Braxton v. Gansheimer ( 2009 )


Menu:
  •                        RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
    Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
    File Name: 09a0132p.06
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
    _________________
    X
    -
    ANTHONY BRAXTON,
    -
    Petitioner-Appellee,
    -
    -
    No. 07-3387
    v.
    ,
    >
    -
    Respondent-Appellant. -
    RICHARD GANSHEIMER, Warden,
    -
    N
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Ohio at Cleveland.
    No. 04-00170—Lesley Brooks Wells, District Judge.
    Argued: September 8, 2008
    Decided and Filed: April 2, 2009
    Before: BOGGS, Chief Judge; GIBBONS and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges.
    _________________
    COUNSEL
    ARGUED: Michael Scott Criss, OFFICE OF THE OHIO ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant. Chad A. Readler, JONES DAY, Columbus, Ohio, for
    Appellee. ON BRIEF: Michael Scott Criss, OFFICE OF THE OHIO ATTORNEY
    GENERAL, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant. Chad A. Readler, JONES DAY, Columbus,
    Ohio, for Appellee. Anthony Braxton, Cleveland, Ohio, pro se.
    _________________
    OPINION
    _________________
    GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge. Respondent Richard Gansheimer, Warden, appeals the
    order of the district court granting petitioner Anthony Braxton, an Ohio state prisoner, a
    conditional writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, on the basis of Braxton’s
    claim that the prosecution’s exercise of a peremptory challenge during jury selection at his
    state court trial was racially discriminatory in violation of the Equal Protection Clause and
    Batson v. Kentucky, 
    476 U.S. 79
    (1986). In granting the writ, the district court held that the
    1
    No. 07-3387         Braxton v. Gansheimer                                            Page 2
    Ohio courts’ decisions denying Braxton’s Batson challenge was an unreasonable application
    of clearly established federal law and was based on an unreasonable determination of the
    facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding, entitling Braxton to
    relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and (2). For the reasons stated below, we reverse the
    judgment of the district court and remand the case with instructions to dismiss Braxton’s
    habeas petition.
    I.
    On November 19, 2001, Anthony Braxton was convicted by a jury in the Court of
    Common Pleas, Cuyahoga County, Ohio, on one count of felonious assault upon a police
    officer in violation of OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.11; one count of failure to comply with
    an order or signal of a police officer, contrary to OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.331; and one
    count of receiving stolen property in violation of OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2913.51. Braxton
    and the victim, a police officer whom he allegedly assaulted, are both African-American
    males.
    During voir dire, defense counsel objected unsuccessfully to the prosecution’s use
    of two of its four peremptory challenges to remove two African-American jurors from the
    panel. Three of the twenty-member prospective panel were African Americans. The
    prosecutor used his first peremptory challenge to excuse Juror No. 8, a retired African-
    American female who had worked for the public defender’s office for fifteen years. The
    prosecutor also excused Juror No. 14, an African-American male, after questioning him
    about his seeming inattentiveness and demeanor:
    [PROSECUTOR]: Are you off this week? Are you able to take the week
    off? Is that a hardship for you especially?
    JUROR NO. 14: No, it’s not.
    [PROSECUTOR]: When you got your subpoena for jury service, what was
    going through your mind?
    JUROR NO. 14: Why me?
    [PROSECUTOR]: Why me? Did anybody in this room when they got their
    jury service think all right? You were excited?
    ***
    No. 07-3387         Braxton v. Gansheimer                                              Page 3
    [PROSECUTOR]: And one of the reasons I ask you, [Juror No. 14],
    because you are a very laid back person or you are kind of exuding the fact
    you might not want to be here. Just to be honest. By body language. Now,
    I don’t know. It could be you’re laid back and you are kind of paying
    attention. And so I just have to ask, would you rather not be here on this
    case?
    JUROR NO. 14: You know, I have no problem. I served before.
    [PROSECUTOR]: And believe me, nobody wants to be here. I’m not
    trying to pick on you.
    JUROR NO. 14: I understand.
    [PROSECUTOR]: We have to pick a jury that’s fair for the State and fair
    for the defendant and so, if I see someone I think – I’m not just picking on
    you, hey, maybe he doesn’t want to be here. You know I want to ask, okay?
    So you are saying you will be all right?
    JUROR NO. 14: No problem.
    [PROSECUTOR]: Okay. Do you have anything else for me, sir?
    JUROR NO. 14: No.
    When the prosecutor exercised his peremptory challenges to excuse Juror No. 8 and
    Juror No. 14, defense counsel objected and moved for a mistrial, maintaining that the
    prosecutor’s challenges regarding these two jurors violated the Equal Protection Clause and
    Batson, which preclude peremptory challenges on the basis of race. At the ensuing bench
    conference, defense counsel asserted that the prosecution had “shown a pattern” by
    challenging both African-American jurors and “remov[ing] 100 percent of potential black
    jury panel members.” Defense counsel argued that, as a result, “only one other [African-
    American juror] remain[ed] at the end of the line and we are not likely to even reach her.”
