Weeks v. Collier ( 2023 )

Case: 22-10126 Document: 00516968334 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/15/2023
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
____________ FILED
November 15, 2023
No. 22-10126 Lyle W. Cayce
____________ Clerk
James Richard Weeks,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Bryan Collier, Executive Director, Texas Department of Criminal
Justice; Brad Livingston, Executive Director, Texas Department of
Criminal Justice; Lannette Linthicum, Texas Department of Criminal
Justice Health Services Division Director; Bobby Lumpkin, Director,
Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division;
Denise DeShields, Texas Tech University Health Sciences
Center/Correctional Managed Health Care Executive Medical Director, Et al.,
Defendants—Appellees.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 2:18-CV-125
______________________________
Before Southwick, Engelhardt, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam: *
_____________________
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
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No. 22-10126
James Weeks, Texas Prisoner # 1489149, filed a pro se complaint in
2018 against numerous Texas Department of Criminal Justice (“TDCJ”) de-
fendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleged several constitutional violations
due to the defendants’ alleged deliberate indifference. Weeks now appeals
the district court’s dismissal of his complaint with prejudice. We AFFIRM.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In late June 2018, James Weeks filed a Section 1983 complaint in the
United States District Court, Northern District of Texas, bringing claims
against 110 defendants from multiple TDCJ units. Weeks alleged these
defendants violated his constitutional rights in connection with the diagnosis
and treatment of his colon cancer and gallstones, resulting in numerous
collateral consequences. Weeks further alleged that various defendants
continuously treated his medical conditions improperly despite his repeated
complaints, improper treatment that he claims sunk to the level of deliberate
indifference. The most serious condition was undiagnosed colon cancer,
which was stage three metastatic cancer by the time of diagnosis in July 2016.
Weeks also made numerous allegations concerning the handling and
outcomes of a multitude of prison grievances; acts of retaliation by prison
guards; his housing unit assignments; the conditions of his confinement,
including the availability and quality of food, toiletries, and commissary
supplies; and the confiscation of his property. He sought compensatory
damages, punitive damages, and injunctive relief.
The district court temporarily granted Weeks leave to proceed in
forma pauperis when it granted Weeks his first leave to amend his complaint.
However, because Weeks filed suit pro se, the district court ordered the Texas
Attorney General to submit Weeks’s authenticated records to allow the court
to fully analyze Weeks’s allegations. After reviewing these records, the court
dismissed Weeks’s complaint with prejudice without conducting a Spears
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hearing. This court established Spears hearings to allow courts to determine
whether claims by in forma pauperis inmates are legally frivolous. Spears v.
McCotter, 766 F.2d 179, 181–82 (5th Cir. 1985).
The district court divided Weeks’s allegations into three groups that
totaled 21 claims: nine claims of deliberate indifference; six claims relating to
the confiscation or deprivation of his private property; and six claims alleging
violations of his right of access to the courts, retaliation by prison officials,
and mishandling of grievances. The court determined that Weeks’s
deliberate indifference claims regarding his pre-cancer diagnosis and
treatment were time-barred because he brought them more than two years
after the discovery of his cancer in “early 2016.”
The district court further concluded that Weeks’s deliberate
indifference claims regarding his serious post-diagnosis medical needs
between December 2017 and January 2018 were frivolous because the
medical records reflected Weeks received regular care during that time. As
for Weeks’s deprivation-of-property claims, the court found that there was
an adequate state post-deprivation remedy. The court determined Weeks’s
remaining claims should be dismissed because they were either conclusory,
without merit, or lacking constitutional magnitude. To the extent that Weeks
was challenging the result of certain disciplinary convictions and
punishments, the court determined the claims were barred under Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994).
Weeks timely filed a notice of appeal and moved for leave to proceed
in forma pauperis. The district court denied Weeks’s motion to proceed in
forma pauperis, concluding that his appeal was not taken in good faith under
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(3).
Weeks later filed in this court for leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.
We granted the motion, determining that Weeks demonstrated his financial
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eligibility and that the appeal involved at least one non-frivolous issue:
whether Weeks’s claims regarding his pre-cancer diagnosis and treatment
were properly dismissed as untimely. The Office of the Texas Attorney
General (“OAG”) then appeared as amicus curiae.
