Zapata v. Hays Cty Juv Detention ( 2023 )

Case: 23-50191 Document: 00516969765 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/15/2023
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
____________ FILED
November 15, 2023
No. 23-50191
Lyle W. Cayce
____________ Clerk
Emiliano Zapata,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Hays County Juvenile Detention Center; Brett
Littlejohn,
Defendants—Appellees.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. 1:21-CV-562
______________________________
Before Jones, Barksdale, and Elrod, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Emiliano Zapata, then 16 years old, was detained for 48 days in the
summer of 2020. During this time, Zapata alleges, the Hays County Juvenile
Detention Center failed to provide him educational and mental health
services. He brought this lawsuit, and the district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the Defendants on Zapata’s claims under the Eighth
_____________________
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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Amendment, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Americans with Disabilities
Act, and affirmed the prior dismissal of Zapata’s Individuals with Disabilities
in Education Act claims. Zapata appeals. We AFFIRM IN PART and
REVERSE IN PART and REMAND for further proceedings. We also
AFFIRM the prior dismissal of Zapata’s claims arising under the
Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act.
I
A
The Hays County Juvenile Detention Center is a correctional facility
in San Marcos, Texas, operated and overseen by the Hays County Juvenile
Board, that provides pre- and post-adjudication detention for juveniles. The
Detention Center contracted with the John H. Woods Charter School—
Inspire Academy to serve as the “local education agency” and to provide
educational services under the IDEA to its residents. In May 2020, the
Detention Center had a 14-day isolation requirement for new detainees to
prevent the spread of COVID-19.
Zapata was sent to the Detention Center on May 20, 2020, upon his
arrest. Texas law demands that detention facilities conduct “[a] health
screening” for juvenile pre-trial detainees “within two hours before or after
admission,” 37 Tex. Admin. Code § 343.406(a), so upon his arrival,
Detention Center personnel administered multiple assessments to Zapata.
First, Zapata’s Intake Assessment. In the portion titled “Information
From Child,” the officer marked “N” as to whether Zapata was in any
special education classes. The official “also noted in the form that [Zapata]
did not appear confused, depressed, agitated, or angry, and that he did not
appear to be suicidal or violent.” Detention Center personnel documented
that Zapata “may be dangerous to himself [] or . . . may threaten the safety of
the public if released.”
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Zapata was next given an Initial Health Assessment, which lists “No”
in response to whether he “had or [is] being treated for any mental
conditions/disorders.” Zapata also denied taking any medications. The
screening officer opined that Zapata did not “appear to need mental health
services” and that he did not need a referral for medical or emergency
services.
A staff member then administered a Behavioral Screening assessment.
When asked, “Have you had or are you being treated for any mental
disabilities?”, and “Do you have any Intellectual or Developmental
Disabilities?”, Zapata responded “No.” The official observed that Zapata
had an “Average” “Level of Emotional and Cognitive Development,” with
the other possible answers being “Low” and “High.” And when asked to
identify any other information regarding his mental abilities, Zapata did not
offer additional details.
The next morning, a nurse administered Zapata’s health appraisal.
The nurse described Zapata’s behavior as “appropriate” during the
assessment, and Zapata denied having any mental health conditions or
attendant treatments, save for trouble sleeping.
As a new detainee, Zapata was subject to the facility’s 14-day
quarantine protocols upon arriving. Throughout this initial quarantine, call
logs show that Zapata called his father seven times. On June 4, 2020,
Zapata’s initial medical isolation concluded, and he was released into the
facility’s general population. Two weeks later, on June 17, 2020, Zapata left
the Detention Center for several hours for a psychological evaluation, which
was conducted by Dr. Keeley Crowfoot.
On June 24, Zapata tested positive for COVID-19 and was
immediately placed in medical quarantine. Throughout this second isolation,
Zapata could not call his father because the telephone was in a public space.
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Instead, Zapata wrote letters to his father and was given an email that his
father wrote to him. On July 5, Detention Center officials decided to conduct
daily counseling with Zapata. Pursuant to that schedule, he received his first
counseling session the day he was released from quarantine, July 6. The
following day, Zapata was discharged from the Detention Center.
B
Zapata filed an administrative complaint under the IDEA concerning
his detention, which was heard and subsequently dismissed by a Texas
Special Education Hearing Officer. Zapata then commenced this action
against the Detention Center and its administrator, Brett Littlejohn, seeking
review of the Special Education Hearing Officer’s dismissal of his IDEA
claims as well as alleging violations of: (1) his Eighth Amendment rights
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act;
and (3) the Americans with Disabilities Act.
