Sealed v. Sealed ( 2023 )

United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
____________ FILED
October 4, 2023
No. 22-11146 Lyle W. Cayce
____________ Clerk
Sealed Appellee,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Sealed Appellant,
Defendant—Appellant.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:20-CV-1344
______________________________
Before Clement, Haynes, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
Edith Brown Clement:
Appellant contends that the district court lacked statutory authority
to order her indefinite civil commitment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4246.
Because Appellant was committed to the custody of the Attorney General
under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) when the government’s § 4246 petition was filed,
we AFFIRM.
I.
Appellant suffers from bipolar schizoaffective disorder, a mental
condition which, among other symptoms, can cause persecutory delusions.
No. 22-11146
Appellant’s delusions led her to believe that the federal government—
specifically, former President Barack Obama—was conspiring with hip-hop
mogul Jay-Z and other members of the music industry to harm Appellant and
her family. To send a message to these government conspirators, on the
morning of August 30, 2019, Appellant threw a Molotov cocktail into the
lobby of the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services field office in
Oakland Park, Florida.
A.
Appellant was indicted in the Southern District of Florida, and the
parties jointly requested an evaluation of whether she was competent to stand
trial. On December 20, 2019, the court determined, based on medical
evaluation, that Appellant was “presently not competent to stand trial” and
therefore ordered her committed to the custody of the Attorney General for
hospitalization and treatment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d).
That statute requires a court to commit a mentally incompetent
criminal defendant to the custody of the Attorney General for hospitalization
and treatment:
(1) for such a reasonable period of time, not to exceed four
months, as is necessary to determine whether there is a
substantial probability that in the foreseeable future he will
attain the capacity to permit the proceedings to go forward; and
(2) for an additional reasonable period of time until—
(A) his mental condition is so improved that trial may
proceed, if the court finds that there is a substantial
probability that within such additional period of time he
will attain the capacity to permit the proceedings to go
forward; or
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No. 22-11146
(B) the pending charges against him are disposed of
according to law;
whichever is earlier.
18 U.S.C. § 4241(d).
In accordance with the terms of § 4241(d)(1), the district court’s
commitment order stated that Appellant would “be examined and treated for
a reasonable time, not to exceed four months, to determine whether there is
a substantial probability that in the foreseeable future she will attain the
capacity to permit [the criminal] proceedings to go forward.” Following
treatment, Appellant’s psychologist determined that a second period of
hospitalization and treatment would likely restore Appellant to competency.
So, on May 8, 2020, the court entered a second commitment order, again
explaining, in accordance with the statutory text, that Appellant would “be
examined and treated for a reasonable time, not to exceed four months, to
determine whether there is a substantial probability that in the foreseeable
future she will attain the capacity to permit [the criminal] proceedings to go
forward.”
On September 4, 2020—four days before the examination-and-
treatment period of the court’s second commitment order was set to
expire—Appellant’s psychologist submitted another evaluation which
concluded that Appellant was still not competent to stand trial and that
“there [was] no substantial likelihood that [she could] be restored to
competency within a reasonable time.” The court promptly convened a
conference with the parties on September 17, during which they discussed
the likelihood that Appellant would be found unrestorable to competency and
how to handle next steps in the case, including potential indefinite civil
commitment based on dangerousness under 18 U.S.C. § 4246. The parties
agreed that the court could not order a dangerousness evaluation without first
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No. 22-11146
making a final determination that the Appellant was incompetent and that
restoration was unlikely. So, the court held a final evidentiary hearing on the
issue of Appellant’s competency and, on November 3, 2020, found that she
was incompetent and unlikely to be restored to competency within a
reasonable time and ordered a dangerousness evaluation for purposes of
confinement under § 4246. The order required that the dangerousness
evaluation be completed, and any civil-commitment proceedings
commenced, within 45 days.
B.
