Tow v. Bulmahn (In Re ATP Oil & Gas Corp.) ( 2017 )


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  •   Case: 17-30077     Document: 00514213228              Page: 1      Date Filed: 10/27/2017
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    No. 17-30077                                   October 27, 2017
    Summary Calendar
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    In the Matter of: ATP OIL & GAS CORPORATION
    Debtor
    ----------------------------------------------------------------
    RODNEY TOW,
    Appellant,
    v.
    T. PAUL BULMAHN; LELAND TATE; ALBERT L. REESE, JR.; GEORGE
    R. MORRIS; PAULINE VAN DER SMAN-ARCHER; ISABEL PLUME; G.
    ROSS FRAZER; BURT A. ADAMS; ARTHUR H. DILLY; BRENT M.
    LONGNECKER; GERARD J. SWONKE; CHRIS A. BRISACK; GEORGE R.
    EDWARDS; KEITH R. GODWIN; ROBERT M. SHIVERS, III; ROBERT J.
    KAROW; CAVITT WENDLANDT, in his capacity as Executor of the Water
    Wendlandt Estate,
    Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Louisiana
    No. 2:15-CV-3141
    Case: 17-30077      Document: 00514213228         Page: 2    Date Filed: 10/27/2017
    No. 17-30077
    Before REAVLEY, PRADO, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Rodney Tow, Chapter 7 Trustee (“Trustee”) for ATP Oil & Gas
    Corporation’s (“ATP”) bankruptcy, appeals the district court’s dismissal of his
    claims against ATP’s officers (“Officers”) 1 and outside directors (“Directors”). 2
    The Trustee asserts that the district court erred in dismissing his breach of
    fiduciary duty claims, fraudulent transfer claims, and related civil conspiracy
    and aiding and abetting claims. The Trustee also asserts that the district court
    abused its discretion in partially denying him leave to amend the Second
    Amended Complaint.
    After having reviewed the record below, we affirm the district court’s
    judgment that the Trustee failed to state a plausible claim upon which relief
    can be granted. We also hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion
    in partially denying the Trustee leave to amend the Second Amended
    Complaint.
    I. BACKGROUND
    A.     Factual Background
    Following the 2010 Deepwater Horizon drilling rig explosion and oil
    spill—and resulting moratoria on new and existing deepwater drilling in the
    Gulf of Mexico—ATP began experiencing difficulties servicing its debt and
    paying expenses. After the oil spill, ATP made substantial investments in
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    1 Officers include: T. Paul Bulmahn, Leland Tate, Albert L. Reese, Jr., George R.
    Morris, Keith R. Godwin, Pauline van der Sman-Archer, Isabel Plume, Robert M. Shivers III,
    and G. Ross Frazer.
    2 Outside directors include: Burt A. Adams, Arthur H. Dilly, Brent M. Longnecker,
    Robert J. Karow, Gerard J. Swonke, Chris A. Brisack, George R. Edwards, and Walter
    Wendlandt.
    2
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    No. 17-30077
    several capital projects. The first project involved a contract for constructing a
    floating production platform in ATP’s Cheviot Field in the North Sea. The
    second project involved efforts to obtain drilling licenses in the Eastern
    Mediterranean Sea for two ATP subsidiaries.
    Ultimately, ATP did not weather the storm of disruption caused by the
    Deepwater Horizon accident and resulting drilling moratoria. New regulations
    on deepwater well decommissioning forced ATP to incur unanticipated costs.
    The Trustee alleges that ATP, struggling to pay these costs, incurred $120
    million in liability to the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management; the Bureau
    eventually stripped ATP of its ability to operate in the Gulf of Mexico.
    Prior to declaring bankruptcy, ATP took a number of steps to generate
    cash to pay “past due obligations,” including selling investors “net profits
    increases” and “overriding royalty interests.” The Trustee alleges that these
    efforts generated cash, but they dramatically encumbered ATP’s ability to
    profit in the future from its in-ground hydrocarbon assets. The Trustee also
    asserts that ATP entered unfavorable vendor contracts that caused the
    company to incur additional costs with little countervailing benefit. The
    Trustee contends that while ATP struggled to maintain profitability, ATP paid
    substantial cash bonuses to certain Officers.
