C.T. Charlton & Associates., Inc. v. Thule, Inc. ( 2013 )


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  •                   NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
    File Name: 13a0853n.06
    No. 12-2619                                     FILED
    Sep 30, 2013
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
    FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
    C.T. CHARLTON & ASSOCIATES, INC.,                         )
    )
    Plaintiff-Appellant,                            )    On Appeal from the United States
    )    District Court for the Eastern
    v.                                                        )    District of Michigan
    )
    THULE, INC.,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Before:          BOGGS and DONALD, Circuit Judges; and STAMP, District Judge.*
    BOGGS, Circuit Judge.       C.T. Charlton & Associates (CTC) provided sales-
    representation services to TracRac, a manufacturer of truck-mounted racks. As TracRac fell into
    financial difficulty, it stopped regularly paying CTC’s commissions. In 2010, Thule, Inc., purchased
    the assets of TracRac, which dissolved shortly thereafter. CTC now seeks to recover its unpaid
    commissions from Thule, under theories of successor liability and unjust enrichment. Because Thule
    purchased CTC’s assets in an arms-length, cash transaction, Thule was not unjustly enriched and the
    traditional rule against successor liability applies. We affirm the decision of the district court.
    I
    *
    The Honorable Frederick Pfarr Stamp, Jr., United States District Judge for the Northern
    District of West Virginia, sitting by designation.
    No. 12-2619
    C.T. Charlton & Assoc. v. Thule, Inc.
    In 2004, CTC entered into a contract with TracRac to provide sales representation services
    in Michigan, in exchange for a commission on all sales. Under the terms of the contract,
    commissions would be due even after its termination, “on orders, inquires received, or programs
    developed” under CTC’s tenure. TracRac terminated the contract in 2007 and continued to pay
    commissions on previously developed sales for the next three years. Nevertheless, due to financial
    difficulties, TracRac only made its payments intermittently, ultimately accumulating approximately
    $150,000 in debt from unpaid commissions.
    Facing potential bankruptcy, TracRac had its broker approach Thule, a large manufacturer
    of automotive and sporting-goods accessories, about acquiring the TracRac business. After a few
    months of negotiations, Thule agreed to purchase substantially all of TracRac’s assets for over $3
    million, effective October 29, 2010. To avoid assumption of TracRac’s liabilities, the transaction
    was structured as an asset sale for cash. Thule assumed only a minimal amount of TracRac’s
    liabilities, and the asset-purchase agreement expressly excluded “accrued commissions earned by
    [TracRac’s] sales representatives” and “waive[d] and release[d] [Thule] from any liability for
    commissions claimed by Charlton & Associates, Inc.” After the acquisition, Thule continued to
    manufacture and market TracRac products under the TracRac brand name, and business operations
    remained largely continuous. The acquisition was publicly announced and Thule sent letters to
    TracRac’s suppliers, retailers, and sales representatives to explain the transition. Within three
    months of the purchase, the TracRac shell corporation had wound down its liabilities and dissolved.
    On August 10, 2011, CTC brought this diversity case against Thule, alleging successor
    liability for TracRac’s failure to pay commissions and unjust enrichment, among other claims. On
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    C.T. Charlton & Assoc. v. Thule, Inc.
    November 13, 2012, the district court granted Thule’s motion for summary judgment. In rejecting
    successor liability, the district court found it significant that the express terms of the asset-purchase
    agreement between TracRac and Thule disclaimed assumption of the CTC commissions and also
    that CTC failed to bring suit against TracRac when it had the chance. The district court rejected the
    unjust-enrichment claim as well, finding that CTC provided no benefit to Thule and that the
    existence of the express contract between CTC and TracRac precluded the court from implying a
    contract with Thule. CTC appeals.
