Jenkins v. Tarrant Cty Shrf's Ofc ( 2023 )

Case: 22-10244 Document: 00516881226 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/01/2023
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
___________ FILED
September 1, 2023
No. 22-10244
Lyle W. Cayce
Consolidated with Clerk
No. 22-10718
Summary Calendar
___________
Shanelle Jenkins, as surviving spouse, and Representative of
the Estate of Robert Geron Miller,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Tarrant County Sheriff’s Office; Bill E. Waybourn,
in his official capacity as Sheriff of Tarrant County, Texas;
Tarrant County; Texas Department of Public Safety,
Texas Rangers Division,
Defendants—Appellees.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:21-CV-910
______________________________
Case: 22-10244 Document: 00516881226 Page: 2 Date Filed: 09/01/2023
No. 22-10244
c/w No. 22-10718
ON PETITION FOR PANEL REHEARING
Before Jones, Haynes, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam: *
IT IS ORDERED that the petition for panel rehearing is
GRANTED for the purpose of ruling on an issue overlooked in the original
opinion. The original opinion is WITHDRAWN, and the following opinion
is SUBSTITUTED:
Plaintiff Shanelle Jenkins’s husband unexpectedly passed away while
he was in the Tarrant County jail. Jenkins brought suit against the
defendants—Tarrant County, the Tarrant County Sheriff’s Office, Bill
Waybourn in his official capacity as sheriff of Tarrant County, and the Texas
Rangers Division of the Texas Department of Public Safety—on his behalf.
Although her complaint admitted that she did not know the cause of, or
circumstances surrounding, her husband’s death, she nevertheless asserted
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for “wrongful death,” “excessive force,”
“inadequate training,” and for an “official policy or custom,” as well as a
few state law claims.
The defendants moved to dismiss, and the district court warned
Jenkins twice that her pleadings were “threadbare recitals of a cause of
action’s elements, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1940 (2009). Jenkins amended her
complaint, but the changes merely added a new defendant and did nothing to
remedy the problems. The defendants again moved to dismiss. Jenkins’s
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion
should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set
forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
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response asked for leave to amend her complaint a second time, promising
that this time she would rectify the deficiency.
The district court refused to allow Jenkins to amend the complaint a
second time. It dismissed Jenkins’s federal claims with prejudice and, also
declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law
claims, dismissed the state law claims without prejudice. It later denied her
Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment, which she brought after
presenting 252 pages of public records that she claims had been improperly
held from her until after the final judgment. She appeals the district court’s
(a) refusal to allow her to amend her complaint for a second time and (b) the
denial of her Rule 60(b) motion for relief.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Jenkins leave
to amend her complaint. “Except as authorized by the first sentence of Fed.
R. Civ. P. 15(a) for one amendment before service of a responsive pleading, a
complaint may be amended only by leave of the district court, and, while such
leave is to be freely given when justice so requires, the decision is left to the
sound discretion of the district court and will only be reversed on appeal
when that discretion has been abused.” U.S. ex rel. Willard v. Humana
Health Plan of Texas Inc., 336 F.3d 375, 387 (5th Cir. 2003). The district court
concluded that allowing further amendment would be futile and cause undue
delay, two justifications that this court has previously identified as
“[p]ermissible reasons for denying a motion for leave to amend.” Cent.
Laborers' Pension Fund v. Integrated Elec. Servs. Inc., 497 F.3d 546, 556 (5th
Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). It also gave the plaintiff ample warning and
time to fill out her threadbare complaint. After Jenkins failed to resolve the
problem in a timely fashion, the district court could permissibly find that
allowing further amendments was unwarranted. Moreover, the district court
also justifiably denied the request to amend because it did not include the
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proposed second amended complaint, thereby violating the district court’s
local rules. See N.D. Tex. L. Civ. R. 15.1.
Jenkin’s Rule 60(b) motion fares no better. Rule 60(b)(2) requires
(1) newly discovered evidence, (2) that could not have been discovered with
reasonable diligence in time for a Rule 59(b) motion, (3) and that is material,
controlling, or would have produced a different result. See Lyles v. Medtronic
Sofamor Danek, USA, Inc., 871 F.3d 305, 316 (5th Cir. 2017). Jenkins fails on
all three counts. The evidence she attempts to present is (a) medical records
that plaintiff had unfettered access to as the plaintiff’s decedent spouse,
45 C.F.R. § 164.510(b)(5), and (b) other public records available under the
Texas Public Information Act. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 552.001 et seq. Given
the ease of accessing this evidence, neither should count as “newly
discovered.” Moreover, given that Jenkins waited two years before
beginning her investigation, she did not exercise due diligence. She claims
that her proposed second amended complaint would have shown how the
evidence is material or controlling—but this argument was apparently not
made to the district court, which declined to sift through the evidence and
determine for itself whether the evidence was material. Rule 60(b)(3)
requires showing clear and convincing evidence of “fraud . . .
misrepresentation, or misconduct” on the part of the opposing party.
Montgomery v. Hall, 592 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1979). Jenkins alleges the public
records agency intentionally delayed in getting her the evidence; the agency
disagrees. We find no reason to conclude that the district court abused its
discretion by ruling that Jenkins lacked clear and convincing evidence of
misconduct.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
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