    By summer 2012, ATP was considering bankruptcy. Prior to filing for
    bankruptcy, ATP’s Board of Directors approved payment of a special dividend
    for Series B stock holders. The announced dividend amounted to $1.99 per
    Series B share and resulted in an authorized payment of $7 million. According
    to the Trustee, this payout occurred despite the fact that ATP’s attorneys
    advised the corporation that the dividend would be improper under the federal
    Bankruptcy Code and Texas law.
    3
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    B.    Procedural Background
    On August 17, 2012, ATP voluntarily filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy
    protection in the Southern District of Texas. ATP’s case was converted to a
    Chapter 7 proceeding on June 26, 2014. Rodney Tow was appointed Trustee
    for ATP’s estate.
    The Trustee filed suit on behalf of ATP’s estate against ATP’s Officers
    and Directors. The case was initially assigned to the Bankruptcy Court for the
    Southern District of Texas, but it was transferred to the U.S. District Court for
    the Southern District of Texas on June 29, 2015. Pursuant to a joint stipulation
    and order, the Trustee filed his First Amended Complaint. The case was
    subsequently transferred to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
    Louisiana. The Officers filed a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the First Amended
    Complaint. The Directors did the same. In response, the Trustee timely sought
    and received leave to amend. He then filed the Second Amended Complaint,
    which included a number of claims pertinent to this appeal. 3 The Officers and
    Directors then filed 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss the Second Amended
    Complaint.
    The district court granted the 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss. However, the
    Trustee in his opposition to the motions sought leave to amend. The district
    court granted leave to amend as to two claims and denied leave to amend as to
    the others, finding that amendment was largely futile.
    The Trustee then filed his Third Amended Complaint which raised only
    the fraudulent transfer claim against a few Officers. The Officers filed another
    3  The pertinent claims assert that: ATP’s cash bonuses and preferred stock dividend
    payout represented breaches of fiduciary duties by the Officers and Directors under Texas
    law; the cash bonuses amounted to fraudulent transfers for which ATP did not receive
    equivalent value in exchange; and the Officers and Directors conspired to breach their
    fiduciary duties, or aided and abetted such breaches.
    4
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    12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. The district court granted the motion. The district
    court then entered a final judgment dismissing the Trustee’s claims with
    prejudice. The Trustee then timely appealed. 4
    II. JURISDICTION
    The district court exercised subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28
    U.S.C. § 1334. The court entered a final judgment disposing of all parties’
    claims on January 4, 2017. The Trustee timely filed notice of appeal on
    February 1, 2017. We have jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 28 U.S.C.
    § 1291.
    III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
    A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim
    showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); see also
    Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Iqbal dictates that:
    To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
    factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is
    plausible on its face.” A claim has facial plausibility when the
    plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
    reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
    misconduct alleged.
    Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
    
    550 U.S. 544
    , 570 (2007)). A dismissal for failure to state a claim is reviewed
    de novo. Wallace v. Tesoro Corp., 
    796 F.3d 468
    , 475 (5th Cir. 2015) (citation
    omitted).
    The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure direct courts to freely give a party
    leave to amend its pleadings “when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
    4 Specifically, the Trustee appeals the district court’s dismissal of the breach of
    fiduciary duty claims related to the preferred stock dividends and cash bonuses, the
    fraudulent transfer claims related to the cash bonuses, and the civil conspiracy and aiding
    and abetting claims regarding the fiduciary duty breaches. The Trustee also argues on appeal
    that the district court abused its discretion in denying the Trustee leave to amend.
    5
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    “A district court’s decision to grant or deny leave to amend will be overturned
    only for abuse of discretion.” Davis v. United States, 
    961 F.2d 53
    , 57 (5th Cir.
    1991) (citation omitted).
    IV. DISCUSSION
    A.    The District Court Properly Dismissed the Fiduciary Duty
    Breach Claims
    Texas law provides that “[t]he elements of a breach of fiduciary duty
    claim are: (1) a fiduciary relationship between the plaintiff and defendant; (2)
    the defendant must have breached his fiduciary duty to the plaintiff; and (3)
    the defendant’s breach must result in injury to the plaintiff or benefit to the
    defendant.” Navigant Consulting, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 
    508 F.3d 277
    , 283 (5th Cir.
