United States v. Corey Guthrie ( 2009 )


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    Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
    File Name: 09a0076p.06
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
    _________________
    X
    Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, -
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    -
    -
    -
    Nos. 07-6215/6286
    v.
    ,
    >
    -
    Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee. -
    COREY L. GUTHRIE,
    -
    N
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Kentucky at Louisville.
    No. 05-00139—Jennifer B. Coffman, Chief District Judge.
    Argued: January 22, 2009
    Decided and Filed: March 2, 2009
    *
    Before: MARTIN and MOORE, Circuit Judges; GWIN, District Judge.
    _________________
    COUNSEL
    ARGUED: Patrick J. Renn, LAW OFFICES, Louisville, Kentucky, for Appellant.
    Monica Wheatley, ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Louisville, Kentucky,
    for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Patrick J. Renn, LAW OFFICES, Louisville, Kentucky, for
    Appellant. Monica Wheatley, Terry M. Cushing, ASSISTANT UNITED STATES
    ATTORNEYS, Louisville, Kentucky, for Appellee.
    _________________
    OPINION
    _________________
    GWIN, District Judge. Defendant-Appellant Cross-Appellee Corey L. Guthrie
    (“Guthrie”) appeals his conviction for one count of car-jacking in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 2119
    ; one count of discharging a firearm during a crime of violence in violation of
    *
    The Honorable James S. Gwin, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Ohio,
    sitting by designation.
    1
    Nos. 07-6215/6286               United States v. Guthrie                            Page 2
    
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c); one count of possession of a sawed-off shotgun in violation of
    
    18 U.S.C. §§ 5861
    (d) and 5871; and one count of possession of firearms by a convicted
    felon in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 922
    (g)(1) and 924(e)(1). A jury convicted Guthrie on
    all four counts. Plaintiff-Appellee Cross-Appellant United States of America cross-
    appeals Guthrie’s sentence. The district court sentenced Guthrie to 180 months
    incarceration on Count 1 (carjacking) and on Count 4 (possession of firearms by a felon)
    and to 120 months imprisonment on Count 3 (possession of a sawed-off shotgun), all to
    be served concurrently. Further, the district court sentenced Guthrie to 120 months
    imprisonment on Count 2 (discharging a firearm during a crime of violence), to be
    served consecutively to the other counts. In total, the district court sentenced Guthrie
    to 25 years of imprisonment.
    With his appeal, Guthrie argues that the district court erred by: (1) permitting the
    Assistant United States Attorney to speak with the victim-witness during her cross-
    examination; (2) permitting the introduction of audio recordings of 911 calls;
    (3) permitting the introduction of video recording of a police pursuit; (4) refusing to
    issue a writ to produce a witness at trial; (5) instructing the jury on the wrong standard
    for “intent to cause death or serious bodily injury”; and (6) denying Guthrie’s motions
    for judgment of acquittal on the grounds of insufficiency of the evidence.
    With its cross-appeal, the United States of America argues that the district court
    erred when it varied from the Sentencing Guidelines in sentencing Guthrie. The United
    States argues that the district court varied from the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range
    due to the effect of applicable statutory mandatory minimums on the overall sentence
    and failed to provide an adequate explanation for the sentence.
    For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM Guthrie’s convictions and his sentence.
    Nos. 07-6215/6286                United States v. Guthrie                          Page 3
    I. Background
    A. Facts
    Defendant Guthrie’s case stems from his effort to collect monies owed him by
    a drug distributor. On May 3, 2005, Ronald Kemp and Defendant Corey Guthrie arrived
    at the apartment of Dominique Ellis in search of money, allegedly owed to them by Ellis.
    Ellis lived in the apartment with his girlfriend, Shavonne Williams, and her two children.
    Kemp and Guthrie were armed when they arrived; they carried a .22 caliber semi-
    automatic pistol and a sawed-off shotgun. According to Kemp, who later cooperated and
    testified against his co-defendant, Guthrie held the shotgun while Kemp kicked in the
    door of the apartment. Also according to Kemp, Guthrie then returned the shotgun once
    Kemp and Guthrie entered the apartment. At the time of entry, Williams and the
    children were asleep; Guthrie’s target, Dominique Ellis, was absent. Kemp pointed the
    shotgun at Williams and demanded to know where Ellis’ money was located.
    Meanwhile, Kemp and Guthrie searched the room for the money. Unsuccessful in his
    attempt to locate the money, Kemp ordered Williams to call Ellis. Williams complied
    and Kemp demanded that Ellis bring money to Kemp and Guthrie and threatened that
    everyone in the apartment would otherwise be killed.