    II
    This court reviews de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment. Chattman v. Toho
    Tenax Am., Inc., 
    686 F.3d 339
    , 346 (6th Cir. 2012). Summary judgment is appropriate where the
    record shows “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
    judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The court must view all of the facts and draw
    all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Fuhr v. Hazel Park
    Sch. Dist., 
    710 F.3d 668
    , 670 (6th Cir. 2013).
    CTC argues that successor liability should be imposed upon Thule for debts incurred by
    TracRac prior to the acquisition, as Thule purchased TracRac as a going concern and continued to
    operate it as before. As will be explained below, CTC relies on the wrong legal standard and cannot
    meet the more stringent test required under Michigan law.
    Michigan follows the traditional rule of successor liability, under which the successor in a
    merger ordinarily assumes all of its predecessor’s liabilities, but a purchaser of assets for cash does
    not. Foster v. Cone-Blanchard Mach. Co., 
    597 N.W.2d 506
    , 509 (Mich. 1999). With respect to
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    No. 12-2619
    C.T. Charlton & Assoc. v. Thule, Inc.
    asset purchases, this general rule is subject to five narrow exceptions: 1) express or implied
    assumption of liability; 2) de facto consolidation or merger; 3) fraud; 4) transfer lacking good faith
    or consideration; and 5) “mere continuation or reincarnation of the old corporation.” 
    Id. at 509
    10.
    In Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 
    244 N.W.2d 873
    (Mich. 1976), the Michigan Supreme Court
    expanded the scope of successor liability in the products-liability context, establishing the
    “continuity of the enterprise” doctrine. 
    Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 883
    . Under this doctrine, successor
    liability is imposed if 1) there is continuity of management, personnel, location, assets, and
    operations; 2) the predecessor promptly ceases business operations; and 3) the purchaser assumes
    those liabilities necessary for continuity in business operations. See 
    Foster, 597 N.W.2d at 510
    (describing Turner doctrine). Turner also deemed relevant whether the purchasing corporation holds
    itself out to the world as the “effective continuation” of the predecessor. 
    Ibid. CTC argues that
    this
    broader standard applies across the board; Thule argues that it is limited to the products-liability
    context.
    Before answering the question of whether the “continuity of the enterprise” doctrine applies
    in the context of a commercial contract, an analytical ambiguity should be cleared up. Both parties,
    and the district court, suggest that the “mere continuation” exception and the “continuity of the
    enterprise” doctrine are one and the same. See Appellant Br. at 19; Appellee Br. at 15; Dist. Ct. Op.
    at 6 n.2. There is some Michigan case law in support of this position. RDM Holdings, LTD v.
    Continental Plastics Co., 
    762 N.W.2d 529
    , 552 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008) (“As indicated earlier in this
    opinion, the continuing enterprise theory (mere continuation or reincarnation of the old corporation)
    is the only theory that can be pursued by plaintiffs at trial.”) A review of Turner, however, suggests
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    No. 12-2619
    C.T. Charlton & Assoc. v. Thule, Inc.
    that these are best understood as two independent exceptions, motivated by different policy concerns
    and applied in different circumstances. In creating the “continuity of the enterprise” doctrine, Turner
    modified one of the traditional “limited exceptions” to successor liability to fit in the products-
    liability context. But this modified exception was not the“mere continuation” exception, which is
    only mentioned in passing in Turner, appearing in a list in a footnote. 
    Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 877
    n.3. Instead, Turner modified the de-facto-merger doctrine, a traditional exception that imposes
    successor liability when four requirements are met: 1) continuation of the enterprise, 2) continuity
    of shareholders, 3) ending of ordinary business operations by the seller, and 4) assumption of
    liabilities and obligations necessary for uninterrupted continuation of business operations by the
    purchaser. 
    Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 879
    . After reviewing the policies underlying products-liability
    law, the court concluded that, in the products-liability context, the form of the acquisition is
    irrelevant to the question of liability. 
