Providence Baptist v. Euclid ( 2005 )


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  •                            RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
    Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
    File Name: 05a0408p.06
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
    _________________
    X
    Plaintiffs-Appellees, -
    PROVIDENCE BAPTIST CHURCH, et al.,
    -
    -
    -
    No. 04-4542
    CITY OF EUCLID,
    ,
    Defendant-Appellee, >
    -
    -
    -
    v.
    -
    Intervenor-Appellant. -
    HILLANDALE COMMITTEE, LTD.,
    N
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Ohio at Cleveland.
    No. 04-00746—Kathleen McDonald O’Malley, District Judge.
    Argued: July 19, 2005
    Decided and Filed: October 5, 2005
    Before: CLAY, GILMAN, and COOK, Circuit Judges.
    _________________
    COUNSEL
    ARGUED: Gerald W. Phillips, PHILLIPS & CO., LPA, Avon, Ohio, for Appellant. Gary F.
    Werner, BERNS, OCKNER & GREENBERGER, Cleveland, Ohio, Stephen M. O’Bryan, TAFT,
    STETTINIUS & HOLLISTER, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Gerald W. Phillips,
    PHILLIPS & CO., LPA, Avon, Ohio, for Appellant. Gary F. Werner, Sheldon Berns, BERNS,
    OCKNER & GREENBERGER, Cleveland, Ohio, Stephen M. O’Bryan, Majeed G. Makhlouf,
    TAFT, STETTINIUS & HOLLISTER, Cleveland, Ohio, L. Christopher Frey, LAW DIRECTOR,
    CITY OF EUCLID, Euclid, Ohio, for Appellees.
    _________________
    OPINION
    _________________
    CLAY, Circuit Judge. Intervenor, Hillandale Committee, Ltd. (“Hillandale Committee”),
    appeals from the order of the district court denying its motion to intervene in a dispute between
    Plaintiffs, Providence Baptist Church, Reverend Rodney Maiden, and Francine James (collectively,
    “Providence”), and Defendant, City of Euclid (“Euclid). Hillandale Committee also appeals the
    district court’s entry of a consent judgment in the case between Providence and Euclid.
    This case arises from a challenge to the Euclid zoning code by Providence, which alleged
    violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
    1
    No. 04-4542           Providence Baptist Church, et al. v. Hillandale Committee                 Page 2
    Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc, et seq., and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982 and 1988. Hillandale Committee
    moved to intervene in the lawsuit, asserting as grounds that in the absence of intervention, the results
    of a referendum on the zoning code could be nullified by a settlement between Euclid and
    Providence, and that Euclid might not adequately represent Hillandale Committee’s purported
    interest in opposing the re-zoning or Hillandale Committee’s purported interest in the protection of
    its referendum and free speech rights. The district court denied the motion to intervene and entered
    a consent judgment between Providence and Euclid after those parties reached a negotiated
    settlement terminating the litigation.
    For the following reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Hillandale Committee’s
    motion to intervene, and DISMISS Hillandale Committee’s challenge to the consent judgment on
    the ground that Hillandale Committee lacks standing to bring that challenge.
    BACKGROUND
    Providence Baptist Church, established in 1921, has a predominantly African-American
    congregation of more than 1,200 members. Plaintiff Reverend Rodney Maiden has been the senior
    pastor of the church since 1980, and Plaintiff Francine James is an individual member of the church
    and Euclid resident. When Providence outgrew its location in Cleveland, it sought to purchase
    property in the nearby area. Providence identified 68.092 acres of land for that purpose in Euclid,
    Ohio. Euclid is approximately twelve miles northeast of downtown Cleveland, and has a population
    of approximately 52,000. Providence planned to build a worship facility and a single- family-home
    development, with homes to be offered for sale to members of the church and the general public.
    Euclid’s zoning code divides the city into twelve separate zoning districts delineating
    specific uses permitted in each district. The zoning code allows churches as a permitted use only
    in the U-R-2 District. At the time the U-R-2 designation was created, all existing churches were
    zoned U-R-2, but no other property is so classified. The property Providence planned to buy, except
    for a small portion, was zoned U7 Light Industrial Park District, to be used only for specific
    manufacturing and assembly processes and products. The remainder of the church’s property was
    zoned U4 Local Retail or Wholesale Store Districts.
