Smith v. Romanowski ( 2009 )

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 09a0455n.06
07-1578
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
FILED
Jul 01, 2009
CALVIN SMITH, ) LEONARD GREEN, Clerk
)
Petitioner-Appellant, )
)
v. ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
KENNETH ROMANOWSKI, Warden, ) EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
)
Respondent-Appellee. )
Before: BATCHELDER, DAUGHTREY, and MOORE, Circuit Judges.
MARTHA CRAIG DAUGHTREY, Circuit Judge. Following the unsuccessful direct
appeals of his convictions for the Michigan state criminal offenses of carrying a concealed
weapon, felon in possession of a firearm, and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony, Calvin Smith filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal
district court. In that petition, he claimed only that the evidence adduced by the
prosecution was constitutionally insufficient to support the verdicts of guilt. He now
continues that line of argument, insisting that the district court erred in denying him habeas
relief. Even though another trier of fact could have found that the evidence of Smith’s
constructive possession of a firearm was insufficient to establish his guilt of the charged
offenses beyond a reasonable doubt, such disagreement with the rendered jury verdict is
not dispositive of the issue now before us. Rather, because the Michigan Court of Appeals
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was not unreasonable in concluding that a rational trier of fact could find Smith guilty of the
relevant offenses based upon the evidence presented at trial, we affirm the district court’s
denial of Smith’s petition.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
At approximately 11:19 p.m. on December 31, 2002, Officer Jason Groulx of the
Flint Police Department observed a van traveling on city streets with neither its headlights
nor its taillights illuminated. After Groulx activated his patrol car’s emergency lights, the
van slowed to a speed of approximately ten miles per hour but continued for two or three
blocks before turning into a parking lot and stopping. At that time, Groulx approached the
driver, Calvin Smith, and requested to see his driver’s license, vehicle registration, and
proof of insurance. Smith produced a valid driver’s license, but claimed that he had
borrowed the van from a friend and thus was not in possession of the necessary
registration and insurance information.
A computer check of the van’s license plates verified Smith’s statement that the
vehicle was registered to an Eric Shoemo, but it also indicated that the plates were issued
for an Oldsmobile Achieva, not for the GMC van to which they were attached. Because
of the discrepancy, Groulx conducted an inventory of the van in preparation for impounding
the vehicle. During that inventory, the officer pulled open a pocket on the back of the front
passenger seat and saw numerous items, including a CD player and a .380 semi-automatic
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handgun.1 Groulx testified at Smith’s state-court trial that he did not see the weapon until
he pulled open the pocket and that
the firearm was placed inside the pocket . . . where . . . the muzzle, the front
of the gun was pointing down and the grip was pointing in this direction, so
it was accessible from the driver’s position, from where the driver was sittin’
in the vehicle the driver could reach into that pocket and retrieve that firearm
from that pocket. It wasn’t sittin’ in a fashion where it was just setting in
there, in my opinion, it was sittin’ in there at this angle in that pocket on top
of other items that were in that pocket, and this – this firearm is quite heavy,
so in the course of movement and – and traveling down a road this – this
firearm is eventually gonna not remain in that position. So that’s where –
where it was located when I found it. So it was accessible from the driver’s
seat, the driver could reach with his arm behind that seat, reach into that
pocket and retrieve that firearm from that pocket.
Eric Shoemo, the owner of the van, also testified at the trial and confirmed that he
had indeed loaned his vehicle to Smith during the late evening hours of December 31,
2002. He further stated that the handgun found in the van was not his and that he did not
even own a gun.
Additional trial testimony was provided by another of Smith’s friends, Marcius Cook,
who said that the handgun retrieved from the van was his. Cook explained that Smith had
given him a ride in the van shortly before midnight on the date in question but that,
because of Cook’s inebriated condition at the time, the passenger had lain down on the
seats behind the front seats until he was dropped off at a New Year’s Eve party. Cook also
1
No fingerprints were found on the gun, on the ammunition cartridge inserted into
it, or on a bullet removed from the firearm.
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stated that he thought he had his gun with him when he exited the van and that he was
surprised to learn that the weapon was found in the seat pocket. He could not explain how
it got there.
Even though Smith’s counsel argued that the petitioner was unaware of the
presence of the firearm in the borrowed van, the jury nevertheless convicted the petitioner
of carrying a concealed weapon and of being a felon in possession of a firearm, for which
he received concurrent prison sentences of 32 months to 15 years. The jury also found
Smith guilty of possessing a firearm in the commission of a felony, for which he was
sentenced to an additional mandatory, consecutive prison term of five years. Efforts by the
petitioner and his attorneys undertaken in the Michigan state court system to overturn the
convictions proved unsuccessful, and Smith ultimately filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in federal court.
