Garza v. JD Foods Inc. (In Re Garza) ( 2007 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS January 16, 2007
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
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No. 06-10691
Summary Calendar
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In The Matter Of: JUANITA GARZA
Debtor
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JUANITA GARZA
Appellant
v.
JD FOODS INC
Appellee
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas, Fort Worth
No. 4:05-CV-694
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Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM, and GARZA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
On July 28, 2004, appellant Juanita Garza filed a voluntary
petition under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. On September
2, 2004, appellee J.D. Foods, Inc. filed a motion asking the
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.
47.5.4.
bankruptcy court to lift the automatic stay so that it could
liquidate its claim against the debtor by obtaining a judgment in
pending state-court litigation. The debtor did not oppose the
motion, and it was granted on September 8, 2004. The state court
entered a judgment against the debtor in the amount of $62,105.82
on October 4, 2004. The bar date for filing proofs of claim was
November 24, 2004, but J.D. Foods did not file a claim until
December 17, 2004. On May 19, 2005, the debtor objected to the
claim on the sole basis that it was not timely filed under 11
U.S.C. § 502(b)(9).1 J.D. Foods responded by filing a motion to
allow the claim as a timely filed informal claim and to permit
amendment of the informally filed claim, arguing that the agreed
motion for relief from the stay constituted an informal proof of
claim that was timely filed and could be amended by a subsequent
formal proof of claim. The bankruptcy court agreed and granted
the motion. The debtor appealed, and the district court affirmed
the bankruptcy court’s order. The debtor appeals yet again.
The only issue on appeal is whether 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(9),
as amended by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, and FED. BANKR.
R. 3001(a), 3002(b), and 3002(c), abrogated the doctrine of
informal proofs of claim. As the district court correctly
described it:
1
According to J.D. Foods’ appellate brief, the debtor
stipulated that she had sufficient non-exempt assets to pay all
claims, including J.D. Foods’ claim, in full.
2
An informal proof of claim permits a
bankruptcy court to treat the pre-bar date
filings of a creditor as an informal proof of
claim that can be amended after the bar date
to conform with, inter alia, the requirements
of Rule 3001(a) of the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure. See, e.g., Barlow v.
Waterman & Associates, Inc. (In re Waterman &
Associates, Inc.), 227 F.3d 604, 608 (6th Cir.
2000). The idea of informal proof of claims
has been in existence for nearly a century.
Id. (citations omitted).
The debtor’s argument that the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994
somehow abrogated the informal proof of claim is wholly
unsupported by any citation to authority. As the district court
noted, subsequent to the adoption of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1994, this court specifically upheld the existence and validity
of informally filed proofs of claims. See Nikoloutsos v.
Nikoloutsos (In re Nikoloutsos), 199 F.3d 233, 236-37 (5th Cir.
2000). The Sixth Circuit’s decision in In re Waterman, cited in
the district court’s opinion, addressed the specific argument
that the debtor makes here and summarily rejected it. See Barlow
v. M.J. Waterman & Assocs. (In re M.J. Waterman & Assocs.), 227
F.3d 604, 608 n.4 (6th Cir. 2000) (“To the extent Waterman
maintains that the informal proof of claims doctrine has been
invalidated by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 (the ‘1994
Act’), we summarily dispense with this claim. . . . [T]here are
numerous cases throughout the country which have allowed informal
claims . . . even after the enactment of the 1994 Act. [And]
Waterman has failed to cite a single case in which § 502(b)(9) of
3
the 1994 Act has been employed to bar informal claims. We find
that the informal proof of claims doctrine is still very much
alive.” (citations omitted)). We agree and reject the debtor’s
argument.
The judgment of the district court affirming the order of
the bankruptcy court is AFFIRMED.
4