    Kemp and Guthrie then escorted Williams out of the apartment. Kemp ordered
    Williams into her car. Holding the shotgun, Kemp sat in the front seat, while Guthrie
    sat in the back and Williams drove. In a conversation with Ellis during the drive, Kemp
    told Ellis that they would kill Williams if they did not get $5,000. Ellis called 911 and
    reported that his girlfriend had been abducted. Shortly thereafter, police began to pursue
    the car.
    The high speed pursuit lasted approximately 35 minutes and spanned 30 miles.
    At one point, when law enforcement officers attempted to block the vehicle in an effort
    to stop it, Kemp leaned out of the window and fired the shotgun into a state trooper’s
    cruiser. During the pursuit, Guthrie threw the .22 caliber semi-automatic pistol from the
    vehicle; it was later recovered. At one point early in the pursuit, a police dispatcher
    called Williams on her cell phone to inquire if she was in danger. Williams replied that
    Nos. 07-6215/6286                     United States v. Guthrie                                 Page 4
    she was safe and had not been abducted, that her phone battery was dying, and that her
    meddling grandmother must have called the police. Later in the chase, Kemp ordered
    Williams to call the police and tell them to back off. Williams complied, screaming that
    if the police did not back off, she would be killed. Finally, a police vehicle struck the
    pursued vehicle to end the chase. Once the vehicle that was being driven by Williams
    had stopped, Kemp fled on foot; police officers subdued and then arrested him. Guthrie
    was arrested at the vehicle.
    B. Procedural History
    On November 23, 2005, the Government secured an indictment charging Corey
    Guthrie and Ronald Kemp with four counts: carjacking, discharging a firearm during a
    crime of violence, possession of a sawed-off shotgun, and possession of firearms by a
    convicted felon. Kemp pleaded guilty. Guthrie proceeded to trial.1 The district court
    severed the counts at trial, so the jury reached its verdict on all of the other counts before
    resolving the felon in possession of a firearm charge (Count 4). The jury convicted
    Guthrie on all four counts.
    At the sentencing hearing, the United States argued for a low-end Guidelines
    sentence of 360 months imprisonment for Counts 1, 3, and 4, in addition to the 10-year
    mandatory consecutive minimum sentence for Count 2, for a total sentence of 480
    months imprisonment. In response, the Defendant argued for a sentence of 25 years (300
    months). The district court agreed that the Guidelines recommended a sentence of 360
    months to life and that Count 2 required a mandatory minimum consecutive sentence of
    10 years. After considering all the sentencing factors, the district court sentenced
    Guthrie to 25 years (300 months) imprisonment. The district court imposed a sentence
    of 180 months imprisonment each on Counts 1 and 4 and 120 months imprisonment on
    Count 3, all to be served concurrently, and 120 months imprisonment on Count 2, to be
    served consecutively. With this sentence, the district court satisfied the mandatory
    minimum required sentences but did not sentence within the Guidelines range.
    1
    Kemp testified against Guthrie at trial and was sentenced to 138 months imprisonment.
    Nos. 07-6215/6286                     United States v. Guthrie                        Page 5
    II. Analysis
    A. Defendant-Appellant Guthrie’s Issues on Appeal
    Defendant-Appellant Cross-Appellee Guthrie raises six issues on appeal, arguing
    that the district court erred by: (1) permitting the Assistant United States Attorney to
    speak with the victim-witness during her cross-examination; (2) permitting the
    introduction of audio recordings of 911 calls; (3) permitting the introduction of video
    recording of a police pursuit; (4) refusing to issue a writ to produce a witness at trial;
    (5) instructing the jury on the wrong standard for “intent to cause death or serious bodily
    injury”; and (6) denying Guthrie’s motions for judgment of acquittal on the grounds of
    insufficiency of the evidence.
    1. Allowing the Victim to Speak with the Prosecutor During Cross-Examination
    Defendant Guthrie first argues that the district court erred by “improperly and
    abruptly halting” the cross-examination of Shavonne Williams, the victim, in order to
    recess for the day, and then permitting the prosecutor to speak to the witness during the
    recess, before the conclusion of Williams’s cross-examination. Guthrie characterizes this
    error as a failure to sequester the witness and a violation of his Sixth Amendment right
    to confront his accuser.
    Guthrie, however, grossly mischaracterizes the recess taken during Williams’
    testimony. Rather than “improperly and abruptly halting” the cross-examination, the
    district court merely called a routine recess at the end of a day of trial. The district court
    allowed defense counsel to finish his line of questioning. The district court called the
    recess after asking whether the defense was at an appropriate transition point. Although
    the court then allowed two prosecution witnesses to testify before calling an end to the
    day’s proceedings, they were brief witnesses with valid reasons necessitating their
    immediate testimony.2 More importantly, the possibility of these final two witnesses
    testifying at the end of the day was not raised until after the court had announced the
    2
    One witness was about to give birth.
