Ordonez Rojas v. Garland ( 2023 )

Case: 22-60477 Document: 00516866852 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/22/2023
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
____________
FILED
August 22, 2023
No. 22-60477
Summary Calendar Lyle W. Cayce
____________ Clerk
Evelyn Yessenia Ordonez Rojas; Evelyn Sarahi Anariba
Ordonez,
Petitioners,
versus
Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General,
Respondent.
______________________________
Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Agency Nos. A208 764 506, A208 764 507
______________________________
Before Willett, Duncan, and Wilson, Circuit Judges:
Per Curiam: *
Evelyn Yessenia Ordonez Rojas and her minor daughter, natives and
citizens of Honduras, petition for review of the decision by the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the denial of their application for
asylum and withholding of removal. We DENY the petition.
_____________________
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-60477 Document: 00516866852 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/22/2023
No. 22-60477
We review the BIA’s decision, and we and consider the immigration
judge’s decision only to the extent it influenced the BIA. Singh v. Sessions,
880 F.3d 220, 224 (5th Cir. 2018). We review factual findings for substantial
evidence, and we review legal determinations de novo. Lopez-Gomez v.
Ashcroft, 263 F.3d 442, 444 (5th Cir. 2001).
Ordonez Rojas first argues that the immigration court lacked
jurisdiction to order her removed because her notice to appear failed to
specify the date, time, and location of her removal hearing. Circuit precedent
forecloses this argument. Castillo-Gutierrez v. Garland, 43 F.4th 477, 480
(5th Cir. 2022); Maniar v. Garland, 998 F.3d 235, 242 (5th Cir. 2021)
(holding that a notice to appear “is sufficient to commence proceedings even
if it does not include the time, date, or place of the initial hearing”) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)). Accordingly, the BIA did not err in
determining that jurisdiction properly vested in the immigration court.
Next, Ordonez Rojas argues that the notice to appear is defective
because the charge is inconsistent with the allegations. Specifically, she
argues that she cannot be removed for attempting to enter the United States
without valid entry documents when she never presented herself for
admission to begin with. But she did not raise this argument to the BIA. “A
court may review a final order of removal only if . . . (1) the alien has
exhausted all administrative remedies available to the alien as of right . . . .”
8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1). Because Ordonez Rojas did not raise this issue to the
BIA, it is unexhausted, and we decline to address it. See id.; Fort Bend Cnty.
v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 1843, 1844 (2019) (“A claim-processing rule requiring
parties to take certain procedural steps in, or prior to, litigation, may be
mandatory in the sense that a court must enforce the rule if timely raised.”
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
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No. 22-60477
Ordonez Rojas next argues that she demonstrated a nexus between her
asserted harm and a protected basis under the immigration laws. To establish
eligibility for asylum or withholding of removal, an applicant must prove that
she is unwilling or unable to return to her home country because of persecution
on account of her race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion. See Cantarero-Lagos v. Barr, 924 F.3d 145, 150
(5th Cir. 2019); Sharma v. Holder, 729 F.3d 407, 411 (5th Cir. 2013).
“[A]lthough a statutorily protected ground need not be the only reason for
harm, it cannot be incidental, tangential, superficial, or subordinate to
another reason for harm.” Cabrera v. Sessions, 890 F.3d 153, 159 (5th Cir.
2018) (internal quotations marks and citation omitted).
Ordonez Rojas claims that she “was persecuted because she, an
unprotected single mother, stood up to a gang and refused to pay the amount
demanded.” But economic extortion is not a cognizable form of persecution
under immigration law. See Singh v. Barr, 920 F.3d 255, 259 (5th Cir. 2019).
Substantial evidence therefore supports the BIA’s determination that
Ordonez Rojas failed to demonstrate a nexus between any suffered harm and
a protected ground. Because Ordonez Rojas has not established the requisite
nexus, we need not address her arguments related to past persecution. See
INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (per curiam) (“As a general rule
courts and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the decision
of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”).
Finally, although Ordonez Rojas mentions the BIA’s denial of her
claim under the Convention Against Torture, this argument is not adequately
briefed, and we deem it abandoned. See Soadjede v. Ashcroft, 324 F.3d 830,
833 (5th Cir. 2003). The petition for review is DENIED.
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