The magistrate judge to whom the matter was referred examined the trial evidence
and recommended that the petition be granted. According to his analysis, each of the
three offenses for which Smith was convicted required proof that the defendant
“possessed” a firearm and, although even constructive possession of a weapon by the
petitioner would have been sufficient to satisfy the state’s evidentiary burden, “[a]
defendant’s mere presence near firearms, without more, is insufficient to prove that he or
she was in possession of the firearm.” (Citing Parker v. Renico, 450 F. Supp. 2d 727, 733
(E.D. Mich. 2006), aff’d in 506 F.3d 444 (6th Cir. 2007)). The magistrate judge concluded:
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Here, there was no evidence presented going to petitioner’s possession
other than his presence in the car with the firearm. There was no evidence
that petitioner had exclusive ownership or control of the vehicle; on the
contrary, the unrebutted evidence was that the car was owned by petitioner’s
friend and driven by a number of people. There was no physical evidence
tying petitioner to the gun – for example, no fingerprints were found on the
gun and petitioner did not have ammunition on his person. There was no
evidence that the gun was owned by or registered to petitioner. There was
no testimony from witnesses who saw petitioner in possession of a gun at
any time. There was no evidence that the gun was visible from its location
such that petitioner had to have known about its presence. There was no
testimony from the arresting officer that petitioner made any furtive
movements indicative of trying to hide the gun. In short, there was no
evidence against petitioner except for the fact that the gun was found in the
same vehicle that he was driving. This was wholly insufficient to establish his
possession of the weapon.
Finding the conclusion of the Michigan Court of Appeals to the contrary unreasonable, the
magistrate judge recommended that the district court “should grant petitioner’s application
for the writ of habeas corpus, and should issue an unconditional writ ordering respondent
to release petitioner from custody.”
The district court rejected that recommendation, however, concluding that the
Michigan Court of Appeals did not act unreasonably in finding the evidence sufficient to
support Smith’s convictions. In doing so, the court focused on certain facts that it claimed
were overlooked by the magistrate judge. Specifically, the district judge noted that: (1)
Smith was the only person in the van when the weapon was found; (2) the firearm was
easily accessible to the petitioner; (3) the gun was resting on top of other items in the
pocket even though it “was heavy enough that it would have settled down amongst
everything else in the pocket if it had been in that location for any period of time”; (4) the
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handle of the gun was pointed toward the driver’s seat; and (5) Smith did not immediately
pull over after Groulx activated his emergency lights, “indicating that he might have been
stalling in an attempt to hide the weapon.” Smith now appeals that conclusion regarding
the claims of evidentiary insufficiency.
DISCUSSION
“At the outset, it is important to recognize, as did the [district] judge in this case, just
how limited is our review in a habeas proceeding.” Brown v. Konteh, ___ F.3d ___, ___,
Nos. 06-4037/4043, 2009 WL 1515501, at *10 (6th Cir. June 2, 2009). The Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub.L.No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214
(1996), provides that a federal court may not grant the writ unless the state court
adjudication on the merits either:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based upon an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
As the United States Supreme Court explained in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,
412-13 (2000):
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Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if
the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court
on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this
Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the
“unreasonable application” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ
if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this
Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the
prisoner’s case.
In deciding whether a state court ruling involved an “unreasonable application” of federal
law, we do not focus merely upon whether the state court decision was erroneous or
incorrect; rather, we may issue a writ of habeas corpus only if the state court’s application
of clearly-established federal law was objectively unreasonable. See id. at 409-11.
As we explained recently in Brown:
In an appeal from a denial of habeas relief, in which a petitioner
challenges the constitutional sufficiency of the evidence used to convict him,
we are thus bound by two separate layers of deference to groups who might
view facts differently than we would. First, as in all sufficiency-of-the-
evidence challenges, we must determine whether, viewing the trial testimony
and exhibits in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). In
doing so, we do not reweigh the evidence, re-evaluate the credibility of
witnesses, or substitute our judgment for that of the jury. See United States
v. Hilliard, 11 F.3d 618, 620 (6th Cir. 1993). [E]ven though we might have
not voted to convict a defendant had we participated in jury deliberations, we
must uphold the jury verdict if any rational trier of fact could have found the
defendant guilty after resolving all disputes in favor of the prosecution.
