Vucaj v. Gonzales ( 2005 )


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  •                 NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
    File Name: 05a0810n.06
    Filed: October 4, 2005
    No. 04-3043
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
    NIKOLIN VUCAJ, NORA VUCAJ, KLAUDIO                       )
    VUCAJ, ANILA VUCAJ,                                      )
    )        ON APPEAL FROM THE
    Petitioners-Appellants,                           )        BOARD OF IMMIGRATION
    )        APPEALS
    v.                                                       )
    )
    ALBERTO GONZALES, Attorney General,                      )
    )
    Respondent-Appellee.                              )                              OPINION
    BEFORE:        MOORE and COLE, Circuit Judges; and WISEMAN, District Judge.*
    R. GUY COLE, JR., Circuit Judge. This is an appeal from the Board of Immigration
    Appeals’ (“BIA”) denial of petitioners’ claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and withholding
    of removal under the Convention Against Torture. The petitioners also appeal the BIA’s denial of
    their motion to reinstate Nora Vucaj’s separate asylum application, as well as the BIA’s disposition
    of their case by a single Board member. For the reasons set forth below, we GRANT the petition
    for review, REVERSE the BIA, and REMAND for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    I.
    A. Procedural Posture
    *
    The Honorable Thomas A. Wiseman, Jr. United States District Judge for the Middle District
    of Tennessee, sitting by designation.
    No. 04-3043
    Vucaj v. Gonzales
    The petitioners are Albanian citizens. The lead petitioner, Nikolin Vucaj, and his wife, Nora,
    were members of the Albanian Democratic Party. The Democratic Party is part of Albania’s
    parliamentary government. The Democratic Party was often in opposition to the Socialist Party, the
    majority party in Albania. Nikolin was also a member of the Association of Formerly Politically
    Persecuted Persons, an Albanian non-profit organization whose members claim past persecution
    based on their political beliefs. It was Nikolin’s membership in these two organizations that formed
    the basis for his application.
    Nikolin entered the United States on May 29, 1997, and shortly thereafter he filed an
    application for asylum, withholding of removal, and withholding under the Convention Against
    Torture. Nikolin claimed that, if he returns to Albania, his life would be in danger because his
    political opinions are contrary to those of the Socialist Party. On August 27, 1997, Nikolin’s asylum
    officer recommended approval of his asylum application.
    Nora entered the United States with the petitioner’s daughter, Anila, on or about June 8,
    1998. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) (now part of the Department of
    Homeland Security) thereafter initiated removal proceedings against Nora and Anila. Nora filed a
    timely application, separate from Nikolin’s, for asylum, withholding of removal, and withholding
    under the Convention Against Torture. Immigration Judge Robert Newberry set a hearing date on
    Nora’s application for January 4, 2000, noting that Nora’s hearing would become moot if her
    husband’s asylum application were approved by that date, because Nora, as a dependent, would be
    granted any relief that her husband received. By January 4, however, Nikolin’s application was still
    pending, and Nora was not ready to proceed on her own application. Therefore, Nora agreed to
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    withdraw her own application, with prejudice, in exchange for having her removal delayed so that
    she and her daughter could proceed under Nikolin’s application.
    In addition to Nora and Anila, Nikolin’s application included their son, Klaudio. However,
    while the INS was processing this application, it determined that Nikolin had previously been
    stopped and fingerprinted by immigration officials.1 This discovery was enough to halt the
    processing of Nikolin’s application, and for the INS to commence removal proceedings against
    Nikolin, Nora, Anila, and Klaudio.
    The Vucaj family then appeared, with new counsel, before the immigration judge on
    September 26, 2000. The new counsel requested that Nora, rather than Nikolin, be designated the
    “lead petitioner” because counsel believed that Nora had a strong case for approval. Counsel for
    the Vucaj family argued that even though Nora had previously agreed to dismiss her own
    application, she should nonetheless be allowed to proceed as the lead petitioner because her previous
    counsel had failed to obtain favorable relevant information from Nora for inclusion in her
    application. The crux of the previously undisclosed information was Nora’s allegation that she had
    been sexually assaulted while she was imprisoned for three days in Albania. After some discussion,
    the immigration judge noted that he was inclined to find that Nora’s new application was not
    properly before the court, but that he would reserve judgment on the matter until the hearing had
    concluded.
