Artur Zawada v. Uber Technologies ( 2018 )


Menu:
  •                         NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
    File Name: 18a0133n.06
    No. 17-1092
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
    ARTUR ZAWADA, et al.,                                   )
    FILED
    Mar 14, 2018
    )
    DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,                           )
    )
    v.                                                      )      ON APPEAL FROM THE
    )      UNITED STATES DISTRICT
    UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC., et al.,                        )      COURT FOR THE EASTERN
    )      DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
    Defendants-Appellees.                            )
    )
    )
    BEFORE:       BATCHELDER, GRIFFIN, and WHITE, Circuit Judges.
    ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge. In this case, two Uber drivers attempted to
    bring a class action against Uber, alleging, among other things, that Uber unlawfully
    misclassified them as independent contractors instead of as employees, depriving them of fair
    compensation. Because both Uber drivers had entered into arbitration agreements with Uber
    containing class action waivers, the district court dismissed the action and compelled individual
    arbitration. We AFFIRM.
    I.
    The Defendants-Appellees in this case are Uber Technologies, Inc. and Rasier, LLC, a
    wholly-owned subsidiary of Uber Technologies, Inc. (collectively “Uber”). The Plaintiffs-
    Appellants are two Michigan men, Artur Zawada and Nashat Farha (collectively “the
    Plaintiffs”). Zawada was formerly an Uber driver, and Farha is currently an Uber driver.
    No. 17-1092, Zawada v. Uber Technologies
    Uber operates a smartphone application that facilitates on-demand transportation
    services. Customers use the Uber app to request vehicle rides, and those requests are sent
    through the app to locally-available Uber drivers who use their own vehicles to transport
    customers. Customers pay their drivers through the Uber app, and Uber keeps part of the fare.
    To become an Uber driver, prospective drivers must enter into a contract titled the
    “Rasier Software Sublicense Online Services Agreement” (“the Agreement”). Within the
    Agreement is an Arbitration Provision that includes a class action waiver. Uber drivers may opt
    out of this provision if they wish to, and some drivers do. The Plaintiffs twice agreed to the
    contract containing the Arbitration Provision, and twice did not opt out of the Arbitration
    Provision.1
    In April 2016, the Plaintiffs filed a purported class action against Uber on behalf of a
    class of Uber drivers in Michigan. The Plaintiffs alleged that Uber unlawfully misclassified
    them as independent contractors instead of as employees, depriving them of fair compensation.
    Uber filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, to compel arbitration, and to strike class
    allegations, which the district court granted. The Plaintiffs timely appealed.
    II.
    On appeal, the Plaintiffs argue that the Arbitration Provision is illegal and unenforceable
    because the class action waiver contained in the Arbitration Provision violates the Plaintiffs’
    rights under the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”). The National Labor Relations Board
    (“NLRB”), as amicus curiae on behalf of the Plaintiffs, argues that class action waivers, even
    1
    Uber periodically modifies the Agreement. Two versions are relevant in this case: the November 2014 Agreement,
    which the Plaintiffs agreed to when they first became Uber drivers, and the December 2015 Agreement, which the
    Plaintiffs agreed to after Uber made a modification to the Agreement. Although there was some dispute in the
    district court about which version of the Agreement controlled, the district court held that “the language that
    operates to compel arbitration [in both versions] is identical or functionally identical.” Zawada v. Uber Techs., Inc.,
    No. 16-cv-11334, 
    2016 WL 7439198
    , at *3 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 27, 2016). The Plaintiffs also concede that “[f]or
    purposes of this appeal, the minor difference between the agreements are [sic] irrelevant.”
    -2-
    No. 17-1092, Zawada v. Uber Technologies
    those that include opt-out provisions, violate the NLRA. The NLRB takes no position on whether
    Uber drivers are statutorily protected “employees” under the NLRA. Uber argues that we should
    not consider the Plaintiffs’ arguments because they raise them for the first time on appeal.
    Ordinarily, we “will not decide issues or claims not litigated before the district court.”
    White v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 
    899 F.2d 555
    , 559 (6th Cir. 1990). This is because we
    “review the case presented to the district court rather than a better case fashioned after the district
    court’s order.” 
    Id.
     (citation omitted); see United States v. Universal Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 
    191 F.3d 750
    , 758–59 (6th Cir. 1999) (collecting cases). Although we have discretion to deviate from this
    rule “in ‘exceptional cases or particular circumstances’ or when the rule would produce a ‘plain
    miscarriage of justice,’” we exercise this discretion only “rarely.” Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Flowers,
    
    513 F.3d 546
    , 552 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
    We generally hold that a party forfeits any issue that it presented to the district court too
    late for the issue actually to be litigated. See 
    id. at 553
    ; see also Lexicon, Inc. v. Safeco Ins. Co.
    of Am., Inc., 
    436 F.3d 662
    , 676 (6th Cir. 2006) (Griffin, J., concurring). We also generally hold
    that a party forfeits issues that it did not fully argue to the district court. See Bldg. Serv. Local 47
    Cleaning Contractors Pension Plan v. Grandview Raceway, 
    46 F.3d 1392
    , 1399 (6th Cir. 1995)
    (“vague references” that “fail to clearly present” an argument are not enough to “preserve an
    issue for appellate review”).
    The Plaintiffs did not mention the NLRA in their briefing before the district court, let
    alone assert the argument they now make on appeal: that their NLRA collective action rights
    were impinged by the class action waiver in the Arbitration Provision. Instead, “on the eve of
    the hearing” on Uber’s motion to dismiss, compel arbitration, and strike the class allegations, the
    Plaintiffs filed a “Notice of Supplemental Authority” citing a Seventh Circuit case which found
    -3-
    No. 17-1092, Zawada v. Uber Technologies
    that a similar arbitration agreement, but without an opt-out clause as here, violated the NLRA.
    See Zawada, 
    2016 WL 7439198
    , at *8. In this “Notice,” the Plaintiffs provided only a single
    paragraph summarizing the Seventh Circuit decision and made no attempt to develop the NLRA
    argument or show how the Seventh Circuit’s decision applied to their case. The district court
    declined to “deny [Uber’s] motion based on arguments that Plaintiffs could have developed in
    their response brief.”2 
    Id.
     We affirm.
    We hold that the Plaintiffs have forfeited the issue of whether the class action waiver
    contained in the Arbitration Provision violated the NLRA. The Plaintiffs did not litigate that
    issue before the district court. Instead, they waited until the eleventh hour to attempt to raise a
    new argument, and even then, cited only a single case and provided no developed argument.
    Plaintiffs “Notice” was insufficient to preserve the issue for appellate review. Finally, the
    Plaintiffs have not argued to us that theirs is an exceptional case in which we must decide this
    issue to prevent a plain miscarriage of justice.
    The Plaintiffs have expressly waived the three arguments that they did present to the
    district court about the validity and applicability of the Arbitration Provision, and we do not
    consider those arguments.
    III.
    For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
    2
    The district court further noted that, even if it “were to consider this late filing, it would not change the result”
    because the cited Seventh Circuit decision concerned an arbitration agreement without an opt-out provision and was
    therefore distinguishable. Zawada, 
    2016 WL 7439198
    , at *8.
    -4-