Nicklin v. Henderson ( 2003 )

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Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206 2 Nicklin v. Henderson No. 02-5183
ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2003 FED App. 0450P (6th Cir.)File Name: 03a0450p.06 Kentucky, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: James M. Morris,
Sharon K. Morris, MORRIS & MORRIS, Lexington,
Kentucky, for Appellant. Thomas Lee Gentry, ASSISTANT
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Lexington, Kentucky, for
Appellee.
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
_________________ _________________
RAYMOND NICKLIN , X OPINION
Plaintiff-Appellant, - _________________
-
- No. 02-5183 SILER, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Raymond Nicklin petitions
v. - this court for review of his disability discrimination action
> against the United States Postal Service (“USPS”). The
, district court denied Nicklin enforcement of a favorable final
WILLIAM J. HENDERSON , -
Postmaster General, United order of the EEOC Office of Federal Operations (“OFO”). It
- found that a settlement agreement, entered into before the
States Postal Service, - OFO order, barred Nicklin’s discrimination claim. Nicklin
Defendant-Appellee. - argues that the USPS waived the settlement issue by not
- raising it at the OFO level, and, therefore, the district court
N should have simply enforced the order. Because we find the
Appeal from the United States District Court settlement agreement provides a separate legal bar at the
for the Eastern District of Kentucky at Lexington. district court level, regardless of what happened at the OFO
No. 99-00443—Karl S. Forester, Chief District Judge. agency level, we AFFIRM.
Argued: September 18, 2003 I. BACKGROUND
Decided and Filed: December 19, 2003 In 1989, Nicklin sustained an on-the-job injury to his left
knee as a letter carrier for the USPS in Ormond Beach,
Before: SILER, BATCHELDER, and COOK, Circuit Florida. Due to this impairment, Nicklin was placed on
Judges. medical restriction and assigned to a distribution clerk
position. In 1994 the Lexington, Kentucky Post Office
_________________ denied him a transfer, and subsequently denied his request for
reconsideration even after his medical restrictions had been
COUNSEL removed. Prior to this denial Nicklin had over 200 Florida
claims decided by, or pending in front of, the EEOC.
ARGUED: James M. Morris, MORRIS & MORRIS,
Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellant. Thomas Lee Gentry, Nicklin challenged the denial based on disability
ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Lexington, discrimination, in violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
1
No. 02-5183 Nicklin v. Henderson 3 4 Nicklin v. Henderson No. 02-5183
29 U.S.C. § 701 et. seq. When the USPS found no evidence in the light most favorable to Nicklin, Anderson v.
discrimination, Nicklin appealed to the EEOC OFO in 1995. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986), we will uphold the
On January 13, 1997, the USPS Florida branch and Nicklin grant of summary judgment if there is no genuine issue as to
entered a settlement agreement for $12,500 releasing “any any material fact such that the USPS is entitled to judgment
and all cases in any and all forms or forums at any stage of as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
appeal or processing.” Subsequently on March 26, 1998, the 317, 322 (1986).
OFO reversed the earlier USPS decision on appeal, finding
that Nicklin was discriminated against by the Kentucky II. DISCUSSION
branch of the USPS. Apparently, the Florida USPS had not
notified the Kentucky USPS of the settlement; consequently, The Validity of the Settlement Agreement
the settlement was never raised by the USPS or considered by
the OFO. We start with the validity of the settlement agreement itself,
because if it does not apply to Nicklin’s Kentucky transfer
In July 1998, after the expiration of the thirty-day time limit claim, whether the USPS has waived its application is
for an internal OFO appeal, see 29 C.F.R. § 1614.407 (1998), irrelevant. Nicklin argues he did not knowingly and
the USPS realized the error and forwarded a copy of the voluntarily assent to the agreement, and that it did not cover
settlement to the OFO. The settlement reached the OFO his Kentucky claim.
within thirty days of a different OFO decision on one of
Nicklin’s Florida claims, and the OFO honored the settlement Federal common law controls the validity of a release of a
sua sponte even though it found the USPS had waived the federal cause of action. Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886
agreement by not asserting it earlier. However, before the F.2d 1472, 1481 (6th Cir. 1989). For discrimination cases,
OFO could consider the settlement’s effect on his Kentucky the Sixth Circuit uses a balancing test to determine whether
claim, Nicklin filed this action in the district court to enforce a settlement agreement was entered into knowingly and
the OFO’s decision. voluntarily. We consider the following factors: (1) Nicklin’s
experience, background, and education; (2) the amount of
Nicklin asserted that since it was a simple enforcement time Nicklin had to consider the release, including whether he
action the district court should not question the merits of the had the opportunity to consult with a lawyer; (3) the clarity of
OFO award. He argued that the USPS had waived its right to the release; (4) the consideration for the release; and (5) the
assert the settlement by not raising it in the OFO proceeding. totality of the circumstances. See Adams v. Philip Morris,
The district court nonetheless found that the USPS could Inc., 67 F.3d 580, 583 (6th Cir. 1995).
assert the settlement claim, that Nicklin had ratified any
problems with the agreement by failing to “tender back” the The district court properly granted summary judgment
$12,500 consideration, and granted summary judgment for against Nicklin. Nicklin contests the time he was given to
the USPS. consider the agreement and argues that he was not offered
counsel. According to him, he was given the agreement and
Nicklin then appealed to this court. We have jurisdiction told to sign it and return it “as soon as possible.” Nicklin
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and review the district court’s claims that this only gave him one day to read, consider, and
grant of summary judgment de novo. Kennedy v. Superior sign the agreement. However, the district court found it
Printing Co., 215 F.3d 650, 655 (6th Cir. 2000). Taking the “undisputed” that Nicklin never requested additional time to
No. 02-5183 Nicklin v. Henderson 5 6 Nicklin v. Henderson No. 02-5183
consider the agreement, had negotiated it for several days filed in any forum or location” and further did not intend or
prior, securing a favorable term excluding his workers indicate any claims, besides the workers compensation
compensation claim, and was well aware of his right to claims, to be excluded. Thus, at most Nicklin made a
counsel from his numerous prior discrimination claims. unilateral mistake that the Kentucky claim was excluded.