DISCUSSION
A district court dismisses a Section 1983 complaint of a prisoner
proceeding in forma pauperis as frivolous “if it lacks an arguable basis in law
or fact.” Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 373 (5th Cir. 2005). Dismissals of
claims brought by in forma pauperis prisoners are subject to two different
standards of review, depending on factors that need not be discussed today.
Id. The district court here dismissed Weeks’s complaint pursuant to three
separate statutes: 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1), 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(a). Because the district court referred to all three relevant statutes
in its opinion, we collectively review the issues de novo. Geiger, 404 F.3d at
373.
Weeks raises 28 issues on appeal, but not all are addressed in his brief.
Although pro se briefs are liberally construed, the litigants must sufficiently
brief arguments if they wish to preserve them. Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222,
224–25 (5th Cir. 1993). We only address the issues for which Weeks
provided adequate legal analysis or discussion. See Weaver v. Puckett, 896
F.2d 126, 128 (5th Cir. 1990). All others are abandoned. Yohey, 985 F.2d at
224–25.
I. Statute of limitations.
Weeks challenges the district court’s dismissal of his pre-diagnosis
deliberate indifference claims as untimely.
“A district court may raise the defense of limitations sua sponte in an
action under [Section] 1915.” Davis v. Young, 624 F. App’x 203, 207 (5th
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Cir. 2015). “[D]ismissal is appropriate if it is clear from the face of the
complaint that the claims asserted [by the prisoner] are barred by the
applicable statute of limitations.” Id. (citation omitted). There is no
specified limitations period for Section 1983 actions, thus a state statute must
be “borrowed.” The OAG argues the applicable state statute here is the
Texas health care liability statute. Under this statute, the claim must be
brought within “two years from the occurrence of the breach or tort or from
the date the medical or health care treatment . . . or hospitalization for which
the claim is made is completed.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 74.251.
The OAG argues this is the proper statute because Weeks’s claims sound in
negligent course of treatment or lack of treatment, and the individuals who
treated him are “healthcare providers” as defined by statute.
The Supreme Court, though, has held that the proper state statute of
limitations for a Section 1983 claim is the one for general personal-injury tort
claims. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007). The applicable limitations
period in Texas is two years from the date on which the cause of action
accrues. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.003(a). We apply that statute.
The next issue is the accrual date for the claim. Wallace, 549 U.S. at
387–88. “[T]he accrual date of a § 1983 cause of action is a question of
federal law that is not resolved by reference to state law.” Id. at 388.
Consequently, we reject the OAG’s effort to convince us that Texas law
applies to the date of accrual. Under federal law, an action accrues when the
plaintiff becomes aware of both the existence of an injury and its cause. In re
FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Prods. Liab. Litig., 646 F.3d 185, 190 (5th Cir.
2011), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Wong, 575 U.S. 402(2015). This federal “discovery rule” delays the accrual period until the
plaintiff knew of the injury and its cause or should have discovered the injury
and its cause through reasonable diligence. Id.5
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The federal discovery rule clarifies the accrual date for a Section 1983
claim is when the plaintiff becomes aware of both the existence of an injury
and its cause. Id. Weeks became aware of both his cancer and its alleged
cause on July 11, 2016, at the earliest. His colonoscopy indicated a large pre-
cancerous tumor, and the diagnosing doctor asked why nothing had been
done about Weeks’s condition despite his complaints. On July 15, 2016, the
tumor was removed and determined to be Stage 3 cancer.
The facts relevant to Weeks’s deliberate indifference claims resulting
in or preventing earlier treatment of his colon cancer could not be known
until the cancer diagnosis was made or at least suspected. Weeks had no
knowledge of his cancer, nor should he have discovered it or its cause through
reasonable diligence, on the date of his last interaction with the defendant
health care providers. That date was March 28, 2016. The district court
seemingly accepted that date when finding the claim accrued “in early 2016”
for any claim. We disagree. Weeks would have no reason to know of his
injury at that time, as the diagnosis of colon cancer occurred later.
We find that the earliest accrual date for Weeks’s pre-diagnosis claims
was July 11, 2016, the date his post-surgery biopsy showed the precancerous
mass. Weeks’s complaint is dated June 28, 2018, postmarked July 3, 2018,
and docketed as filed on July 5, 2018. His claims are thus timely.