    The trial court then asked the prosecutor to elaborate on his reasons for excusing the
    two jurors. The prosecutor explained that he excused Juror No. 8 because she worked for
    the public defender’s office for fifteen years and her employment there “worried” the State;
    thus, the prosecutor believed she would be better suited for a civil-action jury panel. The
    prosecutor perceived Juror No. 14 as being disinterested in serving on the jury:
    With regards to [Juror No. 14], he sat there the entire time with his arms
    crossed and his head bent over, and his hand – he showed no interest in
    being in here. I specifically questioned him about his body language, and
    he even said he didn’t want to be here. So, I am not going to have someone
    No. 07-3387        Braxton v. Gansheimer                                                 Page 4
    sit on a jury that for the last two hours didn’t listen to anything, had no
    intention of actually paying attention and then even when I asked him, he
    said he didn’t want to be here. It’s got nothing to do with race.
    With regards to [the third African-American prospective juror], who is juror
    number 20, there is a potential if she gets on this panel and I can tell you
    right now we have no problem with her as well, the lone black juror.
    We also want to note our objection for the record because we know that’s
    why we objected before. We knew he [defense counsel] was planning on
    getting rid of four white people as well. There is a reverse Batson. There’s
    case law on that, and that’s why we noted our continuing objection as well.
    And I suspect that’s why he actually put it on initially because he knew both
    African American jurors were not suitable for this jury regardless of the
    race. One was a public defender. One hadn’t paid attention at all. He knew
    we were kicking them off, and I specifically asked the guy about it.
    Defense counsel objected to the prosecutor’s explanation, and the following colloquy
    occurred between counsel and the court:
    [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, as it relates to [Juror No. 8], she was
    retired I think she said nine years ago from the Public Defender’s Office.
    And she had also worked for Legal Aid. Now, working for Legal Aide [sic]
    or the Public Defender’s Office for nine years after you terminate your
    employment, then that is most extraordinary.
    I also point out as it relates to Mr. Smoot [Juror No. 14], right now as we sit
    here, juror number 14 is seated in the jury, he’s turned around, his arms are
    folded, right at the moment his head is down. Your Honor, that does not
    disqualify him.
    [PROSECUTOR]: What is he talking about?
    [THE COURT]: [Defense counsel], I agree with you, that does not
    disqualify a person from serving as a juror, but [the prosecutor] is attempting
    to present a nondiscriminatory reason for the reason he exercised his
    peremptory.
    [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, in terms of what he’s just indicated,
    neither one of them are sufficient bases to satisfy our Batson objection. We
    again move for a mistrial.
    [THE COURT]: I disagree with your reasoning. I think they are sufficient
    bases to satisfy the standard of Batson. I will overrule your objection and
    overrule your request for a mistrial.
    The trial proceeded with a jury panel composed of all white jurors. The remaining
    African-American juror – Juror No. 20 – was seated as an alternate. The jury found Braxton
    No. 07-3387         Braxton v. Gansheimer                                               Page 5
    guilty as charged on all counts, and the court later imposed a sentence of six years of
    imprisonment.
    In his direct appeal, Braxton raised six claims, including his assertion that the
    prosecution’s peremptory challenges of Jurors Nos. 8 and 14 violated Batson. See State v.
    Braxton, No. 80663, 
    2002 WL 31123906
    (Ohio Ct. App., Sept. 26, 2002). The Ohio Court
    of Appeals affirmed Braxton’s convictions, finding all of his assignments of error to be
    without merit. 
    Id. With regard
    to the Batson claim, the court, after accurately reciting the
    governing legal principles, found no purposeful discrimination under the circumstances:
    In the instant case, the defense sought a mistrial based on the fact that the
    State removed two black jurors. When pressed for an explanation as to the
    grounds for the peremptory challenge, the State explained that one of the
    jurors worked at the public defender’s office for 15 years. According to the
    State, the second juror indicated by his body language during voir dire “arms
    crossed and head bent over” that he did not desire to sit on the case. The
    prosecutor concluded that such an individual would not be attentive.
    ***
    In the case at bar, the trial court, after appropriate inquiry, rejected the
    notion that the prosecutor’s challenge rested on perceived stereotypical
    assumptions or the intention of excluding African-American jurors. Nothing
    in the prosecutor’s explanation showed that he chose to exclude jurors on the
    basis of race.
    
    Id. at *3.
    Affording substantial deference to the trial judge’s assessment of credibility and
    demeanor, the court of appeals concluded that “Braxton failed to make a prima facie case of
    purposeful discrimination, the prosecutor provided a bona fide race-neutral explanation for
    the challenge, and the court’s determination was not clearly erroneous.” 
    Id. Upon further
    appeal and reiteration of his Batson claim, the Supreme Court of Ohio
    issued an order denying leave to appeal and dismissing the appeal “as not involving any
    substantial constitutional question.” State v. Braxton, 
    783 N.E.2d 521
    (Ohio 2003)
    (unpublished table decision).
    Braxton thereafter filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
    § 2254 in federal district court, averring, inter alia, Batson error with regard to Juror No.
    No. 07-3387           Braxton v. Gansheimer                                                      Page 6
    1
    14. Ultimately, on March 1, 2007, after referral of the matter to a magistrate judge, the
    district court issued an Opinion and Order granting Braxton a conditional writ of habeas
    corpus on his Equal Protection claim.2 Reviewing the case under the applicable
    standards of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”),
    28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), the district court held that
    the evidence is clear and convincing that the prosecutor’s stated
    justifications for excusing Juror No. 14 were a pretext for discrimination.
