United States v. Stanford ( 2023 )

Case: 22-20388 Document: 00516924118 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/09/2023
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
____________ FILED
October 9, 2023
No. 22-20388 Lyle W. Cayce
____________ Clerk
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Robert Allen Stanford,
Defendant—Appellant.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:09-CR-342-1
______________________________
Before King, Smith, and Elrod, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
This appeal arises from Robert Allen Stanford’s pro se Renewed
Motion for Compassionate Release Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)
and the First Step Act. The district court denied Appellant’s motion for
compassionate release on July 25, 2022. On appeal, we ordered a limited
remand of that decision for the district court to explain its reasons for denial.
United States v. Stanford, 79 F.4th 461, 462 (5th Cir. 2023).
_____________________
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-20388 Document: 00516924118 Page: 2 Date Filed: 10/09/2023
No. 22-20388
On limited remand, the district court then explained its reasons for
the denial and reiterated its ruling. United States v. Stanford,
4:09-cr-00342-1, ECF 1591 (Aug. 31, 2023). Specifically, the district court
analyzed Mr. Stanford’s motion for compassionate release under the Section
3553 factors. Id. at 2–3. In doing so, the district court explained that
Mr. Stanford’s offenses were unprecedented and affected a countless
number of victims, and that Mr. Stanford has an unsatisfied $5.9 billion
restitution order against him. Id. at 2–3. Further, the district court noted
that Ralph Janvey, the court-appointed receiver in the case, stated in a notice
to the district court that Mr. Stanford is actively obstructing efforts to
compensate victims. Id. at 3. Relying on these considerations, the court held
that the Section 3553(a) factors and relevant policy considerations justified
denying Mr. Stanford’s motion for compassionate release. Id. at 3.
Mr. Stanford now argues that the district court erred by considering
Mr. Janvey’s notice, which was not part of the criminal record and which
Mr. Stanford argues would not be admissible in a criminal proceeding.1
Mr. Stanford also argues that the district court erred by denying his motion
for compassionate release in light of the evidence that was properly before
the district court.2
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1
Mr. Stanford requests that we take judicial notice of his argument that the district
court wrongfully included Mr. Janvey’s statement when weighing the Section 3552(a)
factors. We do notice his argument, but it fails. Mr. Stanford’s argument that the district
court violated his due process rights by considering evidence that would not be admissible
under the Federal Rules of Evidence lacks merit. The Federal Rules of Evidence do not
apply at sentencing. Fed. R. Evid. 1101(d)(3). Instead, federal courts “‘exercise a wide
discretion in the sources and types of evidence used’ to craft appropriate sentences.”
Concepcion v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 2389, 2395 (2022) (quoting Williams v. New York,
337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949)).
2
The court GRANTS Appellant’s motion for leave to file supplemental briefing.
2
Case: 22-20388 Document: 00516924118 Page: 3 Date Filed: 10/09/2023
No. 22-20388
We review an order denying a motion for compassionate release for
abuse of discretion. See United States v. Escajeda, 58 F.4th 184, 186 (5th Cir.
2023). Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in its
determination that Mr. Stanford’s motion for compassionate release should
be denied. See United States v. Chambliss, 948 F.3d 691, 693 (5th Cir. 2020)
(“[A] court abuses its discretion if it bases its decisions on an error of law or
a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.”). We AFFIRM.
3