McLin v. Twenty-First Judicial Dist ( 2023 )


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  • Case: 22-30490     Document: 00516860566         Page: 1     Date Filed: 08/16/2023
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Fifth Circuit
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    ____________                                  FILED
    August 16, 2023
    No. 22-30490                            Lyle W. Cayce
    ____________                                  Clerk
    Katelynn McLin,
    Plaintiff—Appellant,
    versus
    Twenty-First Judicial District; Robert H. Morrison,
    III,
    Defendants—Appellees.
    ______________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Louisiana
    USDC No. 3:21-CV-411
    ______________________________
    Before Higginbotham, Graves, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.
    Patrick E. Higginbotham, Circuit Judge:
    In this employment dispute, the district court dismissed with
    prejudice a suit brought by Katelynn McLin against the Louisiana
    Twenty-First Judicial District and its former Chief Judge Robert Morrison,
    concluding that: (1) the Twenty-First Judicial District lacked the capacity to
    be sued; (2) McLin failed to plausibly allege that she was treated differently
    from anyone else; and, (3) Chief Judge Morrison was entitled to qualified
    immunity. McLin now appeals. We AFFIRM.
    Case: 22-30490        Document: 00516860566              Page: 2      Date Filed: 08/16/2023
    No. 22-30490
    I.
    A.
    McLin is a White female previously employed by Louisiana’s Twenty-
    First Judicial District.1 On November 13, 2020, McLin attended a clerical
    staff luncheon convened by the Twenty-First Judicial District. During the
    luncheon, the Judicial Administrator Sara Brumfield publicly praised McLin
    for her work performance. McLin sat next to T.D. at the luncheon, a Black
    colleague whom she had never met. At the end of the lunch, McLin stated
    that it was “time to go back to LP and deal with the LPians.” McLin alleges
    that “LPians” refers to citizens of Livingston Parish, and that she did not use
    that term “objectively or intend[ing] to be offensive, racially charged, or
    antagonistic in any possible sense.” The Parties do not suggest the use of
    “LPians” has any racial connotation. Accepting Plaintiff’s pleading as true,
    it either lacks a racial element or none was intended. Yet the comment
    prompted T.D. to search for McLin’s social media.
    While searching through McLin’s Facebook posts, T.D. noticed an
    article McLin reposted regarding a motorist on I-244 who drove his vehicle
    and horse trailer through a blockade of protestors rallying in the wake of
    George Floyd’s murder. In the post, McLin, who herself keeps and trains
    horses and drives a truck with a horse trailer, posted “All I’m going to say is
    _____________________
    1
    Her employment was “at will” and “may be terminated by either the Court or
    the employee at any time, for any reason not prohibited by law.” McLin began her career
    with the Twenty-First Judicial District as a collection’s department collector. At the time
    of her termination, she had been promoted to a Hearing Officer’s Secretary.
    2
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    that Silver Duramax enjoys pulling that black horse trailer at 80mph
    #IWillrunYouOver.”2
    T.D. complained about the Facebook post and the use of the term
    “LPians” to her supervisor, Judge Blair Edwards. Judge Edwards then
    brought the complaint to Chief Judge Morrison, who terminated McLin’s
    employment. Chief Judge Morrison asked Brumfield to process the
    termination of employment, and Brumfield, in turn, told McLin that she
    “hate[d] having to do this” but that she “had no other choice” as her “hands
    are tied.” McLin then confronted Chief Judge Morrison who confirmed that
    his decision to terminate her was based on the Facebook post and comment
    to T.D., observing that “[i]n today’s world that we live in, I have no other
    choice but to terminate you. You need to watch what you say and do.”
    B.
    In April 2021, McLin filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal
    Employment Opportunity Commission alleging that the Twenty-First
    Judicial District unlawfully terminated her based on her race in violation of
    Title VII, and the EEOC issued a right to sue letter. This suit in the Middle
    District of Louisiana followed, with: (1) a disparate treatment claim based on
    race in violation of Title VII against the Twenty-First Judicial District, (2)
    _____________________
    2
    We note that the Twenty-First Judicial District did not have any rules or policies
    restricting employees from engaging in political speech via social media, and the only
    Twenty-First Judicial District policy concerning political speech prohibited employees
    from publicly endorsing political candidates for office. McLin alleges that her post was such
    a political opinion.
    3
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    § 1981 and § 1983 claims of disparate treatment based on race against Chief
    Judge Morrison, (3) a claim of unlawful termination for “political activity”
    in violation of Louisiana state law against the Twenty-First Judicial District,
    and (4) a § 1983 claim of unlawful termination in retaliation for engaging in
    protected speech in violation of the First Amendment to the U.S.
    Constitution against Chief Judge Morrison.
    The district court dismissed all claims under Rules 12(b)(1) and
    12(b)(6), holding that the Twenty-First Judicial District lacked the capacity
    to be sued, that Chief Judge Morrison was entitled to qualified immunity, and
    the Complaint failed to state a claim. McLin timely appealed.
    II.
    We review the district court’s grant of a 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss de
    novo.3 Rule 12(b)(1) motions challenge the subject matter jurisdiction of the
    district court,4 with the burden of proof on the party asserting jurisdiction.5
    When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed with other Rule 12 motions, the court
    first considers its jurisdiction.6
    We review the grant of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) de
    novo, “accepting all well-pleaded facts as true and viewing those facts in the
    _____________________
    3
    Ramming v. United States, 
    281 F.3d 158
    , 161 (5th Cir. 2001).
    4
    
