McAdoo v. Elo , 346 F.3d 158 ( 2003 )

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206 2 McAdoo v. Elo No. 01-2050
ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2003 FED App. 0339P (6th Cir.)File Name: 03a0339p.06 Debra M. Gagliardi, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL, CORRECTIONS DIVISION, Lansing,
Michigan, Appellee. ON BRIEF: James R. Gerometta,
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDERS OFFICE, Detroit,
Michigan, for Appellant. Debra M. Gagliardi, OFFICE OF
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, CORRECTIONS DIVISION,
_________________ Lansing, Michigan, Appellee.
SILAS MCADOO , X _________________
Petitioner-Appellant, -
- OPINION
- No. 01-2050 _________________
v. -
> JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. Silas McAdoo
, appeals the district court’s denial of his petition for a writ of
FRANK ELO , Warden -
Respondent-Appellee. - habeas corpus. McAdoo pled guilty in Michigan state court
to one count of second-degree murder and two counts of
N assault with intent to commit murder. Pursuant to a plea
Appeal from the United States District Court agreement, he was sentenced to three life sentences to run
for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit. concurrently. McAdoo later claimed that his attorney
No. 98-74705—Paul D. Borman, District Judge. misinformed him about the consequences of a life sentence.
McAdoo raises three issues in this appeal, arguing that (1) his
Argued: February 5, 2003 guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because he
misunderstood its consequences, (2) his plea was illusory
Decided and Filed: September 23, 2003 based on the effective unavailability of parole for those
serving a statutory life sentence, and (3) his trial counsel was
Before: GILMAN and GIBBONS, Circuit Judges; ineffective for allegedly misinforming McAdoo about his
POLSTER, District Judge.* possible sentence. For the following reasons, we affirm the
district court’s denial of habeas relief.
_________________
I.
COUNSEL
McAdoo was charged in Michigan state court with one
ARGUED: James R. Gerometta, FEDERAL PUBLIC count of first-degree murder and two counts of assault with
DEFENDERS OFFICE, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellant. intent to commit murder. The charges arose from the
stabbing death of McAdoo’s wife, Alicia Kelley, and the
stabbing of two of his daughters. At McAdoo’s preliminary
*
hearing, his ten and fourteen year old daughters testified
The Ho norable Dan Aaron Polster, United States District Judge for
the Northern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.
1
No. 01-2050 McAdoo v. Elo 3 4 McAdoo v. Elo No. 01-2050
about the facts of McAdoo’s offenses, all of which occurred there was confusion when McAdoo entered his plea about
in the family home. what the sentence would be. The prosecutor responded that
there was some confusion at sentencing, “but not at plea
On January 9, 1995, the trial date, McAdoo entered a time.”
guilty plea to the lesser offense of second-degree murder and
two counts of assault with intent to commit murder. The At the resentencing hearing, McAdoo, who was not under
agreement was in exchange for the dismissal of the first- oath, had the following exchange with the state trial court:
degree murder charge that carried a maximum sentence of life
without parole. At the plea proceeding, McAdoo’s attorney THE COURT: Mr. McAdoo, sir, do you wish to say
told the court that the plea agreement indicated three life anything before this Court imposes the correct sentence,
sentences. McAdoo signed the plea form, which stated that which was pursuant to the plea agreement?
the agreement was for three life sentences. McAdoo stated to
the court under oath that no one had promised him anything DEFENDANT McADOO: Yes, Judge Braxton. The
other than what the plea form indicated. day that you accepted my plea, I don’t know if you
remember. I know you have a lot of cases that you have
Sentencing was held on February 1, 1995. At the outset, to do, but when Batchelor first came before you with me,
McAdoo’s attorney stated that McAdoo did not want to and you asked me more than once did I understand, and
withdraw his plea, and McAdoo agreed on the record. The you asked me how did I plead, and I pled not guilty.
court stated that it was ready to “impose a sentence in accord
with the sentence agreement.” It then sentenced McAdoo to Then he took me, and we went into the back chambers
parolable life for the murder conviction and two concurrent or in another room, and he made the statement to me, and
terms of twenty years imprisonment for the assault maybe I am wrong, but I was told that the three life
convictions. The sentencing judge stated “Count one and sentences would be 20, 20, 20 to run concurrently, and
murder two for a term of statutory life which is 20 years.” that my kids would not have to be subjected to the Court.
