Stemler v. Florence , 350 F.3d 578 ( 2003 )

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206 2 Stemler, et al. v. City Nos. 01-5956/6205
ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2003 FED App. 0420P (6th Cir.) of Florence, et al.
File Name: 03a0420p.06
Florence Police Department, -
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Defendants-Appellees/ -
Cross-Appellants, -
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT -
_________________ RON KENNER , in his official -
capacity as Boone County -
Sheriff, -
No. 01-5956 X
- Defendant. -
SUSAN STEMLER, -
Plaintiff-Appellee, - -
- Nos. 01-5956/6205 No. 01-6205
WILLIAM CHIPMAN, - -
SUSAN STEMLER, -
Administrator of the Estate of >
, Plaintiff-Appellee, -
Conni Black, -
Plaintiff-Appellant/ -
RANDY BLACK, -
Intervenor-Appellee/ -
Cross-Appellee, - -
- Cross-Appellant,
RANDY BLACK, Legal -
Guardian of Shianne Black, - -
Intervenor-Appellant/ -
v. -
- -
Cross-Appellee, -
FLORENCE , City of Florence, -
- -
- Defendant,
v. -
- BOBBY JOE WINCE, in his
-
- official capacity as an Officer -
FLORENCE , City of Florence,
- of the Florence Police -
Defendant-Appellee, -
BOBBY JOE WINCE, in his
Department; JOHN DOLAN, in -
- his official capacity as an -
official capacity as an Officer - -
- Officer of the Florence Police
of the Florence Police -
- Department; THOMAS
Department; JOHN DOLAN, in -
his official capacity as an - DUSING , in his official -
- capacity as an Officer of the -
Officer of the Florence Police -
Florence Police Department, -
Department; THOMAS - Defendants-Appellants/ -
DUSING , in his official - -
- Cross-Appellees.
capacity as an Officer of the N
1
Nos. 01-5956/6205 Stemler, et al. v. City 3 4 Stemler, et al. v. City Nos. 01-5956/6205
of Florence, et al. of Florence, et al.
district court’s order granting summary judgment for the
defendants in this civil action arising out of an encounter
Appeal from the United States District Court between Conni Black and Susan Stemler, on the one hand,
for the Eastern District of Kentucky at Covington. and police officers from the City of Florence, Kentucky and
Nos. 94-00062; 95-00014—William O. Bertelsman, Boone County, Kentucky. Appellees/cross-appellants Bobby
District Judge. Joe Wince, John Dolan, and Thomas Dusing appeal the denial
of summary judgment on Susan Stemler’s claim of violation
Argued: December 5, 2002 of equal protection. Wince appeals the denial of summary
judgment on Stemler’s claims of fabrication of evidence and
Decided and Filed: December 2, 2003 excessive force.
Before: BOGGS, Chief Judge; and SILER and GIBBONS, This case arises out of an incident that occurred on
Circuit Judges. February 19, 1994. We have reviewed this case on a previous
appeal. The relevant facts are described at length in Stemler
_________________ v. Florence, 126 F.3d 856 (1997). Briefly, Black was killed
in a car accident shortly after police officers allegedly
COUNSEL removed her from Stemler’s car and placed her in the truck of
her boyfriend, Steve Kritis. Both Black and Kritis had been
ARGUED: Eric C. Deters, ERIC C. DETERS & drinking heavily, and after an altercation between them at a
ASSOCIATES, Ft. Mitchell, Kentucky, for Plaintiffs. Jeffrey bar, Black left with Stemler in Stemler’s car. Kritis then
C. Mando, ADAMS, STEPNER, WOLTERMANN & began to chase the women on the streets of Florence before
DUSING, Covington, Kentucky, for Defendants. both the car and the truck were stopped by the police after a
ON BRIEF: Eric C. Deters, ERIC C. DETERS & concerned citizen alerted them to the situation. Stemler was
ASSOCIATES, Ft. Mitchell, Kentucky, for Plaintiffs. Jeffrey arrested for driving under the influence. Witnesses say that
C. Mando, ADAMS, STEPNER, WOLTERMANN & all the police officers present repeated Kritis’s assertion that
DUSING, Covington, Kentucky, Hugh O. Skees, ROUSE, Stemler was a lesbian to each other and to others present. No
SKEES, WILSON & DILLON, Florence, Kentucky, David police officer ever checked Kritis for intoxication or asked
Whalin, LANDRUM & SHOUSE, Louisville, Kentucky, for him to leave his truck. Black was either escorted or carried
Defendants. from Stemler’s car to the passenger seat of Kritis’s truck.