    Id.
    5
    
    Id.
    6
    
    Id.
    4
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    light most favorable to the plaintiffs.”7 A complaint survives a Rule 12(b)(6)
    motion only if it “pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
    reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
    alleged.”8
    Finally, we review denials of motions to amend for abuse of
    discretion,9 but “where the district court’s denial of leave to amend was
    based solely on futility, this court applies a de novo standard of review
    ‘identical, in practice, to the standard used for reviewing a dismissal under
    Rule 12(b)(6).’”10 It is not an abuse of discretion to deny the motion to amend
    if it would not survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.11
    III.
    McLin first argues that whether she sued a judicial district instead of
    a district court is only a matter of semantics.12 We disagree. Regardless of
    _____________________
    7
    Dorsey v. Portfolio Equities, Inc., 
    540 F.3d 333
    , 338 (5th Cir. 2008) (quotation
    omitted).
    8
    Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 678 (2009).
    9
    Stem v. Gomez, 
    813 F.3d 205
    , 209 (5th Cir. 2016).
    10
    Thomas v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 
    832 F.3d 586
    , 590 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting City
    of Clinton v. Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., 
    632 F.3d 148
    , 152 (5th Cir. 2010)).
    11
    Stem, 
    813 F.3d at 216
    .
    12
    On the other hand, the Twenty-First Judicial District argues that makes all the
    difference, as “the judicial districts are just geographical areas. The district courts, on the
    other hand, are subject to the control, oversight, and funding of numerous other public
    entities.” McLin contends that this is “an argument without much relevance because, first,
    these are really the same entity, and, second, if this Court were to find the Judicial District
    Court was capable of being sued based on the merits arguments below, but not the Judicial
    5
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    whether McLin sued the Twenty-First Judicial District or the Twenty-First
    Judicial District Court, the suit fails because both entities lack juridical
    personality under Louisiana law.
    Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b), Louisiana state law governs
    the capacity of a state district court to be sued.13 By its metric, capacity
    belongs to a juridical person. The term is defined as “an entity to which the
    law attributes personality, such as a corporation or a partnership.”14 The
    Louisiana Supreme Court set forth a framework for determining an entity’s
    juridical status in Roberts v. Sewerage and Water Bd. of New Orleans.15 The
    Roberts court held that:
    The important determination with respect to the juridical
    status or legal capacity of an entity is not its creator, nor its size,
    shape, or label. Rather the determination that must be made in
    each particular case is whether the entity can appropriately be
    regarded as an additional and separate government unit for the
    particular purpose at issue. In the absence of positive law to the
    contrary, a local government unit may be deemed to be a
    juridical person separate and distinct from other government
    entities, when the organic law grants it the legal capacity to
    function independently and not just as the agency or division
    of another governmental entity.16
    _____________________
    District, plaintiff repeats her request originally made to the district court for leave to amend
    her complaint to make that change.”
    13
    See Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b) (“Capacity to sue or be sued is determined . . . by the
    law of the state where the court is located[.]”).
    14
    La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 24.
    15
    
    634 So.2d 341
     (La. 1994).
    16
    
    Id.
     at 346–47.
    6
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    Where there is no constitutional or statutory authority for an entity to sue or
    be sued, it lacks capacity under Roberts.17 The Louisiana Constitution
    organizes Louisiana’s government into three separate branches, legislative,
    executive, and judicial.18 Louisiana’s district courts are created by the
    Louisiana Constitution as component parts of a unified state system. Under
    that system, the Twenty-First Judicial District is not a separate entity. It is a
    part of the greater body of the Judicial Branch of Louisiana’s state
    government.19
    The legislature did not classify judicial districts as political
    subdivisions for all purposes, as it limited the classification to a particular
    revenue statute.20 McLin’s comparing the Twenty-First Judicial District to
    “Fire Protection Districts” or “Hospital Service Districts” is unavailing as
    the legislature granted the latter two districts the right “to sue and be
    sued.”21 In creating specific types of districts capable of suit and not others, it
    implicitly chose not to make judicial districts separate entities.22 Having
    “district” in their name does not alone give them juridical status. The district
    _____________________
    17
    
