Atwood v. Christopher ( 2023 )

Case: 22-20310 Document: 00516891682 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/12/2023
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
____________ FILED
September 12, 2023
No. 22-20310 Lyle W. Cayce
____________ Clerk
David Ray Atwood,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Kate E. Christopher; Executive Director Bryan
Collier; Warden Steve McClarin; Captain Cory Webb,
Defendants—Appellees.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:20-CV-1368
______________________________
Before Dennis, Engelhardt, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam: *
David Ray Atwood, Texas prisoner #01749941, proceeding pro se and
in forma pauperis, sued a prison medical provider and other prison officials
after he sustained a head injury in his cell. Concluding that Atwood had failed
to state a claim for which relief may be granted, the district court sua sponte
dismissed Atwood’s claims with prejudice under 28 U.S.C.
_____________________
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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No. 22-20310
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). On appeal, Atwood only challenges the dismissal of his
deliberate indifference claims against the medical provider. Therefore, he has
abandoned any challenge to the dismissal of his other claims. See Yohey v.
Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224–25 (5th Cir. 1993). Construing Atwood’s pro se
briefing liberally, see Alderson v. Concordia Par. Corr. Facility, 848 F.3d 415,
419 (5th Cir. 2017), he argues on appeal that the district court failed to accept
his deliberate indifference allegations as true before dismissing his claims.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires a district court to sua sponte
dismiss a prisoner’s in forma pauperis suit if, among other things, the court
finds that the prisoner has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted or the action is frivolous. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(ii). Using
the same standards that govern dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6), we review
dismissals for failure to state a claim de novo. See Legate v. Livingston, 822 F.3d
207, 209–10 (5th Cir. 2016). And we review a district court’s dismissal of a
claim as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) for an abuse of
discretion. See Carmouche v. Hooper, 77 F.4th 362, 366 (5th Cir. 2023).
The Supreme Court has held that prison officials violate the Eighth
Amendment if they act with “deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious
medical needs, constituting an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”
Easter v. Powell, 467 F.3d 459, 463 (5th Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted). A
prison official acts with deliberate indifference if he is aware of and ignores a
serious risk to an inmate’s health. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837
(1994). “Deliberate indifference is an extremely high standard.” Domino v.
Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001). A plaintiff must
demonstrate that a defendant denied him treatment, purposefully gave him
improper treatment, ignored his medical complaints, “or engaged in any
similar conduct that would clearly evince a wanton disregard for any serious
medical needs.” Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 346 (5th Cir. 2006)
(quotation omitted). Unsuccessful medical treatment, negligence, medical
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malpractice, disagreement with medical care, or decisions whether to provide
additional treatment do not constitute deliberate indifference. Id. Further, a
treatment delay violates the Eighth Amendment only “if there has been
deliberate indifference [that] results in substantial harm.” Mendoza v.
Lynaugh, 989 F.2d 191, 195 (5th Cir. 1993).
“To assist district courts in discerning whether in forma pauperis
prisoner complaints may proceed, [this Court] has adopted a procedure from
the Tenth Circuit that allows the district court to obtain a supplemental
record to further flesh out the facts behind a prisoner’s complaint.” Davis v.
Lumpkin, 35 F.4th 958, 963 (5th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted); see also
Martinez v. Aaron, 570 F.2d 317 (10th Cir. 1978) (creating the procedure).
That record, known as a Martinez report, is generated by officials who
investigate the inmate’s allegations and “compil[e] an administrative record
that acts like an affidavit to aid the district court in screening the complaint.”
Davis, 35 F.4th at 963. But the district court cannot use the Martinez report
to resolve factual disputes: “[I]f the Martinez report conflicts with the pro se
plaintiff’s allegations, the district court [still] must accept the plaintiff’s
allegations as true, not the records in the report.” Id. at 964.
Here, even assuming the district court wrongly used the Martinez
report to conclude that Atwood failed to state a claim for deliberate
indifference under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), we conclude that any error was
harmless. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 61. That is because Atwood’s deliberate
indifference claims are independently frivolous under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). A
district court may dismiss as frivolous the complaint of a prisoner
proceeding in forma pauperis if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Denton
v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31–32 (1992). It is clear from the medical records
compiled with the Martinez report that “medical personnel repeatedly
diagnosed, treated, and monitored” Atwood’s injuries. See Richie v. Univ. of
Tex. Med. Branch Hosp. Galveston, 581 F. App’x 405, 407 (5th Cir. 2014). And
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that does not conflict with any allegation in Atwood’s complaint. At most,
Atwood alleges that he disagrees with the care he received or that the prison
medical official committed medical malpractice. † See Gobert, 463 F.3d at 346.
We have long held that deliberate indifference requires more.
AFFIRMED.
_____________________
†
Atwood’s allegations that he did not receive medication at particular times after
his injury are not cognizable deliberate indifference claims. See Richie, 581 F. App’x at 407
(quoting Gobert, 463 F.3d at 346) (“[T]he decision whether to provide additional treatment
is a classic example of a matter of medical judgment.”).
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