Mendoza Martinez v. Garland ( 2023 )


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  • Case: 22-60176        Document: 00516870471             Page: 1      Date Filed: 08/24/2023
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Fifth Circuit
    ____________
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    No. 22-60176
    Summary Calendar                                 FILED
    ____________                               August 24, 2023
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Jorge Luis Mendoza Martinez,                                                      Clerk
    Petitioner,
    versus
    Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General,
    Respondent.
    ______________________________
    Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Agency No. A205 650 500
    ______________________________
    Before King, Higginson, and Willett, Circuit Judges.
    Per Curiam: *
    Jorge Luis Mendoza Martinez, a native and citizen of Mexico,
    petitions for review of the decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals
    (BIA) adopting and affirming an order of an immigration judge denying his
    application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the
    Convention Against Torture (CAT).
    _____________________
    *
    This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
    Case: 22-60176      Document: 00516870471          Page: 2   Date Filed: 08/24/2023
    No. 22-60176
    As a preliminary matter, the IJ held, and the BIA affirmed, that
    Mendoza Martinez was barred from proceeding with his asylum claim
    because the application was untimely and he failed to demonstrate changed
    or extraordinary circumstances excusing the untimely filing. Although
    Mendoza Martinez now argues that the increase in violence by gangs and
    cartels since he left Mexico constitutes changed circumstances excusing the
    untimely filing of his asylum application, we lack jurisdiction to review
    determinations of timeliness that are based on findings of fact. See Zhu v.
    Gonzales, 
    493 F.3d 588
    , 594-95 (5th Cir. 2007).
    We review the BIA’s decision and consider the immigration judge’s
    decision only to the extent it influenced the BIA. Singh v. Sessions, 
    880 F.3d 220
    , 224 (5th Cir. 2018). Factual findings are reviewed for substantial
    evidence, and legal determinations are reviewed de novo. Lopez-Gomez v.
    Ashcroft, 
    263 F.3d 442
    , 444 (5th Cir. 2001). Under the substantial evidence
    standard, we may not overturn a factual finding unless the evidence compels
    a contrary result. 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (b)(4)(B); Martinez-Lopez v. Barr, 
    943 F.3d 766
    , 769 (5th Cir. 2019).
    On appeal, Mendoza Martinez contends that he was subjected to past
    persecution, he has a well-founded fear of future persecution, he is entitled
    to protection under the CAT, and his circumstances warrant a grant of
    humanitarian asylum.
    First, Mendoza Martinez argues that he suffered persecution because
    he was threatened on two occasions with harm and death by cartel members
    when he opposed their attempted recruitment. In both instances, Mendoza
    Martinez was able to walk away without being harmed. As we have explained,
    such exaggerated, non-specific threats, which were also lacking in
    immediacy, are not enough to demonstrate past persecution. Qorane v. Barr,
    
    919 F.3d 904
    , 910 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing Corado v. Ashcroft, 
    384 F.3d 945
    , 947
    2
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    No. 22-60176
    (8th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (explaining that not all alleged death threats
    necessarily amount to persecution, such as “where a factfinder concludes
    that threats are exaggerated, non-specific, or lacking in immediacy”)).
    Accordingly, the evidence does not compel a finding of past persecution. See
    Martinez-Lopez, 943 F.3d at 771.
    Next, to demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution, an
    applicant must have a subjective fear of persecution, the fear must be
    objectively reasonable, and the subjective fear must have a nexus to a
    protected ground. Cabrera v. Sessions, 
    890 F.3d 153
    , 159-60 (5th Cir. 2018).
    Here, Mendoza Martinez argues that he demonstrated a clear probability of
    future prosecution based on his country condition evidence and testimony
    that he would be killed if he refused recruitment by a cartel. But this evidence
    reflects a fear of general criminal activity, and “an applicant’s fear of
    persecution cannot be based solely on general violence and civil disorder.” See
    Eduard v. Ashcroft, 
    379 F.3d 182
    , 190 (5th Cir. 2004). Moreover, nothing in
    the record indicates that Mendoza Martinez would be targeted on his claimed
    protected ground, his relationship with his father. Thus, the evidence does
    not compel a finding that Mendoza Martinez has a well-founded fear of future
    persecution on account of a protected basis.
    To establish entitlement to relief under the CAT, an alien must prove
    that it is more likely than not that he will be tortured with the consent or
    acquiescence of public officials if he returns to the particular country in
    question. 
    8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16
    (c)(2), 1208.18(a)(1). The record does not
    compel a finding that Mendoza Martinez made such a showing. See Morales
    v. Sessions, 
    860 F.3d 812
    , 818 (5th Cir. 2017).
    Finally, Mendoza Martinez argues that he warrants a grant of
    humanitarian asylum. As the Government notes, however, Mendoza
    3
    Case: 22-60176        Document: 00516870471              Page: 4       Date Filed: 08/24/2023
    No. 22-60176
    Martinez failed to exhaust this challenge to the BIA. We agree that the issue
    is unexhausted and therefore decline to reach it. See 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (d)(1). 1
    Based upon the foregoing, the petition for review is DISMISSED
    IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
    _____________________
    1
    “Neither the Supreme Court nor our court has decided whether § 1252(d)(1) is a
    mandatory claim-processing rule.” Carreon v. Garland, 
    71 F.4th 247
    , 257 n.11 (5th Cir.
    2023); see also Fort Bend Cnty. v. Davis, 
    139 S. Ct. 1843
    , 1849 (2019) (“A claim-processing
    rule may be mandatory in the sense that a court must enforce the rule if a party properly
    raise[s] it.” (alteration in original) (citations and quotations omitted)). However, we need
    not address this question as we would enforce the exhaustion requirement regardless of
    whether § 1252 is a mandatory claims processing rule. See Carreon, 71 F.4th at 257.
    4