United States v. Smith ( 2023 )

Case: 22-10795 Document: 00516888162 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/08/2023
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
____________ FILED
September 8, 2023
No. 22-10795 Lyle W. Cayce
____________ Clerk
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Shaquille Dewayne Smith,
Defendant—Appellant.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 2:22-CR-18-1
______________________________
Before Jones, Stewart, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Shaquille Dewayne Smith (“Smith”) appeals his guilty plea
conviction and sentence for possession of a firearm by a felon. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1). Because he fails to demonstrate that his guilty plea was invalid
or that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional, we AFFIRM.
_____________________
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-10795 Document: 00516888162 Page: 2 Date Filed: 09/08/2023
No. 22-10795
I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2016, Smith was sentenced to five years in prison after pleading
guilty in state court to two felony offenses: (1) evading arrest in a motor
vehicle1, and (2) taking a weapon from a peace officer.2 In 2022, a few months
before completing parole for both convictions, Smith was stopped by police
officers for a traffic violation. During the stop, officers saw a firearm on the
passenger’s seat and arrested and charged Smith for being a felon in
possession of a firearm. See id. Subsequently, a grand jury indicted Smith as
charged.
Pursuant to a written plea agreement, Smith pleaded guilty to
possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of § 922(g)(1). As part of the
plea agreement, Smith waived his right to appeal or collaterally challenge his
conviction or sentence, with the exception of a sentence imposed in excess of
the statutory maximum or resulting from an arithmetic error. He further
waived his right to challenge the voluntariness of his plea or waiver, or to
bring claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court accepted
the plea agreement, and sentenced Smith to 60 months of imprisonment,
followed by a one-year term of supervised release. Smith timely appealed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because Smith did not raise a constitutional challenge, or otherwise
object to his conviction and sentence before the district court, we review for
plain error. “Plain error is clear or obvious error that affects substantial rights
of the defendant and seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Sanchez, 325 F.3d 600,
_____________________
1
See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 38.04.
2
See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 38.14.
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603 (5th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). To demonstrate plain
error, Smith must show that: (1) an error occurred, (2) the error is clear and
obvious, and (3) the error affected his substantial rights. Puckett v. United
States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). Upon making such a showing, this court has
the discretion to remedy the error only if it “seriously affect[s] the fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v.
Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936). Where an issue is disputed or unresolved,
or where there is an absence of controlling authority, there can be no clear or
obvious error. United States v. Rodriguez-Parra, 581 F.3d 227, 230–31 (5th
Cir. 2009).
III. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Smith advances two primary arguments to support his
position that his guilty plea conviction is invalid. First, he argues that the facts
to which he pleaded were insufficient to show the requisite interstate nexus.
He further asserts that § 922(g) is unconstitutional because it does not have
a substantial effect on interstate commerce and thus exceeds Congress’s
authority under the Commerce Clause. Second, Smith argues that the
Supreme Court’s recent decision in N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen,
142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022), supports a finding that § 922(g)(1) infringes upon his
Second Amendment right to bear arms and is, therefore, unconstitutional.
We are unpersuaded by either argument.
A. § 922(g)(1) and the Commerce Clause
As a preliminary matter, Smith rightly concedes that his first
argument is foreclosed by Fifth Circuit precedent. United States v. Alcantar,
733 F.3d 143, 145 (5th Cir. 2013) (concluding that this court is bound by prior
precedent establishing that § 922(g)(1) is a valid exercise of Congress’s
authority under the Commerce Clause). For this reason, we reject his nexus
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and Commerce Clause arguments as meritless and do not discuss them
further herein.
B. Enforcement of the Appellate Waiver
Smith next argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in Bruen
supports his assertion that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional because it
encroaches on an individual’s right to bear arms as guaranteed by the Second
Amendment. The Government argues that Smith’s plain-error challenge to
the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is waived by the terms of his appeal waiver
in his plea agreement. Although the Government advances a compelling
argument regarding the applicability of Smith’s appeal waiver, we
nevertheless elect to evaluate his argument on the merits. See United States
v. Douglas, No. 22-10385, 2023 WL 2264199 (5th Cir. Feb. 28, 2023).
