Miller v. Straub ( 2002 )

5(&200(1'(' )25 )8//7(;7 38%/,&$7,21
3XUVXDQW WR 6L[WK &LUFXLW 5XOH 
(/(&7521,& &,7$7,21  )(' $SS 3 WK &LU
)LOH 1DPH DS
81,7('67$7(6&28572)$33($/6
)257+(6,;7+&,5&8,7
BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB
1R ;
&257(= 0,//(5 
3HWLWLRQHU$SSHOOHH 
 1RV

Y !


'(11,6 0 675$8%:DUGHQ 
5HVSRQGHQW$SSHOODQW 

1R 

.(50,7 (/'5,'*( +$<1(6 
3HWLWLRQHU$SSHOOHH 

Y 

/8(//$ %85.(:DUGHQ 

6DJLQDZ&RUUHFWLRQDO)DFLOLW\ 
5HVSRQGHQW$SSHOODQW 
1
$SSHDOIURPWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV'LVWULFW&RXUW
IRUWKH(DVWHUQ'LVWULFWRI0LFKLJDQDW'HWURLW
1RV²'HQLVH3DJH+RRG
'LVWULFW-XGJH
$UJXHG2FWREHU
'HFLGHGDQG)LOHG$XJXVW

 0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO 1RV
%HIRUH%2**6*,/0$1DQG%5,*+7&LUFXLW-XGJHV
BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB
&2816(/
$5*8('  7KRPDV 0 &KDPEHUV 2)),&( 2) 7+(
3526(&87,1* $77251(< 'HWURLW 0LFKLJDQ IRU
$SSHOODQWV  -RKQ 5 0LQRFN &5$0(5 0,12&. $QQ
$UERU0LFKLJDQ0DUOD50F&RZDQ67$7($33(//$7(
'()(1'(5 2)),&( 'HWURLW 0LFKLJDQ IRU $SSHOOHHV
21 %5,()  7KRPDV 0 &KDPEHUV 2)),&( 2) 7+(
3526(&87,1* $77251(< 'HWURLW 0LFKLJDQ IRU
$SSHOODQWV  -RKQ 5 0LQRFN &5$0(5 0,12&. $QQ
$UERU0LFKLJDQ0DUOD50F&RZDQ6XVDQ00HLQEHUJ
67$7( $33(//$7( '()(1'(5 2)),&( 'HWURLW
0LFKLJDQIRU$SSHOOHHV
%5,*+7-GHOLYHUHGWKHRSLQLRQRIWKHFRXUW*,/0$1
- SS  GHOLYHUHG D VHSDUDWH FRQFXUULQJ RSLQLRQ
%2**6 - SS  GHOLYHUHG D VHSDUDWH GLVVHQWLQJ
RSLQLRQ
BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB
23,1,21
BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB
0<521+%5,*+7&LUFXLW-XGJH7KHZDUGHQVRIWZR
0LFKLJDQ VWDWH FRUUHFWLRQDO LQVWLWXWLRQV DSSHDO D IHGHUDO
GLVWULFWFRXUW¶VFRQGLWLRQDOJUDQWRIKDEHDVFRUSXVWRSULVRQHUV
&RUWH]0LOOHUDQG.HUPLW+D\QHVRQWKHJURXQGRILQHIIHFWLYH
DVVLVWDQFH RI FRXQVHO  +D\QHV DQG 0LOOHU DUH FXUUHQWO\
VHUYLQJOLIHVHQWHQFHVZLWKRXWSDUROHDIWHUSOHDGLQJJXLOW\WR
ILUVWGHJUHHPXUGHU
7KH +RQRUDEOH 0\URQ + %ULJKW 6HQLRU &LUFXLW -XGJH RI WKH 8QLWHG
6WDWHV &RXUW RI $SSHDOV IRU WKH (LJKWK &LUFXLW VLWWLQJ E\ GHVLJQDWLRQ
1RV 0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO 
,Q0LOOHUDQG+D\QHVZHUHILIWHHQDQGVL[WHHQ\HDUV
ROG UHVSHFWLYHO\  (DFK RQ WKH DGYLFH RI KLV RZQ GHIHQVH
FRXQVHO SOHG JXLOW\ LQ 0LFKLJDQ VWDWH FRXUW WR ILUVW GHJUHH
PXUGHU7KHLUDWWRUQH\VEHOLHYHGLWOLNHO\WKDWWKHWULDOFRXUW
ZRXOGLPSRVHMXYHQLOHVHQWHQFHV7KHWULDOFRXUWGLGVHQWHQFH
WKHPDVMXYHQLOHV,QHDFKFDVHWKHSURVHFXWLRQDSSHDOHGDQG
WKH0LFKLJDQ&RXUWRI$SSHDOVUHYHUVHG0LOOHUDQG+D\QHV
HDFK WKHQ UHFHLYHG WKH RQO\ DYDLODEOH DGXOW VHQWHQFH XQGHU
0LFKLJDQODZOLIHLQSULVRQZLWKRXWSRVVLELOLW\RISDUROH
1HLWKHU 0LOOHU¶V QRU +D\QHV¶ WULDO FRXQVHO FRQVLGHUHG RU
DGYLVHG WKHLU UHVSHFWLYH FOLHQWV WKDW the prosecutor could
appeal the imposition of a juvenile sentence.
Miller and Haynes petitioned for writs of habeas corpus,
and the federal district court concluded that the failure of
their defense attorneys to inform them of the prosecutor's
right to appeal, particularly in light of their youth at the time
of the pleas, constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. 7KH
FRXUWIXUWKHUFRQFOXGHGWKDWDFRQWUDU\GHWHUPLQDWLRQRQWKH
IDFWV DQG WKH ODZ E\ WKH 0LFKLJDQ &RXUW RI $SSHDOV
FRQVWLWXWHGDQXQUHDVRQDEOHDSSOLFDWLRQRIFOHDUO\HVWDEOLVKHG
IHGHUDOODZDVGHWHUPLQHGE\WKH8QLWHG6WDWHV6XSUHPH&RXUW
LQ:LOOLDPVY7D\ORU529 U.S. 362 (2000)+LOOY/RFNKDUW
474 U.S. 52 (1985DQG6WULFNODQGY:DVKLQJWRQ466 U.S.
668 (1984)  $FFRUGLQJO\ WKH FRXUW separately JUDQWHG
0LOOHU¶VDQG+D\QHV¶SHWLWLRQVIRUZULWVRIKDEHDVFRUSXVRQ
WKHJURXQGRILQHIIHFWLYHDVVLVWDQFHRIFRXQVHO7KHZDUGHQV
DSSHDO$IWHUDFDUHIXOUHYLHZRIWKHUHFRUGVLQWKHWZRFDVHV
ZH$)),50WKHGLVWULFWFRXUW

The Honorable Denise Page Hood, United States District Court
Judge for the Eastern District of Michigan.

The court published only one opinion. See Haynes v. Burke, 115
F.Supp.2d 813 (E.D.Mich 2000). The other opinion is unpublished, see
Miller v. Straub, No. 98-CV-74655-DT (E.D. Mich. Aug. 31, 2000), but
the court analyzed the two cases similarly. ,Q ERWK FDVHV WKH GLVWULFW FRXUW
RUGHUHG WKDW XQOHVV 0LFKLJDQ WRRN DFWLRQ ZLWKLQ  GD\V WR DIIRUG 0LOOHU
DQG +D\QHV QHZ WULDOV WKH\ FRXOG DSSO\ IRU ZULWV RUGHULQJ WKHLU IRUWKZLWK
UHOHDVH IURP FXVWRG\
 0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO 1RV 1RV 0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO 
,%$&.*5281' PHDQVWKDWLWGLGQRWFRUUHFWO\LGHQWLI\DQGDSSO\6WULFNODQGDV
WKHJRYHUQLQJIHGHUDOUXOH%XWHYHQLIZHZHUHWRSDUVHWKH
Kermit Haynes and Cortez Miller are two of six youths WZRSDUWVRI6WULFNODQGLQWKLVZD\ZHZRXOGQRWFRQGXFWD
FKDUJHGE\WKHVWDWHRI0LFKLJDQZLWKWKH PXUGHURI IXOOGHQRYRUHYLHZEXWUDWKHUD³LQGHSHQGHQW´UHYLHZDVODLG
%HQMDPLQ*UDYHO7KHVWDWHFKDUJHG+D\QHVDQG0LOOHUHDFK RXWLQRXUUHFHQWFDVHRI+DUULVY6WRYDOO)G
ZLWK ILUVW GHJUHH IHORQ\ PXUGHU, assault with intent to rob WK &LU   7KHUH ZH VDLG LQ D VLPLODU FDVH  ³7KDW
while armed, and possession of a firearm during commission LQGHSHQGHQWUHYLHZKRZHYHULVQRWDIXOOGHQRYRUHYLHZRI
of a felony. WKHFODLPVEXWUHPDLQVGHIHUHQWLDOEHFDXVHWKHFRXUWFDQQRW
JUDQWUHOLHIXQOHVVWKH VWDWHFRXUW¶VUHVXOWLVQRWLQNHHSLQJ
A. Miller’s Plea ZLWK WKH VWULFWXUHV RI WKH $('3$´  ,ELG  7KXV HYHQ LQ
FRQGXFWLQJDQLQGHSHQGHQWUHYLHZZHPXVWGHWHUPLQHPRUH
On March 23, 1990, Miller pled guilty before Chief Judge WKDQVLPSO\WKDWZHEHOLHYHWKHVWDWHFRXUWZDVZURQJLQLWV
Roberson of the Recorder’s Court for the City of Detroit. He XOWLPDWHRXWFRPH
was fifteen years old at the time. At the plea hearing, the
court questioned Miller as to whether he understood that if he $VWKHDERYHDQDO\VLVRI6WULFNODQG:LOOLDPVDQG&RQH
pled guilty, his "only hope" to avoid mandatory life VKRZV ZH FDQ E\ QR PHDQV WHUP WKH MXGJPHQW RI WKH
imprisonment lay in convincing the court to treat him as a 0LFKLJDQ&RXUWRI$SSHDOVXQUHDVRQDEOH7KHMXGJPHQWLV
juvenile. Miller answered that he understood. Miller’s SHUKDSV GHEDWDEOH LI ZH LJQRUH 6WULFNODQG¶V FOHDU
mother, who was present at the plea hearing, stated that UHTXLUHPHQWV ZH PLJKW VD\ LW ZDV LQFRUUHFW XQGHU QR
Miller’s plea had been discussed with her and that she FLUFXPVWDQFHVFDQZHVD\LWZDVXQUHDVRQDEOH
understood that the judge might sentence her son as a juvenile
or as an adult. The prosecutor advised the court that his
office would request that the court sentence Miller as an adult.
The court then questioned Miller. Miller affirmed that he
was making his plea freely, understandingly, and voluntarily.

