United States v. Turman ( 2023 )

Case: 22-10208 Document: 00516850853 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/08/2023
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
____________
August 8, 2023
No. 22-10208 Lyle W. Cayce
____________ Clerk
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Zack Monroe Turman,
Defendant—Appellant.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 1:20-CR-67-1
______________________________
Before Wiener, Graves, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam: *
Zack Monroe Turman pleaded guilty, pursuant to a written plea
agreement, to distribution of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252A(a)(2) & (b)(1). In his plea agreement, Turman waived his right to
challenge his conviction and sentence on direct appeal or in any collateral
proceedings, but he reserved the right to, among other things, challenge on
appeal a sentence exceeding the statutory maximum punishment. Turman
_____________________
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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was sentenced to 240 months in prison and 15 years of supervised release,
and was ordered to pay $38,000 in restitution. On appeal, he challenges the
district court’s restitution order as exceeding the statutory maximum. On
the merits, Turman argues that the district court plainly erred by ordering
restitution without first determining his relative role in causing the victims’
claimed losses. The Government asserts that Turman’s challenge to the
restitution order is barred by his appeal waiver, and that the record precludes
a finding of plain error. We agree with the Government that Turman’s
challenge is barred by his appeal waiver, and, even if it were not, that there
was no plain error.
I.
By statute, restitution is mandatory in child pornography cases. See
18 U.S.C. § 2259. In Paroline v. United States, the Supreme Court held that
restitution is proper under § 2259 “only to the extent the defendant’s offense
proximately caused a victim’s losses.” 572 U.S. 434, 448 (2014). Paroline
was then codified at § 2259(b)(2), which provides, in part, that the district
court “shall order restitution in an amount that reflects the defendant’s
relative role in the causal process that underlies the victim’s losses, but which
is no less than $3,000.” 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(2)(B).
Generally, a challenge to an unauthorized restitution amount is not
barred by an appeal waiver because such an award exceeds the statutory
maximum sentence. See United States v. Winchel, 896 F.3d 387, 389 (5th Cir.
2018); United States v. Leal, 933 F.3d 426, 431 (5th Cir. 2019). In United
States v. Alfred, however, we held that an appeal waiver barred a “Paroline-
based” challenge to a restitution order because the district court had
performed the Paroline analysis and the appeal simply challenged the
outcome of that analysis. 60 F.4th 979, 982 (5th Cir. 2023). “Because it
[was] clear that the district court considered the Paroline factors at
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sentencing and ordered restitution as authorized by § 2259, the statutory-
maximum exception [did] not apply.” Id. In Winchel and Leal, by contrast,
“we declined to enforce the appeal waivers because the district courts failed
to conduct the requisite analysis altogether.” Id.
In this case, the presentence report (PSR) identified six victims of
Turman’s offense, each of whom requested restitution, and the PSR
recommended that the district court award the requested amounts, for a total
restitution amount of $38,000. Turman did not object to the PSR or to the
district court’s restitution order. After this case was appealed the district
court granted the Government’s unopposed motion to supplement the
record under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(e) “to include evidence
related to the requests for restitution filed by the defendant’s victims.” The
district court further stated unequivocally that it had relied on that
supplemental information and considered the Paroline factors when ordering
restitution. Given the unopposed supplemental evidence and the district
court’s order, Turman’s waiver bars the instant appeal because the district
court considered the Paroline factors, and the appeal simply challenges the
factual outcome of that analysis. See Alfred, 60 F.4th at 982.
II.
Alternatively, were his challenge not barred, Turman’s claim would
also fail on the merits. See United States v. Story, 439 F.3d 226, 230–31 (5th
Cir. 2006) (explaining that appeal waivers are not jurisdictional); United
States v. Smith, 528 F.3d 423, 424 (5th Cir. 2008) (pretermitting
consideration of an appeal waiver and resolving a restitution case on the
merits). Because Turman did not object to the restitution order in the district
court, we review for plain error. United States v. Dominguez-Alvarado, 695
F.3d 324, 327 (5th Cir. 2012). To satisfy plain-error review, a “defendant
must show a clear or obvious error that affects his substantial rights” and
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even then, “our court has discretion to correct that error, and generally will
do so only if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
judicial proceedings.” United States v. Mudekunye, 646 F.3d 281, 287 (5th
Cir. 2011).
In his opening brief, Turman argued that the district court plainly
erred by failing to conduct a Paroline analysis. After Turman filed his opening
brief, however, the district court granted the Government’s unopposed
motion to supplement the record, and the district court stated that it had
relied on the supplemental material and considered the Paroline factors in
ordering restitution. Therefore, in his reply brief, Turman needed to show
that the district court made a clear or obvious error in awarding $38,000 in
restitution based on the supplemented record.
Contending that the district court did not fully explain its analysis of
the Paroline factors on the record at sentencing—when Turman did not
object to the restitution amount—does not satisfy the requirement of plain
error. See United States v. Rosenblatt, 788 F. App’x 960, 961 (5th Cir. 2019).
The Paroline factors are intended to serve as “guideposts” for district courts
to consider when determining a proper restitution amount that reflects the
“relative causal significance of the defendant’s conduct in producing [the
victim’s] losses,” not “rigid” requirements to be mechanically applied. 572
U.S. at 460. The factors include:
[1] the number of past criminal defendants found to have
contributed to the victim’s general losses; [2] reasonable
predictions of the number of future offenders likely to be
caught and convicted for crimes contributing to the victim’s
general losses; [3] any available and reasonably reliable
estimate of the broader number of offenders involved (most of
whom will, of course, never be caught or convicted);
[4] whether the defendant reproduced or distributed images of
the victim; [5] whether the defendant had any connection to
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the initial production of the images; [6] how many images of
the victim the defendant possessed; and [7] other facts relevant
to the defendant’s relative causal role.
Id. at 459–60. These factors cannot be converted into a “formula”; rather,
guided by the factors, district courts must ultimately use their discretion to
determine a proper restitution amount. Id. at 460; see Alfred, 60 F.4th at 982
(explaining that a district court’s Paroline analysis involves the exercise of
“discretion and sound judgment” to fashion an appropriate restitution
order).
Of the six victims who requested restitution, all except one addressed
the Paroline factors in the supporting documents they submitted to the
district court. While the sixth victim did not discuss the Paroline factors, the
information in her restitution claim was sufficient for the district court to
undertake a Paroline analysis. In his reply brief, Turman asserts that the
evidence was insufficient to sustain the restitution awards and argues for a
lower restitution amount, but he fails to show that awarding the requested
amounts instead of the statutory minimum amount of $3,000 per victim
constituted plain error.
In sum, given that the district court received sufficient evidence of the
victims’ losses and applied the Paroline factors to calculate an appropriate
restitution order, Turman cannot show a clear or obvious error that affects
his substantial rights.
AFFIRMED.
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