
be brought.” Waller, 922 F.3d at 602 (quoting United States v. McRae, 702
F.3d 806, 830-31 (5th Cir. 2012)).
Gonzalez’s complaint does not adequately allege an access-to-courts
claim of any kind because it does not “identify a nonfrivolous, arguable
underlying claim” that is being or was frustrated by the defendants’ acts.
Christopher, 536 U.S. at 415; see also DeMarco v. Davis, 914 F.3d 383, 388 (5th
Cir. 2019) (affirming dismissal of backward-looking claim where plaintiff
“has not identified any actionable claim that he would have raised”).
Gonzalez alleges that the defendants’ conduct is “hindering [his] ability . . .
to challenge effectively [his] prolonged detention” through a habeas corpus
petition. But Gonzalez provides no factual details about his allegedly
prolonged detention or the nature of a habeas claim he would bring to
challenge it, and so he fails to allege a nonfrivolous and arguable habeas claim.
Moreover, Gonzalez alleges that he is already challenging his prolonged
detention through a habeas corpus petition, and it is not possible to discern
from his pleadings how the defendants’ conduct has frustrated that habeas
litigation in any way. See Barbour v. Haley, 471 F.3d 1222, 1226 (11th Cir.
2006); Stokes v. Gehr, 399 F. App’x 697, 699 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam)
(affirming dismissal of forward-looking access-to-courts claim where plaintiff
failed to demonstrate that underlying habeas petition would be viable); see
also Chriceol v. Phillips, 169 F.3d 313, 317 (5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (finding
no record evidence of actual injury on summary judgment where plaintiff
successfully filed complaint); McBarron v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 332 F.
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App’x 961, 964 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal of access-
to-courts claim for failure to state a claim where record showed plaintiff had
successfully filed a complaint); Vetcher v. Barr, 953 F.3d 361, 370 (5th Cir.
2020) (finding no due process violation from denial of access-to-courts, in
context of immigration petition, where litigant secured “intermittent
successes throughout the course of his pro se efforts,” even though litigant
argued that he did not win on a claim for which legal materials were
unavailable).
On appeal, Gonzalez argues that the district court erred in dismissing
these claims because the law library is inadequate and the defendants acted
willfully. But there is no “abstract, freestanding right to a law library or legal
assistance.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996). For Gonzalez to have
been denied access to the courts, he must allege that he has a nonfrivolous,
arguable underlying claim. See Christopher, 536 U.S. at 415. Because he has
not done so, the district court correctly dismissed these claims. 5
IV.
The district court also correctly dismissed Gonzalez’s claims under
§ 1985(2) and (3) because he failed to adequately allege a conspiracy.
“The first part of § 1985(2) proscribes conspiracies that interfere with
the administration of justice in federal court, and the second part proscribes
conspiracies that interfere with the administration of justice in state court.”
Daigle v. Gulf State Utils. Co., Loc. Union No. 2286, 794 F.2d 974, 979 (5th
Cir. 1986) (footnote omitted). Relevant here, § 1985(3) proscribes
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5
To the extent that Gonzalez asserts in his brief that the defendants have violated
equal protection principles by providing “alien immigrants” with inadequate law libraries
compared to those available to non-alien federal prisoners, the complaint does not bring an
equal protection claim or include these allegations, and we will not consider them for the
first time on appeal. See Hannah v. United States, 523 F.3d 597, 600 n.1 (5th Cir. 2008).
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conspiracies “for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any
person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal
privileges and immunities under the laws.” Deubert v. Gulf Fed. Sav. Bank,
820 F.2d 754, 757 (5th Cir. 1987). So, to bring a claim under any of these
provisions, a plaintiff must allege a conspiracy.
Gonzalez’s complaint does not “contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true,” to state a conspiracy claim “that is plausible on its face”
with respect to any of the named defendants. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation
omitted). At most, Gonzalez alleges that the Director of the New Orleans
Field Office “is responsible for the draft of policies applicable to detainees at
the [Washington facility],” that the Washington facility “personnel changed
. . . the LexisNexis law program,” and that after the detainees complained to
the Washington facility personnel, they “were informed that ICE had
ordered such change.” The complaint does not allege that the Director or
any other defendant drafted a policy to change the Washington facility
library, that the change to the Washington facility was the result of a policy
as opposed to a discrete decision, that the Director or that any other
defendant ordered the change to the Washington facility, or that the Director
or any other defendant did so as part of a conspiracy. Without further factual
allegations, we cannot “infer more than the mere possibility” that any
defendant conspired with anyone to interfere with the administration of
justice in any court or deprive Gonzalez of equal protection. Id. at 679. And
Gonzalez’s allegations that the defendants “conspired to interfere with [his]
due process right of access to the courts” do not state a claim because such a
threadbare recital of the conspiracy element of a cause of action under
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§ 1985(2) or (3), supported by a conclusory statement that a conspiracy
exists, does not suffice. 6 Id.
