Williams v. Kijakazi ( 2023 )

Case: 23-30035 Document: 00516885233 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/06/2023
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
____________ FILED
September 6, 2023
No. 23-30035 Lyle W. Cayce
____________ Clerk
Ronnie Williams,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Kilolo Kijakazi, Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant—Appellee.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
No. 2:22-CV-1141
______________________________
Before Dennis, Engelhardt, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Plaintiff-Appellant Ronnie Williams applied for and was denied social
security disability benefits by the Commissioner of Social Security. The
district court affirmed, finding that the decision of the Administrative Law
Judge (“ALJ”) was supported by substantial evidence and applied proper
legal standards in evaluating the evidence. For the reasons that follow, we
AFFIRM.
_____________________
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 23-30035 Document: 00516885233 Page: 2 Date Filed: 09/06/2023
No. 23-30035
I. Factual and Procedural History
Plaintiff, who is now fifty-four-years-old, applied for Disability
Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) on
March 13, 2020, and March 30, 2020, respectively. Plaintiff alleged disability
beginning on March 10, 2018, due to his degenerative disc disease, diabetes
mellitus, hypertension, obstructive sleep apnea, obesity, post-traumatic
stress disorder, anxiety, and depression. On August 3, 2021, the ALJ held an
administrative hearing on Plaintiff’s applications. At that hearing, Plaintiff,
his attorney, and a vocational expert appeared. On August 18, 2021, the ALJ
issued a decision finding Plaintiff not disabled.
Plaintiff sought Appeals Council review of the ALJ’s decision, which
was denied. Accordingly, the ALJ’s August 18, 2021, decision stands as the
Commissioner’s final administrative decision, subject to judicial review. The
adjudicated period here begins with the alleged disability onset date (March
10, 2018) and ends on the date of the ALJ’s decision (August 18, 2021).
On April 26, 2022, Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking judicial review
before the district court. The magistrate judge issued a Report and
Recommendation affirming the Commissioner’s decision. Over the objection
of Plaintiff, the district judge adopted the Report and Recommendation and
issued a judgment on December 9, 2022, affirming the Commissioner’s final
decision. Plaintiff subsequently appealed.
II. Standard of Review
Our review of the ALJ’s determination is both highly deferential and
limited. Perez v. Barnhart, 415 F.3d 457, 464 (5th Cir. 2005). Review is
limited to whether the decision is supported by “substantial evidence” and
whether the correct legal standards were applied. Id. at 461; 42 U.S.C. §
405(g). We may not reweigh the evidence, substitute our own judgment, or
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resolve conflicts of evidence. Singletary v. Bowen, 798 F.2d 818, 822-23 (5th
Cir. 1986).
III. Discussion
This appeal mostly centers around the weight afforded by the ALJ to
various medical opinions in making a determination that Plaintiff was not
disabled under the Social Security Act (“SSA”). To qualify for DIB and SSI,
a claimant must suffer a disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The SSA
defines a “disability” as a “medically determinable physical or mental
impairment lasting at least twelve months that prevents the claimant from
engaging in substantial gainful activity.” Masterson v. Barnhart, 309 F.3d 267,
271 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)). The Commissioner
employs a sequential five-step process to determine whether a claimant is
disabled within the meaning of that Act, as follows:
“(1) whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful
activity, (2) the severity and duration of the claimant’s
impairments, (3) whether the claimant’s impairment meets or
equals one of the listings in the relevant regulations, (4)
whether the claimant can still do his past relevant work, and (5)
whether the impairment prevents the claimant from doing any
relevant work.”
Wills v. Kijakazi, No. 22-20609, 2023 WL 4015174, at *2 (5th Cir. June 14,
2023) (quoting Webster v. Kijakazi, 19 F.4th 715, 718 (5th Cir. 2021)).
“[T]he claimant bears the burden of proof with respect to the first
four steps of the analysis.” Waters v. Barnhart, 276 F.3d 716, 718 (5th Cir.
2002) (citing Jones v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 524, 526 (5th Cir. 1987)). “If the
claimant advances that far, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to ‘prove
the claimant’s employability.’” Webster, 19 F.4th at 718 (quoting Keel v. Saul,
986 F.3d 551, 555 (5th Cir. 2021)). And “[i]f at any step the Commissioner
finds that the claimant is or is not disabled, the ALJ need not continue the
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analysis.” Copeland v. Colvin, 771 F.3d 920, 923 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing Leggett
v. Chater, 67 F.3d 558, 564 (5th Cir. 1995)). Here, the ALJ proceeded through
all five steps and determined that Plaintiff was not disabled within the
meaning of the SSA during the relevant time period.
On appeal, Plaintiff first challenges the ALJ’s finding that “other jobs
were available to [Plaintiff]” alleging such a finding was “not supported by
substantial evidence because the limitations were derived from non-
examining sources instead of from examining sources,” which Plaintiff
contends was “in violation of 20 C.F.R. 404.1520c.” As explained below,
Plaintiff’s argument reflects a misunderstanding of the revised regulatory
framework governing his claims—i.e., disability claims filed on or after
March 27, 2017.1
Under prior Social Security regulations, a hierarchy of medical
opinions dictated the weight that must be given by the ALJ tasked with
deciding whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). Treating
physicians and other examining physicians were generally given the most
weight while non-examining physicians were generally given the least
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1
This misunderstanding is also reflected in the record below. Back at the district
court, citing the old regulation, Plaintiff made the same argument that the ALJ’s reliance
on non-examining sources was error. The district court correctly found that while the pre-
2017 regulation “generally states that the SSA [must] give[] ‘more weight to the medical
opinion of a source who has examined [a claimant] than to the medical opinion of a medical
source who has not,” the old regulation did not apply to Plaintiff’s claims because it
“applies only to claims filed before March 27, 2017.” Plaintiff’s earliest claim was filed on
March 13, 2020. Because of that later filing date, Plaintiff’s claims were governed by the
revised regulatory framework applicable to disability claims. On appeal, Plaintiff cites the
correct regulation this time, but he makes the same argument that still substantively tracks
the pre-2017 regulation.