    Nos. 07-6215/6286                United States v. Guthrie                            Page 6
    recess that interrupted Williams’ testimony. Defense counsel did not object to either the
    interruption of Williams’ testimony or the inclusion of the two prosecution witnesses.
    We find that the district court did not abuse her discretion in interrupting Williams’
    testimony for an overnight recess and then allowing two brief prosecution witnesses to
    testify before the recess began.
    In considering the district court’s decision to allow the prosecutor to speak with
    Williams while she was still on cross-examination, this Court applies an abuse of
    discretion standard. United States v. Rugiero, 
    20 F.3d 1387
    , 1394 (6th Cir. 1994).
    Guthrie fails to show any abuse of discretion. Moreover, even if the district court had
    abused its discretion, to reverse on these grounds we must find that the “error was
    prejudicial to the defendant’s receiving a fair trial.” 
    Id.
     (citation omitted).
    At trial, the district court called the described recess during the cross-examination
    of Williams, the victim in this case. As she was being dismissed, defense counsel asked
    “that [the prosecutor] not have any conversation with [the witness].              She is on
    cross-examination at this point.” Defense counsel then formally objected. Guthrie thus
    sought to prevent Williams from speaking to the prosecutor.
    In permitting the prosecutor to speak with the victim while she was still on cross-
    examination, the district court did not explicitly violate the rule on sequestration of
    witnesses. Federal Rule of Evidence 615 provides that “at the request of a party the
    court shall order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear the testimony of other
    witnesses.” FED. R. EVID. 615 (emphasis added). Sequestration orders, even when
    granted, do not prohibit witnesses from speaking with counsel. See United States v.
    Maliszewski, 
    161 F.3d 992
    , 1011-12 (6th Cir. 1998). Defendant Guthrie nonetheless
    argues that the district court’s ruling violated the spirit of Rule 615, because the purposes
    of the sequestration of witnesses are to prevent witnesses from tailoring their testimony
    to that of other witnesses; to facilitate the detection of “less than candid” testimony; and
    to prevent improper attempts to influence witness testimony.
    The district court enjoyed discretion to address those concerns by means other
    than prohibiting the prosecutor from speaking with the witness. In fact, the district court
    Nos. 07-6215/6286               United States v. Guthrie                            Page 7
    clearly and correctly articulated the limits of the prosecutor’s permitted interaction with
    the witness by stating: “[The prosecutor] may have conversations with his witness. He
    may not coach the witness.” Despite the trial court’s invitation to Guthrie’s counsel to
    make any record that the prosecutor improperly communicated with Williams, Guthrie’s
    attorney asked no questions on this when Williams retook the stand the following day.
    In overruling the Defendant’s objection, the court told defense counsel, “She is going to
    be here tomorrow morning at 9:00 o’clock, and you may examine her about anything
    improper in the interim.”
    Moreover, the Defendant does not allege, much less demonstrate, that anything
    improper occurred over the recess. Although the court had encouraged the Defendant
    to inquire as to any impropriety over the break, when the witness resumed her testimony
    the following morning the Defendant did not even question the victim about the issue.
    Thus, there is no evidence that the court’s failure to prevent the prosecutor from
    speaking to the victim while she was on cross-examination was “prejudicial to the
    defendant’s receiving a fair trial.” Rugiero, 
    20 F.3d at 1394
    . Therefore, we find that the
    district court did not abuse its discretion or violate the Confrontation Clause by allowing
    the prosecutor to speak with the witness over the recess.
    2. Admission into Evidence of Audio Recordings of 911 Calls
    Defendant Guthrie also claims that the district court erred by permitting the
    introduction of audio recordings of conversations between Williams (the victim) and 911
    operators. Guthrie argues that the recordings should not have been admitted because
    statements made in the recordings were hearsay not falling within an exception. Further,
    the Defendant says the recordings were unduly prejudicial.
    This Court reviews evidentiary rulings by the district court for abuse of
    discretion. United States v. Moon, 
    513 F.3d 527
    , 544 (6th Cir. 2008); United States v.
    Arnold, 
    486 F.3d 177
    , 184 (6th Cir. 2007) (applying abuse of discretion review to a
    district court’s application of Federal Rule of Evidence 803(d) to 911 calls). In Arnold,
    this Court considered the introduction of 911 calls despite hearsay challenges. We noted
    that three elements must be shown to satisfy the excited utterance exception: “First, there
    Nos. 07-6215/6286                     United States v. Guthrie                          Page 8
    must be an event startling enough to cause nervous excitement. Second, the statement
    must be made before there is time to contrive or misrepresent. And, third, the statement
    must be made while the person is under the stress of the excitement caused by the
    event.” Arnold, 
    486 F.3d at 184
     (quoting Haggins v. Warden, Fort Pillow State Farm,
    
    715 F.2d 1050
    , 1057 (6th Cir. 1983)).