    The trial court failed to address the blatant inconsistency between the
    juror’s actual response and the prosecutor’s claims in Batson inquiry, and
    the appellate court unreasonably determined that the trial court did not
    err. Additionally, the appellate court made an unreasonable application
    of Batson in finding that Mr. Braxton did not satisfy his prima facie case
    when such matter had become moot.
    The district court therefore ordered Braxton’s state court convictions and sentences to
    be vacated, unless the State of Ohio commenced a new trial against him within 120 days
    of entry of the judgment. This timely appeal by respondent Gansheimer followed.
    II.
    We review the district court’s legal conclusions in habeas proceedings de novo
    and its findings of fact for clear error. Harris v. Haeberlin, 
    526 F.3d 903
    , 909 (6th Cir.
    2008). AEDPA supplies the narrow parameters of federal habeas review of state court
    proceedings, providing that an application for a writ of habeas corpus shall not be
    granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court
    proceedings unless adjudication of the claim:
    (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
    unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
    determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
    1
    As the district court accurately noted, “[a]lthough Mr. Braxton asserts both of the prosecutor’s
    peremptory challenges as a basis of his petition, the thrust of [his] argument focuses on Juror No. 14.”
    2
    The district court adopted in part and rejected in part the Report and Recommendation (“R&R”)
    of the magistrate judge, who advised that Braxton’s habeas petition should be denied on all grounds. The
    district court agreed with the R&R that Braxton’s claims unrelated to the Batson issue were procedurally
    defaulted and dismissed those claims. The court also denied Braxton’s motions for summary and
    declaratory judgment. However, the court disagreed with the R&R that Braxton’s Batson claim pertaining
    to Juror No. 14 did not merit relief.
    No. 07-3387           Braxton v. Gansheimer                                          Page 7
    (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
    determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State
    court proceeding.
    28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); 
    Harris, 526 F.3d at 909-10
    .
    Under the “unreasonable application” clause of § 2254(d)(1), habeas relief is
    available if “the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the
    Supreme Court’s] decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the
    prisoner’s case,” or if a “state court decision either unreasonably extends or
    unreasonably refuses to extend a legal principle from the Supreme Court precedent to
    a new context.” 
    Harris, 526 F.3d at 909
    (citations omitted). “[T]he central inquiry is
    whether the state court decision was objectively unreasonable and not simply erroneous
    or incorrect.” 
    Id. at 910
    (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, “a reviewing court
    must be careful not to substitute its own judgment for that of the state court by equating
    the more stringent standard of ‘objectively unreasonable’ with the more lax standard of
    ‘clear error.’” 
    Id. With respect
    to § 2254(d)(2), “[f]actual determinations by state courts are
    presumed correct absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, § 2254(e)(1), and
    a decision adjudicated on the merits in a state court and based on a factual determination
    will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the
    evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 
    537 U.S. 322
    ,
    340 (2003).
    Braxton’s Batson claim presents a mixed question of law and fact and
    “necessarily focuses on the reasonableness of the decisions of the state courts – that is,
    whether those decisions constituted an unreasonable application of Supreme Court
    precedent.” Lancaster v. Adams, 
    324 F.3d 423
    , 429 (6th Cir. 2003). See also Railey v.
    Webb, 
    540 F.3d 393
    , 397 (6th Cir. 2008) (“Mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed
    under the ‘unreasonable application’ prong of the AEDPA.”). However, “the question
    of ‘whether a prosecutor intended to discriminate on the basis of race in challenging
    potential jurors is, as Batson recognized, a question of historical fact.’” 
    Lancaster, 324 F.3d at 429
    (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 
    500 U.S. 352
    , 367 (1991)). “Under
    No. 07-3387         Braxton v. Gansheimer                                            Page 8
    AEDPA, primary or historical facts found by state courts are presumed correct and are
    rebuttable only by clear and convincing evidence.” 
    Id. at 429
    (citations and internal
    quotation marks omitted). Thus, while a district court’s ruling on a Batson claim
    presented on direct appeal is entitled to great deference and should not be disturbed
    unless it is clearly erroneous, “the standard must be modified in the context of a § 2254
    petition to give credence to § 2254(e)(1)’s requirement that facts found by a state court
    be presumed correct unless the petitioner rebuts this presumption by clear and
    convincing evidence.” 
    Id. at 429
    n.1.
    The Equal Protection Clause precludes a party from using a peremptory
    challenge to exclude members of the jury venire on account of their race. 
    Batson, 476 U.S. at 89
    . Batson involves a tripartite burden-shifting inquiry. 
    Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 358
    . First, the party opposing the peremptory challenge must make a prima facie
    showing of racial discrimination. 
    Id. If such
    a case is established, the burden shifts to
    the defending party to articulate a race-neutral explanation for striking the juror in
    question. 
    Id. at 358-59.
    The party’s reason for its decision to dismiss a juror is “neutral”
    if “it is based on something other than the race of the juror” and, absent “discriminatory
    intent inherent in the explanation,” the reason should be deemed race-neutral. United
    States v. Jackson, 
    347 F.3d 598
    , 606 (6th Cir. 2003). “This non-racial explanation ‘need
    not be particularly persuasive, or even plausible, so long as it is neutral.’” McCurdy v.
