Mitchell v. Goings ( 2023 )

Case: 22-30759 Document: 00516953759 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/02/2023
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
____________ FILED
November 2, 2023
No. 22-30759
Lyle W. Cayce
Summary Calendar
Clerk
____________
Gator Mitchell,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Robert Goings, Sergeant; John Craine, Sergeant; Gary King,
Sergeant; Brink Hillman, Captain; Robert Tanner, Warden,
Defendants—Appellees.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
USDC No. 2:20-CV-1333
______________________________
Before Barksdale, Southwick, and Graves, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Gator Mitchell, former Louisiana prisoner # 711538, raised claims of
excessive force and failure to protect under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and state-law
claims of negligence and respondeat superior. He contests the magistrate
judge’s dismissal without prejudice of his claims for failure to exhaust. See
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (requiring prisoners to exhaust administrative
_____________________
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-30759 Document: 00516953759 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/02/2023
No. 22-30759
remedies). Mitchell asserts: he exhausted his administrative remedies;
alternatively, he was not required to exhaust them because he was released
from Louisiana custody during the pendency of this appeal; and prison
officials thwarted his attempt to use the administrative-review process.
Defendants’ various summary-judgment and Rule 12(b)(6) motions to
dismiss were granted, and Mitchell’s claims against all defendants were
dismissed without prejudice. For purposes of our review, we need not repeat
the well-known standards for our de novo review of summary-judgments and
Rule 12(b)(6) motions. E.g., Dillon v. Rogers, 596 F.3d 260, 266 (5th Cir.
2010) (outlining summary-judgment standard); Ferguson v. Bank of N.Y.
Mellon Corp., 802 F.3d 777, 780 (5th Cir. 2015) (outlining Rule 12(b)(6)
standard).
Mitchell’s contentions are unavailing. First, the Louisiana
Administrative Code permits a prisoner to proceed to the second step of the
administrative process if a first-step response is not received within the
prescribed time limit. See La. Admin. Code tit. 22, pt. I, § 325(J)(1)(c)
(“[E]xpiration of response time limits shall entitle the offender to move on
to the next step in the process”.); e.g., Bargher v. White, 928 F.3d 439, 447
(5th Cir. 2019) (explaining administrative process). Second, despite his
release from Louisiana custody, Mitchell was still bound by the exhaustion
requirement because he filed his action while in custody. See, e.g., Williams
v. Henagan, 595 F.3d 610, 619 (5th Cir. 2010) (“[Defendant]’s release during
the pendency of the suit does not relieve him the obligation to comply with
42 U.S.C. § 1997e”.). Third, Mitchell fails to support his contention that
prison officials thwarted his attempt to complete the administrative process.
AFFIRMED.
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