7ZR RI WKH IRXU RWKHU ER\V IDFHG WULDO RQ FKDUJHV RI ILUVW GHJUHH
IHORQ\ PXUGHU DQG DVVDXOW ZLWK LQWHQW WR URE ZKLOH DUPHG WKH\ ZHUH
IRXQG QRW JXLOW\ 7ZR ER\V SOHG JXLOW\ WR VHFRQG GHJUHH PXUGHU DQG
DVVDXOW ZLWK LQWHQW WR URE ZKLOH DUPHG 7KH\ ZHUH VHQWHQFHG DV MXYHQLOHV
7KRVH MXYHQLOH VHQWHQFHV ZHUH XSKHOG E\ WKH 0LFKLJDQ &RXUW RI $SSHDOV
3HRSOH Y %URZQ  1:G  0LFK $SS 

8QGHU 0LFKLJDQ ODZ DW WKDW WLPH WKH WULDO FRXUW KDG GLVFUHWLRQ WR
GHWHUPLQH ZKHWKHU MXYHQLOHV FRQYLFWHG RI ILUVW GHJUHH PXUGHU VKRXOG EH
VHQWHQFHG DV MXYHQLOHV RU DV DGXOWV 6HH 0LFK &RPS /DZV $QQ † 
 7KH 0LFKLJDQ OHJLVODWXUH DPHQGHG WKH VWDWXWH LQ  WR UHPRYH
WKLV GLVFUHWLRQ 6HH 0LFK 3XE $FW  1R  $OO MXYHQLOHV
FRQYLFWHG RI ILUVW GHJUHH PXUGHU DUH QRZ PDQGDWRULO\ VHQWHQFHG DV DGXOWV
6HH 0LFK &RPS /DZV $QQ † J 
 0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO 1RV 1RV 0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO 
SRVVLELOLW\ RI D JRYHUQPHQW DSSHDO  $OO RI WKH FRXQVHO He acknowledged an understanding of the various trial rights
LQYROYHG QRWHG WKDW WKH\ GLG QRW FRQWHPSODWH WKDW VXFK DQ he was foregoing by pleading guilty. Miller affirmed his
DSSHDO FRXOG RFFXU RU WKDW LW ZRXOG EH VXFFHVVIXO  ,Q WKH understanding that first degree murder was punishable by a
0LOOHUFDVHRQWKLVDSSHDO0LOOHU¶VFRXQVHODQGFOLHQWZHUH maximum sentence of life imprisonment without parole. The
LQFRXUWZKHQWKHSURVHFXWRUVDLGWKDWWKHVWDWHZRXOGDSSHDO court described the situation to Miller: "the only hope that
DQGVSHFLILFDOO\WHVWLILHGWKDWKHIHOWWKDWWKHFKDQFHVRIVXFK you [have] in this plea is if I decide to treat you as a juvenile
DQDSSHDOVXFFHHGLQJRQHKDGQHYHUEHHQWULHGLQ0LFKLJDQ for the purpose of disposition. You heard [the prosecutor] say
WRWKLVSRLQWZHUHVXIILFLHQWO\ORZWKDWLWGLGQRWDIIHFWWKHLU that they are going to want to hold a lengthy disposition
MXGJPHQW hearing, do you understand that?" Miller stated that he
understood, and specifically acknowledged that he was
-XGJH*LOPDQ¶VLQWHUHVWLQJPDWKHPDWLFDODQDO\VLVDWSDJH "taking that chance."
EHJLQVWRDGGUHVVWKHFRUUHFWLQTXLU\EXWGRHVQRWJRIDU
HQRXJK7KHUHOHYDQWTXHVWLRQLVZKHWKHUWKHXOWLPDWHDGYLFH The court then questioned Miller briefly as to the factual
ZDV D VWUDWHJ\ ZLWKLQ WKH EURDG ERXQGV RI SURIHVVLRQDO basis for his plea. Miller stated that he was part of a group
FRPSHWHQFH5HODWHGO\ZHDVNZKHWKHUWKHGHFUHDVHLQWKH that decided to steal a car. Sometime before the crime he
SUREDELOLW\ RI D VXFFHVVIXO RXWFRPH GXH WR SURVHFXWRULDO gave Haynes a gun knowing that Haynes planned to use it to
DSSHDOUHQGHUVFUHGLEOHSHWLWLRQHUV¶DVVHUWLRQVWKDWWKH\ZRXOG steal a car. Miller acknowledged knowing the inherent
KDYHJLYHQXSWKHLUFKDQFHDWDMXYHQLOHVHQWHQFHEHIRUH-XGJH danger to life when a car is taken at gunpoint.
5REHUVRQ7KHRQHFRXQVHOZKRWHVWLILHGVSHFLILFDOO\WKRXJKW
WKDWWKHFKDQFHVRIWKHVWDWHVXFFHHGLQJRQDSSHDOZHUHIDLUO\ Over the course of the next year, Chief Judge Roberson
VPDOODQGZHKDYHQREDVLVIRUGLVFRXQWLQJWKDWMXGJPHQW held several hearings RQWKHGLVSRVLWLRQRI0LOOHU¶VVHQWHQFH
7KXVLIFRXQVHOFDOFXODWHGWKHFKDQFHVRI-XGJH5REHUVRQ¶V 2Q )HEUXDU\   0LOOHU¶V FRXQVHO PDGH FORVLQJ
VHQWHQFLQJ WKH GHIHQGDQWV DV MXYHQLOHV DW  ZKHQ WKH DUJXPHQWVWRWKHFRXUWDWWKHILQDOKHDULQJLQ0LOOHU¶VFDVH$W
UHDOLW\WXUQHGRXWWREHDQGEHOLHYHGWKHFKDQFHRI WKDW KHDULQJ WKH SURVHFXWRU DQQRXQFHG WKDW LI WKH FRXUW
VXFFHVVRQDSSHDOE\WKHVWDWHWREHFRQWLQJHQWRQWKH VHQWHQFHG0LOOHUDVDMXYHQLOHWKHSURVHFXWLRQZRXOGDSSHDO
MXYHQLOH VHQWHQFLQJ EHORZ WKHQ WKH FKDQFHV RI XOWLPDWH On June 17, 1991, the court sentenced Miller to confinement
VXFFHVVZRXOGKDYHVKUXQNIURPWR7KLVPLJKW in a juvenile institution until age twenty-one.
VWLOO ORRN H[WUHPHO\ JRRG DV RSSRVHG WR D YHU\ ODUJH
SUREDELOLW\RIFRQYLFWLRQRIILUVWGHJUHHPXUGHUDQGDVHQWHQFH B. Haynes’ Plea
RIOLIHZLWKRXWSDUROH
On March 27, 1990, Haynes pled guilty to all charges
:KLOHP\DVVLJQLQJRIYDOXHVLVMXVWDVVSHFXODWLYHDV-XGJH against him, also before Chief Judge Roberson. He was
*LOPDQ¶V LW GRHV HPSKDVL]H WKDW WKH SURSHU LQTXLU\ IRU
HIIHFWLYHDVVLVWDQFHRIFRXQVHOVKRXOGEHWKHRYHUDOOVWUDWHJ\
HPSOR\HG,WGRHVQRWDSSHDUWRPHWKDWZHFDQSURSHUO\VD\ 
XQGHUWKH$('3$VWDQGDUGWKDWWKHVWDWHFRXUWVXQUHDVRQDEO\ $  DPHQGPHQW WR 0LFKLJDQ VWDWXWRU\ ODZ JUDQWHG Michigan
DSSOLHG6WULFNODQG prosecutors an appeal of right from "[a] final judgment or final order of
the . . . recorder’s court" in criminal cases. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.
§ 770.12 (as amended, Mich. Pub. Act 1988 No. 66) ,Q 1RYHPEHU 
)LQDOO\,GRQRWDJUHHZLWK-XGJH*LOPDQWKDWWKHIDLOXUHRI WKH 0LFKLJDQ &RXUW RI $SSHDOV SXEOLVKHG D GHFLVLRQ LQ ZKLFK LW FRQVWUXHG
WKHVWDWHFRXUWWRGLVFXVVWKHSUHMXGLFHSURQJRI6WULFNODQG WKH DPHQGPHQW WR DOORZ SURVHFXWRUV WR DSSHDO FULPLQDO VHQWHQFHV DV RI
ULJKW 3HRSOH Y 5H\QROGV  1:G   0LFK $SS 
 0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO 1RV 1RV 0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO 
sixteen years old at the time. At the plea hearing, his counsel, 0RUHRYHU$('3$LPSRVHVDGGLWLRQDOFRQVWUDLQWVRQWKH
Wilfred Rice, stated that he had discussed the matter with DELOLW\RIIHGHUDOFRXUWVWRJUDQWDZULWRIKDEHDVFRUSXV,Q
Haynes and his family and that Haynes, with the acquiescence RUGHUWRPHHWWKHJDWHNHHSHUVWDQGDUGVVHWIRUWKE\$('3$
of his father, wanted to enter a plea of guilty as charged. Rice  86& † G IRU WKH LVVXDQFH RI ZULWV RI KDEHDV
stated that Haynes understood that the court could sentence FRUSXV WKH VWDWH FRXUW DGMXGLFDWLRQ RI WKH FODLP WKDW LV
him as an adult or as a juvenile, and affirmed that Haynes FKDOOHQJHG RQ FROODWHUDO DSSHDO PXVW KDYH UHVXOWHG LQ D
understood that the prosecutor would attempt to convince GHFLVLRQWKDWZDV³FRQWUDU\WRRULQYROYHGDQXQUHDVRQDEOH
Chief Judge Roberson that Haynes should be sentenced as an DSSOLFDWLRQRIFOHDUO\HVWDEOLVKHG)HGHUDOODZDVGHWHUPLQHG
adult. E\WKH6XSUHPH&RXUWRIWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV´,ELG&RQH
6&WDW
The court questioned Haynes directly about whether he
understood that, if he pled guilty, "the only option you have 7KH6XSUHPH&RXUWKHOGLQ:LOOLDPVY7D\ORU86
in this case, the only escape you have in terms of mandatory   WKDW ³>W@KH PRVW LPSRUWDQW SRLQW LV WKDW DQ
life, [is] if the prosecution can’t convince me to treat you as XQUHDVRQDEOHDSSOLFDWLRQRIIHGHUDOODZLVGLIIHUHQWIURPDQ
an adult." Haynes stated that he understood. LQFRUUHFWDSSOLFDWLRQRIIHGHUDOODZ´,GDWHPSKDVLVLQ
RULJLQDO$VWDWHFRXUWGHFLVLRQFDQLQYROYHDQXQUHDVRQDEOH
Haynes stated that he had talked to his parents about his DSSOLFDWLRQRI8QLWHG6WDWHV6XSUHPH&RXUWSUHFHGHQWLQRQO\
guilty plea. He affirmed that he was not being coerced into WZRZD\V)LUVWDVWDWHFRXUWPLJKWLGHQWLI\WKHFRUUHFWOHJDO
his plea and that he made his plea freely, understandingly, and UXOHEXWXQUHDVRQDEO\DSSO\LWWRWKHIDFWV6HFRQGDVWDWH
voluntarily. He also affirmed an awareness of the various FRXUWGHFLVLRQPLJKWXQUHDVRQDEO\H[WHQGD6XSUHPH&RXUW
trial rights he was foregoing by pleading guilty. OHJDOSUHFHGHQWWRDQHZFRQWH[WZKHUHLWVKRXOGQRWDSSO\RU
XQUHDVRQDEO\UHIXVHWRH[WHQGWKDWSULQFLSOHWRDQHZFRQWH[W
The court then questioned Haynes briefly about the factual ZKHUH LW VKRXOG DSSO\ ,G DW   7KH 6XSUHPH &RXUW
basis for his plea. Haynes stated that other boys in the group UHFHQWO\ UHLWHUDWHG WKDW WKH :LOOLDPV REMHFWLYH
pulled a tree branch into the street to force cars to stop. When XQUHDVRQDEOHQHVV VWDQGDUG DSSOLHV WR WKH LQHIIHFWLYH
the victim, Gravel, stopped his car in front of the tree branch, DVVLVWDQFHRIFRXQVHOVHWWLQJ&RQH6&WDW,Q
Haynes ran out to the car intending to steal it. He was &RQH WKH &RXUW KHOG WKDW ZKHQ D VWDWH FRXUW FRUUHFWO\
carrying a handgun Miller had given him. As Haynes LGHQWLILHVWKH6WULFNODQGVWDQGDUGDVDSSOLFDEOHDQGPDNHVD
approached the car, it pulled away and he fired at the car. UHDVRQDEOH MXGJPHQW UHJDUGLQJ DWWRUQH\ SHUIRUPDQFH DQG
Haynes specifically admitted that he shot at the car as part of SUHMXGLFHXQGHUWKHFRUUHFWVWDQGDUGDIHGHUDOFRXUWODFNVWKH
his attempt to steal it. SRZHU WR JUDQW D ZULW RI KDEHDV FRUSXV FRQWUDYHQLQJ WKDW
