James Coitrone v. Bobby Murray ( 2016 )

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 16a0102n.06
FILED
No. 15-5575 Feb 19, 2016
DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
JAMES COITRONE, )
)
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
)
v. ) ON APPEAL FROM THE
) UNITED STATES DISTRICT
BOBBY D. MURRAY; RICKI L. ALLEN; BRETT ) COURT FOR THE WESTERN
COOMES, individually, ) DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
)
Defendants-Appellees. )
)
BEFORE: DAUGHTREY, ROGERS, and WHITE, Circuit Judges.
ROGERS, Circuit Judge. James H. Coitrone, on a motorcycle, led Kentucky State Police
Trooper Brett Coomes on a chase through the streets of Bowling Green, Kentucky. The chase
ended when Coomes’s car collided with Coitrone’s motorcycle. Coitrone filed a 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 action in federal district court, alleging that Coomes violated Coitrone’s Fourth
Amendment rights and alleging supplemental state-law claims for negligence and battery. The
district court granted summary judgment to Coomes, and Coitrone appealed. The undisputed
facts establish that Coomes’s use of force did not violate Coitrone’s Fourth Amendments rights.
The district court therefore properly granted summary judgment on this claim to Coitrone.
Coitrone’s state-law claims require some additional analysis, and may warrant the district court’s
declining of supplemental jurisdiction.
No. 15-5575
James H. Coitrone v. Bobby D. Murray, et. al.
On the morning of August 19, 2012, Coitrone planned to take his live-in girlfriend,
Shasta McCollum, to church on Coitrone’s motorcycle. After getting ready, Coitrone and
McCollum left their home on Barren River Road in Bowling Green, Kentucky, and proceeded to
their church on Coitrone’s motorcycle with McCollum riding as passenger. Coitrone and
McCollum were waiting at a stop light when Kentucky State Trooper Kevin Mayfield pulled up
behind them. Mayfield ran Coitrone’s license plate, revealing outstanding warrants for Coitrone
for kidnapping, rape, sodomy, and bail jumping. After Coitrone proceeded through the
intersection, Mayfield turned on his blue lights to indicate that Coitrone should pull over.
Coitrone testified that after Mayfield flashed his lights, Coitrone slowed down and waved to
Mayfield to let him know that Coitrone intended to stop, but did not stop because there were
orange cones and pedestrians along the right side of the road. Coitrone testified that because he
did not feel that there was any safe place for him to pull over, he turned right onto Russellville
Road in order to stop.
Coitrone testified that he intended to stop when he saw that there were no cones on the
right side of Russellville Road but kept going because he heard screeching tires and believed that
the state trooper was going to strike him from behind. Coitrone became frightened, and decided
to take McCollum, who was still riding on the back of his motorcycle, to a “safe place.” After
reaching a Wendy’s, Coitrone pulled between a parking barrier and a tree to drop off McCollum.
Coitrone testified that he did not get off of his motorcycle and speak with the state trooper at this
time because he was “[s]cared to take an ass whooping” and “knew for sure they were gonna
whoop [him].”
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After Coitrone dropped off McCollum, he continued to flee down Dishman Lane. At
some point, Dishman Lane turned into Cave Mill Road. Coitrone drove down Dishman Lane
and onto Cave Mill Road at a speed of about 55 miles per hour in a 30-miles-per-hour zone.
Coitrone proceeded down Cave Mill Road until he came to a light at an intersection and
took a left onto Smallhouse Road, a two-lane road in a residential area. At the time that Coitrone
reached this intersection, Coomes, who had joined the pursuit of Coitrone after hearing Trooper
Mayfield run Coitrone’s license plate on the radio, was about to catch up with Coitrone. Coomes
testified that he saw Coitrone run a red light during this left turn, although Coitrone does not
recall doing so. As Coitrone drove down Smallhouse Road, he traveled in and out of the left lane
in order to pass vehicles traveling in the right lane.