    B. The Vucaj Family’s Factual Allegations
    1
    While it is unclear from the record, it appears that this stop by immigration officials was tied
    to the fact that Nikolin had initially attempted to enter the country with a fraudulent passport. See
    infra.
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    What follows are petitioners’ allegations of their past political persecution.
    Nikolin testified that both his grandfather and uncle had been executed by the Albanian
    Army in the 1940s because of their opposition to the Communist regime. A few months before
    Nikolin was born, his father was arrested and never heard from again. In 1990, while the
    Communist Party’s rule over Albania was quickly disintegrating, Nikolin and his brothers
    participated in a protest in Shkodra, Albania, where they lived. They attempted to tear down the
    bust of a former dictator and, along with over two-hundred protesters, were arrested by the police.
    Nikolin was immediately handcuffed and transported by truck to a police station. Once there, the
    police pushed him off the truck with such force that he fell and broke both of his wrists. Nikolin
    stated that, while in police custody, he received medical treatment for his wrists and then remained
    in jail for four weeks. He also claimed that he was beaten with electric wires during his time in
    prison.
    After the fall of the Communist Party in Albania, the Democratic Party assumed power in
    1992. However, in 1997, the Democratic Party was removed from power and replaced by the
    Socialist Party. Nikolin testified that he and his wife attended two demonstrations in opposition to
    the rule of Socialist Party. In 1997, Nikolin received two letters from unidentified sources,
    promising that he and his brothers would be “eliminated.” Nikolin also learned from a friend that
    his name had been added to a Socialist Party blacklist and that people added to the blacklist were
    usually killed within a few days.
    Nikolin first left Albania in April 1997. Nikolin attempted to enter the United States but was
    refused entry when his fraudulent passport was detected by immigration authorities. Nikolin
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    returned to Tirana, Albania and lived in hiding at a friend’s house for a month before he was
    successful in entering the United States.
    Nora testified that on March 8, 1998, she participated in a human rights demonstration that
    was held outside the Democratic Party headquarters in Shkodra. Though the demonstration itself
    was peaceful, two uniformed police officers and a third man in civilian attire came to her home later
    that night, grabbed her by the hair, and took her to a prison. For the next two days she was held in
    a small room and interrogated by police officers about her husband’s whereabouts. Nora testified
    in great detail that on the third day, an Albanian official in plain clothes, violently raped her while
    her hands were tied. Nora stated that as a result of the rape, she had bruises on her body, particularly
    around her neck. That same day, Nora was released.
    Nora explained that she told only her sister about the rape because she was ashamed and
    feared that her community would shun her. She did not tell her husband for the same reason. Nora
    also did not tell her first counsel about the rape because she was too ashamed for her
    interpreter—who was an Albanian male—to hear about these events, and she thought that the details
    of her three-day captivity were irrelevant to her application, as she had disclosed her captivity and
    mistreatment in general.
    Nora further testified that on April 26, 1998, masked men attempted to kidnap Anila as she
    walked home alone from a class field trip. Though Nora admitted that she did not witness the
    attempted kidnapping, she recounted that her neighbors brought Anila home and told Nora about
    the incident. Nora believed that the kidnappers were members of the Socialist Party because of her
    prior encounter with the police and because she also received anonymous letters threatening her life.
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    At this point in the hearing, the judge asked Nora about the jewelry she was wearing. The judge
    questioned Nora extensively about whether the stone in her necklace was an opal, and why she wore
    two “very ostentatious” rings, one of which had “great big diamond.” Joint Appendix (“JA”) 500.
    The judge then commented that Nora was well-dressed and raised the possibility that the kidnappers
    were after Nora’s money. Nora explained that they were a middle-class family in Albania and that
    she had bought her jewelry at a garage sale in the United States. Petitioners further note to this
    Court that they were under the impression that they should appear well-dressed at their hearing out
    of respect for the immigration court.