II. Deliberate indifference.
Weeks asserted two categories of deliberate indifference claims: pre-
diagnosis and post-diagnosis. The district court dismissed all claims as
frivolous and for failure to state a claim. We analyze each deliberate
indifference claim separately.
When reviewing a dismissal for failure to state a claim, all well-pleaded
facts are accepted as true and viewed “in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff.” Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 637 (5th Cir. 2013). A plaintiff
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must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” and plead facts “that
allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(citation omitted). Threadbare recitals of causes of action and conclusory
statements are insufficient. Id.Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment when they are deliberately indifferent to a
prisoner’s serious medical needs. Easter v. Powell, 467 F.3d 459, 463 (5th Cir.
2006). A prison official acts with deliberate indifference “only if (A) he
knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious bodily harm and (B) he
disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Gobert
v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 346 (5th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).
“Unsuccessful medical treatment, acts of negligence, or medical malpractice
do not constitute deliberate indifference, nor does a prisoner’s disagreement
with his medical treatment, absent exceptional circumstances.” Id.Instead, a prisoner must provide evidence “that prison officials
refused to treat him, ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him
incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that would clearly evince a
wanton disregard for any serious medical needs.” Id. (quotation marks and
citations omitted). This court defines a “serious medical need [a]s one for
which treatment has been recommended or for which the need is so apparent
that even laymen would recognize that care is required.” Id. at 345 n.12.
Overall, “[d]eliberate indifference is an extremely high standard to meet.”
Id. at 346 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
a. Pre-diagnosis.
The district court did not reach the merits of Weeks’s pre-diagnosis
deliberate indifference claims, finding them untimely and frivolous. Because
we disagree as to timeliness, we now need to examine their merits.
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While incarcerated, Weeks complained of blood in his stool on several
occasions. Following each report to medical staff, Weeks was provided a
Fecal Occult Blood (“FOB”) test. Under prison policy, a positive result for
blood had to appear in two of three FOB tests before a colonoscopy could be
ordered. Prior to March 2016, Weeks’s FOB tests were negative. After two
FOB tests returned positive in March 2016, Weeks received his July 11, 2016,
colonoscopy. The diagnosis of colon cancer led to surgical removal of
Weeks’s tumor, his gallbladder, and 30 lymph nodes.
Weeks argues the manner in which his complaints were addressed
constitutes deliberate indifference. Responding to serious medical needs
with cursory or minimal, ineffective treatment and delay of care can amount
to deliberate indifference. Harris v. Hegmann, 198 F.3d 153, 159 (5th Cir.
1999); Easter, 467 F.3d at 463–64. Weeks received routine tests for blood
found in stool and the policy-required colonoscopy only when two of those
tests returned positive results.
Is there evidence of cursory, minimal, ineffective treatment? Weeks
contends that FOB tests were not the proper procedure for his condition
because those tests are for hidden blood, yet he reported visible blood in each
of his complaints. There is evidence in the record that the more sensitive
Fecal Immunochemical Test is preferred for cancer screening. Further,
Weeks’s diagnosing doctor questioned why a different procedure had not
been done. Weeks argues from all this that the policy and procedure of the
medical providers prescribing Fiber-Lax and performing no physical tests
other than the FOB tests support deliberate indifference.
These actions must be measured against the rule that “the decision
whether to provide additional treatment” and the choice between forms of
treatment are “classic example[s] of a matter for medical judgment,” and are
not deliberate indifference. Gobert, 463 F.3d at 346; Estelle v. Gamble, 429
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U.S. 97, 107 (1976). Weeks provides no evidence to support the
disagreement about the proper tests. It is understandable that he believes his
complaints should have caused a more in-depth examination, but a belief does
not amount to deliberate indifference. Further, there is nothing in the record
indicating he had two positive FOB tests prior to March 2016, and those tests
led to the proper diagnosis and surgery.