Second, even were we to conclude that a rational trier-of-fact could not have
found a petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, on habeas review, we
must still defer to the state appellate court’s sufficiency determination as long
as it is not unreasonable. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).
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Brown, ___ F.3d at ___, 2009 WL 1515501, at *11.
Despite our inclinations, we cannot, therefore, “rely simply upon our own personal
conceptions of what evidentiary showings would be sufficient to convince us of the
petitioner’s guilt.” Id. at ___, 2009 WL 1515501, at *11. Nor can we end our habeas
corpus inquiry after determining whether any rational trier of fact would conclude that
petitioner Smith is guilty of the offenses with which he was charged. Instead, we must
consider whether the Michigan Court of Appeals itself was unreasonable in its conclusion
that a rational trier of fact could find Smith guilty beyond a reasonable doubt based upon
the evidence introduced at trial. See, e.g., Knowles v. Mirzayance, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1420
(2009) (“The question ‘is not whether a federal court believes the state court’s
determination . . . was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable – a
substantially higher threshold.’”) (quoting Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007)).
See also Brown, ___ F.3d at ___, 2009 WL 1515501, at *11.
As noted by the magistrate judge, a crucial element of each of the three offenses
for which Smith was convicted was the defendant’s possession of an operable firearm.
See M.C.L.A. §§ 750.224f (felon in possession); 750.227(2) (carrying a concealed
weapon); 750.227b(1) (possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony). Under well-
established Michigan law, such possession may be either actual or constructive. See
Parker v. Renico, 506 F.3d 444, 448 (6th Cir. 2007). “Constructive possession exists when
a person does not have actual possession but instead knowingly has the power and the
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intention at a given time to exercise dominion and control over an object, either directly or
through others.” United States v. Kincaide, 145 F.3d 771, 782 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting
United States v. Craven, 478 F.2d 1329, 1333 (6th Cir. 1973)). Such “control,” however,
“requires something more than a defendant’s mere proximity to establish constructive
possession.” Parker, 506 F.3d at 449 (citations omitted). “The prosecution must show an
additional independent factor linking the defendant with the [firearm].” People v. Williams
469 N.W.2d 4, 6 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991).
Smith’s challenge to the sufficiency of the convicting evidence in this case relies
upon his contention that the prosecution failed to establish that he was in constructive
possession of the gun found in the pocket on the back of the front passenger seat.
According to Smith, no witness ever saw him with a firearm, his fingerprints were not found
on the weapon or its ammunition, the vehicle in which the gun was found did not belong
to Smith, the handgun was not in plain view of the driver, and another friend of the
petitioner admitted owning the firearm. Without question, each of these factors provides
strong indications that Smith was not aware of the presence of the weapon and that the
petitioner did not exercise dominion or control over it. Unfortunately for Smith, however,
the likelihood or unlikelihood that this panel would convict or acquit the petitioner based
upon the evidence adduced is irrelevant to his chances for success in this habeas
proceeding. Instead, we repeat, this court must examine only whether the Michigan Court
of Appeals was unreasonable in concluding that some rational trier of fact could examine
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the testimony offered and conclude that Smith was guilty of the charged offenses beyond
a reasonable doubt.
Here, the evidence of Smith’s constructive possession of the handgun found in the
van he was driving on December 31, 2002, is slim indeed. As this court has recently
reaffirmed, “[t]he mere fact that [an individual] was driving the [vehicle] in which the police
found the firearm is not enough to establish dominion and control over the firearm.” United
States v. Bailey, 553 F.3d 940, 947, (6th Cir. 2009). To convict a person of an offense
involving constructive possession of a firearm, we therefore require additional
circumstantial proof of such dominion and control. See id. In this case, however, a rational
trier of fact could reasonably credit testimony that – in conjunction with other facts that do
not, by themselves, establish Smith’s guilt – supports the inference that the petitioner did
indeed hide the handgun in the seat pocket after he realized that he was subject to a stop
and search by the police. Specifically, Officer Groulx testified at trial that the firearm was
placed into the seat pocket in such a way that it rested precariously on top of other items
in the storage compartment but that “this firearm is quite heavy, so in the course of
movement and – and traveling down a road this – this firearm is eventually gonna not
remain in that position.” The clear inference that could reasonably be drawn from such
testimony is that the gun must have been placed in the pocket by Smith immediately prior
to Groulx’s search because, had it been stored there previously by Marcius Cook or by
some other individual, the jostling resulting from travel on city streets – even the short
distance the van traveled between the location where Smith dropped Cook and where the
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van was stopped by Groulx – would have dislodged the weapon from the position in which
it was found.