    At Guthrie’s trial, audio recordings of two separate 911 calls were played. The
    first call (chronologically as it occurred on the night of the offense) started when a 911
    dispatcher called Williams’ cell phone inquiring about her safety. Williams calmly told
    the 911 operator that she was not in any danger. She stated that she had not been
    abducted at gunpoint, that her cell phone battery was dying, and that she was on the
    expressway. The district court found that this call did not fall within the excited
    utterance hearsay exception because the victim sounded calm and because she not only
    had time to contrive, but did in fact contrive, as all of her responses were lies.
    Nonetheless, because the United States did not object, Guthrie played this recording at
    trial and questioned the victim about it on cross-examination.
    The second audio recording played at the trial was a clip of one of several calls
    made by Williams to the police during the police pursuit of the vehicle. In these later
    calls, Williams told police to back off in their pursuit or else she would be killed. The
    district court allowed the introduction of the recording of the later call based on the
    exited utterance hearsay exception.
    Assuming that the statements made during the latter 911 call were hearsay,3 the
    district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the statements qualified for
    admission under the excited utterance exception. In ruling on the issue, the district court
    addressed the three elements of the test applied in Arnold. At the conclusion of proof,
    the district court explained that it was not considering the abduction at the apartment to
    be the startling event. Although that event would have been sufficient to trigger the
    excited utterance exception, the court acknowledged that during the first 911 call, the
    3
    The audiotape was not transcribed and made a part of the trial transcript.
    Nos. 07-6215/6286               United States v. Guthrie                            Page 9
    victim “exhibited a calm demeanor” as she lied to the police. Thus, the statements made
    during subsequent 911 calls could not have been the result of the stress of being initially
    abducted at gunpoint - another intervening startling event must have occurred. The court
    therefore clarified that “. . .[A]nother traumatic event occurred before the second call.
    And that was that the police had come on the scene . . . So I find that the other traumatic
    event that occurred was the police chase.”
    The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the police chase
    acted as an exciting catalyst. Just because the victim was calm after being abducted at
    gunpoint does not mean she necessarily preserved her calm. The district court could
    reasonably have found that when the situation turned into a police chase, the victim
    reacted accordingly. Based on this theory, the initiation of the police chase could have
    served as a new and independent startling event, sufficient to effectuate the excited
    utterance hearsay exception.
    Moreover, the district court found that admission of the recordings of the 911
    calls did not violate Federal Rule of Evidence 403 because “the probative value of th[e]
    victim’s call[s] from the car outweighs any prejudicial . . . effect.” “Within the context
    of Rule 403, ‘[u]nfair prejudice does not mean the damage to a defendant’s case that
    results from the legitimate probative force of the evidence; rather it refers to evidence
    which tends to suggest [a] decision on an improper basis.’” United States v. Lawson,
    
    535 F.3d 434
    , 442 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Newsom, 
    452 F.3d 593
    , 603
    (6th Cir. 2006)). The 911 calls were highly probative of the charged carjacking offense
    and the evidence did not suggest a decision on an improper basis. Therefore, the district
    court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the introduction of the 911 calls.
    3. Admission into Evidence of Video Recordings of the Police Pursuit
    Defendant Guthrie also claims that the district court erred when it permitted the
    introduction of video recordings of the police pursuit. Guthrie argues that the recordings
    should not have been admitted because they were unduly prejudicial. Further, the
    Defendant claims that the introduction of the video recordings violated his Fifth and
    Nos. 07-6215/6286                     United States v. Guthrie                                 Page 10
    Sixth Amendment rights to due process and a fair trial, as well as the presumption of
    innocence.
    This Court reviews evidentiary rulings by the district court for abuse of
    discretion. Moon, 
    513 F.3d at 544
    . Here, Guthrie argues that the video was “overly
    dramatic” and identified Guthrie as a dangerous criminal to the jury because it showed
    the Defendant “being pursued by numerous police officers with their lights and sirens
    blazing.” But the Defendant again mischaracterizes the evidence. Contrary to the
    Defendant’s argument, the single video recording shown at trial (without audio) did not
    depict “essentially an arrest in progress.”4 The video depicted a crime in progress - the
    carjacking for which the Defendant was on trial. Therefore, this evidence did not violate
    the presumption of innocence, it merely contributed to a finding of guilt. The district
    court, having viewed the video and heard the parties’ arguments, concluded that the
    video “even if it is slightly cumulative . . . is illustrative and makes [the event] clear –
    actually, clearer to the jury.” In so deciding, the district court did not abuse its “very
    broad discretion” in determining if the prejudicial danger of the evidence outweighed the
    probative value. See United States v. Vance, 
    871 F.2d 572
    , 576 (6th Cir. 1989).
