Morgan v. Richards ( 2023 )

Case: 21-10931 Document: 00516900285 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/19/2023
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
September 19, 2023
No. 21-10931
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Kassan Khalid Morgan,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Dana Richards, Correctional Officer; Kimberly
Satterfield, Correctional Officer; Kevin Darden,
Correctional Officer; Rick Brewster, Correctional
Officer; Melissa Stengel; Christopher Arias,
Correctional Officer; Frankie L. Haynes, Law
Librarian; Hazelle M. Davis, Correctional Officer V;
Kenneth Madison, Jr.; Robert Wainscott; James
Tapscott; Adam Salvador; Joseph Boyle,
Defendants—Appellees.
Appeal from the United States United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 7:12-CV-34
Before Elrod, Haynes, and Willett, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. Rule 47.5.4
Case: 21-10931 Document: 00516900285 Page: 2 Date Filed: 09/19/2023
Kassan Khalid Morgan, Texas prisoner #1306656, challenges the
district court’s denial of his motions for appointment of counsel in his § 1983
action. A district court is not required to appoint counsel for an indigent civil-
rights plaintiff unless the case presents “exceptional circumstances.” The
district court did not abuse its discretion in holding that this case did not
present such circumstances. We AFFIRM.
I
Kassan Khalid Morgan filed a § 1983 action against various prison
officials. Morgan alleged that after he filed a lawsuit against other prison
officials, the defendants retaliated against him by turning off the water in his
cell, denying him food and access to courts, using excessive and unnecessary
force, instituting false disciplinary charges, and conspiring against him.
Morgan filed two motions for appointment of counsel. He claimed
that he had been kept in Administrative Segregation for 23 hours a day,
impairing his ability to access legal materials, and that he suffers from a
mental impairment which “substantially limits and significantly restricts his
ability to perform major life activities.” The district court denied Morgan’s
first motion for counsel and dismissed his complaint as frivolous before ruling
on the second. On appeal, we vacated the district court’s dismissal of several
of Morgan’s claims and remanded for further proceedings. Morgan v.
Richards, 725 F. App’x 270, 273 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam). But we affirmed
the district court’s denial of Morgan’s motion for appointment of counsel.
Id.On remand, Morgan filed an additional motion for appointment of
counsel, which the district court denied. The district court then granted in
part and denied in part the defendants’ motions for summary judgment.
After the case was set for a jury trial, Morgan again filed yet another motion
for appointment of counsel. He contended that his limited education and
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No. 21-10931
mental impairments rendered him unable to conduct a trial, cross-examine
witnesses, arrange exhibits, or file pretrial motions. Again, the district court
denied Morgan’s motion. A jury trial was conducted, and the jury returned a
defense verdict on all claims.
Morgan’s sole contention on appeal is that the district court abused
its discretion in denying him appointment of counsel. Morgan argues that he
lacked the ability to effectively litigate because he has an I.Q. of 84, a fourth-
grade education, limited access to the law library, and a mental illness for
which he takes medication. He says he needed an attorney to help with
discovery and to effectively cross-examine witnesses and present evidence at
trial. He attributes his limited success at the pretrial stage to “jailhouse
lawyers” who were not allowed to represent him at trial. Finally, Morgan
asserts that he is a covered person under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and
that denying him appointed counsel violated his right to reasonable
accommodations under that Act.
II
An order denying a request for appointed counsel is reviewed for
abuse of discretion. Cupit v. Jones, 835 F.2d 82, 86 (5th Cir. 1987). “A court
‘abuses its discretion if it bases its decision on an erroneous view of the law
or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.’” Hall v. Louisiana,
884 F.3d 546, 549 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Hesling v. CSX Transp., Inc., 396
F.3d 632, 638 (5th Cir. 2005)).
III
We previously affirmed the denial of Morgan’s first motion for
appointment of counsel. Morgan, 725 F. App’x at 273. To the extent Morgan
challenges that denial, the law-of-the-case doctrine forecloses revisiting it.
See United States v. Matthews, 312 F.3d 652, 657 (5th Cir. 2002). Morgan’s
argument that the denial of his motion violated § 504 of the Rehabilitation
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Act is equally unavailing. That statute, by its terms, does not apply to the
federal judiciary. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)–(b).
That leaves Morgan’s argument that the district court abused its
discretion by denying the two motions for appointment of counsel that he
filed after remand from our court. A civil rights plaintiff has no right to the
automatic appointment of counsel. Cupit, 835 F.2d at 86. And a district court
is not required to appoint counsel for an indigent plaintiff in a civil rights
action unless the case presents “exceptional circumstances.” Ulmer v.