Regardless of how we would have viewed the evidence of Smith’s guilt had we been
called upon to evaluate the strength of the prosecution’s case, we cannot escape the fact
that the Michigan Court of Appeals was not unreasonable in choosing to credit Groulx’s
testimony and to put upon the facts of this case the gloss it did. According this evidence
the most favorable inference possible, a rational trier of fact could choose to disbelieve the
testimony of Marcius Cook and conclude that the petitioner placed the gun in its hiding
place moments prior to Groulx’s inventory of the van’s contents. Because Smith has thus
failed to satisfy the substantial burden placed upon him by the provisions of AEDPA, the
district court appropriately denied the petition for the writ of habeas corpus.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set out above, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.
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KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge, dissenting. Because I believe that our
precedent requires a different result, I respectfully dissent.
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979), provides the standard for evaluating
a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim and explains that “the relevant question is whether,
after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”
“As framed by AEDPA, the issue [that we must consider] is whether the district court erred
in concluding that the Michigan Court of Appeals unreasonably applied [Jackson].” Parker
v. Renico, 506 F.3d 444, 448 (6th Cir. 2007). This standard requires deference to the
jury’s verdict and to the state court’s review of that verdict. Id. However, even after
AEDPA, this panel must “distinguish reasonable speculation from sufficient evidence” when
reviewing a state court’s application of Jackson. Brown v. Palmer, 441 F.3d 347, 352 (6th
Cir. 2006); see also Parker, 506 F.3d at 452.
Smith argues that the prosecution failed to prove that he possessed the firearm
found in the van, an element required by each of the three statutes under which Smith was
convicted. See Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 750.227(2), 750.224f, 750.227b. Under Michigan
law, possession can be either actual or constructive. Parker, 506 F.3d at 448. As under
federal law, “‘a person has constructive possession if there is proximity to the [weapon]
together with indicia of control.’” Id. (quoting People v. Hill, 446 N.W.2d 140, 143 (Mich.
1989)). Similarly, under both Michigan and federal law, “the ‘indicia of control’ element
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requires something more than a defendant’s mere proximity to establish constructive
possession.” Id. at 449.
Although AEDPA mandates deference to the state court’s holding, I would hold that
the evidence introduced against Smith shows nothing more than his proximity to the
firearm and that the Michigan court’s conclusion that this evidence was sufficient to prove
possession was an unreasonable application of Jackson. I believe this result is required
by our opinion in Parker. In Parker, four men, including Parker, were stopped by officers
because the car they were in was driving erratically. Id. at 445-46. Immediately before the
stop, one of the men in the car had shot another man four times. Id. at 445. When the
officers tried to stop this car, it sped up and led the police on a high-speed chase. Id. at
446. During this chase, a door on the driver’s side of the car opened. Id. The car
eventually crashed, and the three other men ran from the car while Parker cooperated with
officers, even preventing one of the other men from picking up a gun. Id. When police
searched the car, they found two guns, one on the front passenger’s side floor and one on
the passenger’s side back seat. Id. A third gun was found on the road along the chase
route. Id. Parker had been sitting in the back seat on the driver’s side. Id. at 445.
The Michigan courts found that there was sufficient evidence to show possession
because “(1) Parker fled from law enforcement; (2) the officers saw an opening driver’s
side door; (3) the gun was within Parker’s reach and in plain sight; and (4) as Williams
exclusively used the Luger, Parker must have used the second gun in the backseat.” Id.
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at 450. We granted habeas relief because “viewed individually each fact the state
advances as ‘indicia of control’ fails to link Parker to the gun, and viewed cumulatively the
evidence gains no greater traction. The evidence may have led the jury, as Brown
contemplates, to ‘reasonably speculate’ that Parker possessed a weapon, but without
‘indicia of control,’ insufficient evidence supports beyond a reasonable doubt Parker’s
constructive possession.” Id. at 452. In reaching this conclusion, we were cognizant of the
standard of review, noting that “[a]lthough Jackson v. Virginia and AEDPA dictate
deferential standards, this is the rare case where the jury’s conclusion fails to conform to
that of a rational jury, and where the Michigan Court of Appeals’ contrary conclusion was
unreasonable.” Id.