Although the judge indicated an intent to sentence McAdoo
in accord with the plea agreement, she failed to do so. First, THE COURT: But he did inform you that they were
a statutory life term does not equal twenty years in Michigan. three life sentences. Is that correct?
Second, the plea agreement did not call for twenty-year
sentences for the assault convictions. DEFENDANT McADOO: Yes, Ma’am.
The prosecution then moved to amend the sentence to THE COURT: Which is indicated on this form.
conform to the plea agreement, which had provided for three MR. DEFENDANT: But he, I guess what I am trying to
concurrent life sentences rather than one life sentence and two say is, Judge Braxton, that if I had understood what he
twenty-year sentences. Resentencing occurred on March 24, was telling me which, as I stated to you before, I had no
1995. McAdoo, then represented by his second counsel, knowledge of what was going on whatsoever. I have no
Robert Plumpe, requested the withdrawal of his guilty plea, –
claiming that he did not understand the nature of his plea
agreement and that he was under the influence of medication THE COURT: Now you had some knowledge because
at the time he entered his plea. Defense counsel argued that I spoke to you. But you go ahead.
No. 01-2050 McAdoo v. Elo 5 6 McAdoo v. Elo No. 01-2050
DEFENDANT McADOO: What I am trying to say is McAdoo was then appointed a third counsel, Edward
my lawyer, Batchelor, he never spoke with me about Jabbour, who filed another motion to withdraw McAdoo’s
anything. It was just the first time I ever saw this piece guilty plea, arguing that the plea was not knowing and
of paper here was the day that you took my plea voluntary. The sentencing court held a hearing on this motion
agreement. When I first saw you, and it was more or less on March 7, 1996. Jabbour argued that McAdoo entered his
stated to me accept it or get another attorney. I wrote all plea believing that he would be released after twenty years
this up, and I turned it in to the Grievance Commission. imprisonment and that this alleged misunderstanding nullified
the plea.
But anyway to sum it all up, he told me something that
was different than what you did, and that’s the only thing The court conducted an evidentiary hearing on May 9,
I am arguing, and is the fact that I didn’t understand what 1996, to determine whether McAdoo’s alleged
he was doing. If I would have understood that he was misunderstanding nullified his plea. At the May 9, 1996,
sentencing me to three life sentences to the point, why hearing, Batchelor testified that his understanding was that
not fight the case? the penalty for first-degree murder in Michigan was a
sentence of “natural life” and the penalty for second-degree
I didn’t want my kids to be subjected to it. It was murder was a sentence of “parolable” life. He testified that he
enough that they went through. And then for him to tell was familiar with the “Lifer Law,”2 which would have
me that it would be the three life sentences, I know I governed McAdoo’s possibility of parole. When asked what
need to be punished for what I did. No problem his understanding of the “Lifer Law” was, Batchelor stated,
whatsoever with that. But that’s not what he explained “in terms of what I remember in discussion with Mr. McAdoo
to me. That’s all I am trying to say to the Court. with regards to the Lifer Law, we never discussed it.” When
asked whether he had said anything to McAdoo about what a
The court then conformed the sentence to the written plea sentence of life imprisonment means, Batchelor responded, “I
agreement and stated that it would consider McAdoo’s don’t recall saying anything to him about life imprisonment.”
motion to withdraw the plea if he presented evidence that his
mental state and medication prevented him from knowingly McAdoo presented the testimony of Michael Patrick
entering a guilty plea.1 Martin, prisoner advocate for the Wayne County jail at the
time of McAdoo’s incarceration there, and Mark Carrico of
2
The “Lifer La w,” M.C.L. § 791.233b; M.S.A. § 28.303(3) provides
1
that prisoners convicted of an enumerated offense (such as second-degree
On May 4, 199 5, the court conducted a hearing on that issue. Dr. murder) are not eligible for parole until the prisoner has served the
Ke ith Dlugokinski, a psychologist from the prison where McAdoo was minimum term less available d isciplinary cred its. People v. Lino, 539
incarcerated, testified that McA doo was suffering from major depression N.W.2d 545 , 549 (M ich. Ct. A pp. 1 995 ), overruled on other grounds by
and was being medicated at the time he entered his plea. However, Peo ple v. Carson, 560 N.W.2d 657, 665 (M ich. Ct. App. 1996). In
Dlugokinski also testified that McAd oo’s medications would not have McA doo’s case, the “Lifer Law” would have m eant that he was likely to
significantly impaired his cognitive abilities. Although no order denying be eligible for parole after serving appro ximately fifteen years. Lino, 539
the motio n to withd raw the plea appe ars in the record, it is evident that the N.W.2d at 548-49 (defendant serving parolable life sentence for crime
court denied the mo tion. T he issue of M cAd oo’s p sychological state and committed on or after O ctober 1, 1992 , is subject to the jurisdiction of the
med ications has no t been raised in this app eal. parole board and eligible for parole after fifteen years imprisonment).