GHWHUPLQDWLRQ  ,G DW   , ZRXOG QRW KROG WKDW WKH
Over the course of the next year, Chief Judge Roberson 0LFKLJDQFRXUWZDVREMHFWLYHO\XQUHDVRQDEOHLQLWVMXGJPHQW
held several hearings on the disposition of Haynes’ sentence. HYHQZHUH,WRGLVDJUHHZLWKLWDVWKHPDMRULW\GRHV
On August 28, 1991, the court sentenced Haynes to
confinement in a juvenile institution until age twenty-one. -XGJH*LOPDQ¶VFRQFXUUHQFHPDNHVDQXPEHURILQWHUHVWLQJ
SRLQWVWKDWGHVHUYHDEULHIUHVSRQVH&RQWUDU\WRWKHVWDWHPHQW
DWSDJH,KDGWKRXJKWWKDW,GLGQRWHLQWKHILUVWSDUDJUDSK
RIWKLVGLVVHQWDQGGLGQRWGLVSXWHWKHREYLRXVIDFWVLQWKH
UHFRUG WKDW FRXQVHO GLG QRW LQIRUP WKHLU FOLHQWV RI WKH
 0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO 1RV 1RV 0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO 
$VIRUWKHSUHMXGLFHHOHPHQWRI6WULFNODQGLWVHHPVFOHDU C. Post-plea Events
WKDWHYHQZLWKNQRZOHGJHRIWKHSRVVLELOLW\RISURVHFXWRULDO
DSSHDOSHWLWLRQHUVZRXOGVWLOOKDYHSOHGJXLOW\0LOOHUZDV After Chief Judge Roberson ordered that Miller and Haynes
H[SUHVVO\LQIRUPHGDWKLVVHQWHQFLQJKHDULQJRQ)HEUXDU\ be sentenced as juveniles, the prosecutor appealed each
WKDWWKHSURVHFXWLRQLQWHQGHGWRDSSHDOKLVVHQWHQFHDV sentence. The state court of appeals reversed on each
DMXYHQLOH0LOOHUDQGKLVDWWRUQH\QRWLFHGDQGGLVFXVVHGWKH defendant and remanded for imposition of the adult sentence:
SURVHFXWLRQ¶V FODLP WKDW LW FRXOG DSSHDO EXW IHOW WKDW WKH mandatory life imprisonment without parole on the first
SURVHFXWLRQZRXOGEHXQVXFFHVVIXORQDSSHDODMXGJPHQWWKDW degree murder charge. People v. Miller, 503 N.W.2d 89ZDVQRWREYLRXVO\XQUHDVRQDEOHJLYHQWKHVWDWHRIWKHODZDW (Mich. App. 1993); People v. Haynes, 502 N.W.2d 758WKDWWLPH0LOOHUGLGQRWDWWHPSWWRZLWKGUDZKLVJXLOW\SOHD (Mich. App. 1993). The state supreme court denied the
DVRIWKHVHQWHQFLQJKHDULQJ+D\QHVGHVSLWHWKHIDFWWKDWKLV defendants’ applications for leave to appeal those results.
FRGHIHQGDQW KDG EHHQ ZDUQHG RI WKH SRVVLELOLW\ RI
SURVHFXWRULDO DSSHDO DV RI )HEUXDU\  GLG QRW PRYH WR On remand before Chief Judge Roberson, the defendants
ZLWKGUDZ KLV SOHD GXULQJ WKH ILYH PRQWKV EHIRUH KLV RZQ moved to withdraw their guilty pleas and for evidentiary
VHQWHQFLQJRQ$XJXVW1HLWKHUSHWLWLRQHUDWWHPSWHG hearings on those motions. Haynes and Miller each alleged
WR ZLWKGUDZ KLV JXLOW\ SOHD DIWHU WKH SURVHFXWLRQ DFWXDOO\ that their guilty pleas had been involuntary due to ineffective
DSSHDOHGUDWKHUWKH\DUJXHGWKHLUFDVHRQWKHPHULWVEHIRUH assistance of trial counsel. They asserted, among other
WKH &RXUW RI $SSHDOV  7KLV PDNHV VHQVH HYHQ ZLWK WKH things, that their attorneys’ failure to inform them that the
SRVVLELOLW\RISURVHFXWRULDODSSHDOWKHFKDQFHWREHVHQWHQFHG prosecutor could appeal the imposition of a juvenile sentence
DVDMXYHQLOHZDVWKHLURQO\RSWLRQVKRUWRIWULDO3HWLWLRQHUV constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The court
ZDQWHG D MXYHQLOH VHQWHQFH QRW D QHZ WULDO  3HWLWLRQHUV granted the motions for evidentiary hearings.
WKURXJK FRXQVHO JDPHG WKH V\VWHP DQG DWWHPSWHG WR
ZLWKGUDZWKHLUJXLOW\SOHDVRQO\DIWHUWKHLUMXYHQLOHVHQWHQFHV The prosecutor applied to the state court of appeals for
ZHUHUHMHFWHGE\WKH&RXUWRI$SSHDOV7KLVSRVWFRQYLFWLRQ leave to file an interlocutory appeal of the orders granting
VWUDWHJ\JDYHSHWLWLRQHUVWZRELWHVDWWKHDSSOHWKDWWKH\QRZ evidentiary hearings. The Michigan Court of Appeals denied
DUJXHWKH\ZRXOGKDYHJLYHQXSWKHLUILUVWDQGH[DQWHPRUH the application. The Michigan Supreme Court, in lieu of
OLNHO\ELWHEHFDXVHRIWKHSRVVLELOLW\RISURVHFXWRULDODSSHDO granting leave to appeal, vacated the trial court’s orders
GHILHVFUHGHQFH granting the evidentiary hearings and directed that Haynes
and Miller be sentenced "forthwith" as adults "without
3HWLWLRQHUVZHUHYHU\DZDUHRIWKHSRVVLEOHFRQVHTXHQFHV prejudice to subsequent consideration of the motion[s] to
RISOHDGLQJ JXLOW\WRILUVWGHJUHHPXUGHU-XGJH5REHUVRQ withdraw the plea[s] of guilty." People v. Miller, 527
WROG WKHP EHIRUH WKH\ SOHG WKDW WKH\ FRXOG SRVVLEO\ EH N.W.2d 513 (Mich. 1994); People v. Haynes, 527 N.W.2d
VHQWHQFHGDVDGXOWVDQGWKHUHIRUHEHVXEMHFWWRDPDQGDWRU\ 512-13 (Mich. 1994).
OLIHVHQWHQFHDVDUHVXOWRIWKHLUJXLOW\SOHDV7KDWLVH[DFWO\
ZKDW KDSSHQHG DIWHU WKH SURVHFXWRULDO DSSHDO  3HWLWLRQHUV
NQHZWKHULVNDQGWRRNWKHLUFKDQFHV7KHIDFWWKDWWKH\GLG
QRW FRUUHFWO\ DVVHVV ZKHWKHU RU QRW WKH\ DFWXDOO\ ZRXOG EH
VHQWHQFHGDVDGXOWVLVZKROO\LUUHOHYDQW7KHSOHDZDVPDGH 
7KH SURVHFXWRU DSSHDOHG +D\QHV¶ VHQWHQFH E\ ULJKW 7KH DSSHDO LQ
YROXQWDULO\ DQG ZLWK IXOO NQRZOHGJH RI WKH SRVVLEOH 0LOOHU¶V FDVH ZDV QRW DV D PDWWHU RI ULJKW EHFDXVH WKH SURVHFXWRU GLG QRW
FRQVHTXHQFHV WLPHO\ ILOH WKH DSSHDO +RZHYHU WKH 0LFKLJDQ &RXUW RI $SSHDOV JUDQWHG
WKH SURVHFXWRU¶V DSSOLFDWLRQ IRU OHDYH WR DSSHDO
 0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO 1RV 1RV 0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO 
On December 19, 1994, Chief Judge Roberson imposed BBBBBBBBBBBBB
sentences of life imprisonment without possibility of parole.
The court subsequently held separate evidentiary hearings on ',66(17
Miller’s and Haynes’ motions to withdraw their guilty pleas. BBBBBBBBBBBBB
Haynes was the only witness at his evidentiary hearing. %2**6 &LUFXLW -XGJH GLVVHQWLQJ  , GLVDJUHH ZLWK WKH
+D\QHVWHVWLILHGWKDWKHWDONHGZLWKKLVFRXQVHO:LOIUHG5LFH PDMRULW\¶V DQDO\VLV DQG ZRXOG UHYHUVH WKH JUDQW RI KDEHDV
WZLFHLQWKHWKUHHZHHNVEHIRUHKLVJXLOW\SOHD(DFKYLVLW FRUSXV,WKHUHIRUHUHVSHFWIXOO\GLVVHQW7KH0LFKLJDQ&RXUW
ODVWHGOHVVWKDQWKLUW\PLQXWHVDQGHDFKFHQWHUHGRQ5LFH¶V RI $SSHDOV GHFLGHG WKDW LQ WKLV FDVH D IDLOXUH WR LQIRUP D
DGYLFHWKDW+D\QHVSOHDGJXLOW\EHIRUH&KLHI-XGJH5REHUVRQ FULPLQDOGHIHQGDQWEHIRUHDJXLOW\SOHDWKDWWKHSURVHFXWLRQ
+D\QHVWHVWLILHGWKDWKHZDVKHVLWDQWWRSOHDGJXLOW\EXWWKDW PD\KDYHDULJKWWRDSSHDOKLVEHLQJVHQWHQFHGDVDMXYHQLOH
5LFHUHSHDWHGO\WROGKLPWKDW it was in his interest to plead GRHV QRW FRQVWLWXWH LQHIIHFWLYH DVVLVWDQFH RI FRXQVHO  7R
before Chief Judge Roberson, where he would "have great VXFFHHGRQDFODLPRILQHIIHFWLYHDVVLVWDQFHRIFRXQVHOWKH
chances of being sentenced as a juvenile." SHWLWLRQHU PXVW VKRZ  GHILFLHQW SHUIRUPDQFH E\ WKH
DWWRUQH\DQGSUHMXGLFH6WULFNODQGY:DVKLQJWRQ
Haynes testified that Rice never told him that, even if Chief 86    /HJLWLPDWH WULDO WDFWLFV DUH H[SUHVVO\
Judge Roberson sentenced him as a juvenile, the prosecutor H[FOXGHGIURPWKHGHILQLWLRQRIGHILFLHQWSHUIRUPDQFH%HOO
could still appeal that sentence and an appellate court could Y&RQH6&W7RHVWDEOLVKSUHMXGLFH
impose an adult sentence of life without parole. Haynes DIWHUKDYLQJSOHGJXLOW\WKHSOHDGHUPXVWVKRZDUHDVRQDEOH
stated that he would not have pled guilty had he known this. SUREDELOLW\ WKDW KH ZRXOG QRW KDYH SOHG KDG KH UHFHLYHG
FRPSHWHQWDGYLFH+LOOY/RFNKDUW86,Q
Q So what is your understanding if you plead WKLV FDVH SHWLWLRQHUV KDYH HVWDEOLVKHG QHLWKHU HOHPHQW RI
guilty and you made it through the sentencing 6WULFNODQG
hearing and you could convince the judge to
sentence you as a juvenile, did you think $W WULDO SHWLWLRQHUV IDFHG QHDUFHUWDLQ FRQYLFWLRQ  7KH
there was anything after that? GHIHQVHV WKDW WKH\ ZRXOG KDYH DVVHUWHG DW WULDO ZHUH LQ
HVVHQFH YDJXH KRSHV IRU MXU\ QXOOLILFDWLRQ  7KHLU GHIHQVH
[Haynes] No. Besides the fact that I’d be going to [a FRXQVHONQHZKRZHYHUWKDWWKHUHZDVDYHU\UHDOKRSHWKDW
juvenile facility]. WKH\ FRXOG EH VHQWHQFHG DV  MXYHQLOHV LI WKH\ SOHG JXLOW\
EHFDXVHRIWKHVHQWHQFLQJKDELWVRIWKHSDUWLFXODUMXGJHLQWKH
.... FDVH&RXQVHOV¶SHUIRUPDQFHZDVQRWGHILFLHQWLQGHHGWKH
LGHDIRUWKHJDPEOHVSUDQJIURPGHIHQVHFRXQVHOV¶VXSHULRU
Q Did you have any idea that the prosection DQG LQWLPDWH NQRZOHGJH RI WKH FRXUW  7KHLU DWWRUQH\V
[sic] had any other option besides that H[SODLQHGWKHUDPLILFDWLRQVRIWKHGHFLVLRQWRSHWLWLRQHUVYHU\
hearing that they had in front of the Judge? FDUHIXOO\  3HWLWLRQHUV¶ SDUHQWV ZHUH LQYROYHG LQ WKH
GHFLVLRQPDNLQJ SURFHVV  7KH GHFLVLRQ WR SOHDG ZDV
FDOFXODWHGYROXQWDU\DQGLQIRUPHGWKLVLVSUHFLVHO\WKHVRUW
RI FRPSHWHQW UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ WKDW LV H[FOXGHG IURP WKH