    Montgomery County, 
    240 F.3d 512
    , 521 (6th Cir. 2001), overruled in part on other
    grounds by Barnes v. Wright, 
    449 F.3d 709
    , 718-20 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting United
    States v. Harris, 
    192 F.3d 580
    , 586 (6th Cir. 1999)). “[B]ody language and demeanor
    are permissible race-neutral justifications for the exercise of a peremptory [challenge].”
    
    McCurdy, 240 F.3d at 521
    (citing United States v. Changco, 
    1 F.3d 837
    , 840 (9th Cir.
    1993)); see also United States v. Forrest, 
    402 F.3d 678
    , 687 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that
    the prosecution’s articulated reason for exercising a peremptory challenge – the juror’s
    “extreme negative reaction” to being called for jury duty – was a permissible race-
    neutral justification in the absence of proof that this reason was pretextual). Indeed,
    “[t]he fact that a prosecutor’s reasons may be founded on nothing more than a trial
    lawyer’s instincts about a prospective juror does not diminish the scope of acceptable
    No. 07-3387           Braxton v. Gansheimer                                         Page 9
    invocation of peremptory challenges, so long as they are the actual reasons for the
    prosecutor’s actions.” United States v. Power, 
    881 F.2d 733
    , 740 (9th Cir. 1989)
    (citation omitted).
    Once the defending party proffers a race-neutral reason, the challenging party,
    who always bears the ultimate burden of persuasion, must show that the explanation is
    merely a pretext for a racial motivation. 
    McCurdy, 240 F.3d at 521
    . Based on the
    parties’ submissions, the trial court must ascertain whether the claimant has
    demonstrated purposeful discrimination. Id.; 
    Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359
    . “In making
    this determination, the court presumes that the facially valid reasons proffered by the
    [party exercising the peremptory] are true.” 
    Lancaster, 324 F.3d at 433
    . “[T]he critical
    question in determining whether a [defendant] has proved purposeful discrimination . . .
    is the persuasiveness of the prosecutor’s justification for his peremptory strike.” Miller-
    
    El, 537 U.S. at 338-39
    . In other words, “the issue comes down to whether the trial court
    finds the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations to be credible.” 
    Id. at 339.
    “Credibility
    can be measured by, among other factors, the prosecutor’s demeanor; by how
    reasonable, or how improbable, the explanations are; and by whether the proffered
    rationale has some basis in accepted trial strategy.” 
    Id. “Great deference”
    to a trial
    court’s findings on the issue of discriminatory intent “makes particular sense” because
    [t]here will seldom be much evidence bearing on that issue, and the best
    evidence often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the
    challenge. As with the state of mind of a juror, evaluation of the
    prosecutor’s state of mind based on demeanor and credibility lies
    “peculiarly within a trial judge’s province.”
    
    Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 364-65
    (quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 
    469 U.S. 412
    , 428 (1985)).
    Thus, “in the absence of exceptional circumstances, we would defer to state-court factual
    findings . . . .” 
    Id. at 366
    (emphasis added).
    No. 07-3387        Braxton v. Gansheimer                                          Page 10
    III.
    In the present case, the district court faulted the state courts’ application of
    Batson to the circumstances and concluded that Braxton was entitled to habeas relief
    under both the legal and factual standards of § 2254(d). The district court determined
    that the state trial court skipped the first step of the Batson inquiry – the prima facie
    showing – and immediately looked to the prosecution to articulate a nondiscriminatory
    explanation for its peremptory challenges. Accordingly, the district court concluded that
    “the state appellate court erred when it concluded that Mr. Braxton failed to make such
    a [prima facie] showing.”
    Next, the district court determined that, instead of analyzing the persuasiveness
    of the prosecution’s nondiscriminatory justification, both the state trial and appellate
    courts “glossed over” the third step of the Batson inquiry. The district court found that
    the trial court “offered no explanation for its ruling other than its conclusion that it
    disagreed with Mr. Braxton’s position,” and the state appellate court, in turn,
    “conclusively presumed that there was no discriminatory intent because a race-neutral
    explanation was tendered.” The district court concluded that “by failing to address this
    third step, neither the trial court nor the appellate court made a reasonable application
    of federal law as set forth in Batson.”
    Finally, from a factual standpoint, the district court found that “the evidence is
    clear and convincing that the prosecutor’s stated justifications for excusing Juror No. 14
    were a pretext for discrimination.” The court explained:
    The prosecutor relied on Juror No. 14’s body language and, more
    importantly, on what he described as Juror No. 14’s statements that “he
    didn’t want to be here.” Both the state trial and appellate courts ignored
    the fact that Juror No. 14 never made these statements. A review of the
    prosecution’s voir dire examination of Juror No. 14 reveals that the
    prosecutor went to great length to entice this juror into conceding that he
    had no interest in serving on this jury. Yet, despite this prodding, Juror
    No. 14 stood firm in his responses that he had no problems with jury
    service. The prosecutor tried, unsuccessfully, to put words in Juror No.
    14’s mouth. Given this blatant inconsistency between the prosecutor’s
    stated “justification” and Juror No. 14’s actual statements as recorded,
    No. 07-3387        Braxton v. Gansheimer                                            Page 11
    the state courts’ rulings were based on an unreasonable determination of
    the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.