C. § 922(g)(1) and the Second Amendment Right to Bear Arms
Recall that to establish plain error, Smith must show a forfeited error
that is clear or obvious and that affected his substantial rights. Puckett, 556
U.S. at 135. This court then has the discretion, not the obligation, to correct
the error, but “only if the error ‘seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or
public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” Id. (quoting United States v.
Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993)). An error is not clear or obvious where an
issue is disputed or unresolved, or where there is an absence of controlling
authority. Rodriguez-Parra, 581 F.3d at 230–31.
In Bruen, the Supreme Court found that the State of New York’s
public-carry licensing regime was unconstitutional because New York issued
licenses “only when an applicant demonstrate[d] a special need for self-
defense,” thus preventing law-abiding citizens with ordinary self-defense
needs from exercising their Second Amendment right to bear arms. Bruen,
142 S. Ct. at 2122. Prior to the Court’s issuance of Bruen, this court and our
sister circuits employed “a ‘two-step’ framework for analyzing Second
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Amendment challenges that combine[d] history with means-end scrutiny.”
Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2125. Under this framework, we first determined whether
the challenged law impinged upon a right protected by the Second
Amendment. Hollis v. Lynch, 827 F.3d 436, 446 (5th Cir. 2016). If not, the
law passed constitutional muster. Id. at 446–47. But if it did, we moved on to
the second step which was to determine “whether to apply intermediate or
strict scrutiny to the law, and then to determine whether the law survived the
proper level of scrutiny.” Id. at 447.
In Bruen, the Court declined to adopt this two-step framework,
instead opting to establish a new test for assessing the constitutionality of a
statute under the Second Amendment. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2125–26, 2129–
30. “When the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an
individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct.
The [G]overnment must then justify its regulation by demonstrating that it
is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Id.
at 2129-30. Only if the Government meets its burden “may a court conclude
that the individual’s conduct falls outside the Second Amendment’s
‘unqualified command.’” Id. at 2130 (internal citation omitted).
Prior to Bruen, this court routinely rejected Second Amendment
challenges to § 922(g)(1). See, e.g., United States v. Darrington, 351 F.3d 632,
633–34 (5th Cir. 2003); United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir.
2001); United States v. Ybarra, 70 F.3d 362, 364 (5th Cir. 1995). We recently
stated on de novo review, however, that “Bruen clearly fundamentally
change[d] our analysis of laws that implicate the Second Amendment” and
rendered our previously adopted two-step framework precedent “obsolete.”
United States v. Rahimi, 61 F.4th 443, 450–61 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 143
S.Ct. 2688 (2023) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Our
reasoning in Rahimi demonstrated our analytical shift after the Bruen
decision. Relying on the Bruen framework, we held in Rahimi that §
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922(g)(8), which bans the possession of a firearm by a person subject to a
domestic violence restraining order, was unconstitutional. Id. at 450–51.
Here, Smith argues that Bruen supports his assertion that Congress
exceeded its powers by enacting § 922(g)(1), thus rendering it
unconstitutional under the Second Amendment. He further contends that
the district court’s failure to advise him on § 922(g)(1)’s unconstitutional
infringement constituted reversible error. Nevertheless, he concedes in his
reply brief on appeal that he cannot show clear or obvious error at this time.
We agree.
Post Bruen, the Eighth Circuit recently concluded that § 922(g)(1)
remains constitutional when applied to convicted felons. United States v.
Jackson, 69 F.4th 495, 502 (8th Cir. 2023). Likewise, this court recently held
in an unpublished opinion that, in the absence of binding precedent post-
Bruen—§ 922(n)’s prohibition of the possession of firearms while under
indictment—“is not consonant with a finding of plain error.” United States
v. Avila, No. 22-50088, 2022 WL 17832287, at *2 (5th Cir. Dec. 21, 2022)
(per curiam). Moreover, in another unpublished opinion, a panel of this court
observed that “there is no binding precedent explicitly holding that §
922(g)(1) is unconstitutional on its face.” United States v. Garza, 22-51021,
2023 WL 4044442, at *1 (5th Cir. June 15, 2023) (per curiam).
Consequently, given the lack of binding authority deeming § 922(g)(1)
unconstitutional, Smith cannot demonstrate an error that is clear or obvious.
Rodriguez-Parra, 581 F.3d at 230–31. Accordingly, we hold that the district
court did not plainly err by accepting Smith’s guilty plea.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s judgment is
AFFIRMED.
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