Muskegon Twnshp v. Muskegon ( 2002 )

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&/$< &LUFXLW -XGJH  Plaintiff, Charter Township of
Muskegon, appeals from the district court’s order entered on
November 13, 2000, denying its motion for relief from
judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5), and
sua sponte dismissing in its entirety this action brought
against Defendant, the City of Muskegon, for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. For the reasons set forth below, ZH
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In 1958, the Charter Township of Muskegon, Michigan
("the Township") issued revenue bonds to finance the
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UHPDQGIRUVXFKDKHDULQJ7KH7RZQVKLSGRHVQRWH[SODLQ construction of the Muskegon Township Water Distribution
ZKDW HYLGHQFH LW ZRXOG XVH WR UHIXWH DQ\ RI WKH SUHYLRXV System No. 2. The Township went into default, and in 1964,
GHWHUPLQDWLRQVE\WKHFRXUW7KHUHIRUH,ZRXOGILQGWKDWWKH certain out-of-state bondholders filed a diversity action in the
GLVWULFWFRXUWKDVPDGHLWVUXOLQJXQGHU5XOHEDQGWKDWLW United States District Court for the Western District of
GLGQRWDEXVHLWVGLVFUHWLRQLQGHQ\LQJWKHUHOLHIUHTXHVWHG Michigan in order to protect their interests. The case was
7KXV,ZRXOGDIILUPWKHDOWHUQDWLYHGHFLVLRQE\WKHGLVWULFW docketed as No. 4731. Both the Township and the City of
FRXUW,QP\RSLQLRQVXFKDUHVXOWGRHVQRWFRQWUDGLFWWKH Muskegon, Michigan ("the City") were named as defendants.
GHFLVLRQLQ5RJHUV
A trial was held in 1969. Excerpts from the proceedings
over which District Judge W. Wallace Kent presided
indicated that the parties were seeking to reach a settlement
and that it was "understood that the decree [settlement] may
include a provision that upon retirement of all the bonds and
upon payment of all the bonds and upon payment of all the
other obligations of the Township system, that the Township
system will then become merged into and become part of the
water system of the City of Muskegon." (J.A. at 78-79.)
Significant to the matter at hand, the excerpts from the
proceedings also indicate that the following colloquy took
place:
THE COURT: Mr. Frederick, did you have something
to say?
FREDERICK: Sir, going back to your last statement on
the City’s assumption of the ownership
of the system, should we have the words,
"existing bond issue."
THE COURT: Yes, existing bond issue.
FREDERICK: There may be more issued in the future,
and this could go on for ever and ever.
THE COURT: Everything as to the bond issue,
reference is made to that which is the
subject of the lawsuit and no other bond
issue. And no obligations except those
required in order to remedy the default,
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except as the income of the  well, no, I BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB
think we can leave it right there, because
from then on you are the operators. So &21&855,1*,13$57',66(17,1*,13$57
when those obligations are liquidated, BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB
then the system becomes part of the City
system. It is merged into it. 6,/(5&LUFXLW-XGJHFRQFXUULQJLQSDUWDQGGLVVHQWLQJLQ
SDUW  , FRQFXU ZLWK WKH FRQFOXVLRQ DQG UHDVRQLQJ RI WKH
KNUDSON: Okay, they take over the assets and PDMRULW\RSLQLRQRQZKHWKHUWKHGLVWULFWFRXUWKDGMXULVGLFWLRQ
liabilities. ,Q VKRUW , DJUHH WKDW WKHUH ZDV MXULVGLFWLRQ WR FRQVLGHU WKH
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THE COURT: Liabilities and everything; it all IURP WKH GHFLVLRQ WKDW WKH PDWWHU VKRXOG EH UHPDQGHG IRU
becomes part of the City system. IXUWKHUSURFHHGLQJV
(J.A. at 79.) $GPLWWHGO\5RJHUVY6WUDWWRQ,QGXVWULHV,QF)G
