Zainah Hammoud v. Wayne County , 697 F. App'x 445 ( 2017 )

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 17a0498n.06
No. 16-2371
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
ZAINAH HAMMOUD; SHAEFA MOHAMED; )
ELEANOR EWALD; ERIC EWALD; CHERYL )
DEANDA; GENO DEANDA; PAULA NEWCOMB; )
ROBERT RADFORD; ANDREA ROWE; GARY )
ZELONY; ANTHONY CRUMP; ERNEST ) FILED
FOREST; BRANDY GUITERREZ; HENRY ) Aug 24, 2017
KOPPOE; TIMOTHY PADDEN; SONIA VARGAS; )
DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
JENNIFER WICK; WARREN WICK; CARL )
NOVAK; RICHARD ROBBS, )
)
Plaintiffs-Appellants, )
)
v. )
)
WAYNE COUNTY; RICHARD HATHAWAY, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE
Wayne County Treasurer; RAYMOND ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT
WOJTOWICZ; DAVID SZYMANSKI; FELECIA ) COURT FOR THE EASTERN
TYLER; CITY OF DEARBORN; ROBERT ) DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
MUERY; ALLYSON BETTIS; RANDY WALKER; )
CITY OF LINCOLN PARK; BRAD L. COULTER; )
CITY OF WAYNE; LISA NOCERINI; REDFORD )
TOWNSHIP; TRACY KOBYLARSZ; JSR )
FUNDING, LLC; JAMES BUDZIAK; )
ENTERPRISING REAL ESTATE, LLC; MILAN )
GANDHI; RISHI PATEL; NANDAN PATEL; HP )
SNAP INVESTMENT, LLC; HETAL GANDHI; )
GLOBAL REALTY, LLC; RICHARD INGBER; )
RANCILIO & ASSOCIATES; RICHARD )
KOSMACK; KAREN FROBOTTA; NANCY )
JACKSON; CITY OF GARDEN CITY, )
Defendants-Appellees.
BEFORE: KEITH, BATCHELDER, SUTTON, Circuit Judges.
No. 16-2371, Hammoud, et al. v. Wayne County, et al.
ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs-Appellants are all former
owners of real property in Wayne County, Michigan. In approximately 2012, they became
delinquent in paying their property taxes, and, pursuant to the Michigan General Property Tax
Act (“GPTA”), Mich. Comp. Laws § 211.78 et seq., the Wayne County Treasurer’s Office took
steps to foreclose upon the properties. Plaintiffs failed to timely redeem the properties, and the
Wayne County Circuit Court entered foreclosure judgments against Plaintiffs in June 2015,
transferring the properties to Wayne County in fee simple absolute by quit claim deed. Plaintiffs
did not appeal the foreclosure judgments.
After the properties were transferred to Wayne County, the municipalities in which they
were situated exercised their right under Michigan law to purchase the properties, see Mich.
Comp. Laws § 211.78m (giving municipalities a right of first refusal to purchase foreclosed
property for a public purpose prior to any public auction of the property), and the respective
municipalities then contracted with developers, who agreed to make substantial improvements to
the properties and to invest a minimum of 50% of the properties’ sale value for the public good.
Plaintiffs brought a purported class action on behalf of approximately 800 similarly
situated property owners, seeking equitable and compensatory relief. Specifically, Plaintiffs
alleged that Wayne County and affiliated individuals (“the Wayne County Defendants”)
“illegally and unconscionably”—and “without required notice” under Michigan and federal
law—foreclosed on Plaintiffs’ real properties. Plaintiffs further alleged that the Wayne County
Defendants conspired with the other Defendants to unlawfully deprive Plaintiffs of their real
properties and rights of due process and equal protection.
Plaintiffs brought ten claims in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan, alleging violations of their state and federal due-process and equal-protection rights; a
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No. 16-2371, Hammoud, et al. v. Wayne County, et al.
civil racketeering claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq.; and violations of several Michigan statutes. The Defendants
filed motions to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), arguing
that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to consider Plaintiffs’ due-process and
equal-protection claims and that Plaintiffs failed to sufficiently plead a civil RICO claim. The
district court granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss, finding that the Tax Injunction Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1341, stripped it of subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiffs’ due-process and
equal-protection claims. The district court also dismissed Plaintiffs’ civil RICO claim, finding
that the Wayne County and municipal Defendants cannot be held liable as a matter of law and
that Plaintiffs failed to sufficiently plead a civil RICO claim against the other Defendants.
Having dismissed Plaintiffs’ federal claims, the district court declined to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.
Plaintiffs timely appealed. We review de novo a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1)
and Rule 12(b)(6). See DLX, Inc. v. Kentucky, 381 F.3d 511, 516 (6th Cir. 2004) (“We review a
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) de novo where it requires no fact-finding.”); Riverview
Health Inst. LLC v. Medical Mut. of Ohio, 601 F.3d 505, 512 (6th Cir. 2010) (“We review de
novo a district court’s dismissal of a suit pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).”). We review for
an abuse of discretion the district court’s decision to decline exercising supplemental
jurisdiction. Gamel v. City of Cincinnati, 625 F.3d 949, 951 (6th Cir. 2010).
After carefully reviewing the record, the applicable law, and the parties’ briefs, we are
convinced that the district court did not err in its conclusion that the Tax Injunction Act barred it
from adjudicating Plaintiffs’ due-process and equal-protection claims. Neither are we convinced
that the district court erroneously dismissed Plaintiffs’ civil RICO claim. The district court’s
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No. 16-2371, Hammoud, et al. v. Wayne County, et al.
opinion carefully and correctly sets out the law governing the issues raised and clearly articulates
the reasons underlying its decision. Thus, issuance of a full written opinion by this court would
serve no useful purpose. And, with no federal claims remaining, the district court’s decision to
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state-law claims was not an abuse of
discretion. See id. at 952 (“When all federal claims are dismissed before trial, the balance of
considerations usually will point to dismissing the state law claims, or remanding them to state
court if the action was removed.”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
Accordingly, we affirm.
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