Jeffery Stevens v. Deutsche Bank Natl Trust , 570 F. App'x 402 ( 2014 )


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  •      Case: 13-50812      Document: 00512652362         Page: 1    Date Filed: 06/04/2014
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    No. 13-50812                            June 4, 2014
    Summary Calendar
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    JEFFERY STEVENS; GLORIA STEVENS,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants
    v.
    DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY; AMERICA’S
    SERVICING COMPANY,
    Defendants-Appellees
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Texas
    USDC No. 5:12-CV-1177
    Before REAVLEY, JONES, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Plaintiffs-Appellants Jeffery and Gloria Stevens (the “Stevenses”)
    dispute the authority of Defendants-Appellees Deutsche Bank National Trust
    Company (“Deutsche Bank”) and America’s Servicing Company (“ACS”) to
    foreclose on their home. The Stevenses base their challenge on alleged flaws
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 13-50812    Document: 00512652362       Page: 2   Date Filed: 06/04/2014
    No. 13-50812
    in an assignment transferring their home-equity loan to Deutsche Bank. The
    district court granted Defendants-Appellees’ motion to dismiss. We AFFIRM.
    I.
    In April 2004, the Stevenses purchased property located at 5801 Spring
    Village, San Antonio, Texas. In November 2006, the Stevenses took out a
    home-equity loan for the amount of $132,000.         The Stevenses executed a
    security instrument naming the New Century Mortgage Company (“New
    Century”) as lender and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.
    (“MERS”) as beneficiary “acting solely as a nominee for Lender and Lender’s
    successors and assigns.” The Stevenses also executed a note, which was placed
    in a trust named HIS Asset Securitization Trust 2007-NCI (the “Trust”).
    Under the Pooling and Servicing Agreement (PSA), mortgages could not
    transfer out of the Trust after April 30, 2007.
    In 2007, New Century went bankrupt.           Around July 2008, ACS, a
    mortgage servicer, notified the Stevenses that they should make future loan
    payments to ACS, allegedly without revealing that the actual mortgagee was
    Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Wells Fargo”).      The Stevenses fell behind on their
    loan with Wells Fargo, and entered into a forbearance agreement in April 2010.
    Around January 2011, MERS, acting as nominee for New Century, transferred
    the note and deed of trust to Deutsche Bank. The Stevenses brought suit in
    Texas state court, contesting Deutsche Bank’s authority to foreclose on the
    Spring Village property.     After removal, Defendants-Appellees moved to
    dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motion, and
    dismissed the case. This appeal follows.
    II.
    On appeal, the Stevenses argue that the assignment was void because it
    violated the PSA and because New Century’s bankruptcy vitiated MERS’s
    right to act on its behalf. The Stevenses also dispute the district court’s
    2
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    No. 13-50812
    dismissal of their claims under Section 12.002(a) of the Texas Civil Practice
    and Remedies Code and for breach of contract. We address each argument in
    turn.
    As a non-party to the assignment agreement, the Stevenses cannot
    challenge the Deutsche Bank’s enforcement of the agreement unless the
    assignment is void. Reinagel v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 
    735 F.3d 220
    ,
    225 (5th Cir. 2013). 1 Here, however, the flaws alleged by the Stevenses render
    the assignment voidable, not void. 
    Id. at 228
    (holding that an assignment that
    violates a PSA renders the assignment voidable); 11 U.S.C. § 549(a)(1)(B)
    (providing that trustee “may avoid” post-petition bankruptcy transfers). Thus,
    the Stevenses do not have standing to challenge the assignment.
    The Stevenses’ claim under Section 12.002(a) requires, inter alia, an
    allegation that Defendants-Appellees intended to cause the Stevenses physical
    injury, financial injury, or mental anguish. Golden v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
    No. 13-50158, 
    2014 WL 644549
    , at *3 (5th Cir. Feb. 20, 2014) (per curiam). The
    Stevenses allege only that Deutsche Bank used the assigning document “for
    the express purpose of closing an [sic] link in the chain of title so that [it] could
    proceed to foreclose.” As this Court previously held:
    [Deutsche Bank]’s use of the assignment for business purposes
    hardly equates to an argument that it intended to inflict financial
    injury or mental anguish. The [Stevenses] have not alleged any
    facts showing that their property would not be subject to
    foreclosure, even absent the assignment of the deed of trust to
    [Deutsche Bank].
    
    Id. Accordingly, Plaintiffs-Appellants
    fail to state a claim under
    1The Stevenses attempt to circumvent Reinagel by arguing that that a transfer in
    violation of a PSA is void under New York law. Because Plaintiffs-Appellants never
    contended, however, that New York law governed this issue in their pleadings or in
    opposition to Defendants-Appellees’ motion to dismiss, this argument is waived. See
    Chambliss v. Massanari, 
    269 F.3d 520
    , 523 (5th Cir. 2001).
    3
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    No. 13-50812
    Section 12.002(a).
    Finally, the Stevenses claim breach of contact based on alleged credit
    swaps and insurance proceed payments. The Stevenses do not allege, however,
    that they performed their loan obligations, nor do they dispute that they are
    in default. In Texas, performance or tendered performance by the plaintiff is
    an essential element of a breach of contract claim, and a party in default cannot
    sue for breach of contact. 
    Id. at *4.
    For both of these reasons, the district court
    correctly dismissed the breach of contract claim as a matter of law.
    AFFIRMED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 13-50812

Citation Numbers: 570 F. App'x 402

Judges: Reavley, Jones, Prado

Filed Date: 6/4/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024