WK&LUVWDWHVWKDW³LIDFRXUWGRHVQRWKDYH
On June 15, 1972, judgment was entered by Judge Kent. MXULVGLFWLRQLSVRIDFWRLWFDQQRWDGGUHVVWKHPHULWVRIDFDVH´
The judgment, which provided a method for ensuring that the +RZHYHUZHQRZKROGWKDWWKHGLVWULFWFRXUWKDGMXULVGLFWLRQ
bonds would be paid, resulted from efforts by the Township LQWKHFDVH7KHFRXUWPDGHDQDOWHUQDWLYHUXOLQJFDOOHGGLFWD
and the City to reach a settlement. The judgment ordered the E\WKHPDMRULW\RSLQLRQWKDWLIMXULVGLFWLRQZHUHSUHVHQWWKHQ
City to assume operation of the water system in the capacity LWZRXOGVWLOOGHQ\WKHPRWLRQWRUHOLHYHWKH7RZQVKLSIURPD
of trustee and to loan sufficient funds to the water system to ILQDOMXGJPHQW
cure any default in its bonded obligations. Paragraphs 7 and
12 of the judgment are relevant to this case and provide, 7KHGLVWULFWFRXUWVHWRXWYDOLGUHDVRQVZK\LWZRXOGGHQ\
respectively, that WKH PRWLRQ  )LUVW  WKH DUJXPHQW E\ WKH 7RZQVKLS WKDW LWV
ILQDQFLDOKHDOWKKDGFKDQJHGWRVXFKDGHJUHHWKDWWKH
[t]he rates and charges of the township customers shall FRQVHQW MXGJPHQW VKRXOG EH VHW DVLGH ZDV LQVXIILFLHQW WR
become uniform with the rates and charges throughout UHYHUVHWKHLQWHQWRIWKHMXGJPHQW,WIRXQGQRLQHTXLW\LQWKH
the City when all the outstanding bonds have been fully WUDQVIHURIWKHZDWHUV\VWHPWRWKH&LW\0RUHRYHUWKHGLVWULFW
paid for the existing bond issue and the City has been FRXUW GHFLGHG WKDW WKH 7RZQVKLS KDG QRW ILOHG LWV PRWLRQ
fully reimbursed of any monies it may have obliged to ZLWKLQDUHDVRQDEOHWLPHEHFDXVHWKH\HDUGHOD\LQILOLQJ
loan to the Muskegon Township Water Distribution WKHPRWLRQZDVZHOOEH\RQGWKHWLPHOLPLWDWLRQFRQWHPSODWHG
System No. 2. E\5XOHE,WFRQFOXGHGWKDWWKH&LW\ZRXOGEHH[WUHPHO\
*** SUHMXGLFHGLIWKHFRXUWUHYLVLWHGWKHPDWWHUDIWHUWKH&LW\KDG
The City’s trusteeship and its obligation to maintain UHOLHG XSRQ WKH MXGJPHQW IRU DOPRVW  \HDUV DEVHQW DQ\
books and records shall continue until all existing bond FKDOOHQJHE\WKH7RZQVKLS
and other obligations of the System, including
obligations due the City, are paid in full, at which time $OWKRXJKWKH7RZQVKLSZDQWVWKHPDWWHUWREHUHPDQGHG
title to the said Muskegon Township Water Distribution IRU D KHDULQJ RQ WKH PHULWV RI WKH PRWLRQ WKH FRXUW KDV
System No. 2 and any future extensions thereto shall vest DOUHDG\PDGHLWVUXOLQJ,WZRXOGEHDQH[HUFLVHLQIXWLOLW\WR
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prevent suit in federal court against municipal subdivisions of in the City of Muskegon and shall be merged into the
a state, as is the case here. See Lawson v. Shelby County, City Water System. Rates and charges shall thereafter be
Tenn., 211 F.3d 331, 335 (6th Cir. 2000). uniform throughout the City and Township except where
a differential is justified as hereinbefore provided.
Having concluded that the district court erred in finding
that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the Township’s motion (J.A. at 77-78; emphasis added.)
brought under Rule 60(b)(5), the question becomes whether
to consider district court’s ruling, albeit made in dicta, that The City made its final payment on the 1958 bonds in May
the Township would not have prevailed with its motion in any of 1998. At that point, all debts and obligations existing in
event, or whether to send the matter back to the district court 1972 were paid in full, and according to the City, it
with instructions for the court to hold a hearing on the motion. automatically acquired title to the system at that time. In a
The Township contends that the district court inappropriately June 30, 1998, letter from the City to the Township, the
addressed the merits of the case after ruling that it did not parties attempted to negotiate a new water service agreement.
