United States v. Williams ( 2023 )

Case: 23-60211 Document: 00516940785 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/23/2023
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
____________ United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
No. 23-60211 FILED
Summary Calendar October 23, 2023
____________ Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Gregory Jamal Williams,
Defendant—Appellant.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
USDC No. 3:20-CR-147-1
______________________________
Before Haynes, Graves, and Higginson, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam: *
Following his guilty plea conviction on multiple drug-trafficking
charges, Gregory Jamal Williams was sentenced within the guidelines range
to 360 months of imprisonment. On appeal, he contends that the sentencing
enhancements he received for importation of methamphetamine, pursuant to
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(5), and for being a manager or supervisor, pursuant to
_____________________
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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No. 23-60211
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b), were error. He also contends that the district court
erred in refusing to depart downwardly based on § 2D1.1’s harsher treatment
of “ice” as compared to actual methamphetamine, which treatment he
asserts lacks an empirical basis and results in unwanted sentencing
disparities.
Williams briefs no argument challenging the district court’s
assessment of a two-level enhancement for possessing a dangerous weapon
under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1), and he likewise briefs no argument challenging
the district court’s drug-quantity calculations under the methamphetamine
Guideline. Accordingly, he has abandoned any such challenge. See United
States v. Still, 102 F.3d 118, 122 n.7 (5th Cir. 1996); Beasley v. McCotter,
798 F.2d 116, 118 (5th Cir. 1986). Although he additionally asserts that the
district court violated his due process rights, his right to the effective
assistance of counsel, and his Eighth Amendment rights by basing his
sentence on “ice” rather than actual methamphetamine, the arguments are
wholly conclusional and inadequately briefed and thus will not be considered.
See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A); United States v. Scroggins, 599 F.3d 433,
446-47 (5th Cir. 2010); see also Beasley, 798 F.2d at 118.
Inasmuch as Williams contends that the importation enhancement is
error because the Government did not present direct evidence that the drugs
he sold in fact came from a Mexican source or that he knew that they were
imported, the argument is patently incorrect. See United States
v. Arayatanon, 980 F.3d 444, 452 (5th Cir. 2020) (upholding importation
enhancement based on circumstantial evidence). Special Agent Rayner’s
testimony at sentencing provided sufficient proof of strong indicators that the
drugs involved in the offense came from Mexico, including testimony that
the high purity, high volume, low cost, and unvarying color and quality of the
drugs were consistent with the large-scale production of methamphetamine
in Mexico, which testimony was corroborated by the DEA reports the
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Government had submitted prior to sentencing. Special Agent Rayner also
presented proof that Williams and his girlfriend had traveled from Jackson,
Mississippi, to the border town of El Paso, indicating a nexus to Mexican
supply, and he further explained that Williams had ventured into the sale of
fentanyl-laced heroin, a practice promoted by Mexican drug cartels.
Williams briefs no argument challenging the district court’s reliance
on this evidence to support a plausible inference of importation, and he
specifically fails to demonstrate that the Government’s evidence was
inaccurate or untrue. See United States v. Gomez-Alvarez, 781 F.3d 787, 796
(5th Cir. 2015); see also Still, 102 F.3d at 122 n.7; Beasley, 798 F.2d at 118.
Given Special Agent Rayner’s testimony, the district court’s finding of
importation is plausible in light of the record as a whole, and this court will
therefore uphold the § 2D1.1(b)(5) enhancement. See United States v. Brune,
991 F.3d 652, 667 (5th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 755 (2022);
Arayatanon, 980 F.3d at 452; United States v. Rico, 864 F.3d 381, 383 (5th Cir.
2017).
Next, Williams challenges the district court’s assessment of a three-
level enhancement for his role in the offense. He urges that he was a mere
participant in the drug-trafficking conspiracy and that did not set prices or
direct transactions and thus was not a manager or supervisor for purposes of
§ 3B1.1(b).
These conclusional assertions are directly refuted by the record,
specifically Special Agent Rayner’s testimony that, in four controlled
purchases with a confidential informant (CI), Williams directly negotiated
the terms of the sale, including the quantity, type, and price of the drugs,
dictated the places where the transactions would occur, and commanded
others, including his son, to deliver the drugs to the CI. Given this
unrebutted evidence, see United States v. Parker, 133 F.3d 322, 329 (5th Cir.
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1998), the district court did not clearly err in finding that Williams exercised
supervisory or managerial responsibility, and this court must similarly uphold
the § 3B1.1(b) enhancement. United States v. Ochoa-Gomez, 777 F.3d 278,
281-83 (5th Cir. 2015).
Although Williams’s argument that § 2D1.1 is not empirically
grounded and results in unwarranted sentencing disparities implicates the
substantive reasonableness of his sentence, his arguments are insufficient to
rebut the presumption of reasonableness afforded his within-guidelines
sentence. See United States v. Cooks, 589 F.3d 173, 186 (5th Cir. 2009).
Whatever appropriate deviations it may permit or encourage at the discretion
of the district judge, “Kimbrough does not force district or appellate courts
into a piece-by-piece analysis of the empirical grounding behind each part of
the sentencing guidelines.” United States v. Duarte, 569 F.3d 528, 530 (5th
Cir. 2009) (citing Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 109 (2007)).
Additionally, Kimbrough does not disturb the presumption of reasonableness
given to his within-guidelines sentence “even if the relevant Guideline is not
empirically based.” United States v. Lara, 23 F.4th 459, 485 (5th Cir.) (citing
United States v. Mondragon-Santiago, 564 F.3d 357, 366–67 (5th Cir. 2009)),
cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 2790 (2022). The district court considered Williams’s
argument that there is no empirical basis for the methamphetamine
guideline’s purity-distinctions but declined to deviate from the Guidelines on
that basis. Accordingly, Williams fails to demonstrate that his sentence is
substantively unreasonable. See Lara, 23 F.4th at 485-86; United States v.
Rebulloza, 16 F.4th 480, 485 (5th Cir. 2021).
To the extent that Williams argues that the application of the
Guideline results in unwarranted sentencing disparities, that argument, too,
is insufficient to rebut the presumption of reasonableness afforded his within-
guidelines sentence. “[T]he need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities
among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar
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conduct,” is a factor that district courts must consider in fashioning a
sentence, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6), and the district court in this case
expressly considered that factor, concluding that a downward variance would
in fact result in a sentencing disparity with Williams’s codefendant son,
whose sentence had already been calculated under the same Guideline. The
record shows that the district court considered Williams’s arguments for
leniency, along with all of the § 3553(a) factors, in imposing sentence.
Williams does not argue, and the record does not reflect, that his sentence
fails to account for a factor that should receive significant weight, gives
significant weight to an irrelevant or improper factor, or represents a clear
error of judgment in balancing sentencing factors. See Cooks, 589 F.3d at 186.
Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.
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