On December 17, 2020, the government filed a dangerousness
certification in the Northern District of Texas along with a petition that
Appellant be civilly committed pursuant to § 4246. 1 The petition was
referred to a magistrate judge, who appointed counsel for Appellant and
scheduled a dangerousness hearing. During the hearing, Appellant’s counsel
objected to the petition on the basis that Appellant had been unlawfully
detained during the two-month period between September 8, 2020—when
the four-month examination-and-treatment period of the Florida court’s
second commitment order expired—and November 3, 2020—when that
court entered its final competency order. Following briefing from the parties
concerning Appellant’s objection, the magistrate judge overruled the
objection and granted the government’s petition for civil commitment under
§ 4246.
Appellant appealed, and we vacated and remanded on the basis that
the magistrate judge had not been authorized by the district court to issue a
_____________________
1
Civil-commitment proceedings must be initiated in “the court for the district in
which the person is confined.” 18 U.S.C. § 4246(a). Because Appellant was confined at a
Federal Medical Center in Tarrant, Texas, the civil-commitment proceedings were
conducted in the Northern District of Texas.
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No. 22-11146
dispositive order. Sealed Appellee v. Sealed Appellant, No. 21-10427, 2022 WL
597249 (5th Cir. Feb. 28, 2022) (per curiam). On remand, the district court
construed the magistrate judge’s order as a report and recommendation and,
after further briefing from the parties, adopted it. On November 1, 2022, the
district court ordered Appellant civilly committed pursuant to § 4246. This
appeal ensued.
II.
We review the presented question of statutory construction de novo.
See Sealed Appellee 1 v. Sealed Appellant 1, 767 F.3d 418, 421 (5th Cir. 2013). 2
III.
A.
18 U.S.C. § 4246 authorizes indefinite-commitment proceedings
against a person “who has been committed to the custody of the Attorney
General pursuant to section 4241(d).” 3 Appellant contends that, as of
September 8, 2020—when the second commitment order’s four-month
examination-and-treatment period expired—she was no longer “committed
_____________________
2
The government contends that Appellant waived the claim she presents on appeal
by agreeing to the timeline of events in the Florida court. But waiver requires an
“intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” United States v. Olano, 507
U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (emphases added) (citation omitted). And we see no evidence that
Appellant’s criminal counsel either “knew of” the potential § 4241(d) timing issue or
“consciously chose to forego it.” See United States v. Arviso-Mata, 442 F.3d 382, 384 (5th
Cir. 2006). Rather, it appears that Appellant’s criminal counsel entirely overlooked the
potential legal ramifications of the timeline that they agreed to, which renders Appellant’s
claims, at most, forfeited and thus subject to plain-error review. Id.; see also Sneed v. Austin
Indep. Sch. Dist., 50 F.4th 483, 490 (5th Cir. 2022). Because we find that Appellant’s claim
fails even under the stricter de novo standard, we need not definitively address the forfeiture
issue and its potential effect on the standard of review. See United States v. Knowlton, 993
F.3d 354, 357 (5th Cir. 2021).
3
The statute also applies to two other classes of individuals, but the parties agree
that Appellant does not fall into either one of those other classes.
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No. 22-11146
to the custody of the Attorney General pursuant to section 4241(d)” and
therefore was not subject to indefinite commitment under § 4246 when the
government filed its petition in December 2020.
Our inquiry into whether Appellant was still “committed to the
custody of the Attorney General pursuant to section 4241(d)” on December
17, 2020 begins and ends with the unambiguous language of the statutory
text. See BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004). Section
4241(d) sets forth two time-periods during which a criminal defendant is
committed to the custody of the Attorney General. First, under subsection
(d)(1), the individual may be committed for up to four months “to determine
whether there is a substantial probability that in the foreseeable future he will
attain the capacity to permit the proceedings to go forward.” Then, under
subsection (d)(2), the individual remains committed “for an additional
reasonable period of time” until either “(A) his mental condition is so
improved that trial may proceed,” or “(B) the pending charges against him
are disposed of according to law,” whichever is earlier. Thus, under the plain
language of the statute, even after the four-month period set forth in
subsection (d)(1) expired, Appellant remained “committed” under
subsection (d)(2) until one of three triggering events occurred: (A) she was
rendered competent to stand trial, (B) her criminal charges were disposed of,
or (C) the duration of her commitment became unreasonable. No such
triggering event occurred.