have jurisdiction to hear the matter, particularly without In the interim, the arrangement that was in place prior to the
hearing any evidence on the merits of the motion. The last bond payment by the City was continued. Then, on
Township relies upon Rogers v. Stratton Industries, Inc., 798 August 29, 2000, after no agreement could be reached, the
F.2d 913, 917 (6th Cir. 1986), wherein this Court held that "if City gave notice to the Township that effective September 29,
a court does not have jurisdiction, ipso facto, it cannot address 2000, it would assume ownership and operation of the water
the merits of a case." We agree with the Township, and system in accordance with the 1972 judgment. The Township
therefore find that the Township should be heard before the responded by filing a Rule 60(b) motion in district court
district court adjudicates the motion. under the 1972 case number to enjoin the City from assuming
ownership. The motion was, however, docketed by the clerk
CONCLUSION as a new case and given a new case number.
For the above stated reasons, the district court’s order On October 4, 2000, a hearing was held by the district
dismissing Plaintiff’s claim is REVERSED and the case is court, Judge Bell, presiding, regarding the Township’s request
REMANDED with instructions for the court to hold a for injunctive relief. The court sua sponte expressed concern
hearing on the merits of Plaintiff’s Rule 60(b) motion. regarding its jurisdiction given that the out-of-state
bondholders were no longer parties to the action, and neither
diversity jurisdiction nor federal question jurisdiction
appeared to be present. The court instructed the parties to
brief the issue, and took the matter under advisement.
Thereafter, on November 9, 2000, the district court entered an
opinion and an order wherein the court ruled "that the prior
judgment vesting title of the Muskegon Township Water
Distribution System must stand," that it did not have "subject
matter jurisdiction over the present controversy of rate setting,
and [that] the parties should seek redress in the appropriate
state forum on those issues." (J.A. at 76-87.)
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In dicta, the district court determined that even if it did 280 F.3d at 271 ("This court has held that ‘[t]he definitional
have jurisdiction over the matter, it would deny the Township limitation in subsection (5) is significant in that it empowers
the relief that it was seeking. The court began by noting that a court to modify a judgment only if it is ‘prospective,’ or
the Township was seeking to revisit the 1972 judgment under ‘executory.’").
Federal Rule Civil Procedure 60(b)(5), which allows a court
to relieve a party from a final judgment when "‘the judgment The district court viewed this action as completely divorced
has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or . . . it is no from the original suit, finding that it lacked jurisdiction
longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective because the parties were not diverse and no federal question
application.’" (J.A. at 83.) The court noted that any motion was involved. The court relied on Evans v. City of Chicago,
brought under this Rule "‘must be made within a reasonable 10 F.3d 474 (1993), to illustrate why it could not exercise
time,’" and that the Township’s motion some twenty-eight continuing jurisdiction over the matter. The district court’s
years after judgment was entered was not within a reasonable reliance on Evans is misplaced.
time, nor did the judgment rise to the level of inequity
necessary for the court to revisit it. (J.A. at 83-84.) The In Evans, the court reasoned that "the district court’s
district court opined that authority to adopt a consent decree comes only from the
statute which the decree is intended to enforce, not from the
[t]he Township seems to want to have its cake and eat parties’ consent to the decree." Id. at 478. (internal quotation
it, too. Having struck a bargain with the City in 1972 to marks and citation omitted). Because the federal law upon
save the Township from financial default, it now wishes which the original injunction was based had changed, the
to retain the City’s benefit of the bargain. In dismissing original injunction had no force and there was no reason for
the current case, this Court allows the Township to the federal court to continue enforcement of the consent
pursue its aims in the appropriate forum  the courts of decree. See id.; see also Sweeton v. Brown, Jr., 27 F.3d 1162,
the State of Michigan, while at the same time ruling that 1166 (6th Cir. 1994) ("As in Evans, there is no federal interest
the 1972 judgment stands. here. Injunctions may be modified ‘when the statutory or
decisional law has changed to make legal what the decree was
*** designed to prevent.’ Here, the decisional law has changed so
that the enjoined behavior, which once might have been a
A court should engage in post-judgment consideration violation of federal law, is no longer a matter of federal law
of the equities of the judgment "only under at all.") (quoting Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502
circumstances when the judgment involves prospective U.S. 367 (1992)). In other words, in Evans, the court found
obligations and effects requiring ongoing court that it could not monitor a consent decree because the law
supervision or execution." The judgment in this case upon which the decree was based had changed, leaving
does not involve prospective obligations, nor does it nothing to monitor. That is not the case here. Finally, the
require ongoing court supervision. The judgment was district court’s reliance on Pennhurst State School & Hospital
fully executed in 1998 when the original bondholders v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) is misplaced inasmuch as
were repaid, and title to the water system vested in the in Pennhurst the Supreme Court held that the Eleventh
City. Further arbitration contemplated by the judgment Amendment prohibits a federal court from ordering state
concerning rates can be done through the appropriate officials to conform their conduct to state law; however, it is
state forum. well established that the Eleventh Amendment does not
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the district court had jurisdiction when the suit was filed, (J.A. at 85-87 (citation omitted).)