Kritis then drove away and turned onto the northbound lanes
_________________ of I-75. According to Kritis, Black, who had passed out,
woke up and began to hit Kritis. He began to hit back and
OPINION
lost control of the truck. The truck swerved and collided with
_________________ the guardrail. Black was partially ejected from the passenger-
BOGGS, Chief Judge. Appellant/cross-appellee William side window. Her arm was completely severed from her body
Chipman, administrator of the estate of Conni Black, and and her head was split into two parts by some part of the
intervenor-appellant/cross-appellee Randy Black appeal the guardrail.
Nos. 01-5956/6205 Stemler, et al. v. City 5 6 Stemler, et al. v. City Nos. 01-5956/6205
of Florence, et al. of Florence, et al.
I. The Claims motions for summary judgment of Florence and Boone
County. Chipman v. City of Florence, 858 F. Supp. 87 (E.D.
A. Chipman’s claim Ky. 1994), reconsideration denied on amended complaint,
866 F. Supp. 332 (E.D. Ky. 1994).
On March 7, 1994, William Chipman, the administrator of
the estate of Conni Black, filed a wrongful death action in the On appeal, we upheld the district court’s order granting
Boone County Circuit Court against Florence police officers summary judgment to the municipal defendants, Florence and
Dusing, Dolan, and Wince; Boone County police officers Rob Boone County. Stemler, 126 F.3d at 866. However, we
Reuthe and Chris Alsip; the City of Florence; and Ron reversed the district court’s dismissal of Chipman’s claims
Kenner, the Boone County Sheriff. The Boone County against the individual officers. We held that Chipman had
Circuit Court entered summary judgment on behalf of the pled facts sufficient to maintain her substantive due process
defendants on Chipman’s wrongful death claim. Chipman v. claim against the individual officers. Id. at 870. The only
City of Florence, No. 94-CI-00202 slip op. at 4 (Boone Co., state court decision prior to our decision was the Boone
Ky., Cir. Ct. Apr. 2, 1996). The Kentucky Court of Appeals County Circuit Court decision awarding judgment to the
reversed the Circuit Court. Chipman v. City of Florence, No. defendant officers, holding that Black was not in custody
1996-CA-001287-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 1998). The when the pickup struck the guardrail and that none of the state
Kentucky Supreme Court then reversed the Court of Appeals actors were the direct cause of her death on the highway. We
and reinstated the summary judgment ordered by the Boone stated in Stemler that “[w]hile these findings are entitled to
County Circuit Court. City of Florence v. Chipman, 38 S.W. preclusive effect, they are irrelevant to the merits of her
3d 387 (Ky. 2001). substantive due process claim.” Id. at 870 n.12. The case
was remanded to the district court for further proceedings
Chipman also filed a complaint in federal court against the consistent with the opinion.
same defendants on March 31, 1994.1 The complaint alleged
that the defendants were liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Shortly after the opinion issued, Randy Black was granted
Black’s wrongful death because they had displayed deliberate permission to intervene on behalf of Conni Black’s minor
indifference by forcing her into Kritis’s car.2 child, Shianne Black, to bring a claim of loss of parental
consortium. At about the same time, the federal district court
Chipman’s federal claims were dismissed by the district held the case in abeyance pending a decision by the Kentucky
court in 1994. The district court granted the individual Supreme Court on appeal of the Boone County Circuit court’s
officers’ motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil order entering summary judgment in favor of defendants and
Procedure 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim, on the ground the Kentucky Court of Appeals reversal of that order, which
of qualified immunity. The district court also granted the was issued February 22, 2001. Chipman later reached a
settlement with the Boone County officers. In June 2001, the
district court granted the officers’ motion for summary
1
W e treated the complaint against Kenner as a suit directly against
judgment on Chipman’s substantive due process claim, and
Bo one County. Stemler, 126 F.3d at 864 n.8. Shianne Black’s claim for loss of parental consortium. The
district court found that the decision of the Kentucky
2 Supreme Court barred their claims under the doctrine of issue
This claim will be referred to as “the substantive due process claim.”
