Ernest Collins v. GEO Group, Incorporated , 536 F. App'x 426 ( 2013 )


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  •      Case: 12-60906       Document: 00512309644         Page: 1     Date Filed: 07/16/2013
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT  United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    July 16, 2013
    No. 12-60906
    Summary Calendar                        Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    ERNEST E. COLLINS,
    Plaintiff-Appellant
    v.
    GEO GROUP, INCORPORATED; JAMES TUNSTAN; LIEUTENANT RYAN,
    Correctional Officer; LIEUTENANT MARTIN, Correctional Officer;
    LIEUTENANT RODGERS, Correctional Officer; WARDEN JESSIE STREETER;
    DOCTOR EMMAUEL KPABITEY,
    Defendants-Appellees
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Mississippi
    USDC No. 3:12-CV-33
    Before SMITH, PRADO, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Ernest E. Collins, Mississippi prisoner # 13044, proceeding pro se and in
    forma pauperis (IFP), appeals the dismissal of his 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     complaint.
    Collins alleged that Officer Tunstan used excessive force in violation of Collins’s
    constitutional rights when Tunstan shot him with a riot gun and that Officers
    Ryan, Martin, and Rodgers failed to protect him from this excessive force. In
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
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    No. 12-60906
    addition, Collins alleged that Warden Streeter and Dr. Kpabitey were
    deliberately indifferent in delaying his treatment by an eye doctor and that he
    continues to have unspecified eye problems as a result of the delay. The district
    court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief may be
    granted.
    Although the district court did not specify the statutory provision on which
    the dismissal of Collins’s complaint was based, the district court was authorized
    to dismiss Collins’s complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
    be granted under 
    28 U.S.C. §§ 1915
    (e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1). We review de
    novo the dismissal of a complaint pursuant to §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and
    1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Green v.
    Atkinson, 
    623 F.3d 278
    , 280 (5th Cir. 2010). To state a claim, “a complaint must
    contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that
    is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 678 (2009) (internal
    quotation marks and citation omitted).
    The district court concluded that Collins failed to state a claim for
    excessive force because Officer Tunstan’s actions were justified as a good-faith
    effort to maintain or restore discipline and were not done maliciously and
    sadistically to cause harm. See Hudson v. McMillian, 
    503 U.S. 1
    , 6-7 (1992). As
    Collins argues, the district court erroneously stated that Officer Tunstan fired
    a shot in response to a loud inmate in Collins’s unit, who had initially complied
    with the order to lie on the ground but then stood up in defiance of that order;
    Collins actually alleged that the loud inmate had been handcuffed and removed
    from the unit prior to the shot being fired. However, Collins contradicts his
    allegations in arguing that Officer Tunstan’s actions were not justified because
    all of the inmates were lying on the floor when the shot was fired. Collins
    alleged that Officer Tunstan said that he needed to shoot in response to another
    inmate who had stood up or was starting to stand up.
    2
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    No. 12-60906
    Since Collins does not offer any argument regarding whether Officer
    Tunstan’s actions were a justified response to the other inmate’s actions, he has
    failed to show that the district court erroneously concluded that he failed to state
    a claim against Officer Tunstan and the other prison officer defendants.
    Moreover, Officer Tunstan’s response to the other inmate’s actions was a
    good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline. See Hudson, 
    503 U.S. at 6-7
    .
    According to Collins’s allegations, the officers had just resolved an attack on
    another officer in an adjoining unit when an inmate in Collins’s unit began to act
    disruptively, the officers were greatly outnumbered by the inmates, and Officer
    Tunstan fired a non-lethal weapon only after the other inmate disobeyed the
    order to lie on the ground by standing up or starting to stand up. Thus, the need
    for the application of force, the relationship between the need and the amount
    of force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the officers, and the effort made
    to temper the severity of the forceful response militate in favor of concluding
    that the force applied was not excessive in violation of Collins’s constitutional
    rights. See Baldwin v. Stalder, 
    137 F.3d 836
    , 839 (5th Cir. 1998).
    As to Collins’s argument that the district court should have obtained and
    viewed a videotape recording of the shooting, the district court was not required
    to allow Collins to conduct discovery prior to dismissing his complaint. See
    §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A(a).
    “[D]elay in medical care can only constitute an Eighth Amendment
    violation if there has been deliberate indifference that results in substantial
    harm.” Rogers v. Boatright, 
    709 F.3d 403
    , 410 (5th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation
    marks and citation omitted). Collins alleged that the eye doctor concluded that
    his eye had healed and did not reveal any permanent damage. Although he
    alleged that he continues to have unspecified eye problems, he did not explain
    the nature of his continuing eye problems. Therefore, he failed to allege facts
    from which it could be inferred that the delay in providing medical treatment
    resulted in substantial harm. See 
    id.
     Moreover, as the district court reasoned,
    3
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    No. 12-60906
    Collins was provided with medical treatment for his eye; he was examined
    shortly after his eye was injured, prescribed antibiotics and eye drops, and
    examined by Dr. Kpabitey several times before being examined by an eye doctor.
    Therefore, Collins’s complaint failed to state a claim that Warden Streeter and
    Dr. Kpabitey disregarded Collins’s medical needs. See 
    id.
    Collins also complains of the failure to provide prescribed followup care for
    his ingrown eyelashes. As stated, Collins alleged that he continues to have
    unspecified eye problems but did not explain the nature of his continuing eye
    problems. Therefore, he has not alleged facts from which it could be inferred
    that this condition or the failure to treat it constitutes a substantial risk of
    serious bodily harm. See Wilson v. Seiter, 
    501 U.S. 294
    , 297 (1991); Lawson v.
    Dallas County, 
    286 F.3d 257
    , 262 (5th Cir. 2002).
    The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Collins’s motion for
    appointment of counsel is DENIED as the case does not present “exceptional
    circumstances.” Cooper v. Sheriff, Lubbock County, Tex., 
    929 F.2d 1078
    , 1084
    (5th Cir. 1991). The district court’s dismissal of Collins’s § 1983 complaint for
    failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted counts as a strike under
    § 1915(g). See § 1915(g); Adepegba v. Hammons, 
    103 F.3d 383
    , 387-88 (5th Cir.
    1996). Collins is WARNED that if he accumulates three strikes, he will not be
    allowed to proceed IFP in any civil action or appeal unless he is under imminent
    danger of serious physical injury. See § 1915(g).
    4