it has jurisdiction to entertain a Rule 60(b) motion. This
jurisdiction is not divested by subsequent events." The Township filed the instant appeal from the district
court’s order, and also moved before this Court for injunctive
However, the district court may need independent relief pending appeal. In so moving, the Township requested
jurisdictional grounds if it does anything more than that the City be enjoined from: (1) taking any action to
relieve a party from a judgment already rendered and assume or exert ownership of Township Water Distribution
entered. The jurisdiction available for a Rule 60 System No. 2, including setting water rates for Township
proceeding will not suffice for anything more than relief residents; (2) taking control of the assets of the system;
from the judgment, because Rule 60 does not authorize (3) making any decisions associated with connections and
a court to grant any affirmative relief. expansions to the system without the Township’s approval;
(4) taking any action that would affect the Township’s rights
12 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE in the system including retiring the remaining outstanding
§ 60.61 (3d ed. 1997) (footnote omitted). obligations of the system; and (5) violating any other term of
the 1972 judgment. In an order filed on January 26, 2001,
It therefore appears by reading Moore’s Federal Practice this Court denied the Township’s motion for an injunction
in connection with the above jurisprudence that so long as the pending appeal, finding that the four-factor test used to
Rule 60 claim is one which seeks relief from judgment, it is determine whether an injunction should issue did not weigh
not considered an independent claim, and the district court in favor of the Township’s request.
has continuing jurisdiction; however, even where an
"independent action" is concerned, so long as the original The Township’s appeal is now before the Court, wherein
case was brought before the district court and does not seek the Township argues that the sole issue on appeal is whether
"reopening of the dismissed suit," jurisdiction is present. the district court erred in finding that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over the Township’s case. The Township
C. Application to the Matter at Hand contends that because the district court held that it lacked
jurisdiction to hear the matter, the court improperly ruled,
In this case, the Township filed what it thought to be a albeit in dicta, upon the merits of the Township’s request for
motion under Rule 60(b)(5) seeking to enjoin the City from relief from judgment. As a result, the Township urges this
allegedly violating the terms of the 1972 judgment and for Court to reverse the district court’s decision holding that it
other relief such as preventing the City from taking ownership lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and remand the case for a
of the water distribution system and setting water rates. The hearing on the Township’s claim for relief from judgment
1972 judgment, pursuant to paragraphs seven and twelve as under Rule 60(b).
noted above, clearly provided the terms as to when ownership
of the water system would be vested with the City. As a DISCUSSION
result, the district court erred in finding that the Township’s
motion was anything other than a motion for relief from We review a district court’s decision regarding subject
judgment under Rule 60(b) for which it had continuing matter jurisdiction de novo. See Green v. Ameritech, 200
jurisdiction. See 12 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S F.3d 967, 972 (6th Cir. 2000). We review a district court’s
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 60.61 (3d ed. 1997); see also Coltec, decision on a Rule 60(b) motion for an abuse of discretion.
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See Futernick v. Sumpter Township, 207 F.3d 305, 313 (6th Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 244
Cir. 2000). (1944)).