    ***
    [T]he prosecutor did not justify his peremptory challenges solely on Juror
    No. 14’s body language, which he could have, but instead emphasized to
    the court incorrectly that Juror No. 14 voiced opposition to jury service.
    The Court finds as the tipping point in this close analysis the fact that the
    prosecutor misquoted Juror No. 14 twice as having said he did not want
    to be there when in fact Juror No. 14 said exactly the opposite. This
    blatant inconsistency between what the prosecutor argued and what the
    record demonstrates undermines the prosecutor’s stated reasons for
    excusing Juror No. 14 and therefore exposes his pretext for racial
    discrimination.
    In this appeal, respondent first argues that the district court erred in holding that
    the state courts unreasonably applied clearly established Supreme Court precedent to the
    facts of the case. Respondent points out that once Braxton raised the Batson challenge,
    the state trial court held a bench conference during which, in conformity with Batson,
    defense counsel was permitted to state his prima facie case, the prosecutor was then
    allowed to set forth race-neutral reasons for striking Juror No. 14, and the trial court
    weighed the parties’ arguments before making its determination that Braxton did not
    prove purposeful discrimination. Respondent contends that thereafter, the state appellate
    court properly applied the three-part Batson test in affirming the trial court. Thus,
    according to respondent, the record illustrates that the trial court’s adjudication of the
    Batson issue was both correct and reasonable. We agree, reiterating the important
    principle that “a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court
    concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied
    clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must
    also be unreasonable.” Williams v. Taylor, 
    529 U.S. 362
    , 411 (2000).
    As the district court correctly noted, the state trial court did not rule expressly on
    whether Braxton established a prima facie case of discrimination and looked
    immediately to the prosecution to articulate a neutral reason for its peremptory
    challenges. In such circumstances, “[o]nce a prosecutor has offered a race-neutral
    explanation for the peremptory challenges and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate
    No. 07-3387          Braxton v. Gansheimer                                        Page 12
    question of intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant
    had made a prima facie showing becomes moot.” 
    Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359
    .
    Consequently, the district court determined that the Ohio Court of Appeals erred when
    it addressed this moot issue on appeal and concluded that “Braxton failed to make a
    prima facie case of purposeful discrimination.” Braxton, 
    2002 WL 31123906
    at *3.
    However, we conclude that the Ohio Court of Appeals’ application of Batson and
    Hernandez was neither erroneous nor unreasonable because the appellate court did not
    rely solely upon the moot issue in rejecting Braxton’s Batson claim. Cf. 
    Lancaster, 324 F.3d at 435
    (“[B]ecause the trial court here had ruled on the ultimate question under
    Batson – whether Petitioner had established intentional discrimination – when it
    concluded that Petitioner had not demonstrated that the reasons for the strike of [a juror]
    proffered by the prosecution were pretextual, the Michigan Court of Appeals acted
    unreasonably under Supreme Court precedent set out in Hernandez when it rested its
    holding on an issue that had become moot” and found that the petitioner had not made
    out a prima facie showing of discrimination) (emphasis added). Rather, the Ohio Court
    of Appeals appropriately analyzed the Batson issue by addressing its second and third
    components and concluding that “the prosecutor provided a bona fide race-neutral
    explanation for the challenge, and the court’s determination was not clearly erroneous.”
    Braxton, 
    2002 WL 31123906
    at *3. By means of this alternative holding, the appellate
    court resolved the dispositive issue of purposeful discrimination. In doing so, it properly
    and reasonably applied Batson and Hernandez.
    The question remains whether the state courts properly evaluated the
    prosecution’s race-neutral explanation for the peremptory strike of Juror No. 14 under
    the third prong of Batson, or whether, as the district court determined, the courts gave
    this critical step short shrift.
    “In the typical peremptory challenge inquiry, the decisive question will be
    whether counsel’s race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge should be
    believed.” 
    Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365
    . At this stage, a trial court has “the duty to
    determine if the defendant has established purposeful discrimination.” Batson, 476 U.S.
    No. 07-3387            Braxton v. Gansheimer                                                    Page 13
    at 98. In giving effect to this duty, we have opined that “when the purported race-neutral
    justification is predicated on subjective explanations like body language or demeanor,”
    an “on-the-record analysis of each of the elements of a Batson challenge is especially
    important.” 
    McCurdy, 240 F.3d at 521
    . In McCurdy, we held that “because the district
    court did not merely credit the explanation of [the defendant], but itself found that [the
    juror] was passive and disinterested, . . . [the plaintiff] has not demonstrated that the
    district court clearly erred in dismissing his Batson challenge.” 
    Id. Cf. Smulls
    v. Roper,
    
    535 F.3d 853
    , 860-61 (8th Cir. 2008) (noting that the Supreme Court has eschewed a
    formalistic approach to fact finding under Batson in holding that the state court’s failure
    to make detailed fact findings following a Batson challenge was not an unreasonable
    application of clearly established federal law under § 2254(d)(1)).