Nos. 01-5956/6205 Stemler, et al. v. City 7 8 Stemler, et al. v. City Nos. 01-5956/6205
of Florence, et al. of Florence, et al.
preclusion. The issue that the district court found could not imprisonment. It also found that her abuse of process claim
be relitigated was whether Black was in “custody” when she was barred based on the probable cause finding, that the
got into Kritis’s car because, according to the district court, officers had no improper motive in arresting her, and that a
the Kentucky Supreme Court had held that Black was never state prosecutor independently had made the prosecutorial
in custody. decisions in her criminal case. As for her claims of negligent
or intentional infliction of emotional distress, the court found
B. Stemler’s Claims that under Kentucky law, there is no viable cause of action for
these torts when she had raised essentially identical claims
Susan Stemler filed a federal complaint, pursuant to under traditional torts as discussed above. Finally, the court
42 U.S.C. § 1983, against officers Wince, Dolan, Dusing, and determined that there was a genuine issue of material fact
the City of Florence. The complaint alleged claims of with respect to her assault and battery claim against Wince,
excessive force, wrongful arrest, malicious prosecution, and but not against Dusing and Dolan. Stemler later voluntarily
violation of equal protection on the bases of sex and sexual dismissed this claim. The Kentucky Court of Appeals
orientation. The district court granted the officers’ Rule affirmed the grant of summary judgment. Stemler did not
12(b)(6) motions to dismiss on the ground of qualified pursue an appeal.
immunity. The district court then consolidated her case with
Chipman’s and awarded summary judgment to Florence. The Upon appeal of the district court decision to this court, we
federal district court then entered an order granting Stemler’s affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the City
motion for voluntary dismissal of her excessive force claim of Florence. Stemler, 126 F.3d at 866. We also affirmed the
against Wince. This voluntary dismissal was entered dismissal of her false arrest and malicious prosecution claims
pursuant to an agreement between the parties to dismiss the because the Boone County Circuit Court’s finding that there
claim so that an appeal could proceed in this court. The had been probable cause to arrest and prosecute Stemler
agreement allowed her to bring her claim again should she be precluded relitigating that issue in this court. Id. at 871-72.
successful upon appeal. We noted that although Stemler seemed to be asserting a
claim that Wince had falsified evidence against her, and that
As Chipman did, Stemler had also brought similar claims the state court’s finding of probable cause would not preclude
in Kentucky state court. She raised state-law claims of her from prosecuting this claim, she had failed to properly
malicious prosecution, false arrest, abuse of process, assault plead it. Id. at 872. We stated that she would be free to file
and battery, false imprisonment, and negligent or intentional a new complaint against Wince raising that claim. Ibid.infliction of emotional distress. Stemler v. Florence, No. 94- Finally, we reversed the dismissal of Stemler’s equal
CI-00459. The Boone County Circuit Court held that she was protection claim of selective prosecution against the officers,
precluded from prosecuting all of her claims, except for holding that the allegations in her complaint were sufficient
assault and battery. See Stemler v. City of Florence, 126 F.3d to state a claim. Id. at 874.
856, 871 (6th Cir. 1997). There was ample evidence
constituting probable cause for her arrest. This barred her After our opinion in Stemler was issued, Stemler amended
false arrest and malicious prosecution claim. As the her complaint to allege that Wince fabricated the blood
defendants were police officers, the court found that there was
no distinction between her claims of false arrest and false
Nos. 01-5956/6205 Stemler, et al. v. City 9 10 Stemler, et al. v. City Nos. 01-5956/6205
of Florence, et al. of Florence, et al.
sample evidence used in her DUI trials.3 As it did in Univ. and Cmty. Coll. Sys. of Tenn., 126 F.3d 849, 851 (6th
Chipman’s case, the district court held Stemler’s case in Cir. 1997); Kane v. Magna Mixer Co., 71 F.3d 555, 560 (6th
abeyance pending final judgments in the state court Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1848 (1996). When
proceedings. In June 2001, the district court denied the deciding whether to afford preclusive effect to a state court
officers’ motion for summary judgment on Stemler’s claims judgment, the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738,
of denial of equal protection based on selective prosecution, requires the federal court to give the prior adjudication the
and Wince’s motion for summary judgment on her claims of same preclusive effect it would have under the law of the state
falsification of evidence, and excessive force. The district whose court issued the judgment. See Migra v. Warren City
court noted that none of these claims actually had been Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984); Heyliger, 126
litigated in state court. It stated that while it might agree with F.3d at 851-52.
