United States v. Harris ( 2023 )

Case: 23-30030 Document: 00516934123 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/17/2023
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
____________ FILED
October 17, 2023
No. 23-30030 Lyle W. Cayce
____________ Clerk
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Bryant Lamont Harris,
Defendant—Appellant.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
USDC No. 2:20-CR-71-1
______________________________
Before Elrod, Ho, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:
Our previous opinion is WITHDRAWN. And the following is sub-
stituted in its place.
* * *
Bryant Lamont Harris asserts that he is required by his religious faith
to abstain from psychiatric medication. But because he is not competent to
stand trial, the Government requested to involuntarily medicate him, and the
district court granted the motion. We hold that Harris’s religious beliefs,
combined with his lengthy detention and his potential civil confinement,
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No. 23-30030
lessen the Government’s interests in forcible medication. We accordingly re-
mand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I.
Harris was charged for threatening to assault a federal judge in viola-
tion of 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B). In February 2020, the FBI received infor-
mation from the United States Marshals regarding threats made against
Judge Susie Morgan and her staff. In response, FBI agents were dispatched
to conduct interviews with Judge Morgan and her staff.
Based on the interviews, the agents determined that a male who iden-
tified himself as Bryant Lamont Harris had contacted Judge Morgan’s cham-
bers via telephone and complained about the New Orleans Police Depart-
ment. Harris asserted that he was an Army veteran and had been expertly
trained in marksmanship. He then asked how many security personnel were
assigned to Judge Morgan. When asked why he needed that information, he
replied, “I need to know how many people I need to take out to get to the
Judge.” He then said, “I’m not hiding” and “I don’t give a f---,” and then
hung up the phone. The FBI later learned that Harris had contacted Judge
Morgan’s chambers several times before.
Harris was subsequently arrested, detained, and indictment for threat-
ening to assault a federal judge in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B).
Shortly after his arrest, Harris underwent a behavioral health evaluation.
Among other things, the evaluation noted Harris’s delusional belief that he
was offered “multiple women and $500k a month contract to join the Illumi-
nati” due to his “special gifts.”
Given his delusions, the district court held a hearing to determine
whether Harris was competent to stand trial. The court determined that Har-
ris was incompetent and ordered that he be committed to the custody of the
Attorney General. Specifically, the order stated that the Attorney General
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“shall hospitalize Harris for treatment in a suitable facility for such a reason-
able period of time, not to exceed four months, as is necessary to determine
whether there is a substantial probability that in the foreseeable future he will
attain the capacity to permit the proceedings to go forward.” The court also
ordered the Attorney General to provide “reports on [Harris’s] mental com-
petency” throughout the confinement period. Harris appealed the district
court’s incompetency determination, and we affirmed. United States v. Har-
ris, No. 21-30326, 2022 WL 1044915 (5th Cir. Apr. 7, 2022).
Toward the end of the confinement period, the district court received
a report from Forensic Psychologist Brianna Glover. The report noted that
Harris remained incompetent to stand trial. Furthermore, because Harris
had been refusing medication, the report also recommended that Harris be
involuntary treated with psychotropic medication. In light of that recommen-
dation, the district court held a status conference and ordered the parties to
submit briefing on the first so-called “Sell factor” (i.e., whether the Govern-
ment has an important interest to warrant involuntary medication). Sell v.
United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180 (2003). The district court also issued an or-
der directing the Bureau of Prisons to prepare an addendum outlining in de-
tail the proposed treatment plan and other details pertinent to the Sell factors.
The court then conducted another hearing once it received the adden-
dum. During that hearing, Harris raised a religious objection to being invol-
untarily medicated, without identifying a particular source of law. The dis-
trict court denied the objection, concluding that: (1) the Government had a
compelling interest in prosecuting Harris’s crime, which was not outweighed
by Harris’s religious liberty interests; and (2) the Government satisfied the
four Sell factors. Thus, the court ordered that Harris “shall be involuntarily
medicated, in an attempt to render him competent to stand trial.”