    In the present case, when the totality of the circumstances are considered, the
    record reflects that the trial court, albeit in abbreviated fashion, adequately and
    reasonably conveyed its decision that the prosecution’s race-neutral, demeanor-based
    justification for the peremptory strike of Juror No. 14 was credible and that Braxton
    failed to carry his burden on the ultimate issue of purposeful discrimination. In doing
    so, the trial court adhered to the Batson three-step inquiry and neither conflated the steps,
    see, e.g., United States v. Kimbrel, 
    532 F.3d 461
    (6th Cir. 2008), nor restricted counsel
    in their respective arguments.3 Likewise, the state court of appeals, after articulating the
    requisite tripartite burden-shifting Batson framework, obviously reviewed the trial
    transcript, acknowledged the prosecution’s assertion that Juror No. 14’s body language
    (“arms crossed and head bent over”) indicated disinterest, noted that “the trial court,
    after appropriate inquiry, rejected the notion that the prosecutor’s challenge [was
    pretextual],” and finally, concluded independently that “[n]othing in the prosecutor’s
    explanation showed that he chose to exclude jurors on the basis of race.” Braxton, 
    2002 WL 31123906
    at *3. In the absence of clearly established Supreme Court authority
    requiring further elaboration, we conclude that the district court erred in holding that the
    3
    Braxton does not dispute that “[t]he prosecutor’s explanation [that Juror No. 14 was
    disinterested] satisfied the minimal burden of [the second] stage in the analysis,” i.e., that the state’s
    justification “need not be particularly persuasive, or even plausible, so long as it is neutral.” 
    McCurdy, 240 F.3d at 521
    (quoting 
    Harris, 192 F.3d at 586
    ).
    No. 07-3387           Braxton v. Gansheimer                                           Page 14
    state courts ran afoul of Batson and its progeny and misapplied this precedent in an
    objectively unreasonable manner under § 2254(d)(1). Cf. Purkett v. Elem, 
    514 U.S. 765
    ,
    766, 769-70 (1995) (holding that a federal court failed to adequately defer to the state
    trial court’s factual finding of no racial motive, even though the trial court rejected the
    Batson objection “without explanation”).
    The district court’s erroneous determination that the state courts unreasonably
    applied Batson by “gloss[ing] over” the third step is inextricably intertwined with its
    conclusion that the state courts’ denials of Braxton’s Batson challenge were based on an
    unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at trial,
    contrary to § 2254(d)(2).            The district court held that the prosecution’s
    mischaracterization of Juror No. 14’s voir dire responses in the course of justifying its
    peremptory challenge “undermine[d] the prosecutor’s stated reasons for excusing Juror
    No. 14 and therefore expose[d] his pretext for racial discrimination.” By allegedly
    “ignor[ing]” this “blatant inconsistency between what the prosecutor argued and what
    the record demonstrates,” the district court determined that the state courts based their
    rulings on an unreasonable determination of the facts.
    We hold that the district court usurped the fact-finding functions of the trial court
    and failed to accord the trial court the “great deference” to which it was entitled in
    judging the credibility and demeanor of the juror and the prosecutor. Moreover, the
    district court itself misapplied Batson by failing to place the ultimate burden on Braxton
    to demonstrate that the prosecutor engaged in purposeful discrimination in striking Juror
    No. 14.
    Our conclusion that the district court overstepped its bounds is confirmed by the
    Supreme Court’s decision in Rice v. Collins, 
    546 U.S. 333
    (2006), in which the Court
    overturned the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ determination that the state trial court
    unreasonably credited the prosecutor’s demeanor-based justification to exclude an
    African-American juror. In our decision in Harris, we summarized Rice as follows:
    In [Rice], when the defendant opposed the prosecution’s exercise of a
    peremptory challenge against juror 16, the prosecution explained that it
    No. 07-3387        Braxton v. Gansheimer                                          Page 15
    disqualified her because she had rolled her eyes in response to a question
    from the court, was young and possibly too tolerant of drug crimes, and
    lacked sufficient connections to the community. The trial court [which
    did not observe the complained-of demeanor] subsequently affirmed the
    prosecution’s race-neutral reasons.
    During the defendant’s habeas appeal before the Ninth Circuit, however,
    that court disagreed with the trial court’s credibility determination and
    found it factually unreasonable to accept the prosecution’s justifications
    based on juror 16’s demeanor and youth. Conducting its own review of
    the underlying facts, the Ninth Circuit found the prosecutor lacking in
    credibility because she had previously referred to another juror as
    “young” despite that juror’s status as a grandmother, had attempted
    impermissibly to employ gender as a race-neutral basis for striking juror
    16, and had claimed juror 16 would be too lenient toward a drug crime
    even though juror 16 expressed an affirmative belief that the crime at
    issue should be illegal. After assessing the Ninth Circuit’s reasons for
    doubting the prosecutor’s credibility, the Supreme Court disagreed that
    the trial court’s factual findings were unreasonable. At most, the
    Supreme Court explained, “the trial court had reason to question the
    prosecutor’s credibility regarding [j]uror 16’s alleged improper
    demeanor,” but this does not translate into the “conclusion that the trial
    court had no permissible alternative but to reject the prosecutor’s race-
    neutral justifications.” Overall, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth
    Circuit’s decision because the court “attempt[ed] to use a set of
    debatable inferences to set aside the conclusion reached by the state
    court [in violation of] AEDPA’s requirements for granting a writ of
    habeas corpus.”
    
    Harris, 526 F.3d at 911
    (citations omitted, emphasis added).
    Thus, where “[r]easonable minds reviewing the record might disagree about the
    prosecutor’s credibility, . . . habeas review . . . does not suffice to supersede the trial
    court’s credibility determination.” 