    2007) (quoting Jones v. Blume, 
    196 S.W.3d 440
    , 447 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006,
    pet. denied). Corporate officers and directors must fulfill three broad fiduciary
    duties: the duty of care, the duty of loyalty, and the duty of obedience. Gearhart
    Indus., Inc. v. Smith Int’l, Inc., 
    741 F.2d 707
    , 719 (5th Cir. 1984). It is well-
    established that while the corporation continues to operate, officers and
    directors of Texas corporations owe fiduciary duties to the corporation—not the
    corporation’s creditors. Conway v. Bonner, 
    100 F.2d 786
    , 787 (5th Cir. 1939);
    see Floyd v. Hefner, No. CIV.A. H-03-5693, 
    2006 WL 2844245
    , at *11–12 (S.D.
    Tex. Sept. 29, 2006), on recons. in part, 
    556 F. Supp. 2d 617
    (S.D. Tex. 2008)
    (finding Conway to still be binding precedent); 
    id. at *24
    (“Texas law does not
    impose fiduciary duties in favor of creditors on the directors of an insolvent,
    but still operating, corporation.”).
    “The business judgment rule in Texas generally protects corporate
    officers and directors, who owe fiduciary duties to the corporation, from
    liability for acts that are within the honest exercise of their business judgment
    and discretion.” Sneed v. Webre, 
    465 S.W.3d 169
    , 173 (Tex. 2015). One
    important outgrowth of the business judgment rule is that courts will not
    6
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    interfere with decisions made by a corporation’s officers or directors based on
    allegations of mismanagement, neglect, or abuse of discretion. 
    Id. at 186.
    Courts typically do not intervene in corporate affairs unless officers or directors
    commit acts that are ultra vires, fraudulent, or oppressive to minority
    shareholder rights. 
    Id. The Trustee
    asserts that the district court erred in dismissing two claims
    pertaining to alleged fiduciary duty violations. The Trustee argues that the
    district court erred in dismissing his assertions that ATP’s Officers and
    Directors breached their fiduciary duties when they permitted the payment of
    preferred stock dividends at the time of ATP’s impending bankruptcy. 5 He
    asserts that the business judgment rule does not shield these actions because
    they were grossly negligent. Second, the Trustee alleges that the district court
    erred in dismissing its claims that ATP’s Officers and Directors breached their
    fiduciary duties when they authorized the payment of cash bonuses to certain
    ATP officers in 2010 and 2011. The Trustee argues that these payments
    violated ATP’s internal policies regarding bonuses. The Trustee again asserts
    that these actions are not shielded by the business judgment rule because the
    acts were grossly negligent. We affirm the district court’s findings regarding
    each claim.
    1. Preferred Stock Dividend Payments
    The district court correctly rejected the Trustee’s claims that the decision
    authorizing preferred stock dividend payments violated any fiduciary duties
    the Officers or Directors may have owed. First, the Trustee fails to allege with
    specificity which Appellees authorized the preferred stock dividend payment.
    That is, the Trustee fails to distinguish between the different roles and
    5The Trustee in his pleadings frequently lumps together the Officers and Directors
    when asserting fiduciary duty violations.
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    responsibilities of the Officers and Directors. The court cannot reasonably infer
    which defendants are liable for the alleged misconduct, so the Trustee’s claims
    lack facial plausibility. See 
    Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
    . Second, the Trustee asserts
    but does not explain why the stock dividend payment would “necessarily
    harm[]” ATP’s “long-term viability and any chance of emerging from
    bankruptcy.” As the district court recognized, the Trustee has failed to plead
    any facts explaining why such a preferred stock dividend payment necessarily
    harmed the corporation itself—the entity to which the Officers and Directors
    owed a fiduciary duty. Thus, we affirm the district court’s determination that
    the Trustee failed to state a plausible breach of fiduciary duty claim with
    respect to the preferred stock dividend payment. See 
    id. 2. Cash
    Bonus Payments
    The Trustee alleges that the district court improperly dismissed the
    claim that certain Appellees are liable for breaching their fiduciary duties
    because they “authoriz[ed], ratif[ied], or receiv[ed] exorbitant cash bonuses
    despite that ATP was insolvent or in the zone of insolvency.” The Trustee
    asserts that the bonus payments violate ATP’s own bonus policies. The Trustee
    contends that the decision to pay large cash bonuses at a time when ATP
    performed poorly and saw decreases in its revenue and profits constituted a
    breach of the corporate executives’ fiduciary duties.