    Prior to purchasing the property, Providence petitioned the city to re-zone the parcel on
    which it planned to construct its worship facility as U-R-2, and the parcel on which it planned to
    build the single family housing as the U-1 Single Family House District zoning classification. The
    city council passed ordinances which did just that on February 2, 2004. However, on March 1,
    2004, referendum petitions were submitted to the city’s finance director in order to place those
    ordinances on the ballot at the November 2, 2004 general election. The Cuyahoga County Board
    of Elections was duly directed to submit the ordinances to the electors of the city at the November
    2, 2004 election. Consequently, the ordinances did not become effective and Providence was unable
    to use its property for the planned worship facility and single-family development.
    Providence purchased the property on April 18, 2004, and instituted this action in the United
    States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio on April 21, 2004. Providence’s complaint
    charged that the zoning code violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
    Constitution. An amended complaint, filed on September 24, 2004, added claims under 42 U.S.C.
    §§ 1982 and 1988 and claims for violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
    Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000cc, et seq.
    On October 28, 2004, Hillandale Committee moved to intervene as a matter of right, under
    Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(A). In the motion to intervene, Hillandale Committee described
    itself as “the duly authorized committee which circulated the referendum petitions” to place the
    ordinances rezoning Providence’s property on the ballot in the November 2, 2004 election.
    No. 04-4542           Providence Baptist Church, et al. v. Hillandale Committee               Page 3
    However, Hillandale Committee was not incorporated until October 20, 2004. Various pieces of
    campaign literature related to the referendum, which were submitted during the litigation before the
    district court by Hillandale Committee, do not bear Hillandale Committee’s name, but that of the
    “Euclid Awareness Committee.” In a sworn affidavit, Rebecca Conway (“Conway”) stated that she
    was involved in the referendum petition process, and that there was “a referendum committee
    composed of six (6) members for the Rezoning Ordinances who represents the Hillandale
    Committee which initially was an unincorporated association of individuals, but who later formed
    the Hillandale Committee Ltd.” (J.A. at 327.)
    Hillandale Committee cited as grounds for its motion that its interest in opposing the
    rezoning, and that the right of the voters to vote on the ordinances at the November 2, 2004 election,
    could be threatened or nullifed by a proposed settlement between Euclid and Providence. Hillandale
    Committee further argued that Euclid might not adequately represent Hillandale Committee’s
    interest in opposing the rezoning and in protecting Hillandale Committee’s constitutional
    referendum rights. Both Providence and Euclid filed memoranda in opposition to the motion to
    intervene.
    On November 2, 2004, the voters of Euclid rejected the two re-zoning ordinances. On
    November 16, 2004, the district court denied Hillandale Committee’s motion to intervene, on the
    grounds that it was procedurally defective because it was not accompanied by a pleading, as required
    by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(c) and that it was mooted by the November 2, 2004 election.
    Providence and Euclid then negotiated a settlement of the litigation. Providence and Euclid
    entered a consent judgment on November 17, 2004, in which they stipulated, and the district court
    found that Euclid’s zoning code was unconstitutional as applied to Providence’s property. The
    consent judgment permitted the development of the planned worship facility and single family
    housing. Various requirements related to the hiring of contractors and builders, the square footage
    of the various types of homes to be constructed, and the base prices of the homes, as well as a
    declaration of covenants, easements, and restrictions, were included in the consent judgment.
    Hillandale Committee filed a notice of appeal to this Court from the denial of the motion to
    intervene and the dismissal of the action pursuant to the consent judgment, on November 17, 2004.
    On January 12, 2005, Euclid and Providence filed a joint motion to dismiss the appeal as moot. This
    Court entered an order on March 15, 2005, denying it “at this time.” The order held that
    [t]he appellant has standing to appeal the denial of its motion to
    intervene. The issue of whether the appellant also has standing to
    appeal the consent judgment is complex and is intertwined with the
    merits of the intervention appeal. Therefore, the panel to be assigned
    to hear this appeal on the merits should decide whether the
    appellant’s interest in the litigation equates to Article III standing for
    the purposes of pursuing an appeal of the consent judgment or
    whether the appeal is moot because no effective relief can be granted.