    4. Refusal to Issue a Subpoena Compelling a Witness to Testify on the Defendant’s
    Behalf
    Next, Defendant Guthrie argues that the district court erred by refusing to issue
    a writ to produce a witness at trial. The Defendant sought to compel Dominique Ellis,
    Williams’ boyfriend, to testify on Guthrie’s behalf. With the testimony, Guthrie sought
    Ellis’s admission that Ellis sold drugs out of Williams’ apartment. The Defendant argues
    that Ellis’ testimony would have negated the intent element of the charged offense by
    demonstrating that Guthrie and Kemp arrived at the apartment to settle a debt, not to
    cause Williams’ death or serious bodily injury. At the time of the trial, Ellis was
    incarcerated on other charges.
    4
    The Government had video of Guthrie’s arrest, but did not seek to introduce that video.
    Nos. 07-6215/6286              United States v. Guthrie                          Page 11
    Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(b) governs the issuance of writs of habeas
    corpus ad testificandum and states that a district court “must order that a subpoena be
    issued for a named witness if the defendant shows . . . the necessity of the witness’s
    presence for an adequate defense.” FED. R. CRIM. PRO. 17(b). This Court reviews the
    district court’s decision regarding the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus ad
    testificandum for abuse of discretion. United States v. Rigdon, 
    459 F.2d 379
    , 380 (6th
    Cir. 1972). The district court’s discretion is “wide,” and “a reviewing court should not
    reverse unless the exceptional circumstances of the case indicate that [the] defendant’s
    right to a complete, fair and adequate trial is jeopardized.” Rigdon, 
    459 F.2d at 380
    (citations and quotations omitted).
    The district court denied the Defendant’s request, concluding that Ellis’
    testimony would only serve the purpose of impeachment on a collateral matter and
    would be cumulative. Kemp had also testified about the intent with which the Defendant
    and Kemp went to the victim’s home that night. Further, the court noted that Kemp had
    already offered testimony about the drugs at Williams’ residence, thereby impeaching
    Williams’ testimony denying the drugs.
    This Court finds that even if Ellis would have testified as the Defendant expected,
    his testimony regarding the presence of drugs in the apartment or a drug debt between
    himself and Kemp or Guthrie would have been irrelevant to the charged offenses. The
    reason why Kemp and Guthrie went to the victim’s apartment in the first place is
    immaterial. The intent element of the carjacking offense involves the intent when the
    vehicle is taken. Holloway v. United States, 
    526 U.S. 1
    , 8 (1999). Ellis could provide
    no evidence as to the intent of Kemp and Guthrie when they abducted Williams at
    gunpoint and forced her to drive. As to the value of Ellis as an impeachment witness,
    it was within the district court’s discretion to determine that Kemp had already offered
    sufficient testimony impeaching Williams and any further such testimony would be
    needlessly cumulative. Guthrie has not shown this decision to be an abuse of discretion.
    Nos. 07-6215/6286               United States v. Guthrie                          Page 12
    5. Jury Instructions Concerning the Intent Element of Carjacking
    Defendant Guthrie argues that the district court erred with its jury instruction on
    Count 1, the carjacking charge. The relevant statute criminalizes the taking of or attempt
    to take a motor vehicle from another by force and violence or by intimidation, with the
    intent to cause death or serious bodily harm. 
    18 U.S.C. § 2119
    . Guthrie argues that the
    jury was not properly instructed on the mens rea element of the crime, saying that the
    instructions discussed the element without reference to when the defendant must have
    had the requisite intent. Under 
    18 U.S.C. § 2119
    , the Defendant must have had the
    necessary intent at the time of the taking of the vehicle. Holloway v. United States,
    
    526 U.S. 1
    , 8 (1999).
    This Court reviews jury instructions for an abuse of discretion. United States v.
    Frost, 
    914 F.2d 756
    , 764-67 (6th Cir. 1990). We will not reverse a jury verdict if the
    jury instructions accurately reflected the law and were not, when “viewed as a whole,
    . . . confusing, misleading, or prejudicial.” United States v. Blackwell, 
    459 F.3d 739
    , 764
    (6th Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Blood, 
    435 F.3d 612
    , 623 (6th Cir. 2006).