A. District Court’s Opinion Indeed, as Moore’s Federal Practice states:
The district court recognized that for purposes of federal An independent action to set aside a judgment needs,
court jurisdiction, diversity of citizenship is determined at the because it is "independent," its own jurisdictional basis.
time that the action is commenced, and that subsequent However, this is usually not a problem when the action
changes in citizenship cannot serve to divest the court’s is filed in the same court that rendered the judgment.
jurisdiction over the matter. Despite this rule of law, the According to the 1884 United States Supreme Court
district court found that it did not have jurisdiction over the decision in Pacific RR of Missouri v. Missouri Pacific
matter at hand because it viewed the Township’s actions here Ry. Co., when an independent action for relief from the
as "a new suit." The court noted the two parties present in judgment is brought in the same court that rendered the
this suit were the non-diverse defendants in the original suit, judgment, the rendering court has "ancillary jurisdiction"
and that the subject matter of the instant claim was different to entertain the action. According to the Court, this
from that in the original suit inasmuch as the original suit "ancillary jurisdiction" is broad enough so that, even
involved the protection of the bondholder’s rights while the when the original basis for federal jurisdiction no longer
matter at hand involves the ownership of the water system. exists, such as when diversity has been destroyed or the
issue to be litigated in no longer a federal question, the
In finding that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction district court that rendered the judgment maintains
over the matter, the district court first considered the jurisdiction to hear an action to set that judgment aside.
Township’s claim that under the terms of the 1972 judgment, Modern courts have generally accepted this ruling
title to the water system would not vest in the City until all without question. Even the United States Supreme
financial obligations incurred in the course of managing the Court, in ruling that courts that render judgments of
system were paid, including the debt incurred as a result of dismissal do not have "ancillary" jurisdiction to enforce
the 1994 extension. After examining paragraphs seven and any settlement agreement that prompted the dismissal,
twelve of the 1972 judgment, and after considering the has taken care to note that a different rule, a rule that
parties’ colloquies with Judge Kent, the district court found jurisdiction does exist, applies when the only relief that
it "clear that the intent of the Court and the parties was that at the parties seek is "reopening of the dismissed suit."
the date the original bonds were paid off, the entire system,
including any new bond obligations, would transfer to the 12 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE
City." According to the district court, given the fact that the § 60.84[1][a] (3d ed. 1997) (footnotes omitted).
judgment was self-executing, title to the water system had
vested in the City and was not open to further discussion. In this regard, Moore’s Federal Practice also states:
The district court therefore concluded that because the It has been long established that no independent
Township’s request for relief was, in effect, a new action in federal jurisdictional basis is needed to support a Rule
which neither diversity jurisdiction nor federal question 60(b) motion proceeding. A Rule 60(b) motion is
considered a continuation of the original proceeding. "If
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When the matter reached this Court, we rejected the jurisdiction was present, subject matter jurisdiction was
contention that the federal courts had no jurisdiction over lacking. Specifically, the court opined:
the bill because the plaintiff and several of the defendants
were from the same State. We first noted that there was It is true, as the Township points out, that diversity
no question as to the court’s jurisdiction over the jurisdiction is determined at the time the action is
underlying suit, and then said: commenced, and that subsequent changes in state
citizenship will not affect the diversity of that action.
"On the question of jurisdiction the [subsequent] suit Here, however, the Township has filed what can only be
may be regarded as ancillary to the [prior] suit, so called a new action. Two of the original parties are in the
that the relief asked may be granted by the court present suit, but they were non-diverse defendants in the
which made the decree in that suit, without regard to original suit. The subject matter is different as well. In
the citizenship of the present parties. . . . The bill, the original suit, the issue was the protection of the rights
though an original bill in the chancery sense of the of the bondholders. The ownership of the water system
word, is a continuation of the former suit, on the was only ancillary to that. Here, the Township is
question of the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court." bringing suit making the ownership of the water system
the primary reason to bring the suit. Yet ownership of
[Pacific, 111 U.S.] at 522. the system was settled by the court order and agreement
of the parties twenty-eight years ago. Were this court to
Even though there was no diversity, the Court relied on revisit the matter in the absence of a clear Rule 60(B)(5)
the underlying suit as the basis for jurisdiction and [sic] mandate, it would throw open the courthouse door
allowed the independent action to proceed. The to challenge any order of a court at any time.