Coitrone proceeded down Smallhouse Road until he encountered Coomes’s supervisor,
Lieutenant John Clark, who had maneuvered his car onto Smallhouse Road to try to end
Coitrone’s flight from the police. Coitrone drove around Clark’s car and continued driving on
Smallhouse Road toward a large church called the Living Hope Church.
After observing Coomes pursue Coitrone through the intersection between Smallhouse
Road and Campbell Lane, Clark put his car in drive and made sure that he got through the
intersection safely. Clark then picked up his microphone and announced on the police radio that
“it was time to terminate the pursuit.” Clark ordered the pursuit to be terminated because he was
concerned that there would likely be a large amount of traffic near the church. Clark testified
that he later learned that no one, including Coomes, heard Clark’s order to terminate the pursuit
because it was covered up by other radio traffic.
Coomes did not observe that traffic had become heavier until he reached the top of the
hill on Smallhouse Road where the church was located. Coomes decided to terminate the chase
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if Coitrone had not stopped by the time Coitrone reached Highland Way, the next intersection on
Smallhouse Road after Campbell Lane, because of the amount of vehicular and pedestrian traffic
in the area.
Coitrone testified that he decided to “giv[e] up” his attempt to evade the police after
crossing the intersection at Campbell Lane because he had observed the church traffic and
“didn’t want to hurt anybody coming from the church house [or] going to the church house.”
Coitrone testified that he let off the throttle and let his motorcycle coast in order to slow down as
he approached the church, but Coomes testified that although Coitrone slowed abruptly, he
showed no sign of intending to stop before Coomes struck the rear of his motorcycle.
Coomes testified that he tried to stop his vehicle after Coitrone slowed, but was unable to
avoid striking the rear of Coitrone’s motorcycle. In contrast, Coitrone testified that he believed
that Coomes had tried to perform a precision immobilization technique in order to stop Coitrone.
A precision immobilization technique is a “method of causing a [vehicle] to stop by ramming it
not squarely from behind but instead at an angle, causing it to spin and stop.” Wourms v. Fields,
742 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014) (internal citation omitted). Upon collision, Coitrone’s
motorcycle hit a concrete culvert and spun around multiple times, ejecting him onto the culvert.
Coitrone alleges that as a result of this collision, he was hospitalized for over a month, placed
into an induced coma, and suffered extensive life-threatening injuries, including multiple
fractures of numerous bones and extensive soft tissue damage.
Coitrone subsequently filed suit in federal district court alleging that Coomes had
violated his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by using unwarranted and unnecessary deadly
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force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and alleging supplemental state-law negligence and
battery claims.1 Coomes moved for summary judgment on all claims.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Coomes. Coitrone v. Murray,
No. 1:13−CV−00132−GNS, 2015 WL 2384298 (W.D. Ky. May 19, 2015). The district court
determined that Coitrone’s § 1983 claim failed as a matter of law to the extent this claim was
premised upon Coomes’s allegedly negligent conduct during the chase because Coitrone
appeared to acknowledge that he could not establish a Fourth Amendment violation based upon
negligent action. Id. at *3 n.6. Assuming that Coomes had intentionally struck Coitrone, the
district court then determined that Coomes’s use of force was objectively reasonable because
1) the crimes at issue were severe; 2) Coitrone’s actions during the chase constituted an
immediate threat to the police and to innocent bystanders; and 3) Coitrone was actively resisting
or attempting to evade arrest by flight. Id. at *4. The district court rejected Coitrone’s attempt to
analogize this case to Walker v. Davis, a case in which this court held that the doctrine of
qualified immunity did not protect a deputy who had used deadly force against a motorcyclist
who posed “no immediate threat to anyone.” Id. at *5−6 (quoting 649 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir.