    In the jury instructions, the district court delineated the elements of the offense,
    including the intent element, “Fourth: That the Defendant ‘intended to cause death or
    serious bodily harm’ when the Defendant took the motor vehicle.” (Emphasis added.)
    The district court then proceeded to define the terms used in the statutory language. As
    to the intent element, the instructions said:
    Whether the Defendant “intended to cause death or serious bodily harm”
    is to be judged objectively from the conduct of the Defendant as
    disclosed by the evidence and from what one in the position of the
    alleged victim might reasonably conclude. If you find beyond a
    reasonable doubt that the Defendant had such an intent, the Government
    has satisfied this element of the offense.
    Despite acknowledging the “accuracy of the court’s recitation of the elements of
    the offense,” Guthrie challenges this later explanation of the intent element for failure
    to include a temporal limitation. By focusing on one paragraph of the instructions,
    however, the Defendant mischaracterizes the instructions.
    Nos. 07-6215/6286                United States v. Guthrie                           Page 13
    Jury instructions must be “viewed as a whole,” rather than considered piecemeal.
    Taken as a whole, the instruction on the offense of carjacking accurately reflected the
    law. The instruction included the elements of the crime, as well as definitions of the
    terms in the statute. In listing the elements of the crime, the district court explained that
    the Defendant must have intended to cause death or serious bodily harm when the
    Defendant took the vehicle. Therefore, the district court did not commit error with the
    jury instructions.
    6. Denial of Judgment of Acquittal for Insufficiency of the Evidence
    Defendant Guthrie finally argues that the district court erred in denying Guthrie’s
    motions for a judgment of acquittal due to insufficiency of the evidence as to Counts 3
    and 4, relating to Guthrie’s possession of the shotgun. Guthrie argues that the only
    testimony linking the Defendant to the shotgun came from Kemp and that testimony was
    insufficient for a conviction. Addressing a challenge regarding the sufficiency of the
    evidence, this Court considers “whether after viewing the evidence in the light most
    favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
    elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    ,
    319 (1979); United States v. Collins, 
    78 F.3d 1021
    , 1030 (6th Cir. 1996). We do not
    independently assess the credibility of witnesses or the weight of the evidence. United
    States v. Talley, 
    164 F.3d 989
    , 996 (6th Cir. 1999).
    To convict on Count 3 of the Indictment, the jury must have found that Guthrie
    had actual or constructive possession of the shotgun used in the offense. Kemp testified
    that he told Guthrie to hold the gun while he, Kemp, kicked in the door of the apartment
    upon arrival. Kemp further testified that during the police chase he told Guthrie to hand
    him the shotgun, which was under the car seat at the time. After Guthrie handed him the
    gun, Kemp claimed that he attempted to throw the gun out the window when it
    accidentally went off, firing shots into the back of a state trooper’s car. We find that a
    rational trier of fact could have believed those portions of Kemp’s testimony regarding
    Guthrie’s possession of the shotgun beyond a reasonable doubt, and so could have relied
    on them alone to convict Guthrie of Count 3 of the Indictment.
    Nos. 07-6215/6286                United States v. Guthrie                           Page 14
    Count 4 of the Indictment charged Guthrie with being a felon in possession of a
    shotgun and a .22 caliber semi-automatic pistol. To be found guilty of being a felon in
    possession, Guthrie need not have possessed both of these firearms - one would suffice.
    As described above, there was sufficient evidence to find that Guthrie possessed the
    shotgun. But there was also sufficient evidence that Guthrie possessed the semi-
    automatic. At trial, Williams testified that she saw Guthrie with the .22 caliber semi-
    automatic pistol during the abduction. A police officer testified that he saw something
    thrown from the passenger side of the car during the chase. Police officers also testified
    that they recovered the .22 caliber pistol from the crime scene, where it was suspected
    to have been tossed from the vehicle. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
    to the prosecution, this Court finds this evidence sufficient for a rational trier of fact to
    find Guthrie guilty of Count 4 of the Indictment. Therefore, we find that the district
    court did not err in denying the Defendant’s motions for a judgment of acquittal based
    on insufficiency of the evidence.
    B. Cross-Appellant United States of America’s Issue on Appeal
    Plaintiff-Appellee Cross-Appellant United States appeals a sentencing issue,
    arguing that the district court improperly varied from the recommended Guidelines
    sentence to compensate for the applicable statutory mandatory minimums and failed to
    provide an adequate explanation for the sentence.
    This Court reviews the district court’s sentence under an abuse of discretion
    standard. Gall v. United States, 
    128 S.Ct. 586
    , 597 (2007). A sentencing decision will
    only be reversed if it is unreasonable. 