No. 01-2050 McAdoo v. Elo 7 8 McAdoo v. Elo No. 01-2050
the Team for Justice, who visited McAdoo after his Upon questioning Mr. Batchelor, he indicated there was,
incarceration. Jabbour asked Martin if McAdoo told him in fact, a plea bargain that was made on the day of trial.
about the sentence agreement contained in the plea He testified further that he, being Mr. Batchelor, was of
agreement. The prosecution objected to this evidence as the opinion that the plea offered the defendant would
hearsay. Jabbour argued that the evidence was “state of give him a better opportunity to put his client in the best
mind” testimony, but the court sustained the objection. possibl[e] posture that he could be in, and he made it
Jabbour attempted to elicit the same information from Carrico know[n] to his client what his options were at the time
that he had from Martin. Carrico stated that, at some ...
unspecified time before McAdoo was transferred to a state
prison to serve his sentence, McAdoo told Carrico he would This Court, after listening to the witnesses and the
“get out in 17 years.” Jabbour then asked the court to rule testimony that was presented in terms of the defendant's
that if McAdoo testified, he could not be questioned about the state of mind, the defendant stated it was his
underlying facts of the offense. The court ruled that McAdoo understanding he would be parolable in 17 years which,
could be questioned about any facts that were relevant to the in fact, is the truth. And this Court, when taking a plea
motion to withdraw the plea. McAdoo did not testify.3 from any defendant as best as I can recall, I’m very
meticulous in terms of whether or not the defendant has
At the close of the hearing, the court denied McAdoo’s an understanding of what it is he's doing. Of course, I
motion to withdraw his guilty plea, concluding: cannot and I do not go behind the scene to ask questions
as to w[he]ther or not--what the defendant's particular
If I look at the testimony and my view of the witnesses understanding is of what a certain word means to a
that testified this afternoon, he stated – Mr. Carrico stated particular defendant. That I do not do. So, based upon the
he met the defendant back in 1994, and that the testimony I've heard, I deny the defendant’s motion.
defendant’s mother called him because he’s a member of
the Team for Justice. He further testified that he visited Following denial of his second motion to withdraw his
weekly with the defendant before he was sent to Jackson guilty plea, McAdoo filed a delayed application for leave to
[prison], and Mr. Carrico also testified he was at the appeal to the Michigan Court of Appeals. This application
sentencing. Mr. Carrico further testified that defendant was denied for lack of merit in the grounds presented.
told him he would be eligible for parole in 17 years. McAdoo then filed a delayed application for leave to appeal
That’[s] what your witness means to the understanding to the Michigan Supreme Court, which was denied.
the defendant had at that time.
McAdoo then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On June 18, 2001, the district
court entered an order denying the petition for habeas corpus.
3 McAdoo was granted a certificate of appealability with
McAdoo later stated in an affidavit filed in the district court that
Batchelor had told him that a “life sentence” in M ichigan was the
respect to his claims that his plea was involuntary, that his
equivalent of a twenty-year sentence and that he would be paroled in
app roxim ately seventeen-and -a-half years. Beca use this affidavit was not
part of the record before the state court, we do not consider it in assessing
whether the state court’s decision to deny M cAd oo’s m otion to withdraw
his plea was objec tively unreasonable.
No. 01-2050 McAdoo v. Elo 9 10 McAdoo v. Elo No. 01-2050
plea was illusory, and that his defense counsel was ineffective errors in state procedure and/or evidentiary law do not rise to
in advising him about the consequences of his plea.4 the level of federal constitutional claims warranting relief in
a habeas action unless the error renders the proceeding so
II. fundamentally unfair as to deprive the petitioner of due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Estelle v.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 69-70 (1991).
(“AEDPA”) governs this case. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d),
a federal court may not grant habeas relief unless the III.
adjudication in the state court proceedings:
A.