    Rice, 546 U.S. at 341-42
    (emphasis added). Cf.
    Uttecht v. Brown, 
    127 S. Ct. 2218
    , 2224 (2007) (according deference to the state trial
    court’s decision to excuse a prospective juror for cause in a death penalty case).
    Respondent concedes that the prosecutor mischaracterized Juror No. 14’s voir
    dire responses when he represented to the trial court that the juror “said he didn’t want
    to be here.” However, here, as in Rice, the district court improperly relied upon
    debatable inferences to reverse the state courts’ Batson decision by presuming
    No. 07-3387            Braxton v. Gansheimer                                                    Page 16
    subjectively that “the prosecution’s justification for excusing Juror No. 14 is based
    primarily on statements Juror No. 14 never uttered,” and by focusing an inordinate
    amount of attention on the misstatement while ignoring the prosecutor’s other race-
    neutral reason for the strike – the disinterest demonstrated by Juror No. 14’s body
    language and demeanor – that was accepted by the trial court. As the record shows, the
    trial court’s factual determination was not unreasonable.
    The prosecutor stated during the Batson hearing:
    With regards to [Juror No. 14], he sat there the entire time with his arms
    crossed and his head bent over, and his hand – he showed no interest in
    being in here. I specifically questioned him about his body language, and
    he even said he didn’t want to be here. So, I am not going to have
    someone sit on a jury that for the last two hours didn’t listen to anything,
    had no intention of actually paying attention and then even when I asked
    him, he said he didn’t want to be here. It’s got nothing to do with race.
    Later, the prosecutor again argued to the trial court that Juror No. 14 “hadn’t paid
    attention at all.” In fact, the record indicates that during active voir dire, well before the
    prosecutor had to justify his peremptory strike during the bench conference, he remarked
    to Juror No. 14 that he was concerned about his demeanor:
    You are [either] a very laid back person or you are kind of exuding the
    fact you might not want to be here. Just to be honest. By body language.
    Now I don’t know. It could be you’re laid back and you are kind of
    paying attention.
    Defense counsel even confirmed, perhaps inadvertently, the prosecutor’s
    observations when, during the bench conference, he called attention to the fact that “as
    it relates to Mr. Smoot [Juror No. 14], right now as we sit here, juror number 14 is seated
    in the jury, he’s turned around, his arms are folded, right at the moment his head is
    down.”4 Moreover, Juror No. 14’s terse responses during voir dire – “Why me?” and
    4
    On appeal, Braxton argues that his trial counsel was referring not to Mr. Smoot but to the juror
    who would have replaced him when he was excused. The record does not indicate whether Mr. Smoot left
    his place as Juror No. 14 before the side-bar conference began. In any event, Braxton’s counsel was
    pointing out that the prosecution’s attempt to prove Juror No. 14’s disinterest by reference to his body
    language was not credible, indicating that Juror No. 14’s demeanor was the basis for the prosecutor’s
    peremptory strike.
    No. 07-3387            Braxton v. Gansheimer                                                       Page 17
    “[n]o problem” – were at best non-committal, but hardly enthusiastic and not, as the
    district court found, “exactly the opposite” of what the prosecutor attributed to the juror.
    In holding that the prosecutor’s stated reason was not persuasive, and granting
    relief on that basis alone, the district court erred in failing to shift the burden back to
    Braxton to prove purposeful racial discrimination. In United States v. Tucker, 
    90 F.3d 1135
    , 1142 (6th Cir. 1996), we held that the district court did not clearly err in finding
    that the defendant failed to show that the peremptory strike of a Latino juror deemed
    “too unintelligent and disinterested” to serve was intentionally discriminatory, where the
    defense failed to introduce any evidence in opposition to the explanation. We noted that
    “[t]he defense might have demonstrated that the articulated reasons were in fact a pretext
    by showing, for example, that the prosecution had not challenged equally unintelligent
    or disinterested jurors of other races.” 
    Id. “It is
    well established that a Batson violation
    may be shown by disparate treatment of white and minority jurors . . . .” United States
    v. Torres-Ramos, 
    536 F.3d 542
    , 559 (6th Cir. 2008). In this case, however, defense
    counsel made no such comparisons and, in fact, the prosecutor indicated that he had no
    problem with Juror No. 20 (the alternate).5
    Given the record before us, we conclude that the district court – like the Ninth
    Circuit in Rice – “assigned the [misstatements] more weight than [they] can bear” where
    the prosecutor provided another “permissible and plausible race-neutral reason[]” and
    Braxton “provide[d] no argument why this portion of the colloquy demonstrates that a
    reasonable factfinder must conclude the prosecutor lied about the [negative demeanor]
    and struck [the juror] based on [his] race.” 
    Rice, 546 U.S. at 340-41
    . There is no
    evidence that the state courts relied upon the prosecutor’s misstatement in denying the
    5
    On appeal, petitioner points out the prosecutor’s comment during voir dire when, in introducing
    himself to the jurors, he joked about the challenges of jury service and observed, “I have two children.