    The Trustee’s allegations suffer from similar flaws as his claims about
    the preferred stock dividend payments. First, the Trustee concludes without
    evidentiary support that the bonuses in question were excessive. Even at the
    pleading stage, the Trustee still needs to state claims with specificity—
    conclusory allegations will not suffice. See 
    Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
    . The Trustee
    does not explain how ATP’s compensation was excessive in comparison to other
    similarly sized public companies in the oil and gas industry at the time. Indeed,
    8
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    the Trustee offers no metric or explanation for finding the bonuses
    “exorbitant.” Second, the Trustee offers no persuasive explanation for why
    paying large cash bonuses constitutes a fiduciary duty breach. The business
    judgment rule likely bars such a claim. See 
    Sneed, 465 S.W.3d at 186
    . The
    district court correctly found that a corporate fiduciary’s decision to receive or
    award compensation in exchange for performing corporate services does not
    constitute a per se duty of loyalty breach. See Torch Liquidating Tr. ex rel.
    Bridge Assocs., LLC v. Stockstill, No. CIV.A. 07-133, 
    2008 WL 696233
    , at *9
    (E.D. La. Mar. 13, 2008), aff’d sub nom. Torch Liquidating Tr. ex rel. Bridge
    Assocs. L.L.C. v. Stockstill, 
    561 F.3d 377
    (5th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he argument that
    by accepting monetary compensation for doing their job and as well as other
    benefits the Defendants engaged in self-dealing, is meritless.”). Executives
    may judge that continuing to compensate corporate management during times
    of financial hardship may be necessary to retain those employees. And during
    a time of potential insolvency, retaining corporate leadership may be the best
    way to revitalize the corporation. Ultimately, the Trustee failed to plead with
    plausibility that the payment of cash bonuses constituted a fiduciary duty
    breach by any Officer or Director. We affirm the district court’s findings in this
    respect.
    B.    The District Court Properly Dismissed the Fraudulent Transfer
    Claims
    The Trustee asserts that the district court erred in dismissing the
    fraudulent transfer claims against the Officers and Directors with regard to
    the payment and receipt of certain cash bonuses. We agree with the court’s
    conclusion that the Trustee failed to state a plausible claim for relief based on
    the fraudulent transfer claim.
    The Trustee, under the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act
    (“TUFTA”), Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 24.005(a)(2), seeks to avoid as fraudulent
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    transfers cash and stock bonuses paid to the Appellees in 2010 and 2011. The
    Trustee argues that ATP received less than reasonably equivalent value in
    exchange for the “improper and exorbitant cash bonuses” received by certain
    Appellees. A detailed recitation of the law on this point is unnecessary. We
    affirm the district court’s conclusion that the Trustee’s factual allegations fail
    to plausibly state a claim for relief. See 
    Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
    ; cf. In re Felt
    Mfg. Co., Inc., 
    371 B.R. 589
    , 651 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2007) (“Bad business decisions
    without more cannot form the basis for a fraudulent conveyance action seeking
    recovery of compensation paid to an officer or a director.”). The Trustee failed
    to plausibly allege that the defendants did not honestly and diligently perform
    their jobs. Even if these executives accepted compensation for decisions that—
    in hindsight—were problematic, that does not prove that the Officers and
    Directors acted to defraud the creditors of their employer’s future estate.
    The Trustee also asserts that ATP was insolvent or had unreasonably
    small capital at the time of the bonus payments, thus the payments were
    fraudulent conveyances. However, the district court correctly found that the
    Trustee failed to present any financial data showing that ATP was actually
    insolvent or had little capital when making the complained-of bonus payments.
    Without a specific reference to ATP’s financial condition at the time—which
    the Trustee should be capable of making in light of his access to ATP’s financial
    books and records—the Trustee cannot plausibly show that ATP was insolvent
    at the time of the transfers. See 
    Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
    . The Trustee, again,
    offers conclusory assertions about ATP’s financial condition and subjective
    determinations regarding the amount of available capital. Conclusory
    allegations, even at the pleading stage, fail to plausibly state a claim upon
    which the court may grant relief. 
    Id. 10 Case:
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    C.     The District Court Properly Dismissed the Conspiracy and
    Aiding and Abetting Claims
    The Trustee asserts that the district court erred in dismissing claims
    against the Officers and Directors regarding a conspiracy to breach their
    fiduciary duties and aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty claims.
    The first issue is the civil conspiracy claim. “An actionable civil
    conspiracy is a combination by two or more persons to accomplish an unlawful
    purpose or to accomplish a lawful purpose by unlawful means.” Massey v.
