Jessica Maxwell v. FCA US, LLC ( 2023 )

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 23a0036n.06
Case No. 22-1356
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
FILED
) Jan 18, 2023
JESSICA MAXWELL, as a daughter and personal DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
)
executor for the Estate of Robert C. Maxwell,
)
deceased, et al.,
) ON APPEAL FROM THE
Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT
) COURT FOR THE EASTERN
v. ) DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
)
FCA US, LLC; DOES 1–25, ) OPINION
Defendants-Appellees. )
)
Before: SILER, COLE, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.
COLE, Circuit Judge. Robert Maxwell lost his life in a motor vehicle collision in
Mississippi on August 20, 2015. Robert’s daughter, Jessica Maxwell, and other family members
then sued FCA US, LLC for various product-liability claims hinging on an alleged design defect
in Robert’s Chrysler minivan. FCA moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted
the motion. Maxwell now appeals that decision. Because the district court correctly determined
that the absence of a material factual dispute as to any essential element of Maxwell’s claims
entitled FCA to summary judgment, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In August 2014, Robert Maxwell purchased a 2008 Chrysler Town and Country Minivan.
Several months later, FCA sent two letters to Robert’s home, notifying him of a potential defect
in the minivan’s ignition (“Recall Notice”). The Recall Notice stated, in relevant part:
The Wireless Ignition Node (WIN) Module on your vehicle may have unintentional
movement of the Frequency Operated Button Ignition Key (FOBIK) from the “ON”
Case No. 22-1356, Maxwell, et al. v. FCA US, LLC, et al.
to the “Accessory” position while driving. This could cause unintended engine shut
off and increase the risk of a crash.
(Recall Notice, R. 51-7, PageID 580.)
The Recall Notice further provided that the defective components would be replaced free
of charge by the customer’s Chrysler dealer. It is unclear whether Robert’s minivan ever received
the free repair.
Tragedy struck on August 20, 2015, as Robert was driving southbound on I-55 in or near
DeSoto County, Mississippi. The weather was clear and dry that day. Robert was not driving
erratically, and there was no indication that he was intoxicated or asleep. But after passing a United
Parcel Service carrier without incident, Robert’s minivan crashed into the backend of a stationary
tractor trailer. Robert was fatally injured and died before he could be transported to a hospital.
The minivan was towed to a salvage facility. Later, Robert’s son-in-law, Craig Williams,
inspected the vehicle and captured video and photographs. The photographs show that the ignition
was in the “Accessory” (“ACC”) position with no key in place. Williams testified at a deposition
that he found the missing key fob under the driver’s seat.
In August 2018, Jessica Maxwell, Robert’s daughter and executor of his estate, along with
several other family members (collectively “Maxwell”), filed this lawsuit against FCA and
unidentified individuals (“Does 1–25”), alleging wrongful death based on defective design,
product liability based on defective design, breach of implied warranty of fitness, and negligent
recall; the negligent recall claim was later abandoned, as were the claims against the Does.
Common to all remaining claims was the theory that the defective ignition module and key fob
described in the Recall Notice caused Robert’s vehicle to malfunction, resulting in the fatal crash.
FCA moved for summary judgment, arguing that, with respect to all remaining claims,
there was no evidence that Robert’s car had the alleged defect, there was no reasonably safe
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alternative design, and there was no evidence that a defect caused the crash. FCA produced expert
reports stating that the ignition and key fob could not have moved to the positions they were found
in post-crash while Robert was driving, and that even if they had, this malfunction would not have
caused the crash because the brakes remained operational. Maxwell produced an expert
declaration stating that the fob “may” have dislodged during the crash or that the ignition and fob
“may” have malfunctioned while Robert was driving, causing the crash.
The district court granted FCA summary judgment on all of the remaining claims,
reasoning that Maxwell had failed to adduce any evidence as to causation or the “feasible
alternative design” requirement. Maxwell now appeals.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standard and Governing Law
A grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Zakora v. Chrisman, 44 F.4th 452,
464 (6th Cir. 2022). Summary judgment is proper where there is no genuine dispute of any
material fact, entitling the movant to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P 56(a). In
reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we take the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom
in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255
(1986). Once the movant demonstrates an absence of disputed fact, the non-movant must present
evidence to create a genuine dispute of fact with respect to each “essential element of her case[.]”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). In so doing, the non-movant “must do more
than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
A federal court sitting in diversity applies the choice-of-law rules of the forum state—here,
Michigan. Tele-Save Merch. Co. v. Consumers Distrib. Co., 814 F.2d 1120, 1122 (6th Cir. 1987)
(citing Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941)). Michigan’s choice-of-
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law rules require the application of Michigan law absent a “rational reason” to do otherwise.
Sutherland v. Kennington Truck Serv., Ltd., 562 N.W.2d 466, 471 (Mich. 1997).
With respect to tort cases, a “rational reason” exists if “any foreign state has an interest in
having its law applied” and that state’s interests outweigh Michigan’s. Id. Typically, where
Michigan’s only connection to the case is that the defendant’s headquarters are located there and
an allegedly defective design was created there, the foreign state’s law will apply instead. See
Hall v. Gen. Motors Corp., 582 N.W.2d 866, 868–71 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) (describing
Michigan’s minimal interest in applying its law to a suit arising from an accident that occurred in
North Carolina involving a North Carolina resident). Applying Michigan’s choice-of-law rules,
Mississippi law governs this dispute because Robert was a Mississippi resident, the crash occurred
in Mississippi, and Michigan is only interested to the extent that FCA is headquartered in
Michigan. See id. at 871. As the district court correctly concluded, however, Maxwell’s claims
fail under either state’s laws.