    Anila, who was twelve years old at the time of the hearing, also testified before the
    immigration judge. Anila testified to the attempted kidnapping, which occurred when she was nine
    years old. Anila stated that while she was walking home from a class field trip, she saw a van with
    two masked men approach her. Anila said that when one of the men grabbed her arm, she screamed,
    attracting the attention of her neighbors who came to her aid. Anila also remembered when the
    police came to her home and took her mother away for three days. When her mother returned, Anila
    remembered that her mother’s clothes were dirty and torn and that she had bruises on her face and
    neck.
    A few days after the attempted kidnapping, Nora , Anila, and Klaudio moved in with Nora’s
    uncle in Pjetroshan, Albania. The three stayed there for a few months until coming to the United
    States.
    In addition to Anila, three of Nikolin’s brothers, Kole, Dod, and Ndoc Vucaj, testified at the
    hearing. Kole testified that he protested alongside Nikolin in 1990 against the Socialist Party and
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    was arrested with him. Kole was not detained in the same cell as Nikolin but he testified that when
    Nikolin returned home a month after having been arrested, both of his arms were in casts. Kole
    testified that he saw, but did not read, the threatening letters that Nikolin received. Kole stated that
    he fled to the United States after his wife and daughter were kidnapped. Dod testified that he visited
    Nikolin when Nikolin had casts on both arms. Then Ndoc testified that he was also at the protest
    in 1990 with Nikolin and Kole, but that he had not been arrested.
    At the end of the hearing, the immigration judge denied the petitioners’ application for
    asylum and withholding of removal. The immigration judge concluded that the petitioners were not
    credible, and alternatively, that the country conditions had changed such that the petitioners no
    longer had a well-founded fear of future persecution in Albania. The judge also denied Nora’s
    motion to reinstate her independent application and include in it the allegations of sexual assault.
    On appeal to the BIA, the case was reviewed and affirmed by a single member of the Board.
    The single Board member issued a short opinion affirming the immigration judge’s credibility
    findings regarding Nikolin and the denial of Nora’s motion to reinstate her application. The
    petitioners timely appealed the BIA’s decision. As our review is limited to the BIA’s decision, we
    will not address the immigration judge’s alternate findings, such as his credibility findings with
    respect to Nora or his findings regarding changed country conditions, as these findings were not
    adopted by the BIA. See Mece v. Gonzales, 
    415 F.3d 562
    , 571 (6th Cir. 2005).
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    II.
    A. Nikolin’s Asylum Application
    Our standard for reviewing the BIA’s factual findings is deferential: factual findings are
    conclusive, unless we determine that the evidence is “so compelling that no reasonable factfinder
    could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution.” INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 
    502 U.S. 478
    , 484 (1992).
    Questions of law are, as usual, reviewed de novo. Ashki v. INS, 
    233 F.3d 913
    , 917 (6th Cir. 2000).
    An applicant may obtain asylum under Section 208(a) of the Immigration and Nationality
    Act if he shows that he is a “refugee,” meaning that he is unwilling or unable to return to his home
    country because of “persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
    nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).
    The applicant must establish, through substantial evidence, that he has both a subjective and
    objective fear of persecution. Ivezaj v. I.N.S., 
    84 F.3d 215
    , 221 (6th Cir. 1996). If an applicant
    establishes past persecution, a presumption of future persecution arises under 8 C.F.R. § 208.13,
    which the Government may rebut by showing changed country conditions.
    As to Nikolin’s claims of past persecution, the immigration judge found that Nikolin was not
    credible based on certain inconsistencies and omissions. In reviewing credibility findings, we
    consider that:
    “[a]n adverse credibility finding must be based on issues that go to the heart of the
    applicant’s claim.” Sylla v. INS, 
    388 F.3d 924
    , 926 (6th Cir. 2004). Findings of non-
    credibility cannot be based upon irrelevant inconsistencies in the evidence presented
    to an Immigration Judge. Daneshvar v. Ashcroft, 
    355 F.3d 615
    , 619 n.2 (6th Cir.
    2004). If presented discrepancies cannot be viewed as attempts by the applicant to
    enhance his claim of persecution, they have no bearing on credibility. 