We find no support for Weeks’s assertion that any member of the
medical staff delayed his care or ignored his complaints. At most, the
conduct of the medical providers would rise to negligence or even gross
negligence, but “deliberate indifference cannot be inferred merely from a
negligent or even a grossly negligent response to a substantial risk of serious
harm.” Thompson v. Upshur Cnty., 245 F.3d 447, 459 (5th Cir. 2001)
(quotation marks and citations omitted). Weeks has failed to state a claim of
deliberate indifference regarding his pre-diagnosis treatment.
b. Post-diagnosis.
Weeks alleges the defendants’ following conduct establishes instances
of deliberate indifference regarding his care after the diagnosis of colon
cancer. Nurse Judith Thomas ordered Weeks’s post-surgical staples to be
removed from his partially healed wound, replaced the staples with steri-
strip, and discontinued his blood thinner. Thomas then told Weeks that
there was no order for the blood thinner medication and that another nurse
told Thomas the medication had been discontinued because Weeks was “up
and about.” Weeks was told in response to a grievance that after consultation
with the pharmacist, there was no indication to continue the medication
because Weeks was “ambulating freely.” The discontinuation of the
medication allegedly caused an infection at his incision.
Weeks claims he suffered from nausea and vomiting for 48 hours after
chemotherapy, and none of the nurses provided any treatment. The enema
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he was given prior to his colonoscopy was, according to Weeks, unnecessary,
and he was uncomfortable throughout the preparation. Weeks alleges nurse
Kelly Morrison intentionally injected more Phenergan into his thigh than he
was prescribed, causing pain and bruising. Additionally, Weeks was
transferred from the 12-hour medical unit to the 24-hour medical unit after
completing half of his chemotherapy treatments, and he contends the
medical attention in the 12-hour unit was better and faster.
These allegations do not raise a facially plausible deliberate
indifference claim. A healthcare provider’s failure to follow the advice of
another provider, without more, supports only a difference in medical
opinion, not deliberate indifference. See Gobert, 463 F.3d at 346; See Estelle,
429 U.S. at 107. Weeks states that nurse Thomas’s “malice can be inferred”
from her conduct and that nurse Morrison’s injection was improper. Neither
his disagreement with Thomas’s use of steri-strips rather than staples nor his
general dissatisfaction with his course of treatment from both nurses
constitutes deliberate indifference “absent exceptional circumstances.”
Gobert, 463 F.3d at 346. Weeks has not asserted any.
Instead, Weeks’s complaint contains facts that nurses on duty
responded to his complaints of nausea and attended to his needs during his
chemotherapy. He was also routinely given anti-nausea medication and
responded to treatments. Overall, the record establishes that after Weeks
was diagnosed with colon cancer, he received regular care from the medical
providers that coincided with their medical judgment.
Weeks has not raised a viable deliberate indifference allegation against
any defendant.
III. Deprivation of property.
Weeks contends officials allowed his property to be stolen while he
was being treated. “Prisoners have a cognizable constitutionally protected
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property interest in their personal property.” Eubanks v. McCotter, 802 F.2d
790, 793–94 (5th Cir. 1986). Nevertheless, “[u]nder the Parratt/Hudson
doctrine, a deprivation of a constitutionally protected property interest
caused by a state employee’s random, unauthorized conduct does not give
rise to a § 1983 procedural due process claim, unless the State fails to provide
an adequate postdeprivation remedy.” Allen v. Thomas, 388 F.3d 147, 149
(5th Cir. 2004) (quotation marks and citations omitted). The Texas
administrative and judicial systems allow prisoners to raise ordinary tort
claims like conversion or an administrative remedy for lost or damaged
property. See Cathey v. Guenther, 47 F.3d 162, 164 (5th Cir. 1995); Spurlock
v. Schroedter, 88 S.W.3d 733, 737 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002).
We examine Weeks’s individual claims. He alleges that his
identification card and shower shoes were taken and not returned to him
when he returned from the hospital after certain defendants failed to follow
proper inventory procedures. Although Weeks has a protected property
interest in this personal property, “[a] prison official’s failure to follow the
prison’s own policies, procedures or regulations does not constitute a
violation of due process, if constitutional minima are nevertheless met.”
Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 768 (5th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks and
citations omitted). We previously held that a similar due process claim was
properly dismissed because Texas law provides the adequate post-
deprivation remedy of conversion when property is taken without proper
procedures. Id. We find the same here. Weeks has an adequate state post-
deprivation remedy under Texas law and thus does not have a Section 1983
due process claim.