The state presented even less evidence of possession here than in Parker. None
of the evidence cited by the Michigan Court of Appeals or by the district court indicates
otherwise. Both courts noted that Smith was alone in the van at the time the gun was
found. However, there was uncontroverted testimony that Smith was not the sole occupant
of the van that night or the only person who drove the van. The prosecution did not
challenge Cook’s testimony that he was in the car on the night Smith was arrested or
Shoemo’s testimony that he loaned the van to a variety of different people.2 Accordingly,
the fact that Smith was alone at the time of his arrest is insignificant. The gun could have
2
Shoemo testified that he did not keep anything in the seat-back pockets or own a
gun, but he also testified that he had not been using the van. Additionally, Shoemo did not
testify about whether he routinely cleaned the van or checked the contents of the pockets.
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been placed in the pocket by Cook or by a third party who had previously borrowed the
van. See United States v. Bailey, 553 F.3d 940, 946 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Because individuals
other than Bailey used the car on the night Bailey was arrested and in the days before, no
juror could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the mere fact that Bailey was driving
the car meant that Bailey had placed the gun beneath the driver’s seat.”).
The Michigan Court of Appeals and the district court also highlighted the fact that
the gun was positioned such that an individual driving the car could reach the weapon.
However, as we explained in Parker, arguments that a firearm was “within an arm’s reach”
of an individual or “in plain sight” are “just proximity by another name.” Parker, 506 F.3d
at 451. Arguments that Smith could have reached the gun or that he could have reached
the pocket to hide the gun are simply arguments that he was near the gun. Accordingly,
the position of the gun would not permit a rational juror to conclude beyond a reasonable
doubt that Smith possessed the weapon.
The Michigan Court of Appeals noted that Cook did not know how the gun had
gotten into the seat-back pocket. While this is true, this fact does not prove that Smith did
know how the gun found its way there. It is not enough for the state to negate Smith’s
case; the prosecution must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, every element of the crime,
including that Smith possessed this firearm. Even if Cook had not testified and if Smith
had not presented a theory as to who put the gun in the van, I believe that the state failed
to present sufficient evidence that Smith possessed the firearm.
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The district court stated that it relied most heavily on the fact that Groulx testified
that although the gun was heavy, it had not fallen to the bottom of the pocket. Although
I believe that this fact presents the closest question, I do not find that it provides sufficient
evidence that Smith possessed the weapon. This argument is yet another restatement of
the fact that the gun was close to Smith. Had the gun fallen to the bottom of the pocket,
it would not have been easily accessible to Smith; only because it remained on the top of
the pocket was it near Smith. And, as stated above, mere proximity to a weapon is
insufficient to show possession. Additionally, Groulx’s testimony regarding the pocket was
far from definite; he stated that the gun would “eventually” fall from its position and that he
could identify the position the weapon had been in even though he had to pull the pocket
open to find it. Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) at 74-75 (Trial Tr. at 107-08). Further, Groulx did
not stop Smith far from where Smith dropped Cook off, so there is no indication that
sufficient time had passed for this eventuality to occur since Cook left the van. Compare
J.A. at 120-21 (Trial Tr. at 156-57) (noting that Smith dropped Cook off near Church, 12th,
and Beach Streets), with J.A. at 62-63 (Trial Tr. at 95-96) (indicating that Groulx first saw
Smith near these same streets).
Additionally, the prosecution did not prove or even allege any of the facts that
sometimes serve as indicia of control: Smith’s fingerprints were not on the weapon; Groulx
never saw Smith reach for the weapon; Smith cooperated with Groulx and there is no
indication that Smith was nervous or concerned about the search; Smith did not have sole
possession and control of the van; no one had seen Smith with a weapon; no one knew
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of Smith having a weapon; the gun was not visible to Smith while he was driving; and Smith
did not have any ammunition with him. I believe that this case presents less evidence of
the indicia of control necessary to establish possession than was shown in Parker. The
evidence shows nothing more than Smith’s proximity to the weapon. As in Parker, “[t]he
evidence may have led the jury, as Brown contemplates, to ‘reasonably speculate’ that [the
defendant] possessed a weapon, but without ‘indicia of control,’ insufficient evidence
supports beyond a reasonable doubt [the defendant’s] constructive possession.” 506 F.3d
at 452. AEDPA review requires us to “distinguish reasonable speculation from sufficient
evidence.” Brown, 441 F.3d at 352 (6th Cir. 2006). Because the case against Smith rests
on nothing more than speculation, I believe that the Michigan Court of Appeals
unreasonably applied Jackson v. Virginia, and I would REVERSE the district court’s
DENIAL of habeas.
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