    Id.
    18
    See La. Const. art. II.
    19
    See Roberts, 634 So.2d at 346–47.
    20
    See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 49:308.
    21
    See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:1500(A); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 46:1060.
    22
    Colgrove v. Battin, 
    413 U.S. 149
    , 163 (1973) (“If [Louisiana] had meant to . . .
    [effectuate the desired scheme] . . . ‘it knew how to use express language to that effect.’ ”
    (quoting Williams v. Florida, 
    399 U.S. 78
    , 97 (1970))); see also NLRB v. Canning, 
    573 U.S. 513
    , 600 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“If the [legislature] had thought [to enact a given
    scheme], they would have known how to do so.”).
    7
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    court did not err in holding the Twenty-First Judicial District lacks the
    capacity to be sued.23
    IV.
    Turning to the claims against Chief Judge Morrison, McLin argues
    that the district court erred in dismissing her § 1981 and Title VII claims. We
    affirm the district court, but upon a different ground.24
    Our “analysis of discrimination claims under § 1981 is identical to the
    analysis of Title VII claims.”25 McLin alleges disparate treatment, which
    “addresses employment actions that treat an employee worse than others
    based on the employee’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”26
    McLin rests her claims on being a White female.
    The district court dismissed the claims, explaining that “Plaintiff does
    not allege any direct evidence of [Chief] Judge Morrison’s discriminatory
    motive . . . and therefore must prove her case through circumstantial
    _____________________
    23
    Since we conclude the Twenty-First Judicial District lacks the capacity to be
    sued and is instead properly considered a part of the Judicial Branch of Louisiana state
    government, allowing McLin to amend her complaint to bring her claims against Louisiana
    would be futile. The Eleventh Amendment bars McLin’s state-law claim for political
    discrimination arising under La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23:961. See Richardson v. S. Univ., 
    118 F.3d 450
    , 453 (5th Cir. 1997). And while Congress abrogated the states’ Eleventh
    Amendment immunity for Title VII purposes, see Ussery v. State of La. on Behalf of La. Dep’t
    of Health & Hosps., 
    150 F.3d 431
    , 434 (5th Cir. 1998), as explained below, McLin fails to
    state a claim of racial discrimination under Title VII. See Section IV.
    24
    See Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 
    720 F.3d 620
    , 622 (5th Cir. 2013) (noting
    that this Court “may affirm [a Rule 12(b)(6) motion] on any basis supported by the record”
    (citation omitted)).
    25
    Body by Cook, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins., 
    869 F.3d 381
    , 386 (5th Cir. 2017).
    26
    Pacheco v. Mineta, 
    448 F.3d 783
    , 787 (5th Cir. 2006).
    8
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    evidence, according to the burden-shifting framework established by . . .
    McDonnell Douglas.”27
    We disagree. A complaint need not allege “each prong of the prima
    facie test for disparate treatment” in order to overcome a Rule 12(b)(6)
    motion; rather, to support a disparate treatment claim under Title VII, a
    complaint must plausibly set out facts that the “defendant took the adverse
    employment action against a plaintiff because of her protected status.”28 As
    we have previously summarized:
    [T]here are two ultimate elements a plaintiff must plead to
    support a disparate treatment claim under Title VII: (1) an
    adverse employment action, (2) taken against a plaintiff because
    of her protected status. . . . We reiterate, however, that a court
    errs by requiring a plaintiff to plead something more than the
    “ultimate elements” of a claim. A court thus inappropriately
    heightens the pleading standard by subjecting a plaintiff’s
    allegations to a rigorous factual or evidentiary analysis under
    the McDonnell Douglas framework in response to a motion to
    dismiss.29
    _____________________
    27
    McLin v. Twenty-First Jud. Dist., 
    614 F. Supp. 3d 278
    , 287 (M.D. La. 2022)
    (internal citation omitted and revised).
    28
    Raj v. La. State Univ., 
    714 F.3d 322
    , 331 (5th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation
    omitted).
    29
    Cicalese v. Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch, 
    924 F.3d 762
    , 767 (5th Cir. 2019) (internal
    quotations and citations omitted).
    9
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    While the able district judge analyzed the claims under the McDonnell
    Douglas standard,30 a plaintiff need only plead an adverse employment action,
    taken against her because of her protected status.31 McLin fails to do this.
    McLin seeks to meet the racial causation element with the comments
    made by Brumfield that her “hands are tied” as well as the Chief Judge’s
    tone and comment stating “[i]n today’s world that we live in, I have no other
    choice but to terminate you. You need to watch what you say and do.” These
    speculative allegations do not carry the day. McLin issued the public
    statement “#IWillrunYouOver” in reference to driving her truck over
    peaceful protestors. Taking all the factual allegations as true, a more
    reasonable and obvious interpretation than the one put forth by McLin is that
    her termination had to do with her public threat to run over people. While
    the district court erred in requiring McLin to make allegations that satisfy the
    McDonnell Douglas standard, McLin still failed to plead one ultimate element
    a plaintiff is required to plead: that the termination was taken against her
    _____________________
    30
    For example, the district court held that “Plaintiff satisfies the first three
    elements of her claim: she belonged to a protected class ([W]hite), excelled at her position,
    and was nonetheless fired. Still, as noted in Defendants’ dismissal papers, Plaintiff falters
    at the fourth element because she has not plausibly alleged any differential treatment, which
    requires allegations establishing that a ‘similarly situated’ comparator was not fired despite
    committing nearly the same misconduct.” McLin, 614 F. Supp. 3d at 288 (internal citation
    omitted). Being terminated is a sufficient adverse employment action.
    31
    Cicalese, 
    924 F.3d at 767
    .
    10
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    because of her protected status.32 We conclude that McLin has not asserted
    plausible facts meeting the elements of this claim.33
    V.
    Finally, McLin argues the district court erred in granting Chief Judge
    Morrison qualified immunity on her First Amendment retaliation claim. We
    disagree.
    “Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil liability
    in their individual capacity so long as their conduct does not violate clearly
    established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
    would have known.”34 “It protects all but the plainly incompetent or those
    who knowingly violate the law.”35 “Qualified immunity shields federal and
    state officials from money damages unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1)
    that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the
    right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.”36
    “Ultimately, ‘the central concern is whether the official has fair warning that
    _____________________
    32
    