Chancellor, 691 F.2d 209, 212 (5th Cir. 1982). Although there is no
comprehensive definition of what constitutes “exceptional circumstances,”
a district court should consider several factors when determining whether to
appoint counsel. Id. at 213. These factors include:
(1) the type and complexity of the case; (2) the petitioner’s
ability adequately to present and investigate his case; (3) the
presence of evidence which largely consists of conflicting
testimony so as to require skill in presentation of evidence and
in cross-examination; and (4) the likelihood that appointment
will benefit the petitioner, the court, and the defendants by
‘shortening the trial and assisting in just determination.’
Parker v. Carpenter, 978 F.2d 190, 193 (5th Cir. 1992) (quoting Murphy v.
Kellar, 950 F.2d 290, 293 n.14 (5th Cir. 1992)).
Here, the district court denied Morgan’s motions in two nearly
identical boilerplate orders that were also nearly identical to the order
denying Morgan’s pre-remand motion for appointment of counsel. In these
orders, the district court recited the relevant factors and held that Morgan
“failed to establish exceptional circumstances which would warrant
appointment of counsel in this case.” According to the court, the case did
not present complex issues of fact and law. And citing Morgan’s complaint
and filings, the court said that Morgan “adequately presented the operative
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facts,” adding that he had an average “command of the English language”
and “understanding of court procedures.” The court also noted that
appointment of counsel was unlikely to shorten the length of trial or “assist
in a just resolution of the complaint.”
We have indicated that appointment of counsel may be required at
later stages of litigation even if it was not appropriate at the motions stage.
See Payne v. Parnell, 246 F. App’x 884, 890 n.6 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam)
(holding denial of appointment of counsel was not abuse of discretion at the
summary judgment stage because “concerns about effective cross-
examination have not yet been implicated,” but “express[ing] no opinion
regarding whether on remand Payne should have counsel appointed to assist
him in further pursuing his § 1983 claim”); Parker, 978 F.2d at 193 (directing
appointment of counsel “[i]f Appellant’s claims survive preliminary
exploration”). Thus, instead of issuing boilerplate orders denying Morgan’s
motions at different stages of litigation, the district court should have
considered the facts anew at each stage, especially the trial stage.
However, on this record, we cannot say that the district court abused
its discretion in denying Morgan’s motions for appointment of counsel. First,
the district court is correct that there is nothing particularly complex about
the case. It involves an alleged single incident of excessive force and
retaliation where the facts, although disputed, were within Morgan’s
personal knowledge. See Feist v. Jefferson Cnty. Comm’rs Court, 778 F.2d 250,
253 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding in a conditions-of-confinement case brought by
pretrial detainee that the appointment of counsel is not warranted in
“straight-forward fact-intensive case”); Van Guilder v. LeBlanc Group, 180
F.3d 264 (5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (holding that district court did not
abuse its discretion in denying state prisoner’s motion for appointment of
counsel because prisoner’s § 1983 excessive force claim was not legally or
factually complicated).
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Second, while Morgan’s arguments regarding his low I.Q., lack of
education, and mental illness are compelling, the totality of Morgan’s district
court filings, as well as his briefs to this court, demonstrate an ability to
adequately present and investigate the case. Morgan attributes his adequate
filings to “jailhouse lawyers” who were unable to assist him at trial and
asserts that his limited education and mental impairment rendered him
unable to adequately litigate the case at trial. But the transcript from the
hearing on Morgan’s motion for a preliminary injunction shows that he was
able to perform adequately in a hearing setting. He recounted his version of
the events, examined a favorable witness, attacked the defendants’ versions
through cross-examination, and overcame defense objections. This suggests
that he would have been able to perform similarly at trial. Of course, Morgan
faced an uphill battle at trial in investigating the officials and policies at the
facility where he was incarcerated. But we have held that the district court
did not abuse its discretion by denying appointment of counsel in similar
circumstances. See Lewis v. Brengesty, 385 F. App’x 395, 397 (5th Cir. 2010)
(per curiam); Williams v. Martin, 570 F. App’x 361, 363 (5th Cir. 2014) (per
curiam).
The third factor admittedly weighs in favor of appointment of
counsel—given the nature of the case, conflicting testimony between
Morgan and the prison officials likely made up a majority of the evidence at
trial. But the fourth factor weighs against Morgan as the district court did not
see any reason, nor do we, that appointment of counsel would have shortened
the length of trial.
Again, on this record, with all but one factor weighing against the
appointment of counsel, we cannot say that this case constitutes an
“exceptional circumstance” in which the district court abused its discretion.
Of course, we do not decide whether we would have granted Morgan’s
motions for appointment of counsel ourselves nor whether we would have
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weighed the factors differently than the district court. And we do not
condone the district court’s repeated use of the same boilerplate reasons in
its orders rejecting Morgan’s motions at different stages of litigation.
However, the district court recited the correct factors and weighed them. It
did not base its decision on an erroneous view of the law or the facts. And our
independent analysis of these factors does not show an abuse of discretion.
AFFIRMED.
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