6WULFNODQGGHILQLWLRQRIGHILFLHQWSHUIRUPDQFH6WULFNODQG
+D\QHV¶ WULDO FRXQVHO :LOIUHG 5LFH GLHG EHIRUH +D\QHV PRYHG WR 86DW&RQH6&WDW
ZLWKGUDZ KLV SOHD
 0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO 1RV 1RV 0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO 
WKDW EXW IRU FRXQVHO¶V HUURUV KH ZRXOG QRW KDYH SOHDGHG [Haynes] No.
JXLOW\DQGZRXOGKDYHLQVLVWHGRQJRLQJWRWULDO´6WULFNODQG
86DW³$UHDVRQDEOHSUREDELOLW\LVDSUREDELOLW\ Haynes J.A. at 176-77.
VXIILFLHQWWRXQGHUPLQHFRQILGHQFHLQWKHRXWFRPH´
Haynes also stated that he was innocent of first degree
murder because he did not intend to harm anyone. Contrary
to his testimony at the original plea hearing, Haynes denied
shooting at the car. He claimed that at the plea hearing he
was "under advisement" of his attorney to say that he shot at
the car.
We turn to Miller’s further proceedings. At the evidentiary
hearing on Miller’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea,
Miller’s trial counsel, Charles Lusby, testified. He stated that
he only did trial work and never handled appeals. Lusby
testified that he considered abandonment to be a possible
defense for Miller because when Miller gave the gun to
Haynes he was deferring to the older boys in the group. He
testified that Miller "practically totally rel[ied]" on his advice,
and that he convinced Miller’s parents, who also relied on
him, that pleading guilty was in Miller’s best interest.
Lusby stated that Miller was "reluctant" to plead guilty, but
that he "prevailed upon him," by telling him he likely would
be sentenced as a juvenile. Lusby testified that, based upon
his familiarity with the juvenile sentencing process, he
believed Chief Judge Roberson would sentence Miller as a
juvenile. Lusby considered his advice that Miller plead guilty
to first degree murder to be "extraordinary."
Lusby admitted that his considerations in formulating this
advice did not include any factor beyond what the trial court
would do.
Q In formulating your advice to Mr. Miller, did
you take into account the fact [that] the
prosecutor had since I believe 1988 the right
to appeal a sentence?
[Lusby] No, I did not.
 0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO 1RV 1RV 0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO 
Q Did you stop to consider that, did it occur to GLVVHQWXQGHUHVWLPDWHVWKHVLJQLILFDQFHRIDSRVVLEOHDSSHDOLQ
you? DQ\ FDOFXODWLRQ WKDW WKH SHWLWLRQHUV RU WKHLU FRXQVHO PDGH
0LOOHUDQG+D\QHVPLJKWKDYHEHOLHYHGWKDWWKH\KDGVD\DQ
[Lusby] That didn’t occur to me at all. FKDQFHRIEHLQJVHQWHQFHGDVMXYHQLOHVE\WKHSDUWLFXODU
WULDOMXGJHEHIRUHZKRPWKH\SOHGJXLOW\,IWKH\KDGEHHQ
Q Did you discuss that possible risk with Mr. DGYLVHGWKDWWKHVWDWHFRXOGDSSHDOKRZHYHUWKH\PLJKWKDYH
Miller? HYDOXDWHGWKHRGGVRIWKHWULDOMXGJH¶VGHWHUPLQDWLRQVEHLQJ
VXVWDLQHG RQ DSSHDO DV RQO\   7KH ULVN RI WKH WULDO
[Lusby] I discussed a lot of things with him, but that MXGJH¶VVHQWHQFLQJGHFLVLRQVEHLQJUHYHUVHGRQDSSHDOZRXOG
was not one of them. It didn’t occur to me LQWKLVH[DPSOHUHGXFHWKHXOWLPDWHOLNHOLKRRGRI0LOOHUDQG
that the prosecutor would do it, nor that the +D\QHVEHLQJVHQWHQFHGDVMXYHQLOHVIURPWRRQO\
appellate court would reverse that decision.
:HDUHXQDEOHRIFRXUVHWRGHWHUPLQHWKHH[DFWRGGVWKDW
Miller J.A. at 254-55. 0LOOHUDQG+D\QHVEHOLHYHGWKDWWKH\IDFHGSULRUWRSOHDGLQJ
JXLOW\EXWWKHDERYHH[DPSOHLOOXVWUDWHVWKHVLJQLILFDQFHRI
Lusby also testified that he recalled the prosecutor stating IDLOLQJWRFRQVLGHUWKHSRVVLELOLW\RIWKHVWDWHDSSHDOLQJ7KH
in his closing argument at the sentencing hearing that he IDFW WKDW 0LOOHU DQG +D\QHV ZHUH DZDUH RI WKH PD[LPXP
would appeal if Miller received a juvenile sentence. Lusby SHQDOW\ WKDW WKH\ IDFHG GRHV QRW WKHUHIRUH QHJDWH WKH
explained that Miller "was struck" by the prosecutor’s VLJQLILFDQFH RI WKH LQIRUPDWLRQ WKDW QHLWKHU WKH\ QRU WKHLU
statement, but "I think I told him I didn’t think [the FRXQVHOFRQVLGHUHG3HUKDSV0LOOHUDQG+D\QHVZRXOGKDYH
prosecutor] would be successful." SOHG JXLOW\ HYHQ LI WKH\ KDG NQRZQ WKDW WKH WULDO MXGJH¶V
VHQWHQFLQJGHFLVLRQVZHUHQRWWKHRQO\KXUGOHWKDWWKH\KDGWR
Miller also testified. He stated that when Lusby advised RYHUFRPH LQ RUGHU WR EH VHQWHQFHG DV MXYHQLOHV  %XW WKH\
him to plead guilty, Lusby did not tell him that the prosecutor ZHUH HQWLWOHG WR EH DGYLVHG RI DOO WKH ULVNV WKDW WKH\ IDFHG
could appeal and that the court of appeals had the authority to EHIRUHFKRRVLQJWRSOHDGJXLOW\DQGIRUHJRLQJWKHLUULJKWVWR
overturn Chief Judge Roberson’s decision. Miller stated that, MXU\WULDOV
had he known, he would not have pled guilty.
%HFDXVH,DPQRWFRQILGHQWWKDW0LOOHUDQG+D\QHVZRXOG
Regarding the factual basis for his plea, Miller stated that KDYH SOHG JXLOW\ LI WKHLU FRXQVHO KDG LQIRUPHG WKDW WKHLU
the version of the facts he gave at the plea hearing was VHQWHQFHVFRXOGEHDSSHDOHG,FRQFXUZLWKWKHOHDGRSLQLRQ
inaccurate: "I was speaking upon the elements that my lawyer LQ FRQFOXGLQJ WKDW WKH GHFLVLRQ RI WKH 0LFKLJDQ &RXUW RI
told me to speak on as far as first degree murder." Miller $SSHDOVZDVDQXQUHDVRQDEOHDSSOLFDWLRQRI6WULFNODQG
stated that when Gravel was killed he was seventy-five yards 86&†GSURYLGLQJWKDWDZULWRIKDEHDVFRUSXVLV
from the car and running away. Contrary to the statements he DYDLODEOH IRU D SHUVRQ LQ VWDWH FXVWRG\ LI WKH VWDWH FRXUW¶V
made at his plea hearing, Miller stated that there had been no DGMXGLFDWLRQRIWKHSHWLWLRQHU¶VFODLP³UHVXOWHGLQDGHFLVLRQ
plan to take a car and that he did not know what Haynes was WKDWLQYROYHGDQXQUHDVRQDEOHDSSOLFDWLRQRIFOHDUO\
planning to do when he gave him the gun. He did not intend HVWDEOLVKHG)HGHUDOODZDVGHWHUPLQHGE\WKH6XSUHPH&RXUW
to take part in a robbery. RI WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV´ +LOO Y /RFNKDUW  86  
³>,@QRUGHUWRVDWLVI\WKHµSUHMXGLFH¶UHTXLUHPHQWWKH
GHIHQGDQWPXVWVKRZWKDWWKHUHLVDUHDVRQDEOHSUREDELOLW\
 0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO 1RV 1RV 0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO 
³SUHMXGLFH´SURQJZHDUHQRWERXQGE\$('3$¶VGHIHUHQWLDO In October, 1995, the trial court determined that Miller’s
VWDQGDUGRIUHYLHZEHFDXVHWKH0LFKLJDQ&RXUWRI$SSHDOV and Haynes’ guilty pleas had not been voluntary, knowing,
QHYHUUHDFKHGWKHLVVXHRISUHMXGLFHZKHQLWGHWHUPLQHGWKDW and intelligent due to ineffectiveness of trial counsel. The
FRXQVHOV¶ SHUIRUPDQFH ZDV QRW GHILFLHQW  6HH *RQ]DOHV Y court granted each his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
0F.XQH  )G   WK &LU  The Michigan Court of Appeals granted leave to the
H[SODLQLQJWKDWEHFDXVHWKHVWDWHFRXUWFRQVLGHUHGRQO\WZR prosecutor to appeal those orders.
RI WKUHH UHTXLUHPHQWV QHFHVVDU\ WR HVWDEOLVK D YLRODWLRQ RI
%UDG\Y0DU\ODQG86DGHQRYRVWDQGDUG In a consolidated decision addressing Miller’s and Haynes’
RIUHYLHZDSSOLHGWRWKHWKLUGHOHPHQW,WKHUHIRUHEHOLHYH cases along with another similarly situated appellant,
WKDW WKH GLVVHQW¶V DSSOLFDWLRQ RI $('3$¶V ³REMHFWLYHO\ Dashawn Lyons,the appeals court reversed the trial court.
XQUHDVRQDEOH´WHVWWRWKHSUHMXGLFHFRPSRQHQWRI6WULFNODQG People v. Haynes (After Remand), 562 N.W.2d 241 (Mich.
LV QRW DSSURSULDWH  :LOOLDPV Y 7D\ORU  86   App. 1997). The court determined that the record showed
 FODULI\LQJ WKH PHDQLQJ RI DQ ³XQUHDVRQDEOH Miller and Haynes were aware at the time they pled guilty
DSSOLFDWLRQ´RIODZXQGHU86&†G that they might be sentenced as adults to mandatory terms of
life imprisonment without possibility of parole. In addition,
7KHGLVVHQWFRQFOXGHVWKDW0LOOHU¶VDQG+D\QHV¶VHIIRUWVWR Miller knew from the prosecutor’s closing argument at his
ZLWKGUDZ WKHLU JXLOW\ SOHDV FRQVWLWXWHG DWWHPSWV WR JHW ³D final sentencing disposition hearing that the prosecution could
VHFRQGELWHDWWKHDSSOH´DQGWKDWWKHSHWLWLRQHUVHQWHUHGWKHLU appeal if Miller received a juvenile sentence from the trial
JXLOW\ SOHDV YROXQWDULO\ DQG ZLWK IXOO NQRZOHGJH RI WKH court. Despite the knowledge each had, Miller and Haynes
SRVVLEOHVHQWHQFHVWKDWWKH\IDFHG,UHVSHFWIXOO\GLVDJUHH pled guilty and did not move to withdraw their pleas until
$OWKRXJK0LOOHUKHDUGWKHSURVHFXWRULQIRUPWKHWULDOMXGJH after the conclusion of the appeal regarding their sentences.
WKDW WKH VWDWH ZRXOG DSSHDO LI 0LOOHU ZHUH VHQWHQFHG DV D Therefore, the court concluded, Miller and Haynes understood
MXYHQLOHWKLVVWDWHPHQWFDPHHOHYHQPRQWKVDIWHUKLVJXLOW\ the consequences of their pleas, and the pleas were
SOHDDQGZDVLPPHGLDWHO\QHXWUDOL]HGE\KLVFRXQVHOWHOOLQJ knowingly, understandingly, and voluntarily made. Haynes
KLPQRWWRZRUU\DERXWDQ\DSSHDO7KLVDGYLFHRQFHPRUH (After Remand), 562 N.W.2d at 246, 248. The Michigan
GLVJXLVHGWKHDGGLWLRQDOULVNRIDQDSSHDOWKDW0LOOHUIDFHG Supreme Court denied Miller and Haynes leave to appeal.
0RUHRYHU WKH UHFRUG VXSSRUWV D ILQGLQJ WKDW 0LOOHU¶V DQG
+D\QHV¶VFRXQVHOQRWWKHSHWLWLRQHUVPDGHWKHGHFLVLRQVWR Miller and Haynes petitioned the federal district court for
SXUVXHWKHDSSHDOVIRUWKHLUUHVSHFWLYHFOLHQWV7KHUHLVQR writs of habeas corpus. The court granted the writs, ordering
LQGLFDWLRQ WKDW DQ\RQH LQIRUPHG 0LOOHU RU +D\QHV RI WKH that Miller and Haynes be released unless they were given
SRVVLELOLW\ RI ZLWKGUDZLQJ WKHLU JXLOW\ SOHDV SULRU WR trials. The district court concluded that Miller’s and Haynes’
VHQWHQFLQJRUGXULQJWKHVWDWH¶VDSSHDORIWKHLUVHQWHQFHV,GR trial counsel were ineffective in failing to advise them of the
QRWEHOLHYHWKDW0LOOHUDQG+D\QHVVKRXOGEHSHQDOL]HGIRU
ZKDWDSSHDUVWREHWKHGHFLVLRQVRIWKHLUFRXQVHOWRSXUVXHWKH
VWDWHFRXUWDSSHDOV7KXVWKHGLVVHQW¶VLQIHUHQFHWKDW0LOOHU
DQG +D\QHV ZHUH ³JDPLQJ WKH V\VWHP´ LV LQ P\ RSLQLRQ
XQZDUUDQWHGXQGHUWKHVHFLUFXPVWDQFHV