    Id.
    33
    Ferrer v. Chevron Corp., 
    484 F.3d 776
    , 780–81 (5th Cir. 2007) (“We may affirm
    a district court’s dismissal based on rule 12(b)(6) on any basis supported by the record.”
    (internal citation omitted)).
    34
    Cunningham v. Castloo, 
    983 F.3d 185
    , 190 (5th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation
    omitted).
    35
    
    Id.
     (internal quotation omitted).
    36
    Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 
    563 U.S. 731
    , 735 (2011) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 
    457 U.S. 800
    , 818 (1982)).
    11
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    his conduct violates a constitutional right.’”37 We may decide which prong
    of the qualified immunity analysis to address first.38 Our inquiry starts and
    ends with the clearly established prong, whether Chief Judge Morrison
    violated a clearly established constitutional right.
    To establish a First Amendment retaliation claim, the public
    employee must establish that: “(1) she suffered an adverse employment
    action; (2) her speech involved a matter of public concern; (3) her interest in
    commenting on matters of public concern outweighs the employer’s interest
    in promoting efficiency; and (4) her speech motivated the employer’s
    adverse action.”39 Only the third prong is at issue.40
    It is canon that “public employees do not surrender all their First
    Amendment rights by reason of their employment.”41 Rather, some speech,
    even if it “concerns information related to or learned through public
    employment,” deserves protection because “‘[g]overnment employees are
    _____________________
    37
    Clarkston v. White, 
    943 F.3d 988
    , 993 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Delaughter v.
    Woodall, 
    909 F.3d 130
    , 140 (5th Cir. 2018)).
    38
    Pearson v. Callahan, 
    555 U.S. 223
    , 242 (2009) (“[T]he judges of the district
    courts and the courts of appeals are in the best position to determine the order of
    decisionmaking that will best facilitate the fair and efficient disposition of each case.”).
    39
    Modica v. Taylor, 
    465 F.3d 174
    , 179–80 (5th Cir. 2006) (internal citation omitted).
    40
    See Graziosi v. City of Greenville Miss., 
    775 F.3d 731
    , 740 (5th Cir. 2015)
    (observing that “whether the relevant government entity had an adequate justification for
    treating the employee differently from any other member of the general public” due to its
    role as employer is a question of law (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 
    547 U.S. 410
    , 418
    (2006))).
    41
    Garcetti, 
    547 U.S. at 417
    .
    12
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    often in the best position to know what ails the agencies for which they
    work.’”42 Yet, “[g]overnment employers, like private employers, need a
    significant degree of control over their employees’ words and actions;
    without it, there would be little chance for the efficient provision of public
    services.”43
    In determining whether a public employee’s speech is protected by
    the First Amendment, we “strike a balance between ‘the interests of
    [employees] . . . commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest
    of [the government], as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public
    services it performs through its employees.’”44 In particular, we evaluate
    whether the speech has caused disruption, impeded performance, or
    “affected working relationships necessary to the department’s proper
    functioning.”45 “When close working relationships are essential to fulfilling
    public responsibilities, a wide degree of deference to the employer’s
    judgment is appropriate.”46
    _____________________
    42
    Lane v. Franks, 
    573 U.S. 228
    , 236 (2014) (quoting Waters v. Churchill, 
    511 U.S. 661
    , 674 (1994) (plurality opinion)) (alteration in original).
    43
    Garcetti, 