the defendants that Stemler could and should have brought
these claims in state court, our opinion in Stemler had implied Under Kentucky law, “[c]laim preclusion bars a party from
that claim preclusion did not apply. The court further stated re-litigating a previously adjudicated cause of action and
that our holding in Stemler stated that she could proceed with entirely bars a new lawsuit on the same cause of action.”
these claims, and that the “law of the case” would be violated Yeoman v. Kentucky Health Policy Bd., 983 S.W.2d 459, 465
if it did not permit her to do so. (Ky. 1998). “Issue preclusion bars the parties from
relitigating any issue actually litigated and finally decided in
II. Chipman’s substantive due process claim an earlier action.” Ibid.Chipman argues that our resolution of the custody issue in A. Issue Preclusion
his favor in Stemler should have had preclusive effect on the
Kentucky state courts. He argues that our opinion’s holdings In order for issue preclusion to apply in Kentucky, (1) the
constituted the “law of the case” and the district court erred in issue in the second case must be the same as the issue in the
applying the doctrine of issue preclusion based on the state first case, (2) the issue must have been actually litigated,
court proceedings. The officers argue that the district court (3) the issue must have been actually decided, and (4) the
was correct in deciding that issue preclusion barred the decision on the issue in the prior action must have been
relitigation of the issue of custody. Alternatively, they argue necessary to the court’s judgment. Ibid. The district court
that Chipman’s substantive due process claim is barred from found that all four factors were met when the Kentucky
further litigation under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, or Supreme Court resolved Chipman’s state claims.
under the doctrine of claim preclusion.
In order for Chipman to prevail in the Kentucky state
We review de novo a district court’s decision with regard courts, the Kentucky Supreme Court stated that he had to
to issue preclusion or claim preclusion. Heyliger v. State show “the existence of a duty and unless a special relationship
was present, there is no duty owing from any of the police
officers . . . .” Chipman, 38 S.W. 3d at 392. The court went
3 on, stating that “[i]n order for the special relationship to exist,
Stemler was twice tried in Boone County District Court on the DUI two conditions are required: 1) the victim must have been in
charge. The first trial ended in a hung jury. She was acquitted at the end state custody or otherwise restrained by the state at the time
of her se cond trial.
Nos. 01-5956/6205 Stemler, et al. v. City 11 12 Stemler, et al. v. City Nos. 01-5956/6205
of Florence, et al. of Florence, et al.
the injury producing act occurred, and 2) the violence or other court made an explicit statement that there was insufficient
offensive conduct must have been committed by a state evidence to support a finding that Black was in custody.
actor.” Ibid. The court held that “[t]here is no evidence from
which it can be ascertained that Black was in state custody or However, the Kentucky Supreme Court’s statement that she
otherwise restrained by the police at the time the pickup truck was never in custody was not necessary to its judgment. The
struck the guardrail with the fatal result. In addition, there is Boone County Circuit Court held that there was no genuine
no evidence to support a claim that the conduct which caused issue of material fact regarding whether Black was in custody
the pickup truck to leave the roadway and strike the guardrail at the time the pickup struck the guardrail – the point at which
was the result of the actions of the police officers.” Ibid. the injury-producing act occurred. Specifically, it stated she
was not in custody at this point. This was the only holding
The Kentucky Supreme Court also stated that Black was necessary for the affirmance of the Boone County Circuit
never in custody. Id. at 393. This is precisely the issue that Court’s judgment. As we noted in discussing this lower court
is relevant in a § 1983 action. In order to prevail on the decision in Stemler, the holdings of the state court on this
§ 1983 claim, Chipman needs to show that the defendant issue are entitled to preclusive effect. Nonetheless, this
officers “violated substantive due process by placing [Black] precise issue is irrelevant to the substantive due process
at risk of harm from a third party . . . .” Stemler, 126 F.3d at claim.
