NLRB v. Tri-County Electric ( 2023 )


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  • Case: 21-60887         Document: 00516850641             Page: 1      Date Filed: 08/08/2023
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Fifth Circuit
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    ____________                                       FILED
    August 8, 2023
    No. 21-60887                                  Lyle W. Cayce
    ____________                                         Clerk
    National Labor Relations Board,
    Petitioner/Cross-Respondent,
    versus
    Tri-County Electric Cooperative, Incorporated,
    Respondent/Cross-Petitioner.
    ______________________________
    Application for Summary Entry of a Judgment Enforcing
    and Cross-Petition for Review of an Order of the
    National Labor Relations Board
    NLRB No. 16-CA-260485
    ______________________________
    Before Duncan and Wilson, Circuit Judges, and Schroeder, District
    Judge. *
    Per Curiam: †
    The National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB” or “Board”) seeks
    summary entry of a judgment enforcing its order determining that Tri-
    County Electric Cooperative, Inc. (“Tri-County”) unlawfully discharged an
    _____________________
    *
    United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Texas, sitting by
    designation.
    †
    This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
    Case: 21-60887     Document: 00516850641           Page: 2   Date Filed: 08/08/2023
    No. 21-60887
    employee. Tri-County cross-petitions for review of that order, arguing that
    its exceptions, filed thirty minutes late, should have been considered by the
    NLRB. We conclude that the NLRB did not abuse its discretion in rejecting
    Tri-County’s untimely exceptions. We therefore affirm the NLRB’s order,
    grant summary entry of a judgment enforcing the order, and deny Tri-
    County’s cross-petition for review.
    I.
    An administrative law judge (“ALJ”) determined that Tri-County
    unlawfully discharged an employee. The day before the deadline to file
    exceptions to the decision, Tri-County requested an extension due to other
    work obligations. The NLRB denied this request because counsel had known
    about these work obligations for almost two weeks, and NLRB regulations
    required that extension requests filed within three days of a due date “be
    grounded upon circumstances not reasonably foreseeable in advance.” 
    29 C.F.R. § 102.2
    (c).
    Following the denial of the request, Tri-County submitted its
    exceptions and brief thirty minutes late. The NLRB rejected the filing as
    untimely. Tri-County responded by moving for a one-day extension to
    accommodate the late filing. The motion was unopposed, and all parties
    agreed that no undue prejudice would result from the extension. Tri-County
    explained that the filing was late because counsel had not accounted for the
    difference between Central and Eastern time zones. Under NLRB
    regulations, filings are due based on “the time zone of the receiving office.”
    
    29 C.F.R. § 102.2
    (b). Tri-County said it “completely missed” that
    requirement.
    The NLRB denied the motion for an extension. Its regulations state
    that documents may be filed late “only upon good cause shown based on
    excusable neglect and when no undue prejudice would result.” 29 C.F.R.
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    § 102.2(d)(1). And the NLRB explained that “[t]he reasons for the late filing
    do not rise to the level of excusable neglect.” Accordingly, without any
    exceptions to consider, the NLRB adopted the ALJ’s decision. Tri-County
    moved for reconsideration, which the NLRB denied because Tri-County had
    “not identified any material error or demonstrated extraordinary
    circumstances warranting reconsideration under Section 102.48(c)(1) of the
    Board’s Rules and Regulations.” The NLRB filed an application in this court
    for summary entry of a judgment enforcing its order adopting the ALJ’s
    decision, and Tri-County filed a cross-petition for review of that order.
    II.
    The NLRB argues that Tri-County’s excusable neglect arguments are
    jurisdictionally barred by § 10(e) of the National Labor Relations Act. We
    disagree.
    Section 10(e) explains that, absent “extraordinary circumstances,”
    “[n]o objection that has not been urged before the Board . . . shall be
    considered by the court.” 
    29 U.S.C. § 160
    (e); see also IBEW Loc. Unions 605
    & 985 v. NLRB, 
    973 F.3d 451
    , 461 (5th Cir. 2020) (“We have relied on
    Section 10(e) to bar appellate review of an issue not briefed to the Board,
    holding that the party’s failure to adequately present its theory relieves the
    Board of an obligation to provide analysis on the issue.”). Tri-County argues
    that it did present all these arguments to the NLRB at the agency level.
    Below, the NLRB pointed Tri-County to the excusable neglect standard, but
    Tri-County did not use the phrase “excusable neglect” in its filings. It did,
    however, lay out all of the facts and reasons behind the delay, explain that no
    undue prejudice would result (which is part of the standard), and explain that
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    the motion was “not sought for the purposes of delay only, but so justice may
    be done.”
    Although parties must generally raise any issues to the NLRB before
    appealing them, “this requirement can be measured in context. The purpose
    of § 10(e) is to give the Board notice and an opportunity to confront
    objections to its rulings before it defends them in court.” Indep. Elec.
    Contractors of Houston, Inc. v. NLRB, 
    720 F.3d 543
    , 551 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing
    Marshall Field & Co. v. NLRB, 
    318 U.S. 253
    , 256 (1943)). This means that
    any objections “must be specific enough to place the agency on notice of the
    party’s objections.” IBEW, 973 F.3d at 460. If the NLRB has “fully
    considered the issue in dispute, . . . ‘the policies underlying the [§ 10(e)] rule
    are not implicated.’” Id. at 461 (quoting Indep. Elec. Contractors, 720 F.3d at
    551). We have also explained that “it would be difficult to hold [the § 10(e)]
    requirement as ‘jurisdictional’ in this court because the statute itself creates
    an exception.” Indep. Elec. Contractors, 720 F.3d at 550.