    Id. at 594
    . Reasonableness review considers both
    procedural and substantive reasonableness. Gall, 
    128 S.Ct. at 594
    ; see also United
    States v. Walls, 
    546 F.3d 728
    , 736 (6th Cir. 2008). A reviewing court:
    must first ensure that the district court committed no significant
    procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating)
    the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to
    consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly
    erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.
    Nos. 07-6215/6286               United States v. Guthrie                          Page 15
    Gall, 
    128 S.Ct. at 597
    . After determining that the sentence is procedurally sound, the
    reviewing court then considers substantive reasonableness under the abuse of discretion
    standard. 
    Id.
    At Defendant Guthrie’s sentencing hearing, the Government argued for a total
    sentence of 40 years.     The suggested 40-year sentence combined the Guideline
    recommended minimum 360-month sentence for Counts 1 (carjacking), 3 (possession
    of the sawed-off shotgun), and 4 (felon in possession with armed career criminal
    designation) with a 10-year statutory mandatory consecutive minimum for Count 2 (use
    of a firearm in a violent crime). In response, the Defendant argued that a total sentence
    of 25 years, the mandatory minimum, would be sufficient but not greater than necessary.
    The district court recognized the recommended Guidelines range to be 360
    months to life imprisonment. The district court also noted that Count 2 required a
    mandatory consecutive minimum sentence of 10 years. Next, the district court turned
    to the § 3553(a) sentencing factors, addressing the Defendant’s history and
    characteristics, the nature and circumstances of the offense, the seriousness of the
    offense, the need to protect the public and promote respect for the law, the need for
    deterrence, the potential for rehabilitation, and the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing
    disparities. Finally, having calculated the applicable Guidelines range and considered
    all the § 3553(a) factors, the district court concluded:
    And that brings us up to the possibility of 40 years. But I’m not going to
    go that high. I just think that’s too long. And where I’m looking at is 25
    years. I am – I believe that’s sufficient in custody. That’s a very, very,
    very long time. I think it takes into account everything I have to take into
    account.
    In particular, the court noted the marginal deterrent effect of a sentence over 25 years.
    The Defendant was sentenced to 180 months imprisonment on Counts 1 and 4 and 120
    months imprisonment on Count 3, all to be served concurrently, and 120 months
    imprisonment on Count 2, to be served consecutively, for a total of 300 months
    imprisonment.
    Nos. 07-6215/6286                United States v. Guthrie                         Page 16
    With its appeal, the Government challenges the reasonableness of the district
    court’s downward variance from the Guidelines range. The Government argues that the
    court “effectively reduced the guidelines sentence to compensate for the statutory
    mandatory minimums” for Counts 2 and 4. In its brief, the Government alleges that
    “[t]he district court seemed to settle on a sentencing number (twenty-five years) that
    encompassed the ten-year mandatory consecutive sentence under § 924(c) (Count 2) and
    the fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence under § 924(e) (Count 4).” The result,
    the Government argues, is that “the court nullified Congressional intent about statutory
    mandatory minimums.”
    First, this Court considers whether the Government preserved this issue for
    appeal. At the end of the sentencing hearing, when the district court asked if there were
    any objections, the prosecutor stated, “Judge, whatever objections I’ve already made I
    won’t repeat.” Earlier in the sentencing hearing, the Government had expressed its
    position that the correct sentence based on the Guidelines and the statutory mandatory
    minimums was 40 years. The parties have no obligation to again raise objections already
    made at the end of a sentencing hearing, especially those customarily raised earlier in the
    proceeding such as objections to or for departures and variances. United States v.
    Vonner, 
    516 F.3d 382
    , 385, 390 (6th Cir. 2008). By earlier arguing for a strict
    Guidelines sentence, the Government adequately preserved the sentencing issue for
    appeal.
    1. Franklin Precedent
    In challenging the reasonableness of the sentence, the Government relies on this
    Court’s decision, United States v. Franklin, 
    499 F.3d 578
     (6th Cir. 2007). In Franklin,
    we considered the re-sentencing under Booker of two defendants convicted of various
    bank robbery charges. The Franklin defendants faced a mandatory consecutive seven
    year sentence for brandishing a firearm in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c). Franklin, 
    499 F.3d at 583
    . The sentencing court granted downward variances of 34 months and 22
    months below the Guidelines range for the two defendants, explaining the decision: “to
    Nos. 07-6215/6286               United States v. Guthrie                           Page 17
    some extent because I feel that adding on a mandatory seven years truly inflates the
    sentence . . . .” See 
    id.
     (quoting Franklin’s sentencing hearing transcript).