/\RQV DOVR SHWLWLRQHG IRU D ZULW RI KDEHDV FRUSXV LQ IHGHUDO GLVWULFW
:LWKUHVSHFWWRZKHWKHU0LOOHUDQG+D\QHVHQWHUHGWKHLU FRXUW ,Q DQ RSLQLRQ ILOHG FRQWHPSRUDQHRXVO\ ZLWK WKLV RSLQLRQ ZH KDYH
JXLOW\ SOHDV NQRZLQJO\ DQG LQWHOOLJHQWO\ , EHOLHYH WKDW WKH DIILUPHG WKH JUDQW RI KDEHDV FRUSXV UHOLHI WR /\RQV E\ WKH GLVWULFW FRXUW
6HH /\RQV Y -DFNVRQ BBB )G BBB WK &LU 
 0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO 1RV 1RV 0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO 
prosecutor’s right to appeal. As a result, Miller and Haynes DQG IDFWV UHOHYDQW WR SODXVLEOH RSWLRQV DUH YLUWXDOO\
had not pled guilty voluntarily or knowingly. The wardens XQFKDOOHQJHDEOHDQGVWUDWHJLFFKRLFHVPDGHDIWHUOHVVWKDQ
appealed to this court. FRPSOHWHLQYHVWLJDWLRQDUHUHDVRQDEOHSUHFLVHO\WRWKHH[WHQW
WKDWUHDVRQDEOHSURIHVVLRQDOMXGJPHQWVVXSSRUWWKHOLPLWDWLRQV
,,',6&866,21 RQLQYHVWLJDWLRQ´$VWKHOHDGRSLQLRQQRWHVDUHDVRQDEOH
DWWRUQH\ZRXOGKDYHFRQVLGHUHGWKHSRVVLELOLW\RIDQDSSHDO
$ +DEHDV&RUSXV5HYLHZ EHIRUHDGYLVLQJ0LOOHUDQG+D\QHVWRSOHDGJXLOW\XQGHUWKH
FLUFXPVWDQFHVRIWKHSUHVHQWFDVH
Provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act (AEDPA) codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) govern our )LQDOO\ , EHOLHYH WKDW WKH GLVVHQW¶V FRQVLGHUDWLRQ RI WKH
reviewRIWKHVWDWHFRXUWGHFLVLRQVLQWKLVKDEHDVFRUSXVFDVH VWUHQJWKRIWKHVWDWH¶VFDVHDJDLQVWWKHSHWLWLRQHUVLQDVVHVVLQJ
ZKHWKHUFRXQVHOSURYLGHGFRPSHWHQWUHSUHVHQWDWLRQLQFOXGLQJ
G $Q DSSOLFDWLRQ IRU D ZULW RI KDEHDV FRUSXV RQ WKHVXJJHVWLRQWKDWWKHLURQO\DYDLODEOHGHIHQVHZDVDKRSHIRU
EHKDOIRIDSHUVRQLQFXVWRG\SXUVXDQWWRWKHMXGJPHQWRI MXU\ QXOOLILFDWLRQ IRFXVHV RQ WKH ZURQJ LVVXH  7KH
D 6WDWH FRXUW VKDOO QRW EH JUDQWHG ZLWK UHVSHFW WR DQ\ SHWLWLRQHUVLQP\RSLQLRQZHUHHQWLWOHGWREHDGYLVHGRIWKH
FODLPWKDWZDVDGMXGLFDWHGRQWKHPHULWVLQ6WDWHFRXUW SRVVLELOLW\ RI DQ DSSHDO EHIRUH GHFLGLQJ ZKHWKHU WR SOHDG
SURFHHGLQJVXQOHVVWKHDGMXGLFDWLRQRIWKHFODLP² JXLOW\EHFDXVHZLWKRXWWKDWNQRZOHGJHWKHLUGHFLVLRQVZHUH
 UHVXOWHG LQ D GHFLVLRQ that was contrary to, or QRW EDVHG XSRQ DOO RI WKH UHOHYDQW IDFWV  $OWKRXJK WKH
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 6XSUHPH&RXUWKDVKHOGWKDWWKH6L[WK$PHQGPHQWGRHVQRW
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme UHTXLUH D FRUUHFW DVVHVVPHQW RI WKH ULVNV DQG EHQHILWV RI
Court of the United States[.] SOHDGLQJJXLOW\DVRSSRVHGWRSURFHHGLQJWRWULDOLWUHFRJQL]HV
WKDWFRXQVHOPXVWDWOHDVWEHDZDUHRIVXFKULVNVHVSHFLDOO\
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). ZKHUHWKHODFNRIDZDUHQHVVGLUHFWO\LPSDFWVWKHUHDVRQLQJ
EHKLQG ZKDWHYHU DGYLFH LV SURYLGHG  6HH 0F0DQQ Y
The federal district court considered Miller’s and Haynes’ 5LFKDUGVRQ86³4XHVWLRQVOLNHWKHVH
petitions for habeas corpus under the "unreasonable >UHODWLQJ WR WKH ULVNV RI WULDO@ FDQQRW EH DQVZHUHG ZLWK
application" prong of this statute. None of the parties argue FHUWLWXGH\HWDGHFLVLRQWRSOHDGJXLOW\PXVWQHFHVVDULO\UHVW
that the federal district court should have inquired whether XSRQFRXQVHO¶VDQVZHUVXQFHUWDLQDVWKH\PD\EH´8QLWHG
the Michigan Court of Appeals decision was "contrary to" 6WDWHV Y +DQOH\  )G   WK &LU 
clearly established federal law. We proceed, therefore, under UHFRJQL]LQJWKDW³DUHYHUVDOIRULQHIIHFWLYHDVVLVWDQFHZRXOG
the "unreasonable application" prong of 28 U.S.C. EHLQRUGHU´LIWKHGHIHQGDQWKDGSOHGJXLOW\VROHO\LQUHOLDQFH
§ 2254(d)(1). XSRQ KLV FRXQVHO¶V HUURQHRXV DGYLFH ³WKDW KH ZRXOG EH
HOLJLEOH IRU SDUROH LQ RQHWKLUG WKH WLPH KH UHFHLYHG IRU
VHQWHQFH´
, DOVR DJUHH ZLWK WKH OHDG RSLQLRQ WKDW LI FRXQVHO KDG
 LQIRUPHG0LOOHUDQG+D\QHVWKDWWKHVWDWHFRXOGDSSHDOWKH
,Q IHGHUDO GLVWULFW FRXUW +D\QHV DOOHJHG RWKHU JURXQGV IRU
LQHIIHFWLYHQHVV RI FRXQVHO 7KDW FRXUW KDYLQJ JUDQWHG UHOLHI EDVHG RQ
WULDO MXGJH¶V VHQWHQFLQJ GHFLVLRQV D UHDVRQDEOH SUREDELOLW\
+D\QHV¶ FRXQVHO¶V IDLOXUH WR DGYLVH KLP RI WKH SURVHFXWRU¶V ULJKW WR H[LVWV WKDW ERWK SHWLWLRQHUV ZRXOG KDYH SURFHHGHG WR WULDO
DSSHDO GLG QRW DGGUHVV WKRVH FODLPV +D\QHV Y %XUNH  )6XSSG UDWKHU WKDQ SOHDG JXLOW\  ,Q FRQVLGHULQJ 6WULFNODQG¶V
  (' 0LFK 
 0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO 1RV 1RV 0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO 
BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), the Supreme
Court elucidated the terms of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). First,
&21&855(1&( the Court explained that "clearly established Federal law, as
BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB determined by the Supreme Court" refers to the Court’s
holdings, as opposed to dicta, at the time of the relevant state
521$/'/((*,/0$1&LUFXLW-XGJHFRQFXUULQJ,IXOO\ court decision. Id. at 412. Second, the Court explained that
FRQFXUZLWKWKHOHDGRSLQLRQ¶VFRQFOXVLRQWKDW0LOOHU¶VDQG a state court decision unreasonably applies Supreme Court
+D\QHV¶VFRXQVHOZHUHFRQVWLWXWLRQDOO\LQHIIHFWLYHEHFDXVHRI precedent by either: (1) identifying the correct governing
WKHLUODZ\HUV¶IDLOXUHWRLQIRUPWKHSHWLWLRQHUVWKDWWKHVWDWH legal rule from Supreme Court precedent but unreasonably
FRXOGDSSHDOWKHGHFLVLRQRIWKHWULDOMXGJHWRVHQWHQFHWKHP applying it to the facts; or (2) unreasonably extending a legal