867. The court must first determine whether “the plaintiff and
the state actors had a sufficiently direct relationship such that As the Kentucky Court of Appeals (now the Kentucky
the defendants owed [Black] a duty not to subject her to Supreme Court) stated in Sedley v. City of West Buechel, 461
danger,” and then “the court must also conclude that the S.W.2d 556, 558 (Ky. 1971):
officers were sufficiently culpable to be liable under a
substantive due process theory.” Ibid. As to the first part, the The general rule is that a judgment in a former action
relevant inquiry is whether Black was in custody at the time operates as an estoppel only as to matters which were
the officers allegedly forced her into Kritis’s truck. necessarily involved and determined in the former action,
and is not conclusive as to matters which were
First, the Kentucky Supreme Court stated that there was no immaterial or unessential to the determination of the
evidence in the record to support a finding that Black was prior action or which were not necessary to uphold the
ever in custody, the same issue that is necessary to Chipman’s judgment.
federal claim. Second, the custody issue was actually
litigated in the state courts: in the Boone County Circuit (Emphasis added).
Court, the Kentucky Court of Appeals and the Kentucky
Supreme Court. The Kentucky Supreme Court found that As the Kentucky Supreme Court correctly stated, our
there was no evidence to support a finding that Black was statements in Stemler regarding whether Black was in custody
ever in custody in the context of deciding the appeal of a were dicta, as the only issue before us at that point was the
summary judgment motion. A summary judgment order is a sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint. Similarly, the
decision on the merits. Ohio Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. United statements of the Kentucky Supreme Court regarding whether
States, 922 F.2d 320, 325 (6th Cir. 1990). Third, the issue Black was ever in custody are dicta, as they are not necessary
was actually decided by the Kentucky Supreme Court. The
Nos. 01-5956/6205 Stemler, et al. v. City 13 14 Stemler, et al. v. City Nos. 01-5956/6205
of Florence, et al. of Florence, et al.
to the state courts’ disposition of the case. The actual holding B. Claim Preclusion
of the Kentucky Supreme Court reads:
The defendant officers also argue that claim preclusion
In order for a claim to be actionable in negligence, there should bar Chipman’s claim against them. Claim preclusion
must be the existence of a duty and unless a special bars further litigation under Kentucky law when: (1) there is
relationship was present, there is no duty owing from any identity of the parties; (2) there is identity of the causes of
of the police officers to Black to protect her from crime action; and (3) the action has been resolved on the merits.
or accident. In order for the special relationship to exist, Yeoman, 983 S.W.2d at 465. Yeoman also stated that “[f]or
two conditions are required: 1) the victim must have been claim preclusion to apply, the subject matter of the
in state custody or otherwise restrained by the state at the subsequent suit must be identical.” Ibid.
time the injury producing act occurred, and 2) the
violence or other offensive conduct must have been In Barnes v. McDowell, 848 F.2d 725 (6th Cir. 1988), we
committed by a state actor. Neither of these factors can stated that “Kentucky courts do not apply the doctrine of
be found from the undisputed material facts in this case. claim preclusion in a subsequent suit involving facts already
There is no evidence from which it can be ascertained at issue in another action when the causes of action in the two
that Black was in state custody or otherwise restrained by proceedings are not the same.” Id. at 730. A district court,
the police at the time the pickup truck struck the interpreting Kentucky law, stated:
guardrail with the fatal result. In addition, there is no
evidence to support a claim that the conduct which [W]here the second action between the same parties is
caused the pickup truck to leave the roadway and strike upon a different claim or demand, the judgment in the
the guardrail was the result of the actions of the police prior action operates as an estoppel only as to those
officers. matters in issue or points controverted, upon the
determination of which the finding or verdict was
City of Florence v. Chipman, 38 S.W.3d 387, 392 (Ky. 2001) rendered. In all cases, therefore, where it is sought to
(emphasis added and citations omitted). apply the estoppel of a judgment rendered upon one
cause of action to matters arising in a suit upon a
The Kentucky Supreme Court would have reached the same different cause of action, the inquiry must always be as
result if it had found that Black was in custody at the time she to the point or question actually litigated and determined
entered Kritis’s truck, so long as it found she was not in in the original action, not what might have been thus
custody at the time the truck hit the guardrail. litigated and determined. Only upon such matters is the
judgment conclusive in another action.