As for Weeks’s craft shop materials, he alleges the failure to transfer
his materials was the result of negligence. The Supreme Court has held that
“the Due Process Clause is simply not implicated by a negligent act of an
official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property.”
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Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986). Thus, Weeks failed to
sufficiently state a claim for relief under Section 1983 because, again, Texas
provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy.
With respect to his craft chemicals, Weeks argues he was deprived of
the chemicals pursuant to prison policy. This claim requires a different
analysis because post-deprivation remedies “do not satisfy due process
where a deprivation of property is caused by conduct pursuant to established
state procedure, rather than random and unauthorized action.” Hudson v.
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532 (1984). “Conduct is not ‘random and
unauthorized’” if the state delegates the power to the defendants “to effect
the very deprivation complained of.” Allen, 388 F.3d at 149.
Weeks alleges in his complaint that he was advised his chemicals could
not be transferred between medication units, he had 60 days to arrange for
their pickup or mailing, and the chemicals would be discarded if he did not
make the arrangements. He describes no actions he took to file a grievance
about this issue or the policy. The prison officials’ explanation of prison
procedures Weeks needed to follow provided him with constitutional
minimum protections. His lack of action and Texas’s adequate post-
deprivation remedy of conversion establish that his claim was properly
dismissed.
Weeks also asserts a general property interest in the prison grievance
system. He contends that the numerous grievances he filed, yet did not
specifically identify in his complaint, were not properly or timely processed.
According to Weeks, this resulted in a denial of his constitutional rights.
Weeks “does not have a federally protected liberty in having [his prison]
grievances resolved to his satisfaction,” and any claim related to that process
is not cognizable under Section 1983. 28 U.S.C. § 1983; Geiger, 404 F.3d at
374. The claim has no merit.
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IV. Right of access to the courts.
Weeks’s alleges his constitutional right to present his case was
impeded by prison officials when they confiscated items from his cell.
Prisoners have “a constitutionally protected right of access to the courts”;
this does not extend to “more than the ability of an inmate to prepare and
transmit a necessary legal document to a court.” Brewer v. Wilkinson, 3 F.3d
816, 819, 821 (5th Cir. 1993). “An inmate alleging the denial of his right of
access to the courts must demonstrate a relevant, actual injury stemming
from the defendant’s unconstitutional conduct.” Brewster, 587 F.3d at 769.
The inmate must “allege that his ability to pursue a ‘nonfrivolous,’
‘arguable’ legal claim was hindered” and “describe the underlying claim well
enough to show that its ‘arguable nature . . . is more than hope.’” Id.(citations omitted).
Weeks contends his stamps and envelopes were confiscated,
depriving him of “service upon a defendant via U.S. mail, causing that
defendant to go unserved.” Weeks does not identify the claims that were
hindered as a result of the conduct, offer evidence showing that any
defendant hindered his ability to pursue a nonfrivolous legal claim, or show
any actual injury stemming from the defendants’ conduct. Weeks has failed
to state a claim for relief on this issue.
V. Retaliation by prison officials.
Weeks asserts numerous acts of retaliation by defendants for his filing
grievances and complaints on his and other prisoners’ behalf. He argues the
defendants fabricated rules in order to charge him with violations.
Specifically, Weeks argues Officer McBroom wrote a disciplinary charge
against him in retaliation for providing legal assistance to other prisoners, and
he was subsequently charged with contraband in his cell.
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Retaliation by a prison official against a prisoner who is seeking to
access the courts or is complaining about misconduct violates the First
Amendment. DeMarco v. Davis, 914 F.3d 383, 388 (5th Cir. 2019).
Retaliation claims are “regarded with skepticism” to avoid enmeshing
federal courts in prison disciplinary actions. Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161,
1166 (5th Cir. 1995). To prevail on a retaliation claim, “a prisoner must
establish (1) a specific constitutional right, (2) the defendant’s intent to
retaliate against the prisoner for his or her exercise of that right, (3) a
retaliatory adverse act, and (4) causation.” Morris v. Powell, 449 F.3d 682,
684 (5th Cir. 2006) (quotation marks and citations omitted). A claim is only
actionable if the retaliatory conduct is “capable of deterring a person of
ordinary firmness from further exercising his constitutional rights.” Id. at
686. The action must be more than de minimis to form the basis of a Section
1983 claim, id. at 684–85, and the prisoner must show the adverse act would
not have occurred but for the retaliatory motive to establish causation.