    DISCUSSION
    I.     Denial of the Motion to Intervene for Failure to Comply with the Procedural
    Requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(c)
    A.      Standard of Review
    This Court generally reviews de novo a district court’s determination of whether a would-be
    intervenor has satisfied the elements required for intervention. However, we conclude that the
    appropriate review of the question of whether a motion to intervene should be dismissed for failure
    No. 04-4542               Providence Baptist Church, et al. v. Hillandale Committee                             Page 4
    to satisfy the procedural requirements of Rule 24(c), as with the question of whether it should be
    dismissed for untimeliness, is for abuse of discretion. See Retired Chicago Police Ass'n v. City of
    Chicago, 
    7 F.3d 584
    , 595 (7th Cir. 1993) (“Whether to permit a procedurally defective motion to
    intervene is within the sound discretion of the district court.”) This approach accords with the
    general principle that “issues involving what can broadly be labeled ‘supervision of litigation’” are
    reviewed for abuse of discretion. Pierce v. Underwood, 
    487 U.S. 552
    , 559 (1988).
    B.       Analysis
    One who seeks to intervene must serve a motion stating the grounds for intervention and
    accompanied by a pleading setting forth the claim or defense for which intervention is sought. FED.
    R. CIV. P. 24(c). The district court’s dismissal of Hillandale Committee’s motion to intervene was
    based in part on Hillandale Committee’s failure to attach a pleading to its motion to intervene.
    Hillandale Committee does not dispute that it failed to file such a pleading. Hillandale Committee
    argues, however, that Rule 24(c) should not be applied “hyper-technically.” We note that the motion
    to intervene did include a statement of “legal grounds[,] reasons[,] and arguments” contending that
    intervention was appropriate.
    The circuits appear to be split in their approach to enforcement of Rule 24(c), with a majority
    favoring a permissive interpretation of the rule. With the exception of a 1951 case involving quite
    different circumstances from those of this case, this Court apparently has not considered whether
    failure to file a pleading as required by Rule 24(c) should be grounds for denying the motion.1 See
    Kentucky Home Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Duling, 
    190 F.2d 797
    , 803(6th Cir. 1951) (members of the
    Nashville Postal Employees Benefit Society could not intervene, post-judgment, in an action by
    another member against an insurance company; the “intervening petition . . . is not a pleading stating
    a cause of action against the Insurance Company, and does not comply with the provisions of Rule
    24(c)”).
    At least four circuits have taken a lenient approach to the requirements of Rule 24(c). The
    D.C. Circuit has explained that “‘procedural defects in connection with intervention motions should
    generally be excused by a court,’” particularly where there is no claim that the parties do not have
    notice of the intervenor’s appeal. Mass. v. Microsoft Corp., 
    373 F.3d 1199
    , n. 19 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
    (quoting McCarthy v. Kleindienst, 
    741 F.2d 1406
    , 1416 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). The Eleventh Circuit has
    similarly suggested that “inconsequential” procedural noncompliance with the requirements of Rule
    24 should be excused. Piambino v. Bailey, 
    757 F.2d 1112
    , 1121 (11th Cir. 1985). The Fourth
    Circuit has held “the proper approach [to Rule 24(c)] is to disregard non-prejudicial technical
    defects.” Spring Constr. Co. v. Harris, 
    614 F.2d 374
    , 377 (4th Cir. 1980). The Fifth Circuit has
    permitted intervention even in the absence of a motion to intervene, citing Federal Rule of Civil
    Procedure 8(e)(1) (“[n]o technical forms of pleadings or motions are required”) and Rule 8(f) (“[a]ll
    pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice”). Farina v. Mission Inv. Trust, 
    615 F.2d 1068
    , 1074 (5th Cir. 1980).
    The First, Second, and Seventh Circuits have taken a stricter approach to Rule 24(c). See
    Public Service Co. of New Hampshire v. Patch, 
    136 F.3d 197
    , 205, n.6 (1st Cir. 1998) (failure to
    accompany motion to intervene with a pleading setting forth a claim or defense “ordinarily would
    warrant dismissal” of the motion); Abramson v. Penwood Inv. Corp., 
    392 F.2d 759
    , 761 (2nd Cir.