    547 U.S. at 418
    .
    44
    Graziosi, 
    775 F.3d at 740
     (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Ed. of Twp. High Sch. Dist.
    205, Will Cnty., Ill., 
    391 U.S. 563
    , 568 (1968)).
    45
    Brawner v. City of Richardson, Texas, 
    855 F.2d 187
    , 192 (5th Cir. 1988) (internal
    citation omitted).
    46
    Connick v. Myers, 
    461 U.S. 138
    , 151–52 (1983). When performing this balancing
    test, courts consider “whether the statement impairs discipline by superiors or harmony
    among co-workers [or] has a detrimental impact on close working relationships for which
    13
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    McLin fails to demonstrate that her interests outweigh those of the
    Twenty-First Judicial District.47 The Supreme Court has explained that “[a]
    government entity has broader discretion to restrict speech when it acts in its
    role as employer, but the restrictions it imposes must be directed at speech
    that has some potential to affect the entity’s operations.”48 Here, Chief Judge
    Morrison’s interest in an efficient, harmonious work environment in its
    office outweighs McLin’s interests in her speech.49 Not only would a public
    Facebook post about running over Black Lives Matter protestors pose a
    threat to amicable workplace relationships, it strikes a blow against the
    Twenty-First Judicial District by undermining its efforts to stay true to the
    fact and image of a court whose “paramount purpose [is] providing a fair and
    impartial open forum in which the public may resolve its disputes.”50 Adding
    Chief Judge Morrison’s substantial interest in maintaining workplace trust
    and efficiency and responding to threats to office morale, the balance weighs
    against McLin. In other words, McLin did not show that Chief Judge
    _____________________
    personal loyalty and confidence are necessary[.]” Rankin v. McPherson, 
    483 U.S. 378
    , 388
    (1987).
    47
    Pickering, 
    391 U.S. at 568
    . “[T]he judicial branch depends upon the confidence
    of the people it serves. Without that necessary confidence, the judiciary cannot serve its
    paramount purpose of providing a fair and impartial open forum in which the public may
    resolve its disputes.” In re Benge, 
    24 So. 3d 822
    , 845 (La. 2009). This duty falls upon Chief
    Judge Morrison.
    48
    Garcetti, 
    547 U.S. at 418
    .
    49
    A “chief judge . . . shall exercise, for a term designated by the court, the
    administrative functions prescribed by rule of court.” La. Const. art. V, § 17.
    50
    In re Benge, 24 So. 3d at 845. By McLin’s own concession, her post was public
    and caused issues at work when T.D. saw it.
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    Morrison violated a clearly established constitutional right. For at the very
    least, the law is sufficiently uncertain so as to support Chief Judge Morrison’s
    defense of qualified immunity.51 This public servant cannot be held
    personally liable in money damages for the difficult choice he was called upon
    to make and that is the issue before this court. The district court did not err
    in granting Chief Judge Morrison’s qualified immunity defense against
    McLin’s First Amendment retaliation claim.
    ****
    For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.
    _____________________
    51
    See McClendon v. City of Columbia, 
    305 F.3d 314
    , 332 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc)
    (holding that qualified immunity must be granted “if a reasonable official would be left
    uncertain of the law’s application to the facts confronting him”); Presley v. City of Benbrook,
    
    4 F.3d 405
    , 409 (5th Cir. 1993) (“[T]he essence of qualified immunity [is] that an officer
    may make mistakes that infringe constitutional rights and yet not be held liable where, given
    . . . uncertain circumstances, it cannot be said that []he knew []he was violating a person’s
    rights.”).
    15