FCA US, LLC v. Patrea Bullock ( 2018 )

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
No. 18-1241
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
FILED
Jun 08, 2018
DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
FCA US LLC, )
)
Plaintiff- Appellant, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE
) UNITED STATES DISTRICT
v. ) COURT FOR THE EASTERN
) DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
PATREA R. BULLOCK, )
)
OPINION
Defendant-Appellee. )
)
Before: BATCHELDER, MOORE, and LARSEN, Circuit Judges.
KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff FCA US LLC (“FCA”) appeals
the district court’s denial of a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) enjoining Defendant Patrea
Bullock (“Bullock”) from disclosing any of FCA’s confidential or proprietary information. We
DISMISS FCA’s appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
I. BACKGROUND
Bullock, a Californian attorney, previously worked at two law firms that represented
automobile manufacturer FCA in California. R. 1 (Compl. ¶¶ 7, 8, 9, 20, 21) (Page ID #2–3, 5).
At these firms, Bullock spent hundreds of hours defending FCA in breach-of-warranty actions. Id.
¶¶ 9, 21 (Page ID #3, 5). FCA claims that Bullock obtained privileged, confidential information
from FCA during this attorney-client relationship. Id. ¶¶ 13, 15, 25, 26 (Page ID #3–4, 7).
According to FCA, Bullock was heavily involved in its defense, and FCA contends that Bullock
“personally determined and advised FCA US about how to respond regarding particular claims,
No. 18-1241
FCA US LLC v. Patrea R. Bullock
evaluated the defenses available to FCA US, developed overall defense strategy, and engaged in
regular contact with FCA US regarding the defenses and strategies of various cases.” Id. ¶ 11
(Page ID #3). For instance, Bullock defended depositions, drafted discovery responses, conducted
vehicle inspections, engaged in settlement processes, and communicated with FCA’s general
counsel. Id. ¶¶ 12, 15, 16, 17 (Page ID #4–5). Bullock also participated in a training program that
FCA hosted, and in order to attend the event, she executed a confidentiality agreement, which
contained choice-of-law and choice-of-forum provisions. R. 1-2 (Compl. Ex. 1-A, Agreement)
(Page ID #24).
In October 2017, however, Bullock opened her own law firm. R. 1 (Compl. ¶ 30) (Page
ID #8). Shortly thereafter, in November 2017, Bullock filed a complaint for breach of warranty
on behalf of a client against FCA in California state court. Id. ¶ 31 (Page ID #8). A few months
later, in January 2018, Bullock filed another complaint in California state court for breach of
warranty on behalf of clients against FCA. See R. 34-2 (Suppl. Br. Ex. A, Compl.) (Page ID #536).
Subsequently, in February 2018, FCA received yet another complaint for breach of warranty from
one of Bullock’s clients. See R. 37-2 (Suppl. Notice Ex. A, Compl.) (Page ID #606).
Reacting to Bullock’s conduct, FCA filed this action in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Michigan. R. 1 (Compl.) (Page ID #1). In its complaint, FCA pleaded
several claims: (1) breach of contract, (2) misappropriation of trade secrets, (3) violation of the
Defend Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1832 et seq., and (4) breach of fiduciary duty. Id. ¶¶ 36–
66 (Page ID #9–13). In light of these allegations, FCA has requested injunctive relief and damages.
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Id. ¶¶ 67–72 (Page ID #13–15). FCA also moved for a TRO in the district court to restrain Bullock
from revealing confidential information, destroying records, and filing breach of warranty actions
against FCA. R. 2 (Mot.) (Page ID #52). The district court denied FCA’s motion. See FCA US
LLC v. Bullock, No. 17-CV-13972, 2018 WL 1064536, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 26, 2018). FCA
appealed the district court’s order denying the TRO. See R. 39 (Notice of Appeal) (Page ID #760).
II. DISCUSSION
We have jurisdiction to review “[i]nterlocutory orders of the district courts . . . refusing . . .
injunctions.’” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). “In contrast, this court generally lacks jurisdiction to hear
an appeal of the district court’s decision to grant or deny a TRO.” Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless
v. Blackwell, 467 F.3d 999, 1005 (6th Cir. 2006) (first citing Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Am. Fed’n
of Gov’t Emps., 473 U.S. 1301, 1303–04 (1985); and then citing Leslie v. Penn Cent. R.R. Co., 410
F.2d 750, 752 (6th Cir. 1969)). “The rationale for this rule is that TROs are of short duration and
usually terminate with a prompt ruling on a preliminary injunction, from which the losing party
has an immediate right of appeal.” Id.
However, the grant or denial of a TRO “may be appealed under section 1292(a)(1) if it has
the practical effect of an injunction and ‘further[s] the statutory purpose of ‘permit[ting] litigants
to effectually challenge interlocutory orders of serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence.’” Id.
(alterations in original) (quoting Carson v. Am. Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 84 (1981)). Thus, we
have jurisdiction when the grant or denial of a TRO “threaten[s] to inflict irretrievable harms.”
See id. at 1005–06 (determining that we had jurisdiction because any harm from the TRO regarding
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the enforcement of voting provisions during an election was irreparable); see also Ohio Republican
Party v. Brunner, 543 F.3d 357, 360 (6th Cir. 2008) (concluding that we had jurisdiction to review
a TRO regarding election procedures because of “the extraordinary time constraints”); Workman
v. Bredesen, 486 F.3d 896, 904 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that we had jurisdiction to review a TRO
staying an execution).
As the district court noted when considering FCA’s motion, FCA does not face irreparable
consequences if it does not receive a TRO. See FCA, 2018 WL 1064536, at *3. Although
Bullock’s actions may be problematic, FCA can challenge her conduct in other forums, and this is
not a case where a TRO acts as a preliminary injunction. For instance, in each action that Bullock
has pursued against FCA, FCA can move to disqualify Bullock. In fact, the courts in those actions
might be better suited to determine whether Bullock’s conduct immediately endangers FCA.
Additionally, as the district court observed, FCA “may contact the California bar” regarding
Bullock’s actions, and it could move for a preliminary injunction in this action. Because FCA can
seek protection in other manners, the district court’s denial of the TRO does not threaten to inflict
irretrievable harm. Therefore, we do not have appellate jurisdiction over the district court’s order
denying a TRO.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed, we DISMISS FCA’s appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
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