Government is therefore wrong to suggest that an
independent action brought in the same court as the (J.A. at 82.) The district court then noted that precedent from
original lawsuit requires an independent basis for the Seventh Circuit existed to support the conclusion that
jurisdiction. jurisdiction does not exist over a consent judgment where the
grounds for federal jurisdiction have been abrogated. Quoting
Beggerly, 524 U.S. at 45-46. Evans v. City of Chicago, 10 F.3d 474, 481 (7th Cir. 1993),
the district court opined that "‘principles of respect for a
The Court then noted that even though the government was coordinate sovereign (and in some cases the eleventh
wrong in suggesting that federal jurisdiction was no longer amendment) mean that federal courts should refrain from
present because diversity jurisdiction no longer existed adjudicating claims under state law, whether raised directly or
among the parties, "[t]his is not to say, however, that the whether used as the springboards for other theories.’" (J.A.
requirements for a meritorious independent action have been at 82.) The court found that the grounds for federal subject
met here." Beggerly, 524 U.S. at 46 (emphasis added). The matter jurisdiction had "vanished" in this case, reasoning that
Court found that "[i]ndependent actions must, if Rule 60(b) is "[a]part from the 1972 consent judgment there is neither
to be interpreted as a coherent whole, be reserved for those diversity nor federal question jurisdiction. What remains is
cases of ‘injustices which, in certain instances, are deemed a local disagreement that on the face of the pleadings must
sufficiently gross to demand a departure’ from rigid turn to state law for succor." (J.A. at 82.) Relying on
adherence to the doctrine of res judicata." Id. (citing Hazel- Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S.
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89 (1984), the court concluded that it could not interfere with in the nature of review, had been abolished. The revision
what was a purely local disagreement between two state made equally clear, however, that one of the old forms, i.e.,
bodies. the ‘independent action,’ still survived." United States v.
Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 45 (1998) (footnote omitted). The
B. Rule 60(b) and the Relevant Jurisprudence Advisory Committee notes illustrate the survival of the
"independent action" in the 1946 amendment. See id."‘The general purpose of Rule 60(b) . . . is to strike a proper Specifically, the Advisory Committee notes state that "‘[i]f
balance between the conflicting principles that litigation must the right to make a motion is lost by the expiration of the time
be brought to an end and that justice must be done.’" Coltec limits fixed in these rules, the only other procedural remedy
Indus., Inc. v. Hobgood, 280 F.3d 262, 271 (3d Cir. 2002) is by a new or independent action to set aside a judgment
(quoting Boughner v. Sec’y of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 572 upon those principles which have heretofore been applied in
F.2d 976, 977 (3d Cir. 1978)). Rule 60(b) provides in such an action.’" See id. (quoting Advisory Committee’s
relevant part: Notes on 1946 Amt. to Fed. Rule Civ. P. 60).
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may The Beggerly Court further expounded on the "independent
relieve a party or a party’s legal representative from a action," as continued to be permitted under the 1946 amended
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following rule, by relying on the case of Pacific Railroad of Missouri v.
reasons: . . . (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, Missouri Pacific Railway Co., 111 U.S. 505 (1884), which
or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based the Advisory Committee cited as an example of such a cause.
has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer See Beggerly, 524 U.S. at 45 & n.3. The Beggerly Court
equitable that the judgment should have prospective opined:
application . . . . The motion shall be made within a
reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3), not One case that exemplifies the category [of independent
more than one year after the judgment, order, or action] is Pacific R.R. of Mo. v. Missouri Pacific R. Co.,
proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this 111 U.S. 505 (1884).
subsection (b) does not affect the finality of judgment or
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power In Pacific the underlying suit had resulted in a decree
of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a foreclosing a mortgage on railroad property and ordering
party from judgment, order, or proceeding . . . . Writs of its sale. This Court enforced the decree and shortly
coram nobis, coram vobis, audita querela, and bills of thereafter the railroad company whose property had been
review and bills in the nature of a bill of review, are foreclosed filed a bill to impeach for fraud the
abolished, and the procedure for obtaining any relief foreclosure decree that had been affirmed. The bill
from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in alleged that the plaintiff in the underlying suit had
these rules or by an independent action. conspired with the attorney and directors of the plaintiff
in the subsequent suit to ensure that the property would
FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b). The 1946 amendment to the Rule (as be forfeited. The plaintiff in the subsequent suit was a
the language currently reads) "made clear that nearly all of the Missouri corporation, and it named several Missouri
old forms of obtaining relief from a judgment, i.e., coram citizens as defendants in its bill seeking relief from the
nobis, coram vobism, audita querela, bills of review, and bills prior judgment.