    Id. at 880
    (“[L]ogically and teleologically, there is no basis for
    treating a purchase of corporate assets different from a de facto merger.”). As a result, the Turner
    court dropped the “continuity of shareholders” element, requiring only elements 1, 3, and 4 of the
    de-facto-merger doctrine to establish successor products liability. 
    Id. at 883.
    The “continuity of the
    enterprise” doctrine, therefore, is best read as a relaxation of the de-facto-merger doctrine in
    products-liability cases, not a redefinition of the “mere continuation” exception. The “mere
    continuation” exception remains narrow, but retains its general applicability.
    No matter how the “continuity of the enterprise” doctrine is characterized, a review of
    Michigan law and the policies underlying the doctrine makes clear that it is only meant to apply in
    products-liability cases (and potentially a few other areas animated by similar public-policy
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    No. 12-2619
    C.T. Charlton & Assoc. v. Thule, Inc.
    concerns1). In creating the doctrine, Turner emphasized that “[t]his is a products liability case first
    and foremost.” 
    Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 877
    . This was no hollow distinction, but the primary
    grounds for departing from traditional corporate-law doctrines. Because the traditional doctrines of
    successor liability “developed to protect the rights of creditors and minority shareholders,” the
    Michigan Supreme Court reasoned that such doctrines are “not applicable to meeting the
    substantially different problems associated with products liability torts.” 
    Id. at 878;
    see also 
    Foster, 597 N.W.2d at 510
    (“The traditional rule reflects the general policy of the corporate contractual
    world that liabilities adhere to and follow the corporate entity. . . . In the context of tort law, the
    traditional rule with its narrow exceptions has been criticized as an elevation of form over
    substance . . . .”). Thus, while Turner may have “shake[n] off various impediments associated with
    traditional concepts” for products-liability cases, those impediments remain in force elsewhere.
    
    Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 416
    ; see also 
    id. at 423
    (“This is precisely the result when the problem is
    correctly treated as a products liability case and is decided on products liability principles rather than
    simply by reexamining and adjusting corporate law principles.”).
    1
    In Stevens v. McLouth Steel Prods. Corp., 
    446 N.W.2d 95
    (1989), for example, the Michigan
    Supreme Court held that a successor corporation could be held liable for employment-discrimination
    claims, as long as the successor had notice of the claims. The Stevens court relied on the Sixth
    Circuit’s reasoning that the civil-rights laws “mandate” application of successor liability, as failure
    to impose liability could “emasculate” the power of courts “to eradicate the present and future effects
    of past discrimination.” 
    Id. at 98
    99 (quoting EEOC v. MacMillan Bloedel Containers, Inc., 
    503 F.2d 1086
    (6th Cir. 1974)). See also John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 
    376 U.S. 543
    , 550
    (1964) (holding that duty to arbitrate survives change of ownership, since “a collective bargaining
    agreement is not an ordinary contract.”). Michigan has only expanded liability for certain statutory
    causes of action; it has not relaxed the traditional rule with respect to ordinary common-law torts.
    See Chase v. Mich. Tele. Co., 
    80 N.W. 717
    , 718 19 (1899); Denolf v. Frank L. Jursik Co., 
    221 N.W.2d 458
    , 461 (Mich Ct. App. 1974), modified on other grounds, 
    238 N.W.2d 1
    (Mich. 1976).
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    C.T. Charlton & Assoc. v. Thule, Inc.
    Subsequent case law has affirmed this limitation. In tracing the development of the doctrine,
    Foster explained that tort-policy concerns “shaped this Court’s expansion of the traditional 
    rule.” 597 N.W.2d at 510
    . In Craig ex rel. Craig v. Oakwood Hosp., 
    684 N.W.2d 296
    (Mich. 2004), the
    Michigan Supreme Court declined to extend successor liability in the medical-malpractice context,
    reasoning “[n]ot only are the Turner/Foster requirements not met here but, more important, the
    policies that justify the imposition of successor liability are noticeably inapplicable here.” 
    Id. at 315.