    Id. at 623.
           (citation and quotation omitted).
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    Mece, 415 F.3d at 576
    (quoting Bibashani v. Ashcroft, 124 Fed. Appx. 361, 365 (6th Cir. 2005)
    (unpublished)). “Like affirmative inconsistencies, omissions may form the basis of an adverse
    credibility determination, provided that they are substantially related to the asylum claim.” Liti v.
    Gonzales, 
    411 F.3d 631
    , 637 (6th Cir. 2005). Furthermore, “[w]hile an adverse credibility finding
    is afforded substantial deference, the finding must be supported by specific reasons.” 
    Sylla, 388 F.3d at 926
    . Therefore, our task is to review the adverse credibility findings that were adopted by
    the BIA and determine whether the underlying basis for these findings was sufficient.
    The immigration judge noted several specific problems with Nikolin’s testimony which
    contributed to the ultimate adverse credibility finding.         Specifically, the judge found four
    inconsistencies or implausibilities. First, the BIA and immigration judge found it critical that the
    petitioners’ asylum applications state that in 1990 Nikolin attended a protest with his brothers where
    the group tore down a statue of “Joseph Stalin,” but when Nikolin testified, he said that the group
    tore down a statue of “Enver Hoxha,” an Albanian dictator who was a successor to Stalin. Nikolin
    explained this inconsistency by saying that his wife must have confused the two dictators because
    in Albania, Hoxha is often referred to as the “son” of Stalin. Nikolin then said that he himself knew
    the difference between the two figures, however this inconsistency was found in his application as
    well as his wife’s application. The Government emphasizes that the “devil is in the details” and that,
    therefore, an inconsistency of this minor nature indicates that the petitioners are untrustworthy. This
    is not the rule we follow for evaluating credibility determinations, nor it is a particularly useful rule
    for detecting the truth. Inconsistencies that do not relate to the basis of an applicant’s alleged fear
    of persecution or that do not go to the heart of the applicant’s asylum claim are plainly insufficient
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    to support an adverse credibility finding. 
    Daneshvar, 355 F.3d at 623
    . While the name of the
    particular Communist dictator whose statue was torn down may be tangentially related to the
    applicants’ claim, in that the name of the dictator and Nikolin’s claim of persecution both involve
    the communist regime, we fail to see how this discrepancy can be “viewed as an attempt[] by the
    applicant to enhance his claim of persecution.” 
    Id. at 623
    (emphasis added). It is not as if Nikolin
    changed the name of the dictator to coincide with the political party in power, or changed an act of
    mere vandalism of public property to a political crime. Instead, the essence of Nikolin’s claim—that
    he attended a political protest with his brothers and helped tear down a statute of a Communist
    leader—remains untarnished. Accordingly, this “inconsistency” is not sufficient to support the
    adverse credibility finding here.
    Second, the BIA and immigration judge found that Nikolin and Nora lacked credibility
    because when Nora left Albania she left her young son Klaudio behind, despite the fact that the
    petitioners claimed that the entire family was in danger. While certain activities by a petitioner may
    cause one legitimately to question his genuine fear of persecution, this is not one of them. Nora
    testified that she wanted to bring both Anila and Klaudio with her to the United States. However,
    her uncle, who had made the arrangements to get them out of Albania, was only able to secure
    passage for Nora and Anila. JA 509. Nora believed that it was important to get out of Albania as
    soon as possible, given the recent kidnapping attempt of Anila. She also believed that her alleged
    persecutors would have an easier time of identifying her family if she stayed at her uncle’s home
    with both of her children, than if only Klaudio stayed with her uncle. JA 512. Nora further
    explained that her uncle was able to find safe passage for Klaudio a few months after Nora and Anila
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    arrived in the United States. While we can conceive of situations in which leaving a child behind
    would tend to discredit a petitioner’s genuine fear of persecution—such as when there was no
    explanation for failing to bring the child and the child was independently a target—this is not that
    case. Here, petitioners temporarily left their son in safe hands, and they did so because there was
    an urgent need to leave the country. It is also clear throughout their testimony that it was Nikolin,
    Nora, and Anila, who had been the visible targets of the family. Accordingly, the fact that Nora left
    her son in Albania with her uncle for a few months does not support the adverse credibility finding;
    to the contrary, it bolsters Nora’s claims.
