United States v. Deleon ( 2023 )

Case: 22-10583 Document: 00516796501 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/22/2023
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
____________ FILED
June 22, 2023
No. 22-10583 Lyle W. Cayce
____________ Clerk
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Ronald Rene Deleon, Jr.,
Defendant—Appellant.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 5:08-CR-23-1
______________________________
Before Dennis, Engelhardt, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam: *
The district court revoked Ronald Rene Deleon, Jr.’s supervised
release and sentenced him to a 24-month term of imprisonment, followed by
six years of supervised release. Deleon appeals the supervised release
component of his revocation sentence. We affirm.
This case arises from a 2008 conviction. Deleon pled guilty to one
methamphetamine-drug-conspiracy count, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846_____________________
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-10583 Document: 00516796501 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/22/2023
No. 22-10583
and 841(a)(1). The district court sentenced him to 210 months’
imprisonment, followed by six years of supervised release.
In 2014, Deleon filed an 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) motion requesting
that the district court amend his sentence in light of changes to the United
States Sentencing Guidelines. In 2016, the district court exercised discretion
on Deleon’s behalf: it granted his motion and reduced his term of
imprisonment to 175 months.
Deleon finished his term of imprisonment and began supervised
release in May 2021. But he violated his supervised release conditions within
30 days of release, specifically by using cocaine in June 2021. He tested
positive for cocaine again in July 2021.
In September 2021, the district court held a revocation hearing. At the
start, the district court told Deleon that “I could have revoked you
immediately.” Then the court announced that it had decided to give Deleon
a second chance. At the close of the hearing the district judge told Deleon “I
hope I don’t see you again.” Deleon replied: “You won’t.”
But Deleon continued to violate his release conditions, and in
February 2022, the Government moved to revoke his supervised release. A
magistrate judge ordered that Deleon be held in custody pending another
appearance before the district court. In June 2022, the district court saw
Deleon again, and sentenced him to 24 months’ imprisonment plus a fresh
six-year supervised release term.
Today, Deleon appeals the district court’s revocation sentence.
Specifically, he argues that the district court reversibly erred because it
applied a mandatory minimum to his new supervised release term, when no
such minimum applied. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(h) (providing that a district
court may, but need not necessarily, impose supervised release following any
imprisonment for revocation of a prior supervised release term).
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No. 22-10583
Because Deleon did not object below, he bears the “difficult” burden
of showing that he is entitled to relief on plain error review. United States v.
Huor, 852 F.3d 392, 398 (5th Cir. 2017) (quotation omitted). That, in turn,
means “showing (1) that the district court committed an error (2) that is plain
and (3) affects his substantial rights and (4) that failure to correct the error
would seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” United States v. Cabello, 33 F.4th 281, 285 (5th Cir. 2022)
(quotation omitted).
We have said that applying a mandatory minimum to a supervised
release term following revocation can constitute plain error. See United States
v. Campos, 922 F.3d 686, 688–89 (5th Cir. 2019). In Campos, the district court
applied a nonexistent minimum, stating that the supervised release range was
“not less than eight years to life” before imposing eight years of supervision.
Id. at 687.
Here, by contrast, the district court did not apply a mandatory
minimum. Instead, relying on a probation officer’s report, it said the
“maximum” supervised release term was “six years to life, minus any
revocation sentence that I impose.” That is an important distinction from
Campos and enough to render any error not “plain.” See United States v.
Bishop, 603 F.3d 279, 280 (5th Cir. 2010).
Nor has Deleon shown prejudice to his substantial rights. We do not
infer that the district court’s comment affected the district court’s actual
sentence because the low-end of the court’s stated maximum—six years
minus the two years of prison time—would have generated a four-year
“maximum” term of supervised release. Yet the district court imposed six
years of supervised release, which suggests the court’s oral reference to a
“maximum” supervised-release term was a mere slip of the tongue and did
not affect its revocation sentence.
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In any event, we correct plain error only where it “seriously affects
the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United
States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993) (quotation omitted). Said
differently, relief “is discretionary, and only particularly egregious errors”
merit reversal. Cabello, 33 F.4th at 285 (quotation omitted). And here, no
discretion is warranted. That’s primarily because Deleon has already
received and abused the benefit of several favorable exercises of federal court
discretion. First, the district court granted his § 3582(c) motion and reduced
the term applicable to his 2008 conviction; absent that mercy Deleon would
have still been incarcerated when the violations giving rise to this proceeding
took place. And second, the district court generously declined to imprison
Deleon in September 2021, saying that it preferred to “g[ive] this guy another
chance.” The significant patience the district court has shown toward
Deleon precludes us from deciding that our justice system has been unfair to
him. Deleon’s case thus would fail the fourth prong of plain error review,
even if it made it that far.
AFFIRMED.
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