United States v. Gutierrez-Garcia ( 2023 )

United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
____________ FILED
September 13, 2023
No. 22-50742 Lyle W. Cayce
____________ Clerk
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Fidel Gutierrez-Garcia,
Defendant—Appellant.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. 4:21-CR-1073-4
______________________________
Before Willett, Engelhardt, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
After a bench trial, the district court found Fidel Gutierrez-Garcia
guilty of possessing with intent to distribute marijuana and sentenced him to
two years of imprisonment. On appeal, Gutierrez argues the district court
abused its discretion when it denied his motion to dismiss the indictment.
Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.
_____________________
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
No. 22-50742
I.
Border Patrol agents found Gutierrez and three other suspects with
backpacks near the Texas-Mexico border. The packs held about 108
kilograms of marijuana. Gutierrez was indicted for importing one hundred
kilograms or more of marijuana, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a), 960(a), (b)(2), and
possessing with intent to distribute one hundred kilograms or more of
marijuana, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B).
At his initial appearance, Gutierrez told the court, through a Spanish
interpreter, that his primary language was Tepehuan (a dialect spoken by
certain indigenous people in Mexico). Gutierrez also stated that he spoke “a
little” Spanish and was able to understand the interpreter “a little bit.”
ROA.133.
Gutierrez subsequently moved to dismiss the indictment without
prejudice. He argued that he was unable to understand the proceedings
against him or to communicate with his attorney absent a Tepehuan
interpreter. The district court held an evidentiary hearing on Gutierrez’s
motion to dismiss. At the hearing, Gutierrez called his attorney, Bob Garcia.
Garcia, a fluent Spanish speaker, testified that he had discovered during his
first meeting with Gutierrez that his native language was Tepehuan and that
he spoke limited Spanish. Garcia stated that, in his opinion, Gutierrez was
unable to understand the legal concepts and rights needed to participate in
his defense. Gutierrez also called Luis Navarro, a Spanish interpreter who
had previously interpreted for Gutierrez at his initial appearance. Navarro
testified that he was unable to communicate the necessary legal concepts with
Gutierrez in Spanish. Navarro also stated that his attempts to locate a
Tepehuan interpreter had failed.
The Government called interpreter Christian Saenz, who interpreted
for Gutierrez in Spanish during his post-arrest interview. Saenz noted that
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Gutierrez gave comprehensible Spanish responses to his Spanish questions.
He noted that Gutierrez did not give long answers but did give interpretable
phrases in Spanish. The Government also called one of Gutierrez’s co-
defendants, Guadalupe Arguelles-Quintero. Arguelles testified that he
remembered Gutierrez speaking Spanish with himself and other members of
their group during their six-night backpacking trip from Mexico to the United
States.
Gutierrez then voluntarily took the stand and testified with the help of
a Spanish interpreter. ROA.219. Gutierrez testified that he understood he
had been arrested by the police because he “was carrying pot.” ROA.221. He
answered additional questions about his role in carrying the drugs and said he
thought he would be paid to carry them into the United States. And he
indicated he understood the maximum sentence he could face if convicted.
The district court denied Gutierrez’s motion to dismiss the
indictment. The court concluded that Gutierrez’s testimony was the best
evidence of his ability to speak Spanish. ROA.78. The court reasoned that
Gutierrez “was able to communicate via the [c]ourt’s Spanish interpreter
with ease, despite being asked long complex questions.” ROA.78. And the
court concluded that its observations of Gutierrez communicating in
Spanish, buttressed by the testimony of Arguelles and Navarro, supported
the denial of the motion to dismiss. The court explained that Gutierrez’s
inability to understand legal concepts was less troubling than “not being able
to understand the language . . . we’re interpreting . . . in.” ROA.229.
During the subsequent bench trial, the parties stipulated that
Gutierrez possessed with intent to distribute marijuana. The district court
found Gutierrez guilty of possessing with intent to distribute 100 kilograms
or more of marijuana. The district court sentenced Gutierrez to two years
imprisonment, a bottom-of-the-Guidelines sentence, and three years of
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supervised release. Gutierrez timely appealed, arguing that the district court
failed to provide an appropriate interpreter.
II.
We review the decision to appoint an interpreter for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Bell, 367 F.3d 452, 463 (5th Cir. 2004). A court
abuses its discretion when “it bases its decision on an error of law or a clearly
erroneous assessment of the evidence.” United States v. Handlon, 53 F.4th
348, 351 (5th Cir. 2022) (quotation omitted).
When a defendant “only or primarily” speaks “a language other
than” English, the Court Interpreters Act requires that a district court
“utilize the services” of an interpreter “in judicial proceedings instituted by
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1827(d)(1)(A). A defendant’s statutory right
to an interpreter under the Act is violated where the lack of an interpreter
inhibited a defendant’s comprehension of the proceedings or communication
to such an extent that the proceedings were “fundamentally unfair.” Bell,
367 F.3d at 464 (quotation omitted). This is “a two-step inquiry.” United
States v. Hasan (Hasan I), 526 F.3d 653, 666 (10th Cir. 2008) (Gorsuch, J.)