    Third, the BIA and immigration judge noted that there is no record that Nikolin told his
    initial asylum officer during his interview that he had received two threatening letters in early 1997
    or that he heard that his name had been placed on a Socialist Party blacklist during that same time
    period. As an initial matter, Nikolin claims that he did in fact tell his asylum officer about these
    events, however the asylum officer did not include these events in his one-and-a-half page
    assessment of the interview. The officer did, however, note that Nikolin “presented testimony that
    was detailed and consistent thus he is deemed credible.” JA 271. Regardless of whether Nikolin
    specifically told the asylum officer about the threatening letters and the blacklist, this omission does
    not support an adverse credibility finding here when one examines what Nikolin indisputably told
    the asylum officer. In Nikolin’s first asylum application, which he filed immediately upon entering
    the United States, he wrote, in the limited space that was provided in the asylum application
    questionnaire, that the Albanian authorities “threatened me and my family . . . if I were to return,
    I would pay the price with my life.” JA 126. He noted again in another answer that Albanian
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    authorities “have detained, beaten, tortured and threatened with death all my family on several
    occasions.” JA 127 (emphasis added). Likewise, Nora noted in three separate places on her initial
    asylum application that she and her husband had been “threatened” by Albanian officials or the
    secret police. Accordingly, it is not as if the petitioners changed their story when they testified
    before the immigration judge. At best, they may be faulted with omitting details of the threats they
    received. “Although an omission can sometimes be significant enough to support an adverse
    credibility determination, ‘an asylum application is not required to provide an exhaustive, detailed
    list of all incidents of persecution in the asylum application.’” 
    Mece, 415 F.3d at 573
    (quoting
    Vasha v. Gonzales, 
    410 F.3d 863
    , 871 n.4 (6th Cir. 2005)). In Mece, we found that where the
    petitioner had described incidents of being beaten by Albanian officials at a demonstration but
    omitted the fact that he had been beaten in the police station itself, such a failing was an insignificant
    omission. Similarly, the fact that Nikolin failed to detail the form in which the death threats were
    made in his initial asylum application does not provide a sufficient basis for an adverse credibility
    finding. This is particularly true because Nikolin noted the other, more significant, incidents of
    persecution—such as the fact that he was arrested, detained, and beaten by the police—and because
    he had consistently asserted that he had been threatened with death by those he believed to be
    government officials.
    Finally, the BIA and immigration judge noted that it was implausible that Nikolin would
    have gone to the Shkodra police station to obtain his passport if he genuinely believed that the police
    were threatening his life. While such a conclusion would be reasonable had Nikolin claimed that
    he feared the Shkodra police officers, Nikolin made no such claim. Nikolin consistently maintained
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    that he believed a “Secret Police” group had sent him the threatening letters and had formed the
    Socialist Party blacklist. He explained that the former head of the “Criminalistic Department” under
    the Communist Regime had formed this governmental group, and it was this group and the people
    associated with it that he feared. JA 544-548. In fact, when Nikolin was asked why he went to the
    police station for his passport, he explained that many of the people who had worked at that
    particular police station had ties with the Democratic Party, and that therefore, he did not have any
    problem picking up his passport from that station. While one would not be compelled to believe
    Nikolin’s assertions against other factual assertions, there were no counter assertions presented at
    the immigration hearing. Without such countering justifications, the immigration judge’s adverse
    credibility finding in this regard was baseless.
    In sum, we find that the adverse credibility findings adopted by the BIA are based on
    irrelevant inconsistencies and omissions which do not go to the heart of the petitioners’ claims or
    are not supported with sufficient and specific reasons. Accordingly, the BIA’s decision with respect
    to Nikolin’s application is VACATED and REMANDED to the BIA.
    B. Nora’s Motion to Reinstate her own Application
    We review the BIA’s decision not to reopen or reinstate a petitioner’s asylum application for
    an abuse of discretion. INS v. Doherty, 
    502 U.S. 314
    , 323 (1992) (motions to reopen); Mendez-
    Gutierez v. Ashcroft, 
    340 F.3d 865
    , 869 (9th Cir. 2003) (motions to reinstate an application are
    treated the same as motions to reopen an application).