DVMXYHQLOHV0\UHDVRQIRUZULWLQJVHSDUDWHO\LVWRH[SODLQ principle from Supreme Court precedent to a new context
LQZKDW,UHJDUGDVDQH[WUHPHO\FORVHFDVHZK\,ILQGWKH where it should not apply or unreasonably refusing to extend
ZHOOZULWWHQGLVVHQWLQJRSLQLRQOHVVSHUVXDVLYHWKDQWKHOHDG that principle to a new context where it should apply. Id. at
RSLQLRQ 407. Finally, the Court declared that the application of law
must be objectively unreasonable, id. at 409, and not merely
/LNHWKHOHDGRSLQLRQ,EHOLHYHWKDWWKH0LFKLJDQ&RXUWRI incorrect or erroneous.
Id. at 411.
$SSHDOV¶VGHWHUPLQDWLRQWKDW0LOOHU¶VDQG+D\QHV¶VFRXQVHO
SHUIRUPHGFRPSHWHQWO\ZDVDQXQUHDVRQDEOHDSSOLFDWLRQRI
6WULFNODQGY:DVKLQJWRQ867KHGLVVHQW
LQFRQWUDVWILQGVFRXQVHOV¶SHUIRUPDQFHWREHFRQVWLWXWLRQDOO\
FRPSHWHQW D FRQFOXVLRQ ZLWK ZKLFK , GLVDJUHH IRU VHYHUDO
UHDVRQV 
7KH 6XSUHPH &RXUW LQ DFNQRZOHGJHG WKH GLIILFXOW\ LQ
GHILQLQJ WKH WHUP ³XQUHDVRQDEOH´ EXW H[SODLQHG WKDW ³LW LV D FRPPRQ WHUP
:LOOLDPV
)LUVW LQ UHDFKLQJ WKH FRQFOXVLRQ WKDW WKH SHWLWLRQHUV¶ LQ WKH OHJDO ZRUOG DQG DFFRUGLQJO\ IHGHUDO MXGJHV DUH IDPLOLDU ZLWK LWV
FRXQVHOSURYLGHGFRPSHWHQWUHSUHVHQWDWLRQWKHGLVVHQWGRHV PHDQLQJ´  86 DW  7KLV FLUFXLW KDV VWDWHG WKDW ZH ³UHO\ VROHO\ RQ
QRWDGGUHVVWKHIDLOXUHRIFRXQVHOWRLQIRUP0LOOHUDQG+D\QHV WKH 6XSUHPH &RXUW¶V GHFLVLRQ LQ :LOOLDPV IRU WKH DSSURSULDWH VWDQGDUG
WKDW WKH VWDWH FRXOG DSSHDO WKH WULDO MXGJH¶V VHQWHQFLQJ XQGHU † G´ Harris v. Stovall, 212 F.3d 940, 943 (6th Cir. 2000);
GHFLVLRQV  7KH GLVVHQW LQVWHDG IRFXVHV VROHO\ RQ ZKHWKHU
accord   )G   Q WK &LU  2WKHU
FLUFXLW FRXUWV WKDW KDYH DWWHPSWHG JUHDWHU FODULILFDWLRQ KDYH FRPH WR
0LOOHU Y )UDQFLV
FRXQVHOV¶VWUDWHJ\ZDVUHDVRQDEOHLQOLJKWRIWKHLUNQRZOHGJH ZLGHO\ GLYHUJHQW YLHZV RQ WKH PHDQLQJ RI ³XQUHDVRQDEOH´ &RPSDUH
RIWKHWULDOMXGJH¶VVHQWHQFLQJWHQGHQFLHVWKHUHE\RYHUORRNLQJ   )G   G &LU  VWDWLQJ WKDW DQ
³XQUHDVRQDEOH DSSOLFDWLRQ´ UHTXLUHV ³>V@RPH LQFUHPHQW RI LQFRUUHFWQHVV
)UDQFLV 6 Y 6WRQH
WKH YHU\ RPLVVLRQ WKDW LQ P\ RSLQLRQ UHQGHUHG WKH
SHUIRUPDQFHRIWKHSHWLWLRQHUV¶FRXQVHOGHILFLHQW EH\RQG HUURU´ EXW ³WKH LQFUHPHQW QHHG QRW EH JUHDW RWKHUZLVH KDEHDV
UHOLHI ZRXOG EH OLPLWHG WR VWDWH FRXUW GHFLVLRQV µVR IDU RII WKH PDUN DV WR
6HFRQG EHFDXVH 0LOOHU¶V DQG +D\QHV¶V FRXQVHO QHYHU
VXJJHVW MXGLFLDO LQFRPSHWHQFH¶´ TXRWLQJ
  )G   G &LU  ZLWK
0DWWHR Y 6XSHULQWHQGHQW 6&,
$OELRQ .LEEH Y 'XERLV  
FRQVLGHUHG WKH SRVVLELOLW\ RI WKH VWDWH DSSHDOLQJ WKH WULDO )G   VW &LU  ³>$@ VWDWH FRXUW GHFLVLRQ LV REMHFWLYHO\
MXGJH¶VVHQWHQFLQJGHFLVLRQVWKHLUDGYLVLQJWKHSHWLWLRQHUVWR XQUHDVRQDEOH XQGHU $('3$ RQO\ LI LW LV VR RIIHQVLYH WR H[LVWLQJ
SOHDG JXLOW\ WR ILUVWGHJUHH PXUGHU FDQQRW EH FRQVLGHUHG D SUHFHGHQW VR GHYRLG RI UHFRUG VXSSRUW RU VR DUELWUDU\ DV WR LQGLFDWH WKDW
UHDVRQDEOHVWUDWHJLFGHFLVLRQWRZKLFKGHIHUHQFHVKRXOGEH LW LV RXWVLGH WKH XQLYHUVH RI SODXVLEOH FUHGLEOH RXWFRPHV´ LQWHUQDO
TXRWDWLRQ PDUNV UHPRYHG DQG ZLWK 'HOJDGR Y /HZLV  )G  
DFFRUGHG  6WULFNODQG  86 DW  H[SODLQLQJ WKDW WK &LU  HTXDWLQJ DQ ³XQUHDVRQDEOH DSSOLFDWLRQ´ ZLWK ³FOHDU
³VWUDWHJLFFKRLFHVPDGHDIWHUWKRURXJKLQYHVWLJDWLRQRIODZ HUURU´ LH ³D GHILQLWH DQG ILUP FRQYLFWLRQ WKDW DQ HUURU KDV EHHQ
FRPPLWWHG´
 0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO 1RV 1RV 0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO 
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel III. CONCLUSION
In Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985) and Strickland v. We conclude that Miller and Haynes each received
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Supreme Court set out constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. We further
the law applicable to an ineffective assistance of counsel conclude that decisions to the contrary on the facts of each
claim such as that made by Miller and Haynes. Both Hill and case are unreasonable applications of clearly established
Strickland were clearly established federal law as determined federal law. We WKHUHIRUH $)),50 WKH IHGHUDO GLVWULFW
by the Supreme Court at the time of the final Michigan Court FRXUW¶V FRQGLWLRQDO JUDQW RI KDEHDV FRUSXV VHSDUDWHO\ IRU
of Appeals decision in 1997. 6HH:LOOLDPV86DW 0LOOHUDQG+D\QHV
UHIHUULQJWR6WULFNODQGDV³FOHDUO\HVWDEOLVKHGSUHFHGHQW´
DWWKHWLPHRID9LUJLQLDVWDWHFRXUW¶VGHFLVLRQ
Under Strickland, a defendant claiming ineffective
assistance of counsel must show both deficient performance
by counsel and prejudice to the defendant resulting from that
deficient performance. 466 U.S. at 687. To be deficient,
counsel’s performance must fall below an objective standard
of reasonableness. Id. at 687-88; Hill, 474 U.S. at 58-59. In
Hill, which applied Strickland to the guilty plea context, the
Court explained that a defendant shows prejudice by
demonstrating "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
errors, [the defendant] would not have pleaded guilty and
would have insisted on going to trial." Id. at 59.
Although the Michigan Court of Appeals did not mention
either Hill or Strickland by name, it did apply the law of those
cases. Thus, we must examine whether that court applied
Hill and Strickland unreasonably.