V.
As the district court concluded, Gonzalez’s claims for injunctive relief
are moot.
Article III of the Constitution gives us the authority to adjudicate
“Cases” and “Controversies.” “A case becomes moot—and therefore no
longer a ‘Case’ or ‘Controversy’ for purposes of Article III—when the issues
presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in
the outcome.” Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 91 (2013) (cleaned
up). When a detainee seeks to change the conditions at a particular
institution, his transfer out of that institution generally renders his claims for
injunctive relief moot unless he shows “either a ‘demonstrated probability’
or a ‘reasonable expectation’ that he would be transferred back to [the
institution] or released and reincarcerated there.” Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d
736, 741 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982)).
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6
Race- or class-based animus is required to bring a claim under § 1985(3), see
Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971); United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners
of Am., Loc. 610, AFL-CIO v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 834-35 (1983), and the second part of
§ 1985(2), see Daigle, v. Gulf State Utils. Co., Local Union No. 2286, 794 F.2d 974, 979 (5th
Cir. 1986); Slavin v. Curry, 574 F.2d 1256, 1262 (5th Cir. 1978), overruled on other grounds
by Sparks v. Duval Cnty. Ranch Co., 604 F.2d 976 (5th Cir. 1979), but not the first part of
§ 1985(2), Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719, 726-27 (1983). In Rayborn v. Mississippi State
Board of Dental Examiners, we explained that a “conspiracy must be race-based to state a
cause of action for violation of § 1985,” 776 F.2d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1985), and we have
repeated this assertion in some later cases. See, e.g., Deubert v. Gulf Fed. Sav. Bank, 820
F.2d 754, 757 (5th Cir. 1987); Cantú v. Moody, 933 F.3d 414, 419 (5th Cir. 2019). However,
because we conclude that Gonzalez’s § 1985 claims fail on the conspiracy element, we need
not decide today whether Rayborn binds us or whether allegations of a conspiracy based on
what Gonzalez calls “alien immigrants” would state a claim under the second part of
§ 1985(2) or § 1985(3).
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Although Gonzalez’s complaint seeks an injunction with respect to
conditions at the Washington facility, he has been transferred to a different
detention center, and he does not point to any evidence of a demonstrated
probability or reasonable expectation of transfer back to the Washington
facility or reincarceration there. Gonzalez’s claims for injunctive relief as to
the Washington facility are therefore moot. See id.
Instead of defending his claims as to the Washington facility, Gonzalez
now argues that he seeks an injunction with respect to a broader government
policy that affects multiple detention centers, including the facility where he
is currently detained. But even construing the complaint as requesting any
injunctive relief necessary to give Gonzalez access to the legal resources he
demands, Gonzalez’s complaint does not adequately allege the existence of a
policy affecting detention centers other than the Washington facility. The
complaint alleges that Gonzalez is detained at the Washington facility, that
Gonzalez “and several other detainees” had filed habeas corpus petitions,
that Washington facility personnel changed the LexisNexis program on
ICE’s orders, and that the right-click button on computer mice was disabled
under orders from ICE or the Washington facility. Nowhere in the complaint
does Gonzalez allege any changes in law library resources at detention centers
other than the Washington facility or a policy that affects other detention
centers. Indeed, on appeal, Gonzalez asserts that until about June 2021—
more than a year after he filed his complaint—he “believed that the
limitation in the law library existed just at [the Washington facility].”
For those reasons, we affirm the dismissal of Gonzalez’s claims for
injunctive relief. 7
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7
Gonzalez purports to bring his § 1985(3) claim on behalf of “a class of people [he]
represent[s], [who] are detained under prolonged detention by ICE, and are challenging
their prolonged detention through habeas petitions,” and he seeks relief, including an
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VI.
Construed liberally, Gonzalez’s brief argues that the district court
erred in dismissing his case with prejudice. We agree.