    Likewise, Starks v. Mich. Welding Specialists, Inc., 
    722 N.W.2d 888
    , 889 (Mich. 2006), reaffirmed
    the traditional rule of successor non-liability for asset purchases, rejecting expansion of the Turner
    doctrine “[b]ecause an exception designed to protect injured victims of defective products rests upon
    policy reasons not applicable to a judgment creditor.” 
    Id. at 889.
    Our circuit as well has rejected
    application of Turner in other contexts; in an environmental-liability case, we broadly concluded that
    “the Michigan Supreme Court intended that the continuing enterprise exception be limited to
    products liability cases.” City Mgmt. Corp. v. U.S. Chem. Co., 
    43 F.3d 244
    , 252 53 (6th Cir. 1994).
    In its reply brief, CTC attempts to distinguish Starks and Craig, arguing that they
    intentionally declined to limit Turner solely to products-liability cases and the proper inquiry is
    determining “whether the circumstances of that case implicate the policy concerns that shaped the
    court’s limitation of the traditional rule in the first place.” (Reply Br. at 6.) Although Starks and
    Craig plainly demonstrate a reluctance to expand the reach of Turner, CTC is correct that the
    ultimate question is whether Turner-type policies apply in the given context. CTC has not shown,
    however, why the policy considerations that led Turner to expand the scope of successor liability are
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    C.T. Charlton & Assoc. v. Thule, Inc.
    applicable to the general commercial context (or how non-judgment creditors like CTC are
    distinguishable from judgment creditors like those in Starks).
    One of the key principles underlying products-liability law is that “‘the hazards of predicting
    and insuring for risk from defective products are better borne by the manufacturer than by the
    consumer.’” 
    Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 881
    (quoting Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 
    501 F.2d 1145
    , 1154 (1st
    Cir. 1974)). This principle encourages looking past the formality of the corporate entity to the
    substance of the business: if there is a continuity of the business enterprise, the new entity is equally
    able to predict and insure against risks. Commercial contracts, however, are not governed by the
    same one-sided risk allocation      both sides are expected to negotiate the allocation of risk and
    receive the benefit of the bargain. Cf. Sullivan Indus., Inc. v. Double Seal Glass Co., 
    480 N.W.2d 623
    , 629 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (“[T]ort law is concerned with ‘the accident problem,’ and,
    consequently, seeks to protect against harms to other property and persons by allocating the risk of
    dangerous or unsafe products to the manufacturer rather than to the consumer. In contrast,
    commercial law is concerned with economic expectations. Commercial enterprises allocate the risk
    of loss due to nonperformance among themselves . . . .”) (internal citations omitted). CTC does not
    press this point, but instead focuses on the other main policy: “to provide a remedy to an injured
    plaintiff in those cases in which the first corporation ‘legally and/or practically becomes defunct.’”
    
    Foster, 597 N.W.2d at 511
    .
    To start, because the public-safety concerns that underlie tort law are absent in the
    commercial context, the force of this policy is weakened. But reliance on this policy is problematic
    for a more fundamental reason. Injuries from defective products are likely to occur long after the
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    C.T. Charlton & Assoc. v. Thule, Inc.
    predecessor corporation has become defunct. Unpaid debts and breached contracts, by contrast, will
    typically be actionable at the time of the sale of assets. Only the rare case would invoke the need-
    for-a-remedy policy (e.g., undiscovered fraud in an expired contract), and no such circumstances are
    present here. In this case, TracRac received over $3 million in an arms-length transaction and
    subsequently wound down its business. CTC has provided no explanation for why the TracRac shell
    would not have been a valid target for recourse     no bankruptcy was filed, and we have no evidence
    as to TracRac’s net asset-liability position after the purchase. Nor has CTC explained how its
    ignorance of the purchase negotiations prevented it from acting once the acquisition became public
    knowledge. As Foster holds, even in products-liability cases, a plaintiff cannot recover from a
    successor corporation where the “predecessor remains a viable source for recourse.”2 
    Ibid. The traditional exceptions,
    “developed to protect the rights of creditors,” are more appropriate in this case
    than Turner’s tort-centric expansion. 
    Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 878
    .
    The cases CTC cites do not suggest otherwise. Most stand for the uncontroversial
    proposition that the traditional exceptions to successor liability (specifically “mere continuity”) apply
    in the commercial context. Under the “mere continuity” exception, courts will look to the totality
    of the circumstances    but only if the “indispensable” requirements of common ownership and a
    transfer of substantially all assets are met first. See Stramaglia v. United States, 377 F. App’x 472,
    2
    “Viable source for recourse” is not the same thing as solvent. Creditors have recourse (i.e.,
    a right to recovery) against insolvent companies, even though they may ultimately get pennies on the
    dollar or nothing. Tort victims do not have recourse against solvent predecessor corporations if the
    predecessor dissolved years before injury. See, e.g., 
    Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 875
    876 (defective press
    was purchased in 1968; predecessor corporation dissolved and distributed assets to its shareholders
    in 1964).
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    C.T. Charlton & Assoc. v. Thule, Inc.
    475 (6th Cir. 2010). In practice, the “mere continuity” exception is a cousin of piercing the corporate
    veil, and thus targeted at limiting abuse of the corporate form, unlike the “continuity of the
    enterprise” doctrine, which instead imposes liability for policy reasons. See, e.g., RDM 
    Holdings, 762 N.W.2d at 552
    (“Much of the evidence discussed above in relation to the corporate veil claim
    is equally relevant to the successor liability claim.”) Thus, in nearly every case cited by CTC, there
    was common ownership between the predecessor and successor corporation. Stramaglia, 377 F.
    App’x at 473 (“By 1997, Stramaglia was the sole shareholder, director, and president of both Auburn
    Park and Volpe-Vito.”); Steinberg v. Young, No. 09-11836, 
    2010 WL 1286606
    , at *2 (E.D. Mich.
    Mar. 31, 2010) (“Mr. Steinberg alleges that Mr. Young has abused the corporate form of the SDE
    Entities, and that Mr. Young has been fraudulently transferring assets out of the SDE Entities in an
    effort to defeat Mr. Steinberg’s collection efforts.”); RDM 
    Holdings, 762 N.W.2d at 551
    (Mich. Ct.
    App. 2008) (“Here, there was documentary evidence that Con-Plastics, a 49 percent owner of Con-
    Lighting, and its president, Anthony Catenacci, fully controlled every aspect of the operations at
    Con-Lighting, including the decision to cease operations and file for bankruptcy to the detriment of
    numerous creditors.”); Lakeview Commons LP v. Empower Yourself, LLC, 
    802 N.W.2d 712
    , 716
    (Mich. Ct. App. 2010) (“Phyllis owned 80 percent and Troy owned 20 percent of both Empower and
    Hamsa.”).
    The only case not involving common ownership, Antiphon, Inc. v. LEP Transport, Inc., 
    454 N.W.2d 222
    (Mich. Ct. App. 1990), does not help CTC. Antiphon did not apply the “mere
    continuity” exception, but instead applied the “implied acceptance of liability” exception under an
    estoppel theory. 
    Id. at 225.
    In the case, the creditors of the predecessor corporation were not notified
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    of the dissolution, and the successor corporation continued to hold itself out as its predecessor. 
    Id. at 224.
    Under these facts, the court held that the successor corporation was estopped from
    disclaiming its predecessor’s liabilities. Although CTC intimates that this deal between TracRac and
    Thule was done in secret, it does not allege that it was unaware of the dissolution or believed that
    Thule had assumed TracRac’s liabilities, and, in any case, does not invoke this exception.
