Kimble v. Correcthealth Jefferson ( 2023 )

Case: 22-30388 Document: 00516783602 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/12/2023
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
____________
FILED
June 12, 2023
No. 22-30388
____________ Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Raymond Harold Kimble, III,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Correcthealth Jefferson, L.L.C.,
Defendant—Appellee.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
USDC No. 2:21-CV-409
______________________________
Before Dennis, Engelhardt, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Raymond Harold Kimble, III is a pretrial detainee at the Jefferson
Parish Correctional Center (“JPCC”) in Gretna, Louisiana. Kimble claims
CorrectHealth Jefferson, LLC (“CHJ”)—the medical care provider at
JPCC—denied him adequate care. The district court granted CHJ’s Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. We affirm.
_____________________
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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No. 22-30388
Kimble alleges that CHJ responded inadequately and
unconstitutionally to injuries he suffered in 2020 at JPCC. According to
Kimble, he injured himself by lifting heavy boxes on March 11, by slipping
and falling in the bathroom on December 17, and by slipping and falling after
taking a shower on December 19. Although CHJ staff examined Kimble,
ordered x-rays, and prescribed and administered medication, Kimble
nevertheless claims they provided constitutionally deficient medical care—
namely, by ignoring his requests for specific types of care such as
appointments with certain medical professionals.
Kimble filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against various
defendants, including CHJ. He alleges that CHJ has a policy or practice of
wantonly disregarding detainees’ serious medical needs, which he says was
the moving force behind the CHJ staff’s alleged indifference to his 2020
injuries. The magistrate judge disagreed. She determined that the facts
alleged in Kimble’s complaint did not rise to the level of deliberate
indifference and thus could not support a constitutional violation.
Accordingly, she recommended that CHJ’s motion to dismiss be granted and
that Kimble’s claims against CHJ be dismissed with prejudice. The district
court so ordered.
Kimble timely appealed. Our jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. We review the district court’s motion-to-dismiss ruling de novo and
apply the same standards. Dyer v. Houston, 964 F.3d 374 (5th Cir. 2020).
Both parties agree that CHJ should be treated as a municipal or local
governmental entity for purposes of § 1983. See Rosborough v. Mgmt. &
Training Corp., 350 F.3d 459, 461 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam); Kennemer v.
Parker Cnty., 2022 WL 2610239, at *1 n.1 (5th Cir. July 8, 2022) (per curiam)
(“Even though LaSalle is a private corporation, it is subject to the same rules
as municipalities because private prisons engage in a fundamentally
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governmental function.” (quotation omitted)). To state a claim against such
a local entity, Kimble must plead facts that plausibly establish “that (1) an
official policy (2) promulgated by [a relevant] policymaker (3) was the
moving force behind the violation of [his] constitutional right[s].” Peterson v.
City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 847 (5th Cir. 2009).
Even assuming Kimble’s complaint satisfies the first two prongs, it
fails the third. Kimble asserts a Fourteenth Amendment deliberate-
indifference claim. See Cadena v. El Paso Cnty., 946 F.3d 717, 727 (5th Cir.
2020) (pretrial detainees’ deliberate-indifference claims are rooted in the
Fourteenth Amendment, while those of convicted prisoners stem from the
Eighth); Baughman v. Hickman, 935 F.3d 302, 306 (5th Cir. 2019) (subjecting
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment deliberate-indifference claims to the
same analysis). To survive CHJ’s motion to dismiss, Kimble must plead facts
demonstrating that CHJ staff were “aware of facts from which the inference
could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exist[ed],” that they
“actually drew the inference” and “disregarded that risk,” and that
“substantial harm resulted.” Baldwin v. Dorsey, 964 F.3d 320, 326 (5th Cir.
2020) (quotation omitted). Put differently, Kimble must plausibly allege that
CHJ staff believed he was at substantial risk of serious harm and that they
nonetheless “refused to treat him, ignored his complaints, intentionally
treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that would clearly
evince a wanton disregard for [his] serious medical needs.” Davis v. Lumpkin,
35 F.4th 958, 963 (5th Cir. 2022) (quotation omitted).
Kimble does not meet this “extremely high standard.” Domino v. Tex.
Dep’t of Crim. Just., 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001). As Kimble himself
acknowledges in his complaint, CHJ staff were attentive to his maladies and
responsive to his mishaps. After Kimble injured himself carrying boxes on
March 11, he was quickly evaluated and given “remedies to help resolve the
pain and stiffness.” When the pain did not abate, he was later evaluated by a
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nurse practitioner (twice), diagnosed with “swollen nerves,” and provided
“a pill twice a day to keep the nerve from swelling.” After Kimble slipped
and fell on December 17, CHJ staff “brought [him] to the clinic by
wheelchair,” where he was examined by the nurse practitioner, observed
overnight, and ultimately shuttled to University Medical Center (“UMC”)
for x-rays. Finally, after Kimble slipped and fell on December 19, a CHJ nurse
“immediately” examined him for a concussion and “concluded that ice
packs were needed [as well as] some form of pain relief.” This is a far cry
from the “wanton” or “reckless” disregard that the Fourteenth Amendment
protects against. Baughman, 935 F.3d at 307; see also Bejaran v. Cruz, 79 F.
App’x 73, 74 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (“Bejaran’s admission in his
complaint that the prison medical staff took x-rays of his back and that Mrs.
Osha gave him ‘generic,’ ‘mild medications’ refute his assertion of deliberate
indifference to his medical needs.”).
In response, Kimble claims that CHJ’s reliance on LPNs (licensed
practical nurses) and CNAs (certified nursing assistants) delayed his ability
to meet with more “educated” and “qualified” health care professionals. He
also highlights one instance where CHJ staff forgot to bring him ice packs and
anti-inflammatories, and another where CHJ allegedly pursued a different
treatment plan than the one suggested at UMC. But if “[u]nsuccessful
medical treatment,” “disagreement with medical judgments,” “acts of
negligence,” and “medical malpractice [are] not enough to meet [the
deliberate-indifference] standard,” then Kimble’s allegations likewise fail.
Davis, 35 F.4th at 963 (quotation omitted); see also Easter v. Powell, 467 F.3d
459, 463 (5th Cir. 2006) (“The mere delay of medical care can also constitute
a[] [constitutional] violation but only if there has been deliberate indifference
that results in substantial harm.” (emphasis added) (quotation omitted));
Blank v. Bell, 634 F. App’x 445, 449 (5th Cir. 2016) (noting that prison
physicians have “discretion whether to follow any medication prescriptions
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in [an inmate’s/detainee’s] hospital-discharge instructions”); Stewart v.
Murphy, 174 F.3d 530, 535 (5th Cir. 1999) (similar).
Accordingly, Kimble fails to plausibly allege a Fourteenth
Amendment deliberate-indifference violation. His § 1983 claims against CHJ
cannot proceed without an underlying constitutional violation. Hicks-Fields
v. Harris Cnty., 860 F.3d 803, 808 (5th Cir. 2017) (“As is well established,
every Monell claim requires an underlying constitutional violation.”
(quotation omitted)).
AFFIRMED.
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