When a district court dismisses a pro se complaint, it should do so
“without prejudice in order to allow the plaintiff an opportunity to file an
amended complaint,” unless “the plaintiff has been given adequate
opportunity to cure the inadequacies in his pleading or if the pleadings
demonstrate that the plaintiff has pleaded his best case.” Alderson v.
Concordia Par. Corr. Facility, 848 F.3d 415, 423 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam)
(cleaned up); see Hale v. King, 642 F.3d 492, 503 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam)
(“[D]istrict courts should not dismiss pro se complaints pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) without first providing the plaintiff an opportunity to amend, unless
it is obvious from the record that the plaintiff has pled his best case.”).
Neither condition is met here.
To start, Gonzalez has not had an adequate opportunity to cure his
pleading deficiencies because his proposed amendments were not drafted
with the benefit of the R. & R. or the district court’s dismissal order. As we
explained, Gonzalez moved to amend his complaint after the federal
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injunction, on behalf of this class. Although a class action generally “becomes moot when
the putative representative plaintiff’s claim has been rendered moot before a class is
certified,” that rule does not apply “where the named class action plaintiff’s claim becomes
moot after the class was certified,” Fontenot v. McCraw, 777 F.3d 741, 748 (5th Cir. 2015),
or where a class certification motion was “diligently filed and pursued at the time the
named plaintiff’s claim [became] moot” and the defendants had mooted the named
plaintiff’s claim and could “pick off successive plaintiffs’ claims,” id. at 750-51 (cleaned
up). Gonzalez does not argue that his claims for injunctive relief are live because they were
brought as a class action, and so he forfeited this argument on appeal. See Arviso-Mata, 442
F.3d at 384. Regardless, these exceptions to mootness are not available here because
Gonzalez never moved for class certification. Cf. Serrano v. Customs & Border Patrol, U.S.
Customs & Border Prot., 975 F.3d 488, 492 & n.1 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (declining to
find class action moot where plaintiff had moved to certify class).
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defendants filed motions to dismiss. In the R. & R., the magistrate judge
recommended denying leave to amend because Gonzalez’s proposed
amendments would fail to state a claim, and it appears that the magistrate
judge decided to recommend dismissal with prejudice based on the
insufficiency of Gonzalez’s proposed amended complaint. But because
Gonzalez filed his motion to amend less than a month after the defendants’
filed their motions to dismiss and more than five months before the R. & R.
issued, Gonzalez’s proposed amended complaint seems to have been
prepared in response to the defendants’ unadjudicated motions—not the R.
& R. that the district court adopted. And Gonzalez may not have grasped the
extent to which his factual allegations fell short from reading the defendants’
motions, upon which the district court never ruled. Under these
circumstances, “it is not clear that [Gonzalez] amended his complaint with a
sufficient understanding of the inadequacies in his original pleading.”
Alderson, 848 F.3d at 424.
Further, Gonzalez’s objections to the R. & R. include new factual
allegations that show that he has not pleaded his best case. For example,
Gonzalez’s objections state that a “Deportation Officer” told him that under
“ICE’s policy[,] detainees are not allowed to have access to a complete law
library as the one that is provided to [f]ederal [p]risoners,” that the
Washington facility once had access to materials for federal prisoners because
the facility was previously a federal prison, that “every ICE detention facility
nationwide is provided with the same law material,” that the facility to which
Gonzalez was transferred also had an “incomplete law library,” that ICE
limits law library access to cases about immigration, even though detainees
are “held in a prison-like environment” and have claims “seek[ing] redress
for constitutional violations,” that Gonzalez prepared his papers in this case
using “a flash drive belonging to [an]other detainee coming from federal
prison,” and that he would amend his complaint to include a claim that the
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defendants’ policy violates equal protection principles. At the very least,
these allegations would likely save Gonzalez’s claims for injunctive relief
from mootness. And Gonzalez’s proposed amended complaint names
additional John Doe defendants who issued “the order to modify the law
library” and who “created a policy” to modify the library. With additional
allegations about the purported conspiracy or a nonfrivolous, arguable
underlying claim that the defendants frustrated, Gonzalez may yet be able to
state a § 1985 or access-to-courts claim.
In sum, “the general rule that dismissal should be without prejudice
applies” in this case. Alderson, 848 F.3d at 424. We REVERSE and
REMAND for the district court to enter a new order dismissing this case
without prejudice.
14