    Lacking commonality of ownership or suggestions of fraud, this case does not fit within the
    narrow exceptions to the traditional rule against successor liability. Even CTC’s invocation of the
    broader products-liability standard falls flat: CTC was fully able to bring its claims against TracRac
    while TracRac was winding down, and has provided no reason why Thule should pay for CTC’s
    oversight in failing to prosecute such claims. See 
    Foster, 597 N.W.2d at 511
    .
    III
    CTC also asserts unjust-enrichment and quantum-meruit claims against Thule.3 To establish
    a claim of unjust enrichment, the plaintiff must show 1) “receipt of a benefit by the defendant from
    the plaintiff” and 2) that “it is inequitable that the defendant retain” the benefit. Dumas v. Auto Club
    Ins. Ass’n, 
    473 N.W.2d 652
    , 663 (Mich. 1991). When these elements are met, “the law operates to
    3
    CTC has pled separate “unjust enrichment” and “quantum meruit” claims (although not
    because they have different elements, see Morris Pumps v. Centerline Piping, Inc., 
    729 N.W.2d 898
    ,
    904 (Mich. Ct. App. 2006)). Count IV (unjust enrichment) alleges that Thule benefitted from CTC’s
    efforts and has failed to pay for those benefits, both in unpaid and future commissions. (R.1, Compl.
    at 12.) Count VIII (quantum meruit) appears to be targeted at TracRac, holding Thule liable as its
    successor. Due to lack of successor liability, this claim fails. In addition, given the express contract
    between TracRac and CTC, it is not clear what “implied contract” CTC seeks to recover on the basis
    of. As a result, we will only address Count IV in this section.
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    imply a contract in order to prevent unjust enrichment.” Barber v. SMH (US), Inc., 
    509 N.W.2d 791
    ,
    796 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993). CTC fails to meet either element.
    First, although Thule has received a benefit (contracts acquired with the help of CTC’s
    services), the benefit was purchased from TracRac, not provided by CTC.4 This first element will
    not be met where the third party, through its own actions, acquires the benefit of the unpaid-for
    contract. See Arlington Transit Mix, Inc. v. MGA Homes, Inc., No. 2008 002714 CH, 
    2012 WL 2402124
    , at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. June 26, 2012) (rejecting unjust-enrichment claim against mortgage
    lender, which foreclosed upon and took possession of property that had been improved with unpaid-
    for construction materials). Simply because an asset continues to provide value does not mean that
    the original provider of the asset continues to provide a benefit. Under CTC’s theory, purchasers
    would never be able to acquire unencumbered assets from failing companies without facing unjust-
    enrichment claims in the event of default.
    Second, CTC has not shown that Thule received its benefit unjustly. Although under
    Michigan law the existence of an express contract between two parties does not automatically
    preclude recovery from a third party under an unjust-enrichment theory, Morris 
    Pumps, 729 N.W.2d at 904
    , the existence of such a contract is relevant to the determination of whether the enrichment
    was unjust or inequitable, 
    ibid. In particular, “[w]here
    a third person benefits from a contract entered
    into between two other persons, in the absence of some misleading act by the third person, the mere
    4
    The nature of this benefit is contested. The district court considered only the completed
    sales on which TracRac did not pay commissions, finding no evidence that CTC was entitled to
    commissions on future sales made after date of the acquisition. Dist. Ct. Op. at 7.
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    failure of performance by one of the contracting parties does not give rise to a right of restitution
    against the third person.” 
    Ibid. (quoting 66 Am.
    Jur. 2d Restitution and Implied Contracts § 32).
    Here, the key fact is that Thule paid TracRac for its assets: where a benefit has been fully paid for,
    its receipt cannot be unjust. CTC was able to pursue its ordinary contract remedies against the newly
    liquid TracRac, both for the unpaid commissions and the expectation value of future commissions.
    Unjust enrichment is not meant to apply to such a situation, and CTC’s claim fails.
    IV
    For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the district court granting summary judgment to
    Thule is AFFIRMED.
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