    Armco Steel Co., 
    652 S.W.2d 932
    , 934 (Tex. 1983) (citations omitted). “The
    essential elements are: (1) two or more persons; (2) an object to be
    accomplished; (3) a meeting of minds on the object or course of action; (4) one
    or more unlawful, overt acts; and (5) damages as the proximate result.” 
    Id. The district
    court determined that the Trustee failed to allege a plausible
    claim for civil conspiracy. We agree. The trustee fails to plausibly allege that
    any meeting of minds occurred between any Appellees. See 
    Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
    . Moreover, because, as 
    discussed supra
    , the Trustee’s fiduciary duty
    breach claims fail, the Trustee cannot satisfy the “unlawful act” requirement
    of civil conspiracy. See 
    Massey, 652 S.W.2d at 934
    . Thus, the civil conspiracy
    claim fails as a matter of law.
    The aiding and abetting claim presents the same issue. Texas law
    contemplates liability for a party who knowingly participates in the breach of
    a duty of a fiduciary; the participating party becomes a joint tortfeasor with
    the breaching party. Meadows v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 
    492 F.3d 634
    , 639 (5th
    Cir. 2007) (citing Kinzbach Tool Co. v. Corbett–Wallace Corp., 
    160 S.W.2d 509
    ,
    514 (Tex. 1942)). A plaintiff bringing this claim must assert three elements:
    “(1) the existence of a fiduciary relationship; (2) that the third party knew of
    the fiduciary relationship; and (3) that the third party was aware that it was
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    participating in the breach of that fiduciary relationship.” 
    Id. (citations omitted).
           The district court rejected the Trustee’s aiding and abetting claims. The
    court concluded that aiding and abetting a fraudulent transfer is not a valid
    claim under either state or federal law. We need not render a final
    determination on this issue. Instead—as the district court recognized—the
    aiding and abetting claim fails because the Trustee has failed to plausibly
    allege a fiduciary duty breach. See 
    Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
    . Thus, the district
    court did not err in dismissing the Trustee’s aiding and abetting cause of
    action.
    D.     The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying the
    Trustee Partial Leave to Amend the Second Amended Complaint
    Courts should give leave to amend freely when justice so requires. Fed.
    R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). However, leave to amend is not automatically granted. See
    
    Davis, 961 F.2d at 57
    . A district court has discretion in deciding whether to
    grant leave to amend a complaint. 
    Id. A number
    of factors may give the court
    reason to deny a party leave to amend, including “undue delay, bad faith,
    undue prejudice to the opposing party by allowing the amendment, and futility
    of the amendment.” 
    Id. (citing Foman
    v. Davis, 
    371 U.S. 178
    , 182 (1962)). “A
    district court’s decision to grant or deny leave to amend will be overturned only
    for abuse of discretion.” 
    Id. The district
    court did not abuse its discretion in partially denying the
    Trustee leave to amend the Second Amended Complaint. The Trustee, on
    appeal, asserts that the district court “should have granted [the Trustee] leave
    to amend to cure any alleged deficiencies.” However, the district court correctly
    determined that many of the Trustee’s claims failed as a matter of law, and he
    would be unable to cure those defects through amendment. The district court
    found that Texas’s business judgement rule barred a number of the Trustee’s
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    claims, so pursuing those claims further would be futile. Moreover, the court
    found that the Trustee had a number of previous opportunities to plead his
    claims. As the district court aptly explained, “the Trustee continue[d] to rely
    almost exclusively on vague, conclusory allegations of wrongdoing, which he
    levels at all eighteen defendants without distinction.” The Trustee’s pattern of
    deficient pleading continues before this court. As the district court recognized,
    these pleading deficiencies are “particularly striking” because the Trustee has
    ample access to ATP’s books and records. As we have held, “[a]t some point a
    court must decide that a plaintiff has had fair opportunity to make his case; if,
    after that time, a cause of action has not been established, the court should
    finally dismiss the suit.” Jacquez v. Procunier, 
    801 F.2d 789
    , 792 (5th Cir.
    1986). Thus, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
    partially denying the Trustee’s motion for leave to amend the Second Amended
    Complaint.
    CONCLUSION
    We affirm the district court’s judgment that the Trustee failed to state a
    plausible claim upon which relief can be granted. We also hold that the district
    court did not abuse its discretion in partially denying the Trustee leave to
    amend the Second Amended Complaint.
    13