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly We apply the standards of AEDPA to McAdoo’s three
established Federal law, as determined by the claims. His first contention is that his guilty plea was not
Supreme Court of the United States; or knowing and voluntary because he was misinformed by his
attorney about the consequences of his plea. Although
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an McAdoo acknowledges that he was aware that he was
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of receiving a life sentence, he argues that he misunderstood the
the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. implications of a life sentence because of erroneous
statements made to him by his lawyer and that the state court
Under AEDPA, “[a] federal habeas court may not issue the finding otherwise was objectively unreasonable.
writ simply because that court concludes in its independent
judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly The Supreme Court has held that a defendant must have
established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Williams “sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely
v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411 (2000). Rather, the issue is consequences” of his plea. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S.
whether the state court’s application of clearly established 742, 748 (1970). A guilty plea must be accompanied by “an
federal law was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409. affirmative showing that it was intelligent and voluntary.”
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969). Such a
A federal court is to apply a presumption of correctness to showing is generally made by the government’s production of
state court findings of fact for habeas corpus purposes unless a transcript of state court proceedings to establish that the plea
clear and convincing evidence is offered to rebut this was made voluntarily. Garcia v. Johnson, 991 F.2d 324, 326
presumption. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Warren v. Smith, 161 (6th Cir. 1993).
F.3d 358, 360-61 (6th Cir. 1998). The appeals court gives
complete deference to the federal district court’s and state Prior to entering his plea, McAdoo signed the Pretrial
court’s findings of fact supported by the evidence. Clemmons Settlement and Notice of Acceptance, which indicated that the
v. Sowders, 34 F.3d 352, 354 (6th Cir. 1994). Trial court sentence for each of the three offenses would be life
imprisonment. When entering the plea, McAdoo stated under
oath that he understood the terms of the plea agreement and
4
A certificate of appealability was denied on McAdo o’s claim that his that he knowingly and voluntarily entered into the agreement.
attorney was ineffective for failing to pursue a diminished capa city McAdoo also testified that no additional promises, other than
defense.
No. 01-2050 McAdoo v. Elo 11 12 McAdoo v. Elo No. 01-2050
those contained in the plea agreement, had been made to him. immediately qualified that information by adding that the
Shortly before McAdoo entered his plea, his attorney stated maximum period he could serve for the sentence would
to the court that the plea agreement called for three life be 15 years. Nowhere does the record show that Hart was
sentences and that he had discussed the agreement with informed before entering his plea of the true sentence, a
McAdoo. The attorney also stated that he had explained minimum of 30 years and a maximum of 75. He was
McAdoo’s constitutional rights to him and McAdoo had informed by the court of this range at his sentencing
indicated his understanding. hearing, but again at the hearing, the court stated that
under Ohio law he would only serve 15 years of the
McAdoo does not contend that the plea colloquy was sentence. . . . Although this statement occurred after Hart
inadequate. He acknowledges that he knew he was agreeing entered his plea, it is evidence that the trial judge himself
to a life sentence. His argument is rather that there was did not understand the consequences of the plea
confusion about the consequences of a parolable life sentence agreement and, accordingly, did not give Hart correct
in Michigan at the time and that he relied on the alleged out- information on the consequences of his plea.
of-court statements of his attorney. In further support of the
existence of confusion, he cites the statement of the judge at Id. at 258. This case differs from Hart in that McAdoo was
sentencing that he would receive “a term of statutory life aware he was receiving a life sentence. Unlike the court in
which is 20 years” and the attorneys’ silence after that Hart, the state court in this case made its sole misstatement at
statement. 5 the sentencing, only after the plea had been entered and
accepted. Any misstatement by the judge at sentencing could
McAdoo contends that his case is analogous to Hart v. not possibly have affected McAdoo’s understanding at the
Marion Correctional Institution, 927 F.2d 256 (6th Cir. time he entered his plea, the relevant time for our inquiry.
1991). In Hart, the state trial judge and Hart’s attorneys
incorrectly informed him that his maximum period of After an evidentiary hearing about whether McAdoo’s plea
incarceration would be fifteen years if he pled guilty. The was entered knowingly, the state court found that his alleged
maximum was actually seventy-five years. This court stated: misunderstanding did not invalidate the plea. The state court
accepted as true McAdoo’s evidence (in the form of Carrico’s
This record shows that the court informed Hart he could testimony) that he believed he would be paroled in seventeen
be sentenced from 60 to 150 years. The court years. This evidence, however, does not show that his plea
was unknowingly entered, as the state court correctly found.