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Harris timely appealed. “In reviewing a district court’s order to med-
icate a defendant involuntarily, we review findings of fact for clear error and
conclusions of law de novo.” United States v. Gutierrez, 704 F.3d 442, 448 (5th
Cir. 2013). “A factual finding is not clearly erroneous as long as it is plausible
in light of the record read as a whole.” United States v. Dinh, 920 F.3d 307,
310 (5th Cir. 2019) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
II.
To forcibly medicate a criminal defendant for the purpose of restoring
his competency to stand trial, the Government must establish that:
(A) “important governmental interests are at stake,” taking into account that
“[s]pecial circumstances may lessen the importance of that interest”;
(B) “involuntary medication will significantly further those . . . interests”;
(C) “involuntary medication is necessary to further those interests”; and
(D) “administration of the drugs is medically appropriate.” Sell, 539 U.S. at
180–81 (2003). Each factor must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.
United States v. James, 938 F.3d 719, 723 (5th Cir. 2019).
Here, we need only consider the first Sell factor. There are two
“[s]pecial circumstances” that lessen the Government’s interests and
necessitate reversal of the district court’s forcible-medication order. Sell, 539
U.S. at 180.
First, Harris has served significant time as a pre-trial detainee. He has
been detained since his arrest on February 14, 2020. As of October 2023, he
has been detained for almost 44 months. If the Government was allowed to
forcibly medicate Harris, the psychiatrist indicated that it would take four-to-
eight months before Harris could stand trial. So by the time of his
hypothetical trial, Harris would have been incarcerated for 48 to 52 months.
And that substantially exceeds the applicable Guidelines range for his
offense, which is only 37 to 46 months.
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True, the Government has an important interest in “bringing to trial
an individual accused of a serious crime.” Sell, 539 U.S. at 180. And even if
Harris was eventually sentenced to time served, that would not extinguish
the Government’s interest in securing his conviction. James, 959 F.3d at 664;
see also id. (“The government bears an interest not in punishing her per se
but in trying her and vindicating the law publicly.”). But “not extinguished”
is not the same as “not lessened.” And on this point, Sell is clear: “[T]he
possibility that [Harris] has already been confined for a significant amount of
time” serves as a “[s]pecial circumstance[]” that “lessens[s]” the
Government’s interest in bringing him to trial. 539 U.S. at 180.
Second, religious faith constitutes a “[s]pecial circumstance” that
lessens the Government’s interest in forcible medication. In Sell, the Court
listed a series of non-exhaustive and case-specific special circumstances that
courts should consider in making forcible-medication decisions. The Court
explained that, while the Government has an interest in bringing defendants
to trial, it “has a concomitant, constitutionally essential interest in assuring
that the defendant’s trial is a fair one.” Sell, 539 U.S. at 180. And the
defendant’s special circumstances can lessen the Government’s trial
interests. Id. True, the special circumstances listed by the Sell Court were
purely secular—things like the potential for future civil confinement of the
defendant and the time already served by the defendant. Id. If such secular
circumstances are important enough to lessen the Government’s interest in
prosecution, however, we believe religious liberty must be at least as
important. Cf. Tandon v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1294, 1296 (2021) (per curiam).
Here, Harris faces a pending civil-confinement hearing in North
Carolina. Moreover, he asserts that his religious belief as a Jehovah’s Witness
prevents him from taking medication. He further asserts that forcible
medication would violate his “constitutionally protected liberty.” The
Government does not dispute that Harris’s religious faith can qualify as a
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“special factor” under Sell. See Red Br. at 13–15; cf. Ramirez v. Collier, 595
U.S. 411, 426 (2022). Harris’s religious beliefs, combined with his lengthy
detention and his potential civil confinement, thus lessen the Government’s
interests under the first Sell factor.
We hasten to emphasize the limits in today’s holding. We do not hold
that religious faith constitutes a get-out-of-jail-free card. We also do not hold
that all religious objections eliminate the Government’s interests under the
first Sell factor. We hold only that religious liberty can constitute a “special
circumstance” under Sell, and that Harris properly raised a religious
objection to forcible medication here. That well-taken special circumstance,
combined with other factors identified above, necessitates the district court’s
reevaluation of the Government’s efforts to forcibly medicate him.
The district court’s order is VACATED, and the case is
REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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