The district court erred in finding that issue preclusion
barred Chipman’s substantive due process claim. Presbyterian Child Welfare Agency of Buckhorn v. Nelson
County Bd. of Adjustment, 185 F. Supp. 2d 716, 720 (W.D.
Ky. 2001) (quoting Louisville v. Louisville Professional
Firefighters Ass’n, 813 S.W.2d 804, 807 (Ky. 1991)).
Nos. 01-5956/6205 Stemler, et al. v. City 15 16 Stemler, et al. v. City Nos. 01-5956/6205
of Florence, et al. of Florence, et al.
While there is identity of the parties, and the action was the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues
resolved on the merits, Chipman’s claim is not barred, as it is before it. Where federal relief can only be predicated
not the same claim as in state court. His claim in the state upon a conviction that the state court was wrong, it is
courts was for wrongful death, which is a negligence claim. difficult to conceive the federal proceeding as, in
This is not the same cause of action as the one he brought in substance, anything other than a prohibited appeal of the
the federal court, a claim of violation of Black’s substantive state-court judgment.
due process rights. It is indeed true that this claim could have
been brought in state courts. However, under the Kentucky Id. at 391 (quoting Catz v. Chalker, 142 F.3d 279, 293 (6th
law of claim preclusion, this does not matter, as there is no Cir. 1998)). In Peterson Novelties, we held that the Rooker-
identity of the causes of action. Yeoman, 983 S.W.2d at 465. Feldman doctrine was inapplicable to claims that the state
Chipman’s federal claim is not barred by claim preclusion. court did not address or rule upon even though the federal
claims arose out of the same nucleus of facts. Id. at 391-93.
C. Rooker-Feldman Therefore, the question is whether this court could hold that
the officers violated Black’s constitutional rights without
The defendant officers also argue that the federal district implicitly holding that the state court wrongly decided the
court lacked jurisdiction to consider Chipman’s claim under issues before it. Id. at 393.
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. They argue that Chipman’s
federal suit is an attempt to appeal a state court decision to the This court discussed the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and its
federal courts. frequent conflation with claim and issue preclusion in
Hutcherson v. Lauderdale County, 326 F.3d 747 (6th Cir.
The doctrine gets its name from two Supreme Court cases. 2003). This court stated that Seventh Circuit case law
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S. Ct. 149 provided a useful way to determine which doctrine to apply:
(1923), held that the power to hear appeals from state court
judgments is exclusively held by the United States Supreme In order to determine the applicability of the Rooker-
Court. The Supreme Court held in District of Columbia Feldman doctrine, the fundamental and appropriate
Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S. Ct. 1303 question to ask is whether the injury alleged by the
(1983), that federal district courts do not have jurisdiction to federal plaintiff resulted from the state court judgment
hear challenges to certain state-court decisions. The Rooker- itself or is distinct from that judgment. If the injury
Feldman doctrine states that “lower federal courts lack alleged resulted from the state court judgment itself,
subject matter jurisdiction to engage in appellate review of Rooker-Feldman directs that the lower federal courts lack
state court proceedings or to adjudicate claims ‘inextricably jurisdiction. If the injury alleged is distinct from that
intertwined’ with issues decided in state court proceedings.” judgment, i.e., the party maintains an injury apart from
Peterson Novelties, Inc. v. Berkley, 305 F.3d 386, 390 (6th the loss in state court and not "inextricably intertwined"
Cir. 2002). In defining “inextricably intertwined,” we have with the state judgment, . . . res judicata may apply, but
adopted the reasoning that: Rooker-Feldman does not . . . .
[t]he federal claim is inextricably intertwined with the Id. at 755 (quoting Garry v. Geils, 82 F.3d 1362, 1365-66 (7th
state-court judgment if the federal claim succeeds only to Cir. 1996)).
Nos. 01-5956/6205 Stemler, et al. v. City 17 18 Stemler, et al. v. City Nos. 01-5956/6205
of Florence, et al. of Florence, et al.