See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985) (“We have never
5
McAdoo also attempts to show confusion about the consequences held that the United States Constitution requires the State to
of a parolable life sentence by submitting evidence that the State Bar of furnish a defendant with information about parole eligibility
Michigan addressed the issue of the consequences of a life sentence at an in order for the defendant’s plea of guilty to be voluntary.”);
annual meeting in September 2000, some five and a half years after
McAdoo entered his guilty plea and so me four and a half years after his
James v. Cain, 56 F.3d 662, 666 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The United
state evidentiary hearing. Evidence about this meeting obviously was not States Constitution does not require the State to furnish a
a part of the reco rd co nsidered b y the state court. In any event, statements
at the annual meeting tend to show that there was confusion about the
likelihood of parole for prisoners sentenced to parolab le life, but they do
not indicate that it was reasonable to believe that a life sentence in
Michigan meant anything other than what its name implies.
No. 01-2050 McAdoo v. Elo 13 14 McAdoo v. Elo No. 01-2050
defendant with information about parole eligibility in order did not affect the outcome of the state hearing. The state
for the defendant’s plea of guilty to be voluntary.”). 6 court heard testimony from Carrico that McAdoo believed
that he would be eligible for parole in seventeen and a half
McAdoo’s argument that at the time of his guilty plea there years. It accepted that testimony as truthful and also
was confusion in Michigan about the consequences of a determined that McAdoo’s belief was consistent with his
parolable life sentence is intertwined with an argument that actual date of parole eligibility under Michigan law.
the state court made erroneous evidentiary rulings at the
hearing on his request to withdraw his plea.7 First, McAdoo McAdoo attempts to characterize his misunderstanding
contends that the state court erroneously excluded Martin’s about the consequences of his sentence of parolable life as a
“state of mind” testimony. Second, he contends that the state misunderstanding about more than his parole eligibility date
court’s incorrect ruling that, if McAdoo testified, he could be or the likelihood of parole. He argues that he in fact thought
cross-examined about the underlying facts of the case forced a life sentence meant a twenty-year sentence. Although
him to elect not to testify.8 Whatever the merit of these McAdoo presented no evidence of this belief to the state
evidentiary arguments, the state court’s evidentiary rulings court, at resentencing (in an unsworn statement during his
allocution), he told the state court that Batchelor told him that
“the three life sentences would be 20, 20, 20 to run
6
concurrently.”
As a practical matter, any information given to a defendant about
paro le at the time he pleads guilty is inherently imprecise. Both parole In Ramos v. Rogers, 170 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 1999), the
eligibility and likelihood are unpredictable. A number of factors, such as
the earning of sentence credits, may affect the time at which a prisoner
defendant attempted to withdraw his guilty plea after
becomes eligible for parole. Furthermore, factors such as the crimes of sentencing. While accepting his plea, the state trial court
conviction, the entire crimina l record, and behavior in prison may impact asked Ramos whether he understood that he was not going to
the likelihood of parole at a particular time after a prisoner becomes receive probation under any circumstances. Id. at 562.
eligible for parole. The likelihood of parole is also affected by changes Ramos responded that he understood. Later, he attempted to
in the law and in the comp osition and attitudes of parole bo ard members.
See James, 56 F.3 d at 666 (noting that changes in L ouisiana’s
withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that his lawyer had actually
commutation procedures made paro le more difficult to attain). As promised him that he would receive “supershock probation.”
McAd oo’s evidence of the 2000 Michigan bar meeting suggests, the fact Id. at 562-63. On appeal, Ramos contended that he was told
that few Michigan prisoners sentenced to parolable life are paroled when only that he was ineligible for probation, but not that he was
they are first eligible is attributable to a “political shift.” An assessment ineligible for supershock probation. Id. at 563. He testified
of the likeliho od that M cAd oo w ill be paroled when he becom es eligible that he did not know the difference between supershock
in 201 0 wo uld have be en speculative in 199 5 whe n he pled guilty and is
speculative today, beca use there is no m eans o f ascertaining future paro le probation and “regular” probation. Id. The court was not
boa rd policy or other relevant factors. persuaded by the argument that the individual defendant’s
misunderstanding of a commonly used term rendered his plea
7
McAdoo d oes not claim that these evidentiary rulings made the void. It held that “such word games cannot be permitted to
proceedings so fund amentally unfair as to dep rive him of due p rocess. vitiate the use of simple words in court.” Id. at 565 n.6.
