United States v. Campbell ( 2023 )

Case: 22-40607 Document: 00516823693 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/17/2023
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
____________ FILED
July 17, 2023
No. 22-40607
Summary Calendar Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
____________
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Adrian Kevin Campbell,
Defendant—Appellant.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 6:21-CR-121-3
______________________________
Before Haynes, Graves, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Adrian Kevin Campbell pleaded guilty to conspiring to possess with
intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and was sentenced to a
below-guidelines term of 120 months in prison with five years of supervised
release. In this pro se appeal, he challenges the district court’s jurisdiction
and argues the court erred by denying various motions. Campbell also
_____________________
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-40607 Document: 00516823693 Page: 2 Date Filed: 07/17/2023
No. 22-40607
disputes the sufficiency of the factual basis for his guilty plea and contends
his right of self-representation was violated.
The Government is correct in urging that Campbell’s unconditional
guilty plea waived any nonjurisdictional defects preceding the plea. See
United States v. Daughenbaugh, 549 F.3d 1010, 1012 (5th Cir. 2008). These
include an alleged violation of his right to a speedy trial. See United States v.
Bell, 966 F.2d 914, 915 (5th Cir. 1992). In addition, Campbell has failed to
brief any argument concerning the denial of two motions filed while he
awaited sentencing, and this constitutes another waiver. See Yohey v. Collins,
985 F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th Cir. 1993). This court construes pro se filings
liberally, but even pro se litigants must brief arguments to preserve them. Id.As to the jurisdictional issues presented, our review is de novo. See
United States v. Isgar, 739 F.3d 829, 838 (5th Cir. 2019); Quick Techs., Inc. v.
Sage Grp. PLC, 313 F.3d 338, 343 (5th Cir. 2002). Federal courts “have only
the power that is authorized by Article III of the Constitution and the statutes
enacted by Congress pursuant thereto.” Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch.
Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986). Campbell’s main contention is that the
district court was without jurisdiction based on a defect in the indictments.
He argues that because the Government failed to allege that his offense
injured the general public, it failed to establish the existence of a case or
controversy supporting the exercise of jurisdiction under Article III.
The Supreme Court has observed that the violation of a federal
criminal statute necessarily gives rise to a justiciable case or controversy. See
Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 771
(2000). Campbell does not argue otherwise; the defect he alleges is one of
form. But as the Government points out, it is well established that defects in
an indictment do not deprive the district court of subject-matter jurisdiction.
See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630-31 (2002); Isgar, 739 F.3d at
2
Case: 22-40607 Document: 00516823693 Page: 3 Date Filed: 07/17/2023
No. 22-40607
838. As Campbell fails to show that a different conclusion is warranted here,
we reject his claim that the district court lacked jurisdiction under Article III.
Campbell’s remaining jurisdictional arguments fare no better. His
attacks on the district court’s personal and territorial jurisdiction are
meritless. See United States v. Dunham, 995 F.2d 45, 45 (5th Cir. 1993);
United States v. Vicars, 467 F.2d 455, 456 (5th Cir. 1972). And any technical
defects in the criminal complaint are immaterial. See Denton v. United States,
465 F.2d 1394, 1395 (5th Cir. 1972).
The next issue is whether Campbell is correct that his factual basis
fails to prove an agreement or other facts necessary to support his conviction.
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(3) provides that a guilty plea must
be supported by admissions sufficient to establish a violation of the offense to
which the defendant is pleading guilty. See United States v. Trejo, 610 F.3d
308, 313 (5th Cir. 2010). Campbell admitted to a factual basis that shows he
played an active, managerial role in an ongoing scheme to use couriers to
transport large amounts of cocaine. This sufficed to prove each element of
the offense. See United States v. Scott, 892 F.3d 791, 798 (5th Cir. 2018);
United States v. Bams, 858 F.3d 937, 945 (5th Cir. 2017).
Campbell represented himself in the district court, and his final claim
concerns a continuance motion filed by the attorney appointed to act as
standby counsel. According to Campbell, the motion was filed without his
consent and violated his right of self-representation.1 See Faretta v.
California, 422 U.S. 806, 819-20 (1975). Standby counsel must not infringe
on a defendant’s right to represent himself, and an improper denial of the
right cannot be harmless. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 & n.8
_____________________
1
We do not address whether this claim was waived by Campbell’s guilty plea.
3
Case: 22-40607 Document: 00516823693 Page: 4 Date Filed: 07/17/2023
No. 22-40607
(1984). We review claims invoking the right de novo. United States v. Cano,
519 F.3d 512, 515-16 (5th Cir. 2008).
The instant claim is deficient in two respects. First, Campbell fails to
show that the continuance affected his defense or his “control [over] the
organization and content” thereof. McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 174. Second,
standby counsel’s participation undermines Faretta rights only if it is “over
the defendant’s objection,” and Campbell did not object to the continuance.
United States v. Long, 597 F.3d 720, 728 (5th Cir. 2010) (internal quotations
and citation omitted). He disputes this, writing that although a transcript
records him saying he “won’t oppose” a continuance, he in fact said
opposite. Campbell did not attempt to correct any errors in the record and
does not suggest he was prevented from doing so. See Fed. R. App. P.
10(e). This court “[c]an only take the record as it finds it,” and we find no
support for Campbell’s assertion in the record before us. Brookins v. United
States, 397 F.2d 261, 262 (5th Cir. 1968) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
We do not construe Campbell’s argument concerning the
continuance motion as alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, as “a
defendant is not entitled to relief for the ineffectiveness of standby counsel.”
United States v. Oliver, 630 F.3d 397, 414 (5th Cir. 2011). Even assuming the
existence of an attorney-client relationship, a claim of ineffective assistance
would be premature on this record. See Isgar, 739 F.3d at 841. To the extent
Campbell suggests he was pressured into pleading guilty, the suggestion is
refuted by statements made in his plea colloquy. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431
U.S. 63, 74 (1977).
For these reasons, the judgment is AFFIRMED.
4