2011)). The district court determined that this case was instead more analogous to Abney v. Coe,
a case in which the Fourth Circuit held that a deputy sheriff’s use of deadly force against a
motorcyclist who posed a “substantial risk of serious harm” to others did not violate the Fourth
Amendment. 2015 WL 2384298, at *6−7 (quoting 493 F.3d 412, 417 (4th Cir. 2007)). The
1
Coitrone also sued Kentucky State Police Captains Bobby D. Murray and Ricki L. Allen, but
Coitrone did not oppose the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Allen and
Murray. Coitrone’s complaint against Coomes also included claims of intentional infliction of
emotional distress and negligence per se, but Coitrone similarly did not oppose the district
court’s grant of summary judgment with respect to those claims. The claims against Murray and
Allen and the claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligence per se are not
at issue in this appeal.
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district court concluded that Coitrone, like the motorcyclist in Abney and unlike the motorcyclist
in Walker, “posed a serious risk of harm to innocent bystanders.” 2015 WL 2384298, at *7.
Accordingly, the district court held that Coomes’s use of force did not violate the Fourth
Amendment. Id.
The district court held in the alternative that even if Coomes’s use of force had violated
Coitrone’s constitutional rights, summary judgment on Coitrone’s § 1983 claim was proper
because the doctrine of qualified immunity barred Coitrone’s claim. Id. at *7−9. The district
court reasoned that Coomes was protected by the doctrine of qualified immunity because his
conduct did not violate Coitrone’s clearly established constitutional rights. Id.
The district court also granted summary judgment on Coitrone’s state-law negligence and
battery claims. The district court held that Coitrone’s negligence claim failed as a matter of law
because the negligence claim was not viable in light of Coitrone’s battery claim for the identical
use of “more force against [Coitrone] than permitted by law.” Id. at *10. The district court
concluded in the alternative that Coomes did not owe a duty of care to Coitrone, “who was
evading law enforcement.” Id. The district court also held that Coitrone’s battery claim failed as
a matter of law. Id. at *11.
The district court properly determined that Coomes’s use of force did not violate
Coitrone’s Fourth Amendments rights. Assuming that Coomes intentionally struck Coitrone’s
motorcycle, Coomes’s use of force was objectively reasonable because the governmental interest
in ending the immediate and substantial risk that Coitrone’s flight posed to the public
outweighed the substantial intrusion that Coomes’s use of force imposed upon Coitrone’s Fourth
Amendment rights. “Determining whether the force used to effect a particular seizure is
‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of the nature and quality
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of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing
governmental interests at stake.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). To make this determination, we use “the objective-
reasonableness standard, which depends on the facts and circumstance of each case viewed from
the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene and not with 20/20 hindsight. . . . The
question we must ask is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the officer’s actions
were objectively reasonable.” Fox v. DeSoto, 489 F.3d 227, 236−37 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal
citations omitted).
Even though “intentionally ramming a motorcycle with a police cruiser involves the
application of potentially deadly force,” Walker, 649 F.3d at 503−04, and the intrusion imposed
on Coitrone’s Fourth Amendment interests was substantial, the governmental interest in ending
Coitrone’s flight outweighed this intrusion because the undisputed facts establish that his flight
posed a substantial and immediate danger to the public. In Scott v. Harris, the Supreme Court
held that law enforcement’s use of force that poses “a high likelihood of serious injury or death”
to a fleeing individual is reasonable when that force is used in an attempt to terminate a chase
that poses “a substantial and immediate risk of serious physical injury to others.” 550 U.S. 372,
384, 386 (2007). The Supreme Court held in Scott that a deputy’s use of potentially deadly force
to end the plaintiff’s flight from the police was therefore reasonable because a videotape
established that the plaintiff had led the police on a chase that placed “police officers and
innocent bystanders alike at great risk of serious injury.” Id. at 380, 386. The Supreme Court
explained:
[On the video] we see [the plaintiff’s] vehicle racing down narrow,
two-lane roads in the dead of night at speeds that are shockingly
fast. We see it swerve around more than a dozen other cars, cross
the double-yellow line, and force cars traveling in both directions
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to their respective shoulders to avoid being hit. We see it run
multiple red lights and travel for considerable periods of time in
the occasional center left-turn-only lane, chased by numerous
police cars forced to engage in the same hazardous maneuvers just
to keep up.