McDonald v. Steward, 132 F.3d 225, 231 (5th Cir. 1998).
Weeks does not have a constitutionally protected right to meet with
another prisoner and provide legal assistance or advice. Shaw v. Murphy, 532
U.S. 223, 228 (2001). He therefore cannot satisfy the first element of a
retaliation claim. Weeks also fails to identify any punishment resulting from
his contraband charges that could be considered more than de minimis.
Confiscation of Tylenol and soap would not deter an ordinary person from
pursuing his claims. Cf. Morris, 449 F.3d at 686–87. Additionally, Weeks
fails to provide any specific support for his claim of retaliatory conduct
against Officer McBroom.
Weeks’s allegations amount to no more than conclusory statements of
his “personal belief that he is the victim of retaliation,” which is insufficient
to state a claim for relief. Johnson v. Rodriguez, 110 F.3d 299, 310 (5th Cir.
1997) (citation omitted).
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VI. Punishment and prison condition.
Weeks raises numerous complaints regarding prison life and use of
restraints during transport. He argues there are several conditions that make
prison life difficult and confusing, and he alleges that use of a “black box”
restraint constituted cruel and inhuman punishment.
Regarding the prison conditions, Weeks fails to identify any specific
constitutional violations or injuries he suffered, and he has not alleged
conditions “so serious as to deprive him of the minimal measure of life’s
necessities, as when denied some basic human need.” Berry v. Brady, 192
F.3d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 1999). None of the conditions rise to the level of a
constitutional violation.
Concerning restraints, the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against
cruel and inhuman punishment is implicated when handcuffs or restraints are
used to subject prisoners to “great pain” either “deliberately, as
punishment, or mindlessly, with indifference to the prisoners’ humanity.”
Fulford v. King, 692 F.2d 11, 14–15 (5th Cir. 1982). Weeks does not contend
that he suffered any injury or great pain, nor has he provided any facts
showing that restraints were used as punishment or to cause him harm. To
the contrary, he states that the guards explained they were using the “black
box” restraints during his transport because another prisoner attempted
suicide during their previous transport. Weeks has failed to sufficiently plead
a claim for relief on either issue.
VII. Entitlement to amend.
Weeks’s final argument is the district court should not have dismissed
his entire complaint if amending would have cured the deficiencies. See
Bazrowx v. Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998). Weeks filed a Rule 59(e)
motion to be permitted to amend. “Generally, a district court errs in
dismissing a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim . . . without giving the
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plaintiff an opportunity to amend.” Id. The district court is not required to
allow such an opportunity, though, if the prisoner’s claims are clearly
frivolous, Eason v. Thaler, 14 F.3d 8, 9 (5th Cir. 1994), or if the prisoner has
pled his best case in the current complaint. Mendoza-Tarango v. Flores, 982
F.3d 395, 402 (5th Cir. 2020).
When a pro se litigant’s complaint is dismissed without allowing an
opportunity to amend, this court considers whether the plaintiff’s
“allegations, if developed by a questionnaire or in a Spears dialog, might have
presented a nonfrivolous section 1983 claim.” Eason, 14 F.3d at 9. If, “[w]ith
further factual development and specificity” the plaintiff’s “allegations may
pass . . . muster,” we generally remand to give the prisoner “an
opportunity . . . to offer a more detailed set of factual claims.” Id. at 10.
In his Rule 59(e) motion, Weeks did not specify what issues he would
have raised or how he would have cured any deficiencies in his complaint.
He already presented, in his initial complaint, 225 pages of allegations to
support his over 100 claims against 110 individual defendants. He provided
detailed facts supporting his claims and the alleged conduct of the defendants
that violated his constitutional rights. Weeks already had a considerable
opportunity to present his best case. Without more in his motion for leave to
amend, the district court did not err in denying it.
AFFIRMED.
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