7KH FRXUW RI DSSHDOV UHFRJQL]HG WKDW D GHWHUPLQDWLRQ RI ZKHWKHU
0LOOHU¶V DQG +D\QHV¶ JXLOW\ SOHDV ZHUH PDGH NQRZLQJO\ DQG YROXQWDULO\
WXUQHG RQ ZKHWKHU WKHLU DWWRUQH\V¶ DGYLFH ZDV ³ZLWKLQ WKH UDQJH RI
FRPSHWHQFH GHPDQGHG RI DWWRUQH\V LQ FULPLQDO FDVHV´ +D\QHV $IWHU
5HPDQG  1:G DW   7KLV LV WKH HTXLYDOHQW RI WKH
SHUIRUPDQFH LQTXLU\ LQ 6WULFNODQG 6HH +LOO  86 DW   HTXDWLQJ
6WULFNODQG¶V SHUIRUPDQFH LQTXLU\ ZLWK FRQVLGHUDWLRQ RI ZKHWKHU FRXQVHO¶V
DGYLFH ZDV ³ZLWKLQ WKH UDQJH RI FRPSHWHQFH GHPDQGHG RI DWWRUQH\V LQ
FULPLQDO FDVHV´ Because WKH 0LFKLJDQ &RXUW RI $SSHDOV GHWHUPLQHG
0LOOHU¶V DQG +D\QHV¶ WULDO FRXQVHO SHUIRUPHG DGHTXDWHO\ LW GLG QRW UHDFK
WKH TXHVWLRQV ZKHWKHU 0LOOHU DQG +D\QHV HDFK ZHUH SUHMXGLFHG E\
GHILFLHQW SHUIRUPDQFH
 0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO 1RV 1RV 0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO 
Miller puts forth additional evidence that, with competent We emphasize that Hill and Strickland state the relevant
assistance, he would have pled not guilty. Lusby testified that law in this case. Relying on a string of circuit court cases, the
Miller pled guilty only reluctantly. The fact that Lusby had wardens argue that defense counsels’ failure to inform Miller
to prevail upon Miller to plead guilty tends to corroborate and Haynes of the prosecution's right to appeal the imposition
Miller’s testimony that he would have pled not guilty had he of a juvenile sentence does not comprise ineffective
known of the prosecutor’s right to appeal. Lusby convinced assistance because the prosecutor’s right of appeal represents
Miller to plead, but did so without advising him of the full a collateral, as opposed to a direct, consequence of the plea.
risk he faced of receiving a life sentence. This evidence We reject this argument on two grounds.
shows that Miller would have been less likely to plead guilty
had he been competently advised of all the risks. First, the wardens’ reliance on circuit court cases is
improper. The AEDPA prohibits use of lower court decisions
Warden Straub argues that Miller actually knew before he in determining whether the state court decision is contrary to,
was sentenced that the prosecutor could appeal. The or is an unreasonable application of, clearly established
prosecutor did state in his closing argument at Miller’s final federal law. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412 (defining "clearly
sentencing hearing that he would appeal if Miller was established law as determined by the Supreme Court" to mean
sentenced as a juvenile. However, tKHGLHKDGDOUHDG\EHHQ holdings of Supreme Court decisions); Harris, 212 F.3d at
FDVW0LOOHU¶VILQDOVHQWHQFLQJKHDULQJFDPHHOHYHQPRQWKV 944 (holding district court erred in "rely[ing] on authority
DIWHU KLV SOHD KDG EHHQ DFFHSWHG DQG /XVE\ GLVPLVVHG WKH other than that of the Supreme Court of the United States in
FRQFHUQV 0LOOHU H[SUHVVHG WR KLP DERXW WKH SURVHFXWRU
V its analysis under § 2254(d)").
VWDWHPHQWEHFDXVH/XVE\FRQVLGHUHGWKHSURVHFXWRUXQOLNHO\
WRVXFFHHG0LOOHU¶VIDLOXUHVXGGHQO\WRUHMHFWKLVFRXQVHO¶V Second, the wardens’ argument is incompatible with
DGYLFHXSRQZKLFKKHUHOLHGKHDYLO\DQGSUHVVWRZLWKGUDZ Supreme Court case law. The Court does not use a
KLVJXLOW\SOHDD\HDUDIWHUKHPDGHLWGRHVQRWVKRZ0LOOHU direct/collateral consequence categorization scheme to decide
ZDVXQSUHMXGLFHGE\/XVE\¶VLQFRPSHWHQFH ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Indeed, in Hill, the
Supreme Court reviewed an Eighth Circuit decision holding
We conclude that Miller’s and Lusby’s testimony, along that parole eligibility was not a "direct consequence" of a
with reasonable inferences from the facts and circumstances guilty plea. See Hill v. Lockhart, 731 F.2d 568, 570-73 (8th
of this case, are sufficient to demonstrate not only a Cir. 1984). The Court noted this holding, but eschewed any
reasonable probability that Miller would have decided to such characterization in favor of directly applying Strickland
plead not guilty but also that a contrary conclusion is to the plea context. Hill, 474 U.S. at 55, 57-60. As the Court
objectively unreasonable. stated in Williams: "the Strickland test provides sufficient
guidance for resolving virtually all ineffective-assistance-of-
The untimely death of Haynes’ trial counsel prevents him counsel claims." 529 U.S. at 391.
from offering any corroborative testimony that Haynes would
have pled not guilty. In these special circumstances, we C. Analysis
conclude that Haynes’ claim and the absence of any evidence
or tenable argument to the contrary is sufficient to establish The federal district court concluded that the Michigan
not only a reasonable likelihood that he would have pled not Court of Appeals decision was an unreasonable application of
guilty, but also that any contrary conclusion is objectively Hill and Strickland. We review de novo a district court’s
unreasonable. legal conclusions in a habeas corpus proceeding. Miller v.
 0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO 1RV 1RV 0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO 
Francis, 269 F.3d 609, 613 (6th Cir. 2001). Where, as here, [Miller and Haynes] might not have been told that the
the district court’s factual findings are based on a transcript prosecution could appeal [the juvenile] sentence [they were]
from the state court proceedings and the district court makes never assured of receiving in the first place should be of no
no credibility determination, we also review those findings de consequence."
novo. Id. We must determine whether it is an unreasonable
application of Hill and Strickland to hold either: (1) that the The wardens maintain that if a defendant is aware of the
petitioners’ trial counsel provided them with objectively maximum possible sentence he cannot be prejudiced by his
reasonable assistance; or (2) that even if the petitioners had counsel's failure to inform him of the prosecutor's right to
been reasonably advised, they stillZRXOGKDYHSOHGJXLOW\ appeal. We decline to adopt the wardens’ argument. An
awareness of the sentencing range available to the trial judge
 3HUIRUPDQFHRI&RXQVHO is not the same as an informed understanding that a
sentencing judge's decision is subject to reversal. The rule
The proper measure of attorney performance is whether suggested by the warden would preclude courts from finding
counsel’s assistance was reasonable "under prevailing prejudice in any situation where the defendant knew the range
professional norms" and "considering all the circumstances." of penalties to which he was subject.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. We make a case-by-case
examination of the evidence, Williams, 529 U.S. at 391, and Furthermore, the circumstances of these cases illustrate the
"indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls failings of the wardens’ argument. Miller and Haynes pled
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." guilty in hopes of avoiding life imprisonment without parole.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. A reduced likelihood of being sentenced as an adult was the
sole benefit of their guilty pleas before Chief Judge Roberson.
The professional norms that guide us rest upon defense In reality, the risk of being sentenced as an adult came in two
counsel’s fundamental duties "to bring to bear such skill and parts: (1) being sentenced as an adult by Chief Judge
knowledge as will render the trial a reliable adversarial testing Roberson; and (2) having received a juvenile sentence from