Id. at 379−80 (internal footnote omitted). The undisputed facts establish that Coitrone, similar to
the plaintiff in Scott, drove recklessly during the pursuit by driving his motorcycle as fast as
65 to 70 miles per hour, exceeding the speed limit by as much as 25 miles per hour, crossing the
double-yellow line, and driving in the left lane of a two-lane road in order to pass vehicles
traveling in the right lane. The undisputed facts also establish that Coitrone’s reckless driving,
like the actions of the plaintiff in Scott, posed an immediate and substantial danger to the safety
of innocent bystanders because portions of the chase occurred in areas in which other drivers and
pedestrians were present. Accordingly, the undisputed facts establish that Coomes’s use of
potentially deadly force against Coitrone was objectively reasonable because Coitrone, like the
plaintiff in Scott, initiated a chase that posed a “substantial and immediate risk of serious
physical injury to others.” 550 U.S. at 386.
In addition to the substantial and immediate danger that Coitrone posed to the public,
other considerations relevant to the objective reasonableness analysis indicate that Coomes’s use
of force against Coitrone was objectively reasonable. Relevant considerations to the objective
reasonableness analysis “include the severity of the crime at issue” and whether the suspect “is
actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Fox, 489 F.3d at 236 (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). The undisputed evidence establishes that Coitrone
attempted to evade arrest by flight because he testified that he fled from the police even though
he was aware the police wanted him to stop. Accordingly, Coomes’s use of force to terminate
this dangerous chase was objectively reasonable under the totality of the circumstances because
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the governmental interest in ending the substantial and immediate danger that Coitrone’s flight
posed to the public, in addition to Coitrone’s attempt to evade arrest by flight, outweighed the
intrusion that Coomes’s use of potentially deadly force imposed upon Coitrone’s Fourth
Amendment interests.
Coitrone contends that Coomes’s use of force was unreasonable because Coitrone did not
pose an immediate danger to others at the time of the collision. To support this assertion,
Coitrone relies on this court’s holding in Walker that when “a suspect poses no immediate threat
to the officer and no threat to others, the harm resulting from failing to apprehend him does not
justify the use of deadly force to do so.” Walker, 649 F.3d at 503 (quoting Tennessee v. Garner,
471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985)). In Walker, this court affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified
immunity to a deputy who hit and killed a motorcyclist after pursuing the motorcyclist for about
five minutes on “empty stretches of highway” and onto a muddy field because the motorcyclist
“posed no immediate threat to anyone as he rode his motorcycle across an empty field in the
middle of the night in rural Kentucky.” Id. at 503−04. Coitrone contends that he did not pose an
immediate threat to others because at the time that the collision occurred “heavy traffic . . . made
any further flight by Coitrone obviously impossible and required Coitrone to begin slowing to a
stop.” This assertion fails because unlike the collision in Walker, which occurred in the middle
of the night on an empty field, the collision here occurred on a Sunday morning near a church at
which pedestrians and other drivers were present. Further, prior to the collision, Coitrone had
exhibited a willingness to endanger others by driving recklessly in order to evade the police. A
reasonable officer in Coomes’s position would therefore be justified in believing that Coitrone
might seriously injure these innocent bystanders by continuing to drive recklessly even though
Coitrone had slowed down before he was struck. Accordingly, Coitrone’s reliance on Walker is
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misplaced because Coitrone, unlike the motorcyclist in Walker, posed a substantial and
immediate danger to innocent bystanders at the time of the collision.