8
Ramos essentially asked the court to rely on his subjective
McAd oo’s description of the state court ruling is not pre cisely impression of the words used, garnered from his lawyer’s
accurate. W hile certainly the state court left open the possibility of such misstatements, rather than the plain meaning of the statements
cross-examination, it did so only to the extent an underlying fact might be
relevant to the motion to withdraw the plea.
made in court. This court declined to do so:
No. 01-2050 McAdoo v. Elo 15 16 McAdoo v. Elo No. 01-2050
If we were to rely on Ramos’s alleged subjective pleas). McAdoo acknowledged in court under oath that he
impression rather than the record, we would be rendering was agreeing to a life sentence, and the evidence and his
the plea colloquy process meaningless, for any convict unsworn statement presented to the state court failed to show
who alleges that he believed the plea bargain was that he reasonably believed he was actually agreeing to a
different from that outlined in the record could withdraw maximum sentence of only twenty years.
his plea, despite his own statements during the plea
colloquy . . . indicating the opposite. This we will not Therefore, the state court did not err in finding that
do, for the plea colloquy process exists in part to prevent McAdoo understood the consequences of his plea. The state
petitioners such as Ramos from making the precise claim court’s findings are entitled to considerable deference under
that is today before us. Where the court has scrupulously AEDPA. A federal court may grant habeas relief only where
followed the required procedure, the defendant is bound the state court proceeding “resulted in a decision that was
by his statements in response to that court’s inquiry. based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light
of the evidence presented.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
170 F.3d at 566 (internal quotation marks omitted). Considering the record here, we cannot say that the state
court’s determination that McAdoo knowingly and
The present case presents a closer question than Ramos. voluntarily entered his plea was unreasonable.
However, as in Ramos, we hold that a term that is
unambiguous on its face and agreed to by the defendant in B.
open court will be enforced. See Hall v. Maggio, 697 F.2d
641, 643 (5th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (holding that McAdoo next contends that his plea bargain was illusory
defendant’s misunderstanding about life sentence, based on because he obtained no real benefit from entering a guilty
“common knowledge” and attorney’s misadvice, did not plea. The Michigan Parole Board rarely grants parole to
invalidate plea). We note that the term “life sentence” is not prisoners sentenced to parolable life, as explained by the
ambiguous. The United States Constitution does not require Michigan Court of Appeals in People v. Lino:
judges to explain the meaning of “life sentence” and other
unambiguous terms during the plea colloquy in order to The reality is that those who receive nonmandatory life
combat alleged misinformation that is not revealed on the sentences are rarely paroled after ten years, and, in fact,
record. Cf. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243-44 (requiring explicit the majority of defendants sentenced to life
waiver of certain constitutional rights on the record when imprisonment are never granted parole. . . . [F]rom 1986
court takes guilty plea); United States v. Hanley, 906 F.2d through 1990, only seven prisoners serving parolable life
1116, 1121 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that defendant was not sentences were paroled. Of the 975 prisoners serving
entitled to relief on his claim of ineffective assistance of such a term in 1990, only two were paroled. In 1991,
counsel where his counsel incorrectly advised him that he only one prisoner serving a parolable life term was
would be eligible for parole in a third of the time he received paroled. In 1992, again only one prisoner serving a
for a sentence because the court informed the defendant of the parolable life term was paroled.
potential range of incarceration for his crime and advised him
that he would be sentenced under the guidelines); see also 539 N.W.2d at 549 (citations omitted). In view of these
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b) (setting forth the elements the federal statistics, McAdoo argues that his “promised benefit will not
court must address when considering and accepting guilty materialize.” He argues that he is entitled to a new trial or a
No. 01-2050 McAdoo v. Elo 17 18 McAdoo v. Elo No. 01-2050
second chance to negotiate a plea bargain because he federal court to undertake independent review of state court
“expected he would be released on parole given the decision when state court decides claim without explanation
information he received concerning the workings of parole in of its decision). The independent review is not, however, “a
Michigan.” full, de novo review of the claims, but remains deferential
because the court cannot grant relief unless the state court’s
This argument fails, however, because McAdoo did obtain result is not in keeping with the strictures of the AEDPA.” Id.