Given that Nicklin does not seriously challenge the other four Since unilateral mistakes are insufficient to set aside the
factors, we uphold the district court’s finding that he agreement, Nicklin’s mistake claim fails. Brown, 872 F.2d at
knowingly and voluntarily entered into the settlement 174-175.
agreement.
Nicklin also asserts fraud. He swore out an affidavit that
This court can also set aside the agreement for mistake or “Hopper specifically told me” the settlement only released the
fraud. See Brown v. County of Genesee, 872 F.2d 169, 174- Florida claims. If this were true, a triable issue of fact might
75 (6th Cir. 1989). Nicklin bears the burden of showing that exist. However, Nicklin subsequently backed off this
the settlement he made was invalid because of fraud or a assertion in his deposition, testifying that they “only
mutual mistake under which both parties acted; a unilateral discussed the Florida ones” and not that Hopper made any
mistake on his part will not invalidate the agreement. Id. affirmative statement that the Kentucky claim was excluded.
Nicklin argues that the agreement covers only his Florida Thus, without any affirmative fraudulent statement to induce
discrimination claims, asserting both mistake and fraud. his reliance, Nicklin’s fraud claim fails.
The settlement was a general release of all Nicklin’s claims, In sum, the district court properly found Nicklin knowingly
clearly covering his Kentucky transfer claim. The agreement and voluntarily entered the agreement, and that there was no
reads that it is: voidable mistake or fraud.
[i]n complete and final settlement of any and all cases in Failure to Assert the Settlement at the Agency Level
any and all forms or forums at any stage of appeal or
processing including but not limited to EEOC, NLRB, Having found a valid settlement, we next consider the
MSPB, and any court or courts and without prejudice to effect of the USPS’s inadvertent failure to raise the settlement
the position of the Postal Service in this or any other case at the EEOC OFO administrative decision stage. The OFO
.... found the USPS had discriminated against Nicklin and
awarded him back pay, interest, and other benefits. The
Nicklin claims he understood the agreement to only cover USPS failed to raise the settlement, and subsequently failed
the Florida claims, leaving the Kentucky claim intact. to move to reconsider within the thirty-day time limit. See 29
However, the plain language of the agreement unambiguously C.F.R. § 1614.407 (1998). Nicklin claims that the district
covers all his claims, and specifically references “all EEOC” court was required to blindly enforce the OFO decision
or “EEO” actions six times in the one-and-a-half page without considering the settlement. He further argues that the
document. Nor does the agreement differentiate between the doctrine of res judicata prevents the USPS from raising the
USPS branches; it covers all claims in any forum “concerning settlement at the district court level because the USPS waived
the United States Postal Service.” The USPS negotiator, the settlement argument by not raising it in the earlier OFO
Thomas Hopper, testified that he intended the release to cover proceeding.
“any and all of [Nicklin’s] claims against the Postal Service,
No. 02-5183 Nicklin v. Henderson 7 8 Nicklin v. Henderson No. 02-5183
Nicklin’s argument has some support. Courts have applied We further note our decision prevents a windfall to Nicklin.
res judicata to administrative law decisions employing a trial He received $12,500 in settlement of all his claims. If we
type hearing. See Drummond v. Commissioner of Social were to ignore the settlement and enforce the OFO order,
Security, 126 F.3d 837, 841 (6th Cir. 1997). Additionally, he Nicklin would receive additional compensation in the form of
correctly asserts that a federal employee is entitled to have the back pay, interest, and other benefits for a claim he already
district court enforce a favorable administrative determination settled. It “goes without saying that courts can and should
without having the court delve into the merits de novo. See preclude double recovery.” EEOC v. Waffle House, 534 U.S.
Haskins v. United States Dep’t of the Army, 808 F.2d 1192, 279, 297 (2002).
1199 n.4 (6th Cir. 1987). Nicklin’s main support is Girard v.
Rubin, 62 F.3d 1244, 1247 (9th Cir. 1995), where the Ninth We find Nicklin’s remaining arguments without merit.
Circuit found the IRS could not relitigate in the district court
the EEOC’s specific determination that Girard timely filed his AFFIRMED.
complaint with the agency.
Although the USPS may have waived the settlement at the
administrative level, the agreement poses a separate legal bar
at the enforcement stage. The settlement agreement applied
to all future actions, and forbade him to file any future
“appeal, complaint, charge, grievance, etc. of any kind” in
“the Federal Courts.” Therefore, the USPS properly asserted
the settlement as a separate bar at the district court
enforcement action level, independent of what happened at
the administrative level. The district court alluded to this,
finding that the USPS was not requesting a merits review of
the underlying OFO judgment, but merely asserting a legal
bar to the enforcement. Under this reasoning, we uphold the
district court’s summary judgment dismissing Nicklin’s
enforcement action.
Girard is distinguishable because there the government was
trying to relitigate the timeliness of a complaint filed with the
agency. If the USPS were only trying to assert that the OFO
should have considered the settlement, we might consider
Girard persuasive. In the instant case, however, the USPS is
instead asserting the settlement as an independent bar to the
enforcement action at the district court level, not that the OFO
should have honored the settlement at the agency level.