Coitrone also claims that Coomes’s alleged violations of KSP policy during the pursuit
establish that Coomes’s use of force was objectively unreasonable. This argument fails because
even if Coomes violated KSP policy during the pursuit, Coomes’s violations of KSP policy
would not establish that his use of force was unconstitutional. “[T]he Supreme Court has been
cautious to draw a distinction between behavior that violates a statutory or constitutional right
and behavior that violates an administrative procedure of the agency for which the officials
work.” Cass v. City of Dayton, 770 F.3d 368, 377 (6th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). This court has therefore held that a detective’s alleged violations of police
department policy were not determinative of whether the detective’s use of force was objectively
unreasonable. Id. As we reasoned in Smith v. Freland, 954 F.2d 343, 347 (6th Cir. 1992),
“[u]nder § 1983, the issue is whether [the officer] violated the Constitution, not whether he
should be disciplined by the local police force. A city can certainly choose to hold its officers to
a higher standard than that required by the Constitution without being subjected to increased
liability under § 1983.” Accordingly, Coomes’s alleged violations of KSP policy do not change
the conclusion that he did not act objectively unreasonably under the circumstances.
Coitrone also argues that an alleged disagreement between Clark and Coomes about
when KSP policy required the pursuit to be terminated creates a genuine issue of material fact
about whether Coomes’s use of force was excessive. This argument is unavailing. Even if
Coitrone is correct that Coomes violated KSP policy by pursuing Coitrone after Clark had
determined that KSP policy required that the pursuit be terminated, Coomes’s alleged violation
of KSP policy would not, as stated above, establish that his use of force violated the Fourth
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Amendment. Similarly, Clark’s alleged belief that Coomes’s continued pursuit of Coitrone was
unreasonable is not determinative of whether Coomes’s use of force violated the Fourth
Amendment. “[A]n officer’s subjective belief that a particular use of force was unreasonable is
no more proof of a constitutional violation than an officer’s subjective belief that a particular use
of force was reasonable is proof of constitutionality; the test is one of objective reasonableness.”
Abney, 493 F.3d at 420 (citing Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404 (2006); Bond v. United
States, 529 U.S. 334, 338 n. 2 (2000)).
Also unavailing is Coitrone’s contention that Coomes’s use of force was unreasonable
because he was not in full flight at the time of the collision. To support this assertion, Coitrone
contends that unlike the suspects in Scott and Abney, who were both in “full flight” when they
were struck by the pursuing officers, Coitrone had “ceased his flight” prior to the collision.
Scott, 550 U.S. at 375; Abney, 493 F.3d at 414. However, the undisputed facts establish that
although Coitrone was slowing down, he had not come to a complete stop at the time that
Coomes struck him and Coomes had no way of knowing whether Coitrone would flee again, as
he had done once after completely stopping his motorcycle.
The district court therefore properly granted summary judgment to Coomes on Coitrone’s
§ 1983 claim.2
Dismissal of Coitrone’s state-law negligence and battery claims, however, does not
automatically follow from the district court’s dismissal of the federal claim. First with respect to
the negligence claim, the district court adopted the reasoning of Turner v. Hill to the effect that a
2
Because Coomes did not violate Coitrone’s constitutional rights, we do not reach the issue of
whether Coomes is protected from liability by the doctrine of qualified immunity, except to note
the Supreme Court’s recent observation that the “Court has thus never found the use of deadly
force in connection with a dangerous car chase to violate the Fourth Amendment, let alone to be
a basis for denying qualified immunity.” Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 310 (2015).
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claim for negligence would not lie for the same excessive force asserted in a battery claim for
excessive force used during a lawful arrest. 2015 WL 2384298, at *9−10. In Turner, the court
reasoned that “[t]o permit a separate claim for negligence premised on the same conduct by the
officer is logically and doctrinally unsupportable.” Turner v. Hill, 5:12−CV−00195−TBR, 2014
WL 549462, at *10 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 11, 2014). The district court also relied on another Western
District of Kentucky case that reasoned that “[t]o permit a separate claim for negligence creates
the risk that a jury would assume that, even if no excessive force were used, the officer might
somehow still be liable for some undefined negligence.” Ali v. City of Louisville, No.
3:05−CV−427−R, 2006 WL 2663018, at *8 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 15, 2006). The underlying premise
of this reasoning is thus that the injury caused by the use of unreasonable force in making an
otherwise proper arrest is compensable under a battery cause of action, not that there can be no
compensation. Coomes has not cited Kentucky state court cases demonstrating that this
approach is correct.