B. Causation
For all of Maxwell’s claims—wrongful death and product liability based on defective
design and breach of implied warranty of fitness—she must show that the defective design caused
the alleged harm. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-63(a)(iii); see Moss v. Batesville Casket Co., 935 So.2d
393, 400 (Miss. 2006); accord Skinner v. Square D Co., 516 N.W.2d 475, 479 (Mich. 1994). Here,
Maxwell failed to adduce any evidence to create a genuine dispute of fact that the alleged defect,
the faulty ignition and fob, caused the crash.
Maxwell primarily points to the testimony and declaration of her expert, Sean Shideh, but
Shideh did not provide any facts from which the district court could have reasonably inferred that
a faulty ignition caused the crash. Shideh equivocated that “the key FOB may have moved from
the ON position . . . prior to the crash” but that “it is also scientifically possible that the key FOB
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may have moved from the ON position . . . as a result of the crash.” (Shideh Decl., R. 51-4, PageID
530, ¶¶ 4, 5.) Shideh offered no conclusions as to the presence of the potential defect in the
vehicle, let alone its causal connection to the crash. Shideh’s vague statements fail to create a
genuine factual dispute. See Goins v. Clorox Co., 926 F.2d 559, 561 (6th Cir. 1991) (noting that
at summary judgment, a non-movant must provide “significant probative evidence” rather than
mere allegations to avoid summary judgment).
Nor do Maxwell’s other offerings suffice. Apart from photographs taken of the car after
the accident, which show that the key fob was out of the ignition but give no clue as to what caused
this, Maxwell offers testimony from other drivers who state that Robert had been driving carefully
that day. Although this evidence helps eliminate some theories for what caused the crash—i.e.,
that Robert was driving while intoxicated—it does not affirmatively support the theory that the
defect caused the crash instead. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323 (non-movant must present
specific facts supporting each essential element); see also Mine Safety Appliance Co. v. Holmes,
171 So.3d 442, 450–52 (Miss. 2015) (describing acceptable circumstantial evidence for providing
causation in product liability action); Moss, 935 So.2d at 400 (noting that plaintiffs failed to show
that an allegedly problematic casket damaged the decedent’s remains). Unfortunately, Maxwell
has no evidence that an alleged defect in the minivan caused the crash, and so the district court’s
grant of summary judgment in favor of FCA was appropriate.
C. Feasible Alternative Design
The district court likewise correctly concluded that Maxwell failed to present evidence of
a “feasible design alternative” that would have had a reasonable probability of preventing the
alleged harm. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-63(f)(ii); accord Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2946(2).
On appeal, Maxwell maintains that the safer alternative design would simply be a
traditional key and ignition set up, and notes that in the Recall Notice, FCA stated that it would
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replace any defective ignition modules and provide the owner two new wireless key fobs free of
charge. Neither of these arguments can save Maxwell’s claims.
With respect to the traditional key argument, Maxwell adduced no evidence—only
argument—that a traditional key-and-ignition design would have been safer than the system in the
vehicle. Argument is not evidence, nor is it sufficient to create a dispute of fact at summary
judgment. See Duha v. Agrium, Inc., 448 F.3d 867, 879 (6th Cir. 2006). As for the argument
premised on the Recall Notice, the standard is not whether a safer design was discovered later—
as evidenced by the Notice—but rather whether a feasible, safer alternative existed at the time the
vehicle was sold. See Williams v. Bennett, 921 So.2d 1269, 1275 (Miss. 2006); accord Gregory
v. Cincinnati, inc., 538 N.W. 325, 329 (Mich. 1995). Maxwell presented no evidence that a safer
alternative existed when Robert bought the car. The district court therefore correctly concluded
that Maxwell’s claims fail on this ground as well.
D. Dobbs is Inapplicable
In a final attempt to save the case, Maxwell argues that the Supreme Court’s recent decision
in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 2228 (2022) requires us to reverse the district
court’s grant of summary judgment to FCA. Maxwell argues that because Dobbs ruled that states
are free to regulate abortion based on a “potential life interest” implicated in terminating a
pregnancy, it also applies to other claims involving a “life interest,” such as wrongful death claims.
Thus, she argues, the district court erred in relying on federal evidentiary standards, which wrongly
require plaintiffs to produce expert testimony to survive summary judgment, where neither the
relevant Mississippi nor Michigan statutes mention expert testimony at all.
This argument misses several marks. Dobbs’s language about “potential life” was cabined
to the abortion context; it explicitly disclaimed invalidating any non-abortion-related precedents.
Dobbs, 142 S. Ct. at 2277–78. More to the point, the district court clarified that it was not granting
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summary judgment to FCA because of Maxwell’s lack of expert testimony, but rather because she
failed to adduce any “competent evidence” to support the essential elements of her claims under
Mississippi or Michigan law. (Op. & Order, R. 55, PageID 1001.)
***
The facts of this case are tragic. But unfortunately, Maxwell has not set forth evidence
sufficient to create a genuine dispute of fact that a defect in the minivan caused the crash that took
Robert’s life or that a reasonably safer design would have prevented it.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to
FCA.
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