The parties filed dueling motions for summary judgment. The district
court granted the Detention Center’s and Littlejohn’s joint motion on all
claims, concluding that (1) the local education agency, not the Detention
Center, is “tasked with providing the relevant services” such that failure to
provide them did not render the Detention Center liable under the IDEA and
dismissal by the Special Education Hearing Officer was appropriate; (2) the
Detention Center was not on notice of Zapata’s disability and, even if it had
been, the facility provided a reasonable accommodation as required by the
Rehabilitation Act and the ADA; and (3) Littlejohn was not a policymaker,
vitiating any Monell-based claims under § 1983. Zapata appeals.
II
“We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing all
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing all
reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.” J.W. v. Paley, 81 F.4th 440, 447
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(5th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted) (italics added). “Summary judgment is
appropriate only when the moving party establishes that ‘there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). “We may affirm a
summary judgment on any ground supported by the record, even if it is
different from that relied on by the district court.” Campos v. Steves & Sons,
Inc., 10 F.4th 515, 520 (5th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted).
Notably, “IDEA litigation invariably involves an inextricable tangle of
law and fact.” Leigh Ann H. v. Riesel Indep. Sch. Dist., 18 F.4th 788, 794 (5th
Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). “We review the district court’s decision de
novo, as a mixed question of law and fact, and the district court’s underlying
findings of fact for clear error.” Krawietz ex rel. Parker v. Galveston Indep.
Sch. Dist., 900 F.3d 673, 676 (5th Cir. 2018). A district court commits clear
error only when “we are ‘left with a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed.’” R.P. ex rel. R.P. v. Alamo Heights Indep. Sch.
Dist., 703 F.3d 801, 808 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Hou. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. V.P.
ex rel. Juan P., 582 F.3d 576, 583 (5th Cir. 2009)).
III
A
Zapata appeals the district court’s order affirming the Special
Education Hearing Officer’s dismissal of his IDEA claim as having been
brought against the wrong defendant.
Enacted by Congress in 1970, the IDEA requires that “all children
with disabilities,” including incarcerated children, receive a “free
appropriate public education.” Texas Educ. Agency v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 908
F.3d 127, 130 (5th Cir. 2018); see 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(11)(C). States are
responsible for implementing its provisions and adhering to its safeguards.
See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a). Relevant here, the IDEA endows states with near-
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plenary authority to do so as they see fit, including the right to “assign to any
public agency in the State the responsibility of ensuring that the requirements
of this subchapter” are met for incarcerated children. Id. § 1412(a)(11)(C).
Because the IDEA authorizes states to transfer in full the responsibility of
IDEA compliance to another governmental entity, “questions of which
agency is responsible for providing a student with a [free appropriate public
education] are determined under state law.” L.A. Unified Sch. Dist. v.
Garcia, 669 F.3d 956, 960 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Union Sch. Dist. v. Smith, 15
F.3d 1519, 1525–27 (9th Cir. 1994)).
Texas state law requires “[t]he Texas Education Agency, the Health
and Human Services Commission, the Department of Family and Protective
Services, and the Texas Juvenile Justice Department” to “establish the
respective responsibilities of school districts and of residential facilities for
the provision of a free, appropriate public education, as required by the
[IDEA] . . . , including each requirement for children with disabilities who
reside in those facilities[.]” Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 29.012(d). Pursuant to
an agreement codified into law by these agencies, local education agencies—
not detention facilities—are responsible for “provid[ing] or ensur[ing] the
provision of a [free appropriate public education] to students with disabilities
residing in [residential facilities] in accordance with [the] IDEA, applicable
federal regulations, and state laws and rules.” 19 Tex. Admin. Code
§ 89.1115(d)(1)(A).
The Detention Center is such a “residential facility,” Tex. Educ.
Code Ann. § 5.001(8), meaning a local education agency with which it
works—not the Detention Center itself—is responsible for IDEA
compliance. Under this framework, the John H. Woods Charter School—
Inspire Academy agreed to be the Detention Center’s local education agency
and to take responsibility for its IDEA compliance. Thus, we agree with the
Special Education Hearing Officer and the district court that Texas’s
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delegation of responsibility and the operative contract between the Detention
Center and the local education agency absolves the Detention Center of
responsibility for IDEA implementation and compliance.
Zapata argues that federal regulations prohibit the state from
relinquishing responsibility in full for IDEA compliance and absolving itself
from attendant liability arising from IDEA shortcomings. Like the district
court, we disagree.