    Although Nora had previously agreed to dismiss her independent asylum application, she
    moved to reinstate her original application when her husband’s asylum application was denied.
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    Nora argued that she only agreed to dismiss her application because it appeared, at the time, that
    Nikolin’s application would be approved and she did not want to disclose unnecessarily her sexual
    assault. She also explained that she did not feel comfortable disclosing the sexual assault to her first
    counsel who used a male interpreter.
    The immigration judge declined to reinstate Nora’s application because by the time she made
    the request, her application was outside of the statutorily prescribed one-year filing period for
    asylum claims. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b). The immigration judge determined that Nora had failed to show
    an extraordinary circumstance under 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(5) which would permit consideration of
    her time-barred claims. The BIA affirmed this decision.
    The BIA erred in analyzing this case under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b), because this statutory
    provision relates to untimely filed asylum applications. In this case, however, Nora did not file an
    untimely asylum claim, but instead filed a motion to reinstate a previously filed timely application.
    Therefore, it was error for the immigration judge and the BIA to apply the “extraordinary
    circumstances” standard set forth under 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(5) to Nora’s situation. Instead, as the
    BIA itself has stated, when a petitioner moves to reinstate a timely filed asylum application, the BIA
    should examine whether the petitioner “has established a prima facie case of eligibility for asylum.”
    
    Mendez-Gutierez, 340 F.3d at 870
    . Nora testified that she was taken to a prison hours after attending
    a political protest, and that during her incarceration, she was brutally raped by a prison official. She
    also testified that shortly thereafter she had received threats and that masked men attempted to
    kidnap her daughter. Her daughter testified as to the details of this attempted kidnapping.
    Accordingly, Nora has established a prima facie case of eligibility for asylum, as she has alleged
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    past persecution by Albanian officials. Nora and Anila’s assertions clearly go beyond the type of
    “vague and general accusations of harassment” which would fail to establish a prima facie case for
    reinstatement. 
    Id. At 868.
    While there may be other factors for the BIA to consider in evaluating
    a motion to reinstate a timely filed asylum application, see 
    id. at 870
    n.7, we conclude that the BIA
    abused its discretion here because it applied the wrong legal framework to Nora’s appeal.
    Accordingly, the BIA’s decision with respect to Nora’s application is VACATED and
    REMANDED.
    C. BIA’s Streamlining Process
    In this case, a single BIA member affirmed the immigration judge with a short opinion
    pursuant to the BIA’s authority to streamline cases under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(5). On appeal, the
    petitioners argue that their case should not have been streamlined and affirmed without opinion.
    First, we note that contrary to petitioners’ argument, an opinion was issued by the BIA;
    however, it was issued by a single member rather than a three-member panel. Second, the
    streamlining regulations provide that cases “may only be assigned for review by a three-member
    panel” if there is a need to settle inconsistencies between immigration judges, to establish precedent
    or resolve a case of national import, or to review decisions that are not in conformity with the law
    or rely on clearly erroneous factual determinations. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(6). We have previously
    upheld the streamlining regulations. See Denko v. INS, 
    351 F.3d 717
    , 730 (6th Cir. 2003).
    Petitioners’ only argument is that the immigration judge’s decision was based on a “clearly
    erroneous factual determination,” and therefore the case should have gone to a three-member panel
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    of the BIA for review. In light of our decision to remand both Nikolin and Nora’s asylum
    applications for further proceedings, this issue is now moot.
    III.
    For the preceding reasons, we GRANT the petition for review, REVERSE the BIA, and
    REMAND for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We encourage the BIA to assign this case
    to a new immigration judge. See 
    Mece, 415 F.3d at 578
    ; Paramasamy v. Ashcroft, 
    295 F.3d 1047
    ,
    1055 n.4 (9th Cir. 2002); Kim v. Ashcroft, 95 Fed. Appx. 418, 425-26 (3rd Cir. 2004) (unpublished).
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