As Chipman is not directly challenging the state court’s circuit court that Stemler cannot establish that they acted with
judgments in federal court, the doctrines of claim and issue an improper motive.” Stemler v. City of Florence, No. 1996-
preclusion are more properly applied to this case. However, CA-001318-MR at 23. The court made this statement in the
in any case, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply. context of discussing the propriety of summary judgment
The Kentucky Supreme Court’s discussion of whether Black regarding Stemler’s abuse of process claim. One of the
was ever in custody was dicta, and therefore any finding by essential elements of that tort is an ulterior purpose. Bonnie
the federal court that Black was in custody at some point Braes Farms, Inc. v. Robinson, 598 S.W. 2d 765, 766 (Ky. Ct.
during the encounter would not implicitly hold that the state App. 1980). It was one of several findings of fact that
court improperly decided the issues before it. The issue of supported the granting of summary judgment in favor of the
Black’s custody before the truck hit the guardrail was not an defendants.
issue that was salient before the Kentucky court.
Stemler argues that our statement in our opinion in Stemler
The district court does have jurisdiction to hear Chipman’s that “the record evidence supports a finding” that the officers
substantive due process claim. chose to arrest her because they believed her to be a lesbian
should have had preclusive effect on the Kentucky state
III. Stemler’s Claims courts. However, this statement was dicta. We reversed the
district court’s dismissal of her claim on a 12(b)(6) motion.
A. Equal Protection Claim Thus the only question before our court was whether her
complaint adequately stated an equal protection claim. A
The defendants argue that Stemler’s equal protection claim dismissal pursuant to 12(b)(6) “is proper only if it appears
is barred by claim preclusion, issue preclusion, and the beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The district court, although support of its claims that would entitle it to relief.”
inclined to rule that her claim was barred by claim preclusion, Kostrzewa v. City of Troy, 247 F.3d 633, 638 (6th Cir. 2001).
instead decided that this court’s decision in Stemler precluded That judgment does not preclude a later summary judgment
the application of any of those doctrines. We first note that motion, arguing that the plaintiff in fact could not show such
the district court was not required to abstain from analyzing evidence. In state court, the claim was being considered for
Stemler’s claims under the claim preclusion doctrine because summary judgment purposes. A summary judgment order is
of our previous opinion. Our opinion was issued while a decision on the merits. Ohio Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 922 F.2d
Stemler’s appeal was pending with the Kentucky Court of at 325. Thus the issue was actually litigated in the state
Appeals. We stated that at that point, claim preclusion did courts. And, as the state court made an explicit finding that
not yet apply to her claims before the federal courts. We the officers had no improper motive, the issue was actually
nowhere said that claim preclusion would never apply. decided.
The defendant officers argue that the Kentucky Court of In order to maintain a claim of selective prosecution (the
Appeals decision conclusively decided the question of basis of Stemler’s equal protection claim), the plaintiff must
whether they had acted with improper motive in arresting her. prove that a state actor initiated the prosecution with a
The Court of Appeals stated that “[a]lthough the officers may discriminatory purpose. This is the same issue as the ulterior
have been crude during Stemler’s arrest, we agree with the purpose issue in Stemler’s state claim of abuse of process.
Nos. 01-5956/6205 Stemler, et al. v. City 19 20 Stemler, et al. v. City Nos. 01-5956/6205
of Florence, et al. of Florence, et al.
And finally, the issue was necessary to the resolution of the her state law claims bars her from reviving her assault and
state claim. Thus, the state court’s finding that the officers battery claims.
did not have an improper motive in arresting Stemler has
preclusive effect on relitigating that issue in the federal First, a voluntary dismissal of a claim is not a judgment on
courts. the merits. Ky. R. Civ. P. 41.01. While Stemler’s assault and
battery claim was dismissed with prejudice against Dolan and
Because Stemler’s equal protection claim is barred by issue Dusing, the state court did not grant summary judgment to
preclusion, the district court should have granted summary Wince, and issue preclusion does not apply to her claim
judgment to the officers on that claim. against Wince. Second, the agreement itself does not bar her
from bringing her federal claim. As she was not successful
B. Excessive Force on appeal in the state courts, the agreement would seem to bar
her from bringing her assault and battery claim again in state
Stemler’s federal claim of excessive force and her state courts. However, the agreement addressed her federal and
claim of assault and battery against Wince were voluntarily state claims separately. The agreement did not say that if she
dismissed so that she could appeal unfavorable lower court was unsuccessful in the state courts that she was barred from
decisions on other claims. Wince first argues that Stemler has bringing her federal excessive force claim again. The
never taken any action to revive her federal claim. However, agreement that bars her from bringing her state assault and
Stemler’s Second Amended Complaint was accepted by the battery claim is not a judgment for the purposes of issue
district court on January 13, 1998. Her Second Amended preclusion, as Wince seems to argue.