    There is no doubt the NLRB was on notice that Tri-County was
    making an excusable neglect argument. After all, when rejecting Tri-
    County’s exceptions, the NLRB explicitly pointed Tri-County to the
    excusable neglect standard for untimely filings. Further, in Supreme Court
    cases where new arguments were considered forfeited, including one case the
    NLRB relies on here, there was no motion for reconsideration filed. See id. at
    551 (distinguishing two cases on that basis: Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc. v.
    NLRB, 
    456 U.S. 645
     (1982), and International Ladies’ Garment Workers’
    Union v. Quality Manufacturing Co., 
    420 U.S. 276
     (1975)). Here, a motion for
    reconsideration was filed and included the grounds for the excusable neglect
    challenge and at least part of the standard itself. This unquestionably put the
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    NLRB on notice of the excusable neglect challenge, and so review of that
    challenge is not barred by § 10(e).
    III.
    Accordingly, we consider the merits of the challenge. The NLRB’s
    “action in finding lack of good cause based on excusable neglect is reviewed
    for abuse of discretion.” NLRB v. U.S.A. Polymer Corp., 
    272 F.3d 289
    , 296
    (5th Cir. 2001). We conclude that the NLRB did not abuse its discretion in
    finding that a mistake about time-zone requirements and other work
    obligations did not constitute good cause.
    In making its determination that the time-zone confusion did not rise
    to excusable neglect, the NLRB cited Unitec Elevator Services Co., 
    337 NLRB 426
     (2002). There, following the Supreme Court’s then-recent guidance in
    Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates Ltd. Partnership, 
    507 U.S. 380
     (1993), the NLRB overruled one of its earlier decisions that a one-
    day delay due to an arithmetic error would constitute excusable neglect.
    Unitec, 337 NLRB at 427–28 (“expressly overruling” Postal Serv., 
    309 NLRB 305
     (1992)). In Pioneer, the Supreme Court explained that “[i]nadvertence,
    ignorance of the rules, or mistakes construing the rules do not usually
    constitute ‘excusable’ neglect,” although the concept is “elastic.” 507 U.S.
    at 392 (quotation omitted). The NLRB explained that, following Pioneer,
    “[h]enceforth, a late document will not be excused when the reason for the
    tardiness is solely a miscalculation of the filing date.” Unitec, 337 NLRB at
    428.
    Analogous precedent from this court regarding the Federal Rules
    concludes     that     “in     most        cases,     an      attorney’s   simple
    misunderstanding . . . ‘weighs heavily against a finding of excusable
    neglect.’” L.A. Pub. Ins. Adjusters, Inc. v. Nelson, 
    17 F.4th 521
    , 525 (5th Cir.
    2021) (quoting Midwest Emps. Cas. Co. v. Williams, 
    161 F.3d 877
    , 880 (5th
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    Cir. 1998)). “Our court has ‘left open the possibility that some
    misinterpretations of the federal rules may qualify as excusable neglect,’ but
    we have emphasized that ‘such is the rare case indeed.’” 
    Ibid.
     (quoting
    Halicki v. La. Casino Cruises, Inc., 
    151 F.3d 465
    , 470 (5th Cir. 1998)). We have
    also explained that when the rule is unambiguous, a district court’s decision
    that the neglect was inexcusable “is virtually unassailable,” because, “[w]ere
    it otherwise, ‘almost every appellant’s lawyer would plead his own inability
    to understand the law when he fails to comply with a deadline.’” Halicki, 
    151 F.3d at 470
     (quoting Advanced Estimating Sys., Inc. v. Riney, 
    130 F.3d 996
    , 998
    (11th Cir. 1997)). The same logic applies to the NLRB’s determination here.
    Nor did the NLRB abuse its discretion in rejecting the significance of
    counsel’s other work obligations. As the NLRB explained, counsel was aware
    of these obligations for almost two weeks before the filing deadline. We have
    previously held that the NLRB did not abuse its discretion in rejecting a late
    filing when the party “was in the process of hiring a new lawyer[.]” See
    U.S.A. Polymer, 
    272 F.3d at 297
    . Given that Tri-County’s counsel was well
    acquainted with the case, we decline to grant more leeway here.
    To summarize: Tri-County’s excusable neglect argument was
    substantively raised in filings before the NLRB and the NLRB was
    unquestionably on notice of it; so, we have considered it. The NLRB,
    however, did not abuse its discretion when it (1) determined that Tri-
    Country failed to show excusable neglect and (2) subsequently refused to
    consider the untimely filed exceptions. As a result, Tri-Party did not properly
    raise any exceptions to the NLRB’s order. Summary entry of a judgment
    enforcing the NLRB’s order is therefore appropriate. See NLRB v. Sw.
    Displays & Events, No. 22-60032, 
    2022 WL 636687
    , at *1 (5th Cir. Mar. 4,
    2022) (unpublished) (per curiam) (“[W]e have emphasized that ‘fail[ing] to
    comply with the [Board’s] regulations requiring the filing of written
    exceptions’ entitles the Board to summary entry of judgment.” (quoting
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    NLRB v. Mooney Aircraft, Inc., 
    310 F.2d 565
    , 566 (5th Cir. 1962) (per
    curiam))).
    *        *         *
    Accordingly, we AFFIRM the NLRB’s order, GRANT summary
    entry of a judgment enforcing the order, and DENY Tri-County’s cross-
    petition for review.
    7