    In vacating the sentence and remanding for a new sentencing, this Court
    examined the statutory language establishing the mandatory consecutive minimum,
    which states that violators of the specific provision “shall” be sentenced to not less than
    seven years imprisonment “in addition to” the punishment provided for the underlying
    crime of violence. Franklin, 
    499 F.3d at 583
     (quoting 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c)(1)(A)). We
    also considered the Guidelines instruction that mandatory consecutive sentences are to
    be imposed “independently” of sentences for other counts. 
    Id.
     at 584 (citing U.S.S.G.
    § 5G1.2(a), (b) and cmt. n.2).       Ultimately, this Court held the sentences to be
    unreasonable because “[w]hen any downward variance of the guideline range is based
    upon the effect of a mandatory sentence, congressional intent is repudiated, just as if the
    mandatory sentence itself had been reduced.” Franklin, 
    499 F.3d at 584-85
    . On remand,
    the district court was instructed to “determine an appropriate sentence for the underlying
    crimes without consideration of the § 924(c) sentence.”
    2. Application of Franklin to Guthrie
    In contrast to Franklin, the district court here nowhere suggested that she was
    trying to negate the mandatory minimum sentence for use of a firearm during a crime of
    violence, as Franklin prohibits. Franklin, 
    499 F.3d at 584-85
     (holding that any
    downward variance based upon the effect of a mandatory sentence repudiates
    congressional intent). The sentencing court in Franklin admitted to granting the
    downward variance from the Guidelines “to some extent because I feel that adding on
    a mandatory seven years truly inflates the sentence.” Franklin, 
    499 F.3d at 583
     (quoting
    Franklin’s sentencing hearing transcript). In contrast, the district court in this case gave
    no such explicit improper explanation. In support of its position, the Government relies
    on a mere inference rather than on any actual evidence. Govt. Br. at 17 (“The district
    court seemed to settle on a sentencing number (twenty-five years) that encompassed the
    ten-year mandatory consecutive sentence under § 924(c) (Count 2) and the fifteen-year
    mandatory minimum sentence under § 924(e) (Count 4).”) (emphasis added). District
    Nos. 07-6215/6286               United States v. Guthrie                         Page 18
    courts enjoy discretion in sentencing based on their “ring-side perspective on the
    sentencing hearing and [their] experience over time in sentencing other individuals.”
    United States v. Poynter, 
    495 F.3d 349
     (6th Cir. 2007). Accordingly, we do not presume
    to read the mind of a sentencing judge, on a search for impropriety.
    Ultimately, after explicitly considering the correct Guidelines range in light of
    the § 3553(a) factors, the district court found the total advisory sentence of 40 years to
    be too long. While it is possible that the district court considered the effect of the
    mandatory sentence, in the absence of any more explicit evidence, we will not impute
    an improper analysis to a sentencing judge. The sentence was reasonable.
    3. Adequate Explanation
    Finally, the Government argues that the district court sentenced Guthrie without
    providing an adequate explanation for the sentence. The sentencing court must “set forth
    enough [of a statement of reasons] to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered
    the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decision
    making authority.” United States v. Bolds, 
    511 F.3d 568
    , 580 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting
    Rita v. United States, 
    127 S.Ct. 2456
    , 2468 (2007)). In making this argument, the
    Government discounts the district court’s consideration of the parties’ arguments, the
    Presentence Report, and the § 3553(a) factors. Notably, the district court commented
    on each of the § 3553(a) factors and their applicability to the Defendant. Engaging in
    these steps allows for reasonable appellate review. See United States v. Sexton, 
    512 F.3d 326
    , 331 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding a sentencing explanation to be adequate where the
    sentencing court properly calculated the Guidelines range, understood the advisory
    nature of the Guidelines, recited and explained all of the § 3553(a) factors, considered
    the factors and their relevance to the defendant, and acknowledged the parties’
    arguments).
    Based on all those considerations, the district court concluded that a 40-year
    sentence was too long, but that a 25-year sentence was sufficient. Regarding the final
    25-year sentence, the district court explained, “[t]hat’s a very, very, very long time. I
    think it takes into account everything I have to take into account.” The court, reflecting
    Nos. 07-6215/6286               United States v. Guthrie                          Page 19
    on what sentence would be “just” and would appropriately punish the young Defendant
    for the acts he committed, determined that “25 years is long enough in this particular
    case.” The district court further explained the choice of 25 years based on the marginal
    deterrent value of additional punishment when the sentence was already so long. This
    Court finds that the district court had a reasoned basis and adequately explained its
    sentence of 25 years, a sentence it deemed sufficient but not greater than necessary to
    effectuate federal sentencing purposes. That is all the district court is required to do.
    III. Conclusion
    For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the convictions and AFFIRM the
    sentence.