Zapata relies on 34 C.F.R. § 300.2(b), which reads: “The provisions
of this part—(1) Apply to all political subdivisions of the State that are
involved in the education of children with disabilities, including: (i) The State
educational agency . . . [and] (iv) State and local juvenile and adult
correctional facilities[.]” Zapata cites no authority for his implied
proposition that this regulation overrides the U.S. Code provision that allows
a state to “assign to any public agency . . . the responsibility of ensuring”
IDEA compliance for incarcerated children. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(11)(C).
Nor could he, for “[w]hen [] regulations are contrary to the wording of the
statute itself, [] this Court must follow the plain statutory language and not
the regulations.” Salinas v. Rodriguez, 963 F.2d 791, 793 (5th Cir. 1992).
Rather, the “harmonious interpretation of the statute[] [and] the
regulations,” id. at 794, is that a detention facility is responsible for meeting
IDEA’s mandates unless a state government assigns that specific
responsibility to another agency or organization. Because Texas charged
local education agencies with IDEA compliance, the Detention Center
cannot be held liable for IDEA noncompliance.
B
Zapata also appeals the district court’s order granting the Detention
Center and Littlejohn summary judgment on his Rehabilitation Act and ADA
claims.
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“The prima facie case of discrimination under the [Rehabilitation
Act] is operationally identical to the test under the ADA.” Austin v. City of
Pasadena, 74 F.4th 312, 334 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Melton v. Dall. Area
Rapid Transit, 391 F.3d 669, 676 n.8 (5th Cir. 2004)). We thus evaluate these
claims simultaneously, though we refer only to the ADA for clarity.
To establish a prima facie case under the ADA, a plaintiff must show:
(1) that he is a qualified individual within the meaning of the
ADA; (2) that he is being excluded from participation in, or
being denied benefits of, services, programs, or activities for
which the public entity is responsible, or is otherwise being
discriminated against by a public entity; and (3) that such
exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination is by reason of
his disability.
Cadena v. El Paso Cnty., 946 F.3d 717, 723 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Melton,
391 F.3d at 671–72).
“[A] plaintiff can establish the third prong of the prima facie case—
discrimination ‘by reason of his disability’—by showing that the defendants
have failed to make reasonable accommodations.” Valentine v. Collier, 993
F.3d 270, 290 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Windham v. Harris Cnty., 875 F.3d
229, 235 (5th Cir. 2017)). “For this type of claim, a plaintiff must show that
the entity knew of the disability and its consequential limitations, either
because the plaintiff requested an accommodation or because the nature of
the limitation was open and obvious.” Cadena, 946 F.3d at 724 (citing
Windham, 875 F.3d at 236–37).
The parties do not dispute that Zapata is a qualified individual.
Rather, they dispute whether the Detention Center had knowledge of
Zapata’s disabilities and whether Zapata was given a reasonable
accommodation. The district court concluded that Zapata failed to show a
genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the Detention Center “knew
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of his disability, and . . . [whether] he was provided with a reasonable
accommodation.” We disagree.
Within two weeks of Zapata’s release from his initial medical
quarantine, he left the facility for a psychological evaluation by Dr. Crowfoot.
Days later, Littlejohn received Dr. Crowfoot’s report, which diagnosed
Zapata with Anxiety Disorder, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, Major
Depressive Disorder, Autism Spectrum Disorder, and various Specific
Learning Disabilities. The report also notes Zapata’s feelings of anxiety and
depression, the trauma he experienced in his family life, and his history of
suicidal ideations. Finally, the report provides a laundry list of
recommendations including counseling and regular assessments for suicidal
ideations as well as his anxiety. This direct language may very well have
placed the Detention Center and Littlejohn—its recipient—on notice of
Zapata’s “disabilities, limitations, and possible accommodations.” Taylor v.
Principal Fin. Grp., Inc., 93 F.3d 155, 165 (5th Cir. 1996).
The district court dismissed the report simply because “Dr. Crowfoot
listed a series of ‘diagnostic impressions’ rather than a conclusive
diagnostic,” meaning it could not place the Detention Center on notice. The
Detention Center does not push this reasoning with much force on appeal,
though it cites medical dictionaries that distinguish between a diagnosis and
a diagnostic impression. This is a distinction without a difference.
Though the above-quoted section is titled “Diagnostic Impressions,”
the table naming these diagnoses reads: “Principal Diagnosis and Specifiers.”
Furthermore, when the report refers to these illnesses elsewhere, it uses the
term diagnosis. To conclude, then, that no fact dispute remains and that this
report did not notify the Detention Center of Zapata’s disabilities is to
demand a degree of specificity not required by our caselaw, missing the forest
for the trees—particularly when our posture commands us to review the
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evidence in the light most favorable to Zapata. J.W., 81 F.4th at 447.