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weight.2 See id.; Hillman v. Barnhart, 170 F. App’x 909, 912-13 (5th Cir.
2006).
On January 18, 2017, the Social Security Administration promulgated
new regulations applicable to disability claims filed on or after March 27,
2017, found at 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c and 416.920c, “revising . . . the rules
regarding the evaluation of medical evidence.” See Revisions to Rules
Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844, 5853 (Jan.
18, 2017) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pts. 404 and 416). As other courts have
recognized, “[t]he new rules were expressly adopted pursuant to the . . .
Commissioner’s statutory authority, see 42 U.S.C. § 405(a), and following
formal notice-and-comment proceedings.” Rogers v. Kijakazi, 62 F.4th 872,
877 (4th Cir. 2023). These new regulations eliminate the old hierarchy of
medical opinions, no longer provide for any inherent or presumptive weight,
and do away with the examining and non-examining physician terminology.
Winston v. Berryhill, 755 F. App’x 395, 402 n.4 (5th Cir. 2018).
Instead, in determining “what weight, if any, to give a medical
opinion,” the ALJ must consider five separate factors: (1) supportability; (2)
consistency; (3) the relationship with the claimant; (4) specialization; and (5)
other factors. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c). While, under the new regulatory
framework, a medical source’s “treatment relationship” with a claimant is a
factor considered when assessing the persuasiveness of medical opinions, no
controlling or deferential weight attaches to any medical opinion as a matter
of course. See Rescission of Social Security Rulings 96–2p, 96–5p, and 06–
3p, 82 Fed. Reg. 15263, 15263 (Mar. 27, 2017). Instead, the persuasiveness of
any medical source’s opinion—whether that source is a treating, examining,
or non-examining physician—depends most significantly on whether the
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2
These regulations still apply to disability claims filed before March 27, 2017.
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opinion is supported by objective medical evidence and the source’s own
explanation of the opinion (i.e., the first factor) and the opinion is consistent
with other evidence provided by medical sources of record (the second
factor). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c), 416.920c(c). Said simply, under the new
regulatory scheme, consistency and supportability are “the most important
factors” considered. Id. § 404.1520c(b). In addition to the medical source’s
treating relationship, other lesser factors considered include a medical
source’s specialty, “familiarity with the other evidence in the claim” record,
and “understanding of [the SSA’s] disability program’s policies and
evidentiary requirements.” Id. §§ 404.1520c(c)(4)-(5), 416.920c(c)(4)-(5).
Despite this new framework, citing our caselaw, Plaintiff asks us to
reverse the district court because the ALJ did not, as a matter of course, give
the most weight to opinions of examining physicians. The cases cited in
support by Plaintiff are not in the context of claims filed after March 27, 2017,
and, accordingly, reflect the old regulatory framework. See, e.g., Kneeland v.
Berryhill, 850 F.3d 749 (5th Cir. 2017). That framework is simply not
applicable to Plaintiff’s claims because his earliest claim was undisputedly
filed on March 13, 2020. Absent something more, Plaintiff’s alleged
assignment of error—that the ALJ did not give more weight to the opinions
of examining physicians—is without merit.3
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3
In a final attempt to add the old examining and non-examining physicians’
framework back into the new regulatory framework applicable to his claims, Plaintiff
misstates 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(v) for the proposition that “Social Security recognizes
that a medical source has a better understanding of your impairment if he or she examines
you than if the medical source only reviews evidence in your folder.” But the regulation in
reality reads: “A medical source may have a better understanding of your impairment(s) if
he or she examines you than if the medical source only review evidence in your folder.” 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(v) (emphasis added).
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Plaintiff next argues that “[t]he error in this case specifically revolves
around the fact that the ALJ does not explain why a medical source that did
not examine the claimant at all is more supported than a medical source that
did examine the claimant.” The new regulatory framework applicable to
Plaintiff’s claims alters the SSA’s requirement that ALJs must explain the
reasons for favoring one medical source opinion over another. Under the new
framework, while ALJs must “articulate how [they] consider[ed] medical
opinions” from all medical sources, such articulation need only explain how
the supportability and consistency factors were considered. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520c(b)-(c). Only if differing medical opinions are “equally well-
supported” (the first factor) and “consistent with the record” (the second
factor) must the ALJ articulate how he considered, inter alia, the relationship
between the medical source and the claimant (the third factor). Id. §
404.1520c(b)(3), (c). Here, the ALJ did not find the differing medical
opinions equally well-supported and consistent with the record—both
findings that Plaintiff does not actually challenge on appeal. The ALJ was not
required to explain how he considered the relationship between the medical
sources and the claimant. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c).
Finally, and on a separate note, Plaintiff makes the conclusory
argument that the ALJ’s rejection of “Dr. Dennis’ exam on the basis that he
did not perform a standard mental health exam . . . is simply not accurate as
the report states that a tele-health exam was performed.” We fail to see how
the notation that a telehealth examination was performed means the ALJ’s
finding that Dr. Dennis failed to perform a standard mental health
examination was “simply not accurate.” Plaintiff offers no further
explanation in his briefing. Because Plaintiff’s briefing on this issue is
inadequate, he forfeited the argument. Rollins v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 8
F.4th 393, 397 n.1 (5th Cir. 2021).
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IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district
court.
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