We need not resolve whether this is an accurate statement of Kentucky tort law. For one
thing, neither case relied upon by the district court addresses a situation where, as here, the
officer asserts that the contact with the suspect was unintentional and the plaintiff alleges
violations of traffic laws and the failure to adhere to reasonable police procedures, all
circumstances that are more consistent with a negligence claim than a battery claim.
In any event, even assuming that at least portions of Coitrone’s negligence claim are
subsumed in the battery claim, this still leaves the issue of whether the district court properly
dismissed Coitrone’s battery claim. This battery claim in turn depends on whether the otherwise
privileged use of force to arrest him was reasonable.
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This reasonableness determination is not limited to an examination of whether there was
probable cause to arrest. The district court did not hold that Coitrone’s evasion of law
enforcement was by itself sufficient to defeat the battery claim, although one sentence of the
district court’s opinion could possibly be so read. The district court, however, clearly stated that
it had to consider “whether Coomes had had reasonable grounds to believe and did believe in
good faith that Coitrone had committed an arrestable offense and whether Coomes used
excessive force in making the arrest.” 2015 WL 2384298, at *11 (emphasis added). In the next
sentence, the district court, based on its previous analysis under federal law, concluded that
Coomes’s “use of force followed Coitrone’s flight from police and wanton endangerment—
felonies to which Coitrone has pled guilty.” Id. We take this to be the district court’s
determination that Coomes did not use unreasonable force under state law.
It is true that the district court stated that Coomes did not owe a duty to Coitrone under
negligence law, but the language in Walker v. Davis that the court used to support this conclusion
at most questioned whether a police officer owes to a fleeing person “such a duty” as that owed
to an innocent bystander. Id. at *10 (citing Walker v. Davis, 643 F. Supp. 2d 921, 933 n.10
(W.D. Ky. 2009)). This is a long way from stating that a law enforcement officer has no duty at
all under negligence law to avoid unnecessary injury to a fleeing person. Apart from the
technical question of whether the negligence claim is subsumed in the battery claim, there could
be no basis for saying that under negligence principles the privilege to arrest permits any use of
force, no matter how unreasonable.
All of this boils down to the question of whether the force applied in this case was or was
not unreasonable under Kentucky tort standards. The state standard of course need not be
identical to the federal standard. Indeed, the Western District of Kentucky court stated in Ali,
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2006 WL 2663018, at *8, that “the analysis of excessive force claims under § 1983 is different
from the analysis under state law.” The district court’s analysis of the Kentucky reasonableness
standard in this case is very brief and relies on its analysis under federal law. The parties in their
briefing to us do not specifically address the Kentucky standard for what is reasonable under the
circumstances. Therefore, assuming that the district court continues to assert supplemental
jurisdiction, the district court on remand should determine whether the force was unreasonable
under the applicable Kentucky reasonability standard.
In light of the need for further state-law analysis, a remand is appropriate so that the
district court may exercise its discretion to determine whether or not to decline supplemental
jurisdiction. “Generally, once a federal court has dismissed a plaintiff’s federal law claim, it
should not reach state law claims. Residual jurisdiction should be exercised only in cases where
the interests of judicial economy and the avoidance of multiplicity of litigation outweigh our
concern over needlessly deciding state law issues.” Experimental Holdings, Inc. v. Farris,
503 F.3d 514, 521 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “[T]he
Supreme Court’s general comity-related principle [is] that residual supplemental jurisdiction be
exercised with hesitation, to avoid needless decisions of state law.” Id. at 522 (citing United
Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966)). “Such a dismissal [would be] of
course without prejudice” to Coitrone’s ability to bring these claims in state court. Id.
Accordingly, we remand this case to the district court so that it can consider whether to
grant summary judgment to Coomes on Coitrone’s state-law claims under Kentucky tort law, or
in the alternative to exercise its discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction and dismiss those
claims without prejudice.
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