    The children’s ages are three and a year and a half. Like you, they’re sleeping . . . .” Petitioner suggests
    that “[w]hen the prosecutor jokes with the potential jurors about them ‘sleeping’ during voir dire, it is odd
    that the prosecutor would then challenge a juror for his purported disinterested demeanor.” However, we
    cannot glean any discriminatory intent from this comment, which appears to be simply an effort at
    “breaking the ice.”
    No. 07-3387            Braxton v. Gansheimer                                                       Page 18
    Batson challenge;6 conversely, the state courts clearly credited the prosecutor’s race-
    neutral reason – Juror No. 14’s demeanor – in rejecting it.
    Thus, while the prosecutor’s misstatement regarding Juror No. 14’s responses
    may furnish a reason to question whether the prosecutor’s motivation for the peremptory
    strike was pretextual, it does not compel such a conclusion. Under these circumstances,
    the district court erred in failing to defer to the trial court as the best judge of the
    prosecutor’s and the juror’s credibility. It further erred in concluding, under AEDPA,
    that Braxton presented the “clear and convincing evidence” necessary to rebut the
    presumption of correctness afforded to the Ohio courts’ factual determinations.
    Finally, Braxton relies upon the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Snyder v.
    Louisiana, 
    128 S. Ct. 1203
    (2008), and argues that this case highlights the deficiencies
    in the state courts’ findings. In Snyder, a state capital murder case, the prosecution
    eliminated all five of the prospective African-American jurors who remained on the
    thirty-six member venire following challenges for cause. The Supreme Court focused
    on the defendant’s Batson challenge to one of these jurors and refused to presume that
    the trial court credited the prosecution’s two distinct race-neutral reasons for the
    peremptory strike – that the juror looked nervous and had work-related time constraints
    – because the trial court simply “allow[ed] the challenge without explanation.” 
    Snyder, 128 S. Ct. at 1209
    . Although the Court adhered to the highly deferential standard of
    review originally enunciated in Hernandez, 
    id. at 1208,
    it nonetheless concluded that the
    trial court committed clear error in rejecting the petitioner’s Batson objection:
    [D]eference is especially appropriate where a trial judge has made a
    finding that an attorney credibly relied on demeanor in exercising a
    strike. Here, however, the record does not show that the trial judge
    actually made a determination concerning [the juror’s] demeanor. The
    trial judge was given two explanations for the strike. Rather than
    making a specific finding on the record concerning [the juror’s]
    demeanor, the trial judge simply allowed the challenge without
    6
    While the district court supposes that the state courts “ignored” or overlooked the misstatement,
    and therefore rendered a decision based on an unreasonable determination of the facts, it is equally possible
    – and the cold transcript does reveal – that the state courts may have, alternatively, purposefully “ignored”
    the misstatements precisely because they were inaccurate.
    No. 07-3387        Braxton v. Gansheimer                                          Page 19
    explanation. It is possible that the judge did not have any impression one
    way or the other concerning [the juror’s] demeanor. [The juror] was not
    challenged until the day after he was questioned, and by that time dozens
    of other jurors had been questioned. Thus, the trial judge may not have
    recalled [the juror’s] demeanor. Or, the trial judge may have found it
    unnecessary to consider [the juror’s] demeanor, instead basing his ruling
    completely on the second proffered justification for the strike. For these
    reasons, we cannot presume that the trial judge credited the prosecutor’s
    assertion that [the juror] was nervous.
    
    Id. at 1209.
    A determinative factor in the Court’s holding was its conclusion that the
    prosecution’s second reason proffered for the strike – the juror’s student-teaching
    obligations – was “suspicious,” “implausible,” and “pretextual” given the brevity of the
    trial, the juror’s lessened concern upon his advisor’s assurances that any interruption
    would not cause a problem, and the fact that similarly situated white jurors with more
    onerous conflicts were not challenged. 
    Id. at 1211-12.
    Consequently, the Court
    concluded that “in light of the circumstances here – including [the] absence of anything
    in the record showing that the trial judge credited the claim that [the juror] was nervous,
    the prosecution’s description of both of its proffered explanations as ‘main concern[s],’
    and the adverse inference [arising from the pretextual work-related reason] – the record
    does not show that the prosecution would have pre-emptively challenged [the juror]
    based on his nervousness alone.” 
    Id. at 1212
    (citation omitted).
    Snyder is readily distinguishable from the present case. Here, we are not left to
    speculate regarding the basis for the trial court’s Batson ruling. As we have concluded,
    the trial court made the requisite findings and credited the prosecution’s race-neutral
    concern with Juror No. 14’s disinterested demeanor as the basis for denying Braxton’s
    Batson challenge. The record substantiates the state courts’ acceptance of this proffered
    reason. Juror No. 14’s demeanor “can credibly be said to have exhibited the basis for
    the strike attributed to the juror by the prosecutor.” 
    Id. at 1208.
    Because Braxton has
    failed to present clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, we conclude that the
    Ohio courts’ Batson ruling did not constitute an unreasonable determination of the facts
    in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceedings under § 2254(d)(2). In
    No. 07-3387        Braxton v. Gansheimer                                         Page 20
    the absence of exceptional circumstances, we will leave interpretation of the nuances of
    demeanor to the trial court. This is not an exceptional case.
    IV.
    For the reasons stated above, we conclude that the district court erred in granting
    Braxton a conditional writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We therefore
    reverse the judgment of the district court and remand the case with instructions to
    dismiss Braxton’s habeas petition.