First, Appellant was never rendered competent to stand trial. To be
sure, there were initially hopeful signs that the treatment for her mental
condition would prove effective. In fact, on April 23, 2020, her treating
psychologist told the court that there was “a substantial likelihood that she
could be restored to competency” with further treatment. But that additional
treatment was unfortunately unsuccessful, and on September 4, 2020, the
treating psychologist informed the court that his professional opinion had
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No. 22-11146
changed and there was “no substantial likelihood that [Appellant could] be
restored to competency within a reasonable period of time.”
Second, Appellant’s criminal charges were still pending when the
dangerousness certificate was filed on December 17, 2020. And third,
Appellant does not argue that her three months of additional confinement
between September and December 2020 was of unreasonable duration. 4
Accordingly, Appellant remained in the custody of the Attorney General
pursuant to § 4241(d) on December 17, 2020, and was therefore properly
subject to indefinite-civil-commitment proceedings under § 4246.
B.
Despite presenting this case as a “question of statutory
interpretation” in her opening brief, Appellant claims in her reply brief that,
actually, the language of the statute “is beside the point.” Instead, says
Appellant, the second commitment order “set a four-month limit on the
second period of hospitalization” irrespective of the statutory limits. We
disagree.
The district court’s May 8, 2020 order says nothing about limiting the
total duration of Appellant’s second hospitalization to four months. Rather,
it simply reiterates—nearly verbatim—the four-month limitation on the
duration of the initial examination-and-treatment period under § 4241(d)(1).
True, the second order—unlike the first—references § 4241(d)(2)(A). But
that reference merely sets forth a basis for the court’s commitment order.
_____________________
4
Appellant has therefore forfeited any such unreasonableness argument twice-
over: first by agreeing, without objection, to the district court’s proposed timeline for her
competency hearing, see United States v. Curbow, 16 F.4th 92, 115 (4th Cir. 2021), and second
by failing to raise the issue on appeal, Rollins v. Home Depot USA, 8 F.4th 393, 397 (5th Cir.
2021).
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No. 22-11146
Remember, at this point, Appellant’s psychologist believed that Appellant
could potentially be restored to competency with further treatment. And
subsection (d)(2)(A) permits additional hospitalization for such treatment
only “if the court finds that there is a substantial probability that within such
additional period of time [the individual] will attain the capacity to permit the
proceedings to go forward.” The court’s mention of that provision was
simply in recognition of this statutory authorization and requirement.
Notably, the entirety of the order was focused on the hope that Appellant
would be restored to competency. There was no consideration of what would
happen if Appellant could not be restored to competency. So, when that came
to pass, subsection (d)(2)(B) came into play. See United States v. Magassouba,
544 F.3d 387, 406 n.9 (2d Cir. 2008) (“Section 4241(d)(2)(B) . . . permit[s]
additional custodial hospitalization of incompetent defendants who are not
expected to regain competency until the criminal charges against them are
dismissed in favor of civil commitment proceedings.”).
That the district court did not intend to set a “hard limit” on the
duration of Appellant’s second commitment is evident in the subsequent
proceedings before that very court. Surely, if the Appellant’s continued
hospitalization was in violation of the district court’s order, the judge would
have said something about it. So, too, would have Appellant’s criminal
counsel. But when the four-month period came and went, the judge and
counsel—operating with full knowledge that Appellant remained
institutionalized—simply held a status conference and scheduled a final
competency hearing for November with nary a word to suggest that anyone
believed Appellant’s continued confinement to be in violation of the court’s
commitment order.
IV.
Because Appellant’s continued hospitalization complied with the
plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) and the district court’s orders,
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No. 22-11146
Appellant remained “committed to the custody of the Attorney General” on
December 17, 2020, and was therefore properly subject to indefinite-civil-
commitment proceedings under 18 U.S.C. § 4246.
AFFIRMED.
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