process" and "to consult with the defendant on important Chief Judge Roberson, being subject to a successful appeal by
decisions and to keep the defendant informed of important the prosecutor. Miller and Haynes, however, each received
developments in the course of the prosecution." Id. at 688. from his attorney information of only the first risk. Defense
counsel's failure to assess all the risks and inform Miller and
The federal district court articulated the circumstances Haynes left each of them to make the most important decision
relevant to the performance inquiry in this case: of his life without essential information. Presented with all
the risks, Haynes and Miller might well have decided to plead
[T]rial counsel’s performance was deficient within the not guilty and to take their chances at trial. To meet the
meaning of the Strickland standard where he failed to prejudice requirement under Hill and Strickland, Haynes and
advise petitioner that the prosecutor could appeal a Miller need only show a reasonable probability that they
juvenile sentence to a Michigan appellate court with the would have pled not guilty had their attorneys competently
very real possibility that a higher court would order advised them.
petitioner resentenced as an adult. Because of
petitioner’s young age, petitioner was particularly reliant
on his attorney’s advice to plead guilty to the offenses in
this case. In light of what amounted to extraordinary WHVWLILHG WKDW KLV DSSHOODWH FRXQVHO DGYLVHG KLP WKHUH ZHUH RWKHU VWHSV WR
EH WDNHQ EHIRUH WKH\ VKRXOG FRQVLGHU ZLWKGUDZLQJ WKH SOHD
 0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO 1RV 1RV 0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO 
2. Prejudice advice by counsel that petitioner plead guilty to an
offense which carried a mandatory sentence of life
To determine whether the petitioners were prejudiced by imprisonment without parole, counsel had a duty both to
their attorneys’ deficient performance, we ask whether there consider and to advise petitioner of the prosecutor’s right
is a reasonable probability that, had they been advised of the to appeal any sentence to the Michigan appellate courts,
prosecutor’s right of appeal, they would have pled not guilty. with the possibility that petitioner’s juvenile sentence
A "reasonable probability" is a probability sufficient to would be overturned on appeal and he would then have
undermine confidence in the outcome; it is less than a to serve a nonparolable life sentence.
preponderance of the evidence. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
Haynes v. Burke, 115 F.Supp.2d 813, 819 (E.D. Mich.
Both Miller and Haynes testified similarly at the 2000).
evidentiary hearings on their plea withdrawal motions that
each was initially hesitant to plead guilty, and that each would 0LOOHU¶VWULDOFRXQVHO/XVE\EURXJKWWREHDURQWKLVFDVH
have pled not guilty had each known the prosecutor could KLVNQRZOHGJHRIWKHMXYHQLOHVHQWHQFLQJSURFHVVDQG&KLHI
appeal. This testimony, though self-serving, may be enough -XGJH5REHUVRQ
VVHQWHQFLQJSUDFWLFHV7KHUHLVQRGRXEWWKDW
by itself to satisfy the prejudice prong under the LQWKLVUHJDUG0LOOHULQLWLDOO\EHQHILWWHGIURP/XVE\
VDGYLFH
circumstances here. See Magana v. Hofbauer, 263 F.3d 542, )XUWKHUPRUH/XVE\DGHTXDWHO\LQIRUPHG0LOOHUUHJDUGLQJWKH
547 n.1 (6th Cir. 2001) (noting that, unlike the Seventh and ULVN UHODWHG WR &KLHI -XGJH 5REHUVRQ¶V VHQWHQFLQJ
Second Circuits, this Circuit has not explicitly adopted a GHWHUPLQDWLRQ0LOOHUunderstood that if he pled guilty &KLHI
requirement that in order to establish prejudice a defendant -XGJH 5REHUVRQ FRXOG RSW WR LPSRVH HLWKHU D VHYHUH DGXOW
must come forward with objective evidence in addition to his VHQWHQFHRIOLIHLPSULVRQPHQWRUDOHQLHQWMXYHQLOHVHQWHQFH
post-conviction claim that he would have changed his mind
about pleading guilty). The circumstances of these cases do +RZHYHU/XVE\DFWHGLQFRPSHWHQWO\LQIDLOLQJWRFRQVLGHU
not require that we resolve this issue today. WKHOLNHOLKRRGWKDWWKHSURVHFXWRUZRXOGH[HUFLVHKLVULJKWWR
DSSHDOWKHGLVWULFWFRXUW
VLPSRVLWLRQRIDMXYHQLOHVHQWHQFH
The wardens argue that Miller and Haynes could not have $Q\MXYHQLOHVHQWHQFHLPSRVHGRQ0LOOHUZRXOGEHOHVVWKDQ
been prejudiced by any deficiency on the part of their trial VL[\HDUVLQDMXYHQLOHIDFLOLW\*LYHQVXFKDOHQLHQWVHQWHQFH
counsel because they acknowledged at their March 1990 plea IRUILUVWGHJUHHPXUGHULWZDVXQUHDVRQDEOHIRU/XVE\QRWWR
hearings that they could be sentenced to life imprisonment KDYH FRQVLGHUHG WKDW WKH SURVHFXWRU FRXOG DSSHDO DQG WKH
without parole.$FFRUGLQJWRWKHZDUGHQV"the fact that MXYHQLOHVHQWHQFHFRXOGEHUHYHUVHG287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
As a result, Lusby misinformed Miller regarding the
likelihood he would receive an adult sentence. Miller was not We conclude that Miller’s trial counsel was incompetent.
fully apprised of the risks he faced. It is an objectively unreasonable application of Hill and
Strickland for the Michigan Court of Appeals to hold
The duty of defense counsel to consult is paramount when otherwise.
a client has to decide whether or not to waive a constitutional
right, such as the right to trial. Because the decision whether Haynes testified that his trial counsel, Rice, similarly failed
or not to plead guilty ultimately rests with the client, see to inform him of the prosecutor’s right to appeal the trial
Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) ("the accused has court’s imposition of a juvenile sentence. Due to Rice’s
the ultimate authority to make certain fundamental decisions death, Haynes was unable to offer any testimony which might
regarding the case, as to whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, corroborate this assertion. TKH0LFKLJDQ&RXUWRI$SSHDOV
testify in his or her own behalf, or take an appeal"); DVVXPHGWKDW+D\QHV¶GHIHQVHFRXQVHOGLGQRWLQIRUPKLPWKDW
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 93 n.1 (1977) (Burger, WKH SURVHFXWRU FRXOG DSSHDO WKH WULDO FRXUW¶V VHQWHQFLQJ
C.J., concurring) ("[o]nly such basic decisions as whether to GHFLVLRQ+D\QHV$IWHU5HPDQG1:GDWQ
plead guilty, waive a jury, or testify in one's own behalf are 7KHIHGHUDOGLVWULFWFRXUWDFFHSWHGWKDWDVVXPSWLRQHaynes
ultimately for the accused to make"), counsel must ensure that v. Burke, 115 F.Supp.2d at 818. ,QKHUDSSHDOWRWKLVFRXUW
the client's decision is as informed as possible. Failing even :DUGHQ%XUNHGRHVQRWFKDOOHQJHWKHIDFWWKDW5LFHGLGQRW
to consider, let alone notify the client of, a factor that could LQIRUP +D\QHV RI WKH SURVHFXWRU¶V ULJKW WR DSSHDO  7KHUH
negate the entire benefit of the guilty plea is not within the EHLQJQRWKLQJLQWKHUHFRUGWRFRQWUDGLFWWKH0LFKLJDQFRXUW¶V
range of professional norms. DVVXPSWLRQZHDGRSWLW
With this assumption made, the reasoning from Miller’s
case applies. Like Miller, Haynes should have been fully
PRUH VHYHUH VHQWHQFH
apprised of the risks he faced, but was not. We conclude that
 Haynes’ trial counsel was incompetent and that it is an
&LWLQJ WKH 6XSUHPH &RXUW¶V UHFHQW GHFLVLRQ LQ %HOO Y &RQH 
6&W   WKH GLVVHQW VWDWHV WKDW DQ DWWRUQH\¶V OHJLWLPDWH WULDO
objectively unreasonable application of Hill and Strickland
WDFWLFV GR QRW FRQVWLWXWH GHILFLHQW SHUIRUPDQFH $ GHIHQVH FRXQVHO¶V for the Michigan Court of Appeals to hold otherwise.
IDLOXUH WR FRQVLGHU D SURVHFXWRU¶V ULJKW WR DSSHDO LV QRW D WDFWLF RU VWUDWHJ\
$ GHIHQVH FRXQVHO¶V IDLOXUH WR LQIRUP RU DGYLVH WKH GHIHQGDQW UHJDUGLQJ
WKH VWDWH¶V ULJKW RI DSSHDO DQG WKH DWWHQGDQW FKDQFHV RI UHYHUVDO LV QRW D
WDFWLF RU VWUDWHJ\ 6XFK RPLVVLRQV RI OHJDO SUDFWLFH DQG OHJDO FRXQVHOLQJ FDQ QHYHU EH D OHJLWLPDWH GHIHQVH WDFWLF RU VWUDWHJ\