Accordingly, we conclude that there is a genuine dispute of material fact as
to whether the report put the Detention Center on notice of Zapata’s
disability.1
Given this conclusion, we turn to whether the Detention Center
provided Zapata a reasonable accommodation. Upon receipt of the report,
Littlejohn testified, the Detention Center did not immediately modify its
plans for Zapata. Instead, record evidence shows that several days after
Littlejohn received the report, the Detention Center decided to conduct daily
counseling with Zapata upon his release. Indeed, Zapata received “a
counseling session on July 6, 2020, as soon as he was released from medical
quarantine and less than a week after Littlejohn received Dr. Crowfoot’s
report.” Without much analysis, the district court determined that this
counseling session was a reasonable accommodation as a matter of law.
We conclude that a genuine dispute of material fact precludes such a
determination at this stage. Whether a proposed accommodation is
reasonable may sometimes turn on considerations that are best reserved “for
the trier of fact.” See Riel v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 99 F.3d 678, 683 (5th Cir.
1996); see also Jones v. Lubbock Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 834 F. App’x 923, 926 (5th
Cir. 2020) (unpublished) (“Whether a proposed accommodation is
reasonable is generally a fact issue.”). On June 18, 2020, Zapata was placed
on medical observation after showing signs of COVID-19, only to be placed
in quarantine after testing positive. Zapata’s quarantine was extended on
July 3, as he remained symptomatic, and he was ultimately released from
_____________________
1
Zapata also argues that the Detention Center was on notice based on statements
he made during his intake assessments and his father’s outreach. Because we conclude that
Dr. Crowfoot’s report may have put the Detention Center on notice, we need not resolve
these secondary arguments.
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isolation on July 6. The day he was released, he received a counseling session,
and the next day, he was discharged. The Detention Center argues that the
counseling session conducted the day he was released from quarantine was
reasonable as a matter of law. The record does not compel this conclusion.
Zapata’s father testified that during Zapata’s initial quarantine, he
was able to have daily phone and video calls with Zapata. The Detention
Center offers no evidence that such technology could not have been deployed
while Zapata was in his second quarantine, while Littlejohn also testified that
he received information regarding “a free online tool kit for individuals
supporting children and youth autism during COVID-19.” It may be the case
that securing such equipment could have jeopardized other detainees’ safety,
thereby militating against any accommodation beyond the delayed counseling
session. But the costs imposed by several more days in isolation were
potentially severe given Zapata’s youth and mental state. Here, too, there is
a genuine dispute of material fact.
Because genuine disputes of material fact exist both as to whether the
Detention Center was aware of Zapata’s disabilities, and whether its
accommodation was “reasonable,” we must reverse and remand on the
Rehabilitation Act and ADA claims.
C
Finally, Zapata appeals the dismissal of his constitutional claims,
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that the Detention Center violated his
Eighth Amendment rights. The district court did not reach the merits of his
claims, instead granting summary judgment because Littlejohn “is not a
policymaker for purposes of Monell liability.” We agree.
In lawsuits against municipal actors in their official capacities,
plaintiffs must prove the following elements of a suit against a municipality
under Monell v. Department of Social Services: (1) a policy maker; (2) an official
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policy; and (3) a violation of constitutional rights whose “moving force” is
the policy or custom. 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Regarding the first element,
“[t]he authority to make municipal policy is necessarily the authority to make
final policy.” City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988)
(plurality opinion). “[W]hether a particular official has ‘final policymaking
authority’ is a question of state law.” Jett v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S.
701, 737 (1989) (quoting Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 123 (plurality opinion)).
Years ago, we held that “state law supports the conclusion that the
Juvenile Board possesses authority to establish official policy for [a] detention
center” run by a county. Flores v. Cameron Cnty., 92 F.3d 258, 264 (5th Cir.
1996) (citing Tex. Hum. Res. Code Ann. § 152.0372). Thus, Littlejohn
cannot be considered the appropriate policymaker unless the Hays County
Juvenile Board has delegated policymaking authority to him. But the
operative policy, the Detention Center’s 2020 Policy and Procedure Manual,
plainly states that it is subject to annual inspection and approval by the Hays
County Juvenile Board. Because the Detention Center and Littlejohn as its
administrator must answer to the Hays County Juvenile Board regarding the
policy at issue, it cannot also be the case that Littlejohn has been delegated
the policymaking authority necessary to sustain Zapata’s claim under Monell.
***
We AFFIRM IN PART and REVERSE IN PART and RE-
MAND for further proceedings.
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