Complaint incorporated by reference her initial complaint and
her First Amended complaint, which included the excessive Wince next argues that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred
force claim. Furthermore, Wince does not explain why he did the district court from considering Stemler’s claims since any
not make this argument when he moved the district court for decision favorable to her would have been an impermissible
summary judgment on this claim, and why the district court review of issues decided adversely to her in the Kentucky
denied his summary judgment motion without ever state court. He also argues that the claim preclusion doctrine
addressing this issue. bars her from relitigating this claim in the federal courts as
well. We will discuss the application of these doctrines
Wince next argues that the voluntary dismissal agreement below in conjunction with Stemler’s other outstanding claim.
bars Stemler from reviving her excessive force claim because
it bars her from reviving her assault and battery claim. The
agreement stated that if her appeal to the state appellate court
on her other state claims was unsuccessful, then her assault
and battery claim could not be revived, and vice versa. It
similarly stated that if her appeal to the federal appellate court
was unsuccessful, then her excessive force claim could not be
revived, and vice versa. He argues that because both claims
rely on the same facts and elements of proof, the dismissal of
Nos. 01-5956/6205 Stemler, et al. v. City 21 22 Stemler, et al. v. City Nos. 01-5956/6205
of Florence, et al. of Florence, et al.
C. The application of claim preclusion and the Rooker- courts confined themselves to the issues of probable cause
Feldman doctrines to Stemler’s Fabrication of and the motive for Stemler’s arrest. The district court could
Evidence and Excessive Force Claims rule in Stemler’s favor without even implicitly holding that
the Kentucky courts wrongly decided the issues before them.
Wince argues that Stemler’s excessive force and fabrication The Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply to these claims,
of evidence claims should be barred by claim preclusion and and the district court has jurisdiction to hear them.
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
Wince also argues that claim preclusion would bar Stemler
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, as previously noted, states from bringing these claims in federal court, because as she
that “lower federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to could have brought them in state court. However, as
engage in appellate review of state court proceedings or to discussed above, the Kentucky law of claim preclusion only
adjudicate claims ‘inextricably intertwined’ with issues bars bringing the same cause of action twice. Stemler’s claims
decided in state court proceedings.” Peterson Novelties, 305 for falsification of evidence and excessive force could have
F.3d at 390. The question for this court is whether a federal been brought in state court and were not. However, under
court can rule in Stemler’s favor on her federal claims without Kentucky law, as she did not bring identical causes of action
implicitly holding that the state courts wrongly decided the in state court, she is not barred from bringing them in federal
issues before them. Id. at 393. court. Yeoman, 983 S.W. 2d at 465. The district court did not
err when it decided that claim preclusion did not apply to
The state courts adjudicated several of Stemler’s claims. these claims.
As noted above, Stemler’s claims of malicious prosecution
and false arrest and imprisonment were dismissed on IV. Conclusion
summary judgment because the state court held that there was
no genuine issue that probable cause existed for her DUI In No. 01-5956, we REVERSE the grant of summary
arrest. Her claims of intentional or negligent infliction of judgment to the defendants on Chipman’s substantive due
emotional distress and outrage were dismissed on summary process claim. In No. 01-6205, we REVERSE the denial of
judgment because Kentucky law holds that if a claimant raises summary judgment with regard to Stemler’s equal protection
claims under traditional torts that allow recovery for claim. We AFFIRM the denial of summary judgment with
emotional distress, the claimant cannot raise claims of regard to Stemler’s excessive force and falsification of
intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress or evidence claim. Both cases are REMANDED to the district
outrage. The Boone County Circuit Court found that there court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
was a genuine issue of material fact as to her assault and
battery claim against Wince.
Except for the decision refusing to dismiss her assault and
battery claim against Wince, the Kentucky state courts never
considered or ruled on any elements of the claims of
fabrication of evidence or excessive force, nor did they
address any facts or issues regarding these claims. The state