his bargained-for benefit, the possibility of parole. Under at 943. Thus, the independent review determines whether the
Michigan law, a defendant convicted of first-degree murder state court decision is contrary to federal law, unreasonably
faces a sentence of mandatory non-parolable life while applies clearly established federal law, or is based on an
second-degree murder carries a sentence of parolable life or unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
any term of years. Pursuant to his plea agreement, McAdoo evidence presented. Id.
was sentenced to three concurrent terms of parolable life. It
was not necessary for the prosecutors or the court to explain The Supreme Court has adopted a two-pronged test for
the likelihood of parole to McAdoo. Hill, 474 U.S. at 56. A determining whether a defendant received adequate assistance
defendant’s mere expectation about the parole process is of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687
“simply no ground for habeas relief.” James, 56 F.3d at 667. (1984). First, a defendant must show that counsel’s
As the district court stated, “the relative reluctance of the performance was deficient, which “requires a showing that
Michigan Parole Board to grant parole to prisoners sentenced counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
to life does not render his plea illusory.” We hold that functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the
McAdoo derived a benefit by avoiding a trial on the first- Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 687. The reviewing court should
degree murder charge which was punishable by life without “indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls
parole and receiving instead a sentence of life with the within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”
possibility of parole. As such, his plea was not illusory. Id. at 689. Second, a defendant must show that counsel’s
deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. Id. at 687.
C. In order to satisfy the “prejudice” requirement in a plea
agreement context, “the defendant must show that there is a
Finally, McAdoo claims that his counsel, Batchelor, was reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would
constitutionally ineffective for allegedly misinforming him of not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to
the consequences of his plea. He requests that this issue be trial.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 58-59.
remanded for an evidentiary hearing.
McAdoo’s argument that his counsel was ineffective is
McAdoo presented his ineffective assistance of counsel closely tied to his argument that his guilty plea was not
claim in his application for leave to appeal in both the knowing and voluntary. With respect to the ineffective
Michigan Court of Appeals and Michigan Supreme Court. assistance issue, his brief to this court states that he should
Neither court discussed the merits of the issue, and both receive an evidentiary hearing because the district court
denied leave to appeal in orders of one sentence. When a erroneously relied on the state court’s finding that McAdoo
state court declines to address the merits of a properly raised understood the amount of prison time that he would be
issue, this court conducts an independent review of the issue. required to serve. McAdoo’s reply brief simply states that the
Harris v. Stovall, 212 F.3d 940, 943 (6th Cir. 2000) (requiring district court erred in accepting the findings of the state trial
No. 01-2050 McAdoo v. Elo 19 20 McAdoo v. Elo No. 01-2050
court because McAdoo was denied a full and fair hearing on true, his argument that his counsel’s performance was
the issue. His brief in the district court states that the deficient may have merit.
incorrect advice establishes deficiency of performance, as a
result of which he entered a plea that was not knowing and McAdoo’s ineffective assistance claim fails in any event,
voluntary, and “that fact establishes the prejudice prong.” however, because it would not have been unreasonable for the
state courts to conclude that he had failed to establish
Considerable case law supports a determination that giving prejudice had they included an analysis of the ineffective
erroneous advice about parole may constitute deficient assistance issue in their opinions. The prejudice prong of
performance. Affirmative misstatements about parole Strickland requires McAdoo to show that there is a reasonable
possibilities are more objectively unreasonable than failure to probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have
inform the defendant about the parole possibilities. James, 56 pleaded guilty and would have gone to trial.
F.3d at 667 (noting that “this Court and others have
recognized that affirmatively erroneous advice of counsel as McAdoo’s exchange with the state judge at resentencing is
to parole procedure is much more objectively unreasonable at best ambiguous. While he suggested that he might have
than would be a failure to inform of parole consequences”). fought the case if he had known he would serve a life
When defense counsel grossly misinforms a defendant about sentence, he also said that he did not want his children to be
details of parole and the defendant relies on that subjected to a trial. Prior to this time McAdoo had been
misinformation, the defendant may have been deprived of his present at the preliminary hearing and was aware that the
constitutional right to counsel. See Strader v. Garrison, 611 evidence against him, which included his daughters’
F.2d 61, 65 (4th Cir. 1979). In Meyers v. Gillis, 142 F.3d 664 testimony, was overwhelming, a fact that the state courts were
(3d Cir. 1998), a habeas petitioner argued that his counsel was entitled to take into account in determining whether he would
ineffective for giving him incorrect advice about parole have pled guilty in the absence of any erroneous advice rather
eligibility. The Third Circuit granted habeas relief, stating than going to trial on first degree murder charges. McAdoo
that “Meyers did not realize he was, in all reality, pleading also conceded that Batchelor and the court informed him that
guilty to an offense that did not allow him to receive parole in he would receive three life sentences. He signed the plea
the future.” Id. The court noted that while a defendant does form indicating three life sentences. Moreover, Batchelor
not have a constitutional right to be provided with parole testified that he did not discuss the Lifer Law with McAdoo.