(quotation omitted). “First, the district court must assess whether
comprehension or communication was inhibited.” Id. If so, then the court
must ask whether the proceedings were rendered fundamentally unfair as a
result. Id. We analyze each step in turn.
First, the district court did not clearly err in concluding that Gutierrez
could understand Spanish well enough to understand the proceedings against
him. See United States v. Tapia, 631 F.2d 1207, 1209 (5th Cir. 1980)
(acknowledging “that the necessity for . . . an interpreter is a question of
fact”); United States v. Hasan (Hasan II), 609 F.3d 1121, 1127 (10th Cir. 2010)
(“Under the abuse-of-discretion standard, we review the district court’s
factual determinations for clear error.”). “There is no clear error if the
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district court’s finding is plausible in light of the record as a whole.” United
States v. Johnson, 14 F.4th 342, 349 (5th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted).
Here, the district court held an evidentiary hearing and heard from
multiple witnesses before denying Gutierrez’s motion to dismiss. The
district court observed Gutierrez testifying through a Spanish interpreter at
the evidentiary hearing firsthand. From its firsthand observation, the district
court concluded that Gutierrez was able to communicate through the Spanish
interpreter “fluidly,” “quickly,” and “with ease.” ROA.78, 220-26. During
the hearing, Gutierrez explained through the Spanish interpreter that he
understood he was arrested “[b]ecause [he] was carrying pot.” ROA.221.
Gutierrez further explained that he was offered a job “[t]o pick the pecans”
but that, when he arrived in Chihuahua, he learned that the job was actually
smuggling marijuana. ROA.222. The district court concluded that Gutierrez
could understand Spanish sufficiently well that he was capable of
understanding and answering “long complex questions” in Spanish,
ROA.78, such as whether he understood that the maximum penalty for his
crime is 20 years, ROA.223. We have said before that the district court “who
is in direct contact with the witnesses, [a]ppellants, and the interpreters must
be given wide discretion” in determining whether an interpreter is needed.
Bell, 367 F.3d at 464 (quotation omitted). That is, of course, because the
district court was “in the best position to assess [Gutierrez’s] language
usage, comfort level[,] and intelligibility” at the evidentiary hearing. Hasan
II, 609 F.3d at 1127 (quotation omitted).
The district court also relied on the testimony of additional witnesses
at the evidentiary hearing in denying Gutierrez’s motion. According to those
witnesses, when the Government agent conducted Gutierrez’s post-arrest
interview through a Spanish interpreter, Gutierrez understood Spanish and
gave “complete phrases to interpret,” so that “the interpretation was
flowing orderly.” ROA.202. The agent learned from all three of Gutierrez’s
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co-defendants that they spoke to Gutierrez in Spanish during the
backpacking expedition. ROA.13, 191–92. Additionally, the testimony of one
of Gutierrez’s co-defendants at the evidentiary hearing corroborated that
information.
True, there is evidence in the record that Gutierrez did sometimes
struggle to understand legal concepts. But there is ample record evidence to
support the district court’s conclusion that Gutierrez’s inability to
“understand legal concepts” did not stem from his inability to “understand
the language” that the proceedings were being interpreted in. ROA.229. The
record indicates that Gutierrez never attended school. Further, the district
court’s staff interpreter testified that Gutierrez could not understand legal
concepts in any language because those concepts do not exist in the
Tepehuan language or culture. And again, the district court is in the best
position to weigh those challenges against the rest of the record to determine
whether Gutierrez’s comprehension and communication were inhibited by
the lack of an interpreter. See Bell, 367 F.3d at 464.
Second, even assuming Gutierrez’s comprehension and
communication were inhibited, the proceedings below were not
fundamentally unfair. See id. at 463 (“The ultimate issue is whether the use
of the interpreter made the trial fundamentally unfair.” (quotation omitted)).
“[A]n inquiry into fundamental fairness focuses on whether the purposes of
the Act—comprehension of the proceedings and the ability to effectively
communicate—were adequately met.” Hasan I, 526 F.3d at 667 (quotation
omitted). “Minor deviations from ideal communication therefore have been
held not to render a proceeding fundamentally unfair.” Id. Here, Gutierrez
knowingly and voluntarily admitted his guilt to the charge of possession of
marijuana with intent to distribute. He was able to explain the facts
underlying his crime and accepted responsibility for them. He also repeatedly
said that he understood the punishment he faced. Any deviations from ideal
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communication in the proceedings below were sufficiently minor that they
did not render the proceedings fundamentally unfair.
AFFIRMED.
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