eligibility information prior to entering a plea, any
information that is provided by defense counsel must be Given this record, the state courts were not unreasonable in
accurate. Id. at 667 n.2. McAdoo argues that Batchelor was rejecting McAdoo’s ineffective assistance claim. While they
ineffective because he allegedly gave McAdoo incorrect could have concluded that McAdoo had established a
information regarding the terms of the plea agreement. He reasonable probability that he would not have pled guilty in
claims that Batchelor told him that he would serve at most the absence of erroneous advice, it also would not have been
twenty years in prison.9 Assuming McAdoo’s claim to be unreasonable for them to conclude otherwise. Thus, after
independent review, we conclude that the state court’s
9
At his state evidentiary hearing, McAdoo’s counsel did not
specifically ask Batchelor whether he made this statement to McAdoo. M cAdoo did not discuss the Lifer Law. McAdoo , as previously noted,
Batchelor, however, implicitly denied the statement by saying that he and did not testify.
No. 01-2050 McAdoo v. Elo 21 22 McAdoo v. Elo No. 01-2050
decision was not contrary to federal law, did not unreasonably Section § 2254(e)(2) may or may not preclude remand for
apply federal law and was not based on an unreasonable an evidentiary hearing on the ineffective assistance issue.10
determination of the facts. See Harris, 212 F.3d at 943. We need not reach this issue, however. Even if we could
remand for an evidentiary hearing, doing so would be futile.
McAdoo requests an evidentiary hearing on the ineffective The present record appears to be complete. McAdoo points
assistance of counsel issue and argues that he did not receive to no fact that he could develop on remand that would result
a “full and fair” hearing in state court. Under AEDPA, a in the granting of the writ. His affidavit in the district court
defendant who “failed to develop the factual basis of a claim addresses his claims about erroneous advice, but does not
in State court proceedings” cannot obtain an evidentiary contain anything that relates to the prejudice issue. Nor does
hearing unless he satisfies two statutory exceptions not he identify any such evidence in his briefs; he simply relies
applicable here. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). However, when a on his claim of an invalid plea to establish prejudice. Yet the
defendant diligently seeks an evidentiary hearing in the state state court did not unreasonably find his plea to be valid.
courts in the manner prescribed, but the state courts deny him Thus, McAdoo’s claim of prejudice fails.
that opportunity, he can avoid § 2254(e)(2)’s barriers to
obtaining a hearing in federal court. Williams v. Taylor, 529 IV.
U.S. 420, 437 (2000). A defendant fails to develop the factual
basis of a claim only when he is at fault for failing to develop For all the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s
the factual record in state court, as when he or his counsel has denial of McAdoo’s petition for writ of habeas corpus.
not exercised proper diligence, or greater fault, in failing to
develop the record. Id. at 432 ; Moss v. Hofbauer, 286 F.3d
851, 858-59 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1092 (2002).
The test for “failed to develop” is defined as a “lack of
diligence, or some greater fault, attributable to the prisoner or
the prisoner’s counsel” in his or her attempts to discover and
present a claim in the state court. Williams, 529 U.S. at 432;
Thompson v. Bell, 315 F.3d 566, 594 (6th Cir. 2003).
Diligence for purposes of § 2254(e)(2) depends upon
“whether the prisoner made a reasonable attempt, in light of
the information available at the time, to investigate and
pursue claims in the state court.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 435;
Thompson, 315 F.3d at 594. If the petitioner did not fail to
develop the facts in the state court, then the district court may
hold an evidentiary hearing. Williams, 529 U.S. at 433;
Thompson, 315 F.3d at 594; Moss, 286 F.3d at 859.
10
Addressing the effect o f § 22 54(e)(2) on M cAd oo’s request for an
evidentiary hearing would require us to consider the state court’s
evidentiary rulings and M cAdoo ’s decision not to testify at the state court
hearing on his motion to withdraw his plea.