    1968) (“appellant’s reference in his motion papers to the allegations of the original complaint was
    insufficient to comply with the requirements of Rule 24(c)”); Shevlin v. Schewe, 
    809 F.2d 447
    , 450
    1
    The Sixth Circuit cases cited by Hillandale Committee for the proposition that this Court “has taken a liberal
    and non-technical approach to intervention under Civil Rule 24,” Hillandale Committee Brief at 9, are inapposite, as they
    all deal specifically with how broadly to construe Rule 24's “substantial interest” requirement, which will be discussed
    below, and not with the consequence of a procedural failure.
    No. 04-4542             Providence Baptist Church, et al. v. Hillandale Committee                        Page 5
    (7th Cir. 1987) (“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(c) is unambiguous in defining the procedure
    for an intervenor,” and requires a pleading to accompany the motion to intervene). However, the
    Seventh Circuit in Shevlin emphasized that a court may excuse a non-prejudicial failure to comply
    with the requirements of Rule 24(c), but saw no reason to do so in that case, where the attempted
    intervenor not only did not timely file a pleading, but in fact did not at any time offer the requisite
    pleading. 
    Id. We conclude
    that the district court abused its discretion in rejecting Hillandale Committee’s
    motion to intervene on the basis that it failed to attach a pleading. Hillandale Committee’s motion
    to intervene alleged a claim or defense with a common question of law and fact as in the main action
    (the constitutionality of the rezoning). After the district court denied Hillandale Committee’s motion
    to intervene, but still before the entry of the consent judgment, Hillandale Committee filed a motion
    for relief from judgment to which an Answer was attached. Furthermore, neither party has ever
    claimed that any prejudice would result from granting the motion to intervene despite the failure to
    attach a pleading; the parties are clearly on notice as to Hillandale Committee’s position and
    arguments. The district court’s exacting application of Rule 24(c) is not in accord with the
    jurisprudence of a majority of the Circuits, which favor a permissive approach, or with the rationale
    applied by other circuits to approve strict enforcement of Rule 24(c) in some circumstances (e.g.,
    where the parties are not on notice as to the grounds asserted for intervention, or there is some other
    prejudice to the parties).
    II.     Hillandale Committee Did Not Have a Substantial Legal Interest in the Subject
    Matter of Providence’s Lawsuit against Euclid
    A.       Standard of Review
    Except as to issues of timeliness, which are not presented here, this Court’s review of a
    district court’s denial of a motion to intervene under Rule 24(a)2 of the Federal Rules of Civil
    Procedure is de novo. Stupak-Thrall v. Glickman, 
    226 F.3d 467
    , 471 (6th Cir. 2000) (citations
    omitted).
    B.       Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24
    Under the Federal Rules of Procedure, a non-party may intervene in an action as of right
    “when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of
    the action and the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter
    impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is
    adequately represented by existing parties.” FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2).
    We have interpreted Rule 24(a) to require an entity seeking to intervene to establish four
    elements: “(1) timeliness of the application to intervene, (2) the applicant's substantial legal interest
    in the case, (3) impairment of the applicant's ability to protect that interest in the absence of
    intervention, and (4) inadequate representation of that interest by parties already before the court.”
    Michigan State AFL-CIO v. Miller, 
    103 F.3d 1240
    , 1245 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing Cuyahoga Valley
    Ry. Co. v. Tracy, 
    6 F.3d 389
    , 395 (6th Cir.1993)).
    The focus of this case is on whether Hillandale Committee has a substantial legal interest in
    Providence’s suit against Euclid. We have adopted “a rather expansive notion of the interest
    sufficient to invoke intervention of right.” 
    Id. (citations omitted).
    For example, “an intervenor need
    not have the same standing necessary to initiate a lawsuit in order to intervene in an existing district
    2
    Rule 24(a) governs intervention as of right. Hillandale Committee also moved for permissive intervention
    under Rule 24(b), but has not appealed the denial of that motion.
    No. 04-4542           Providence Baptist Church, et al. v. Hillandale Committee                Page 6
    court suit where the plaintiff has standing.” Associated Builders & Contractors v. Perry, 
    16 F.3d 688
    , 690 (6th Cir. 1994).
    C.      The Accuracy of Hillandale Committee’s Self-Description
    We have serious concerns about whether Hillandale Committee is, in fact, what it claims to
    be. Hillandale Committee argues that as the “duly authorized committee for a referendum opposing
    the rezoning of certain properties,” it has an interest in protecting “the vote of the people and the
    results of the election against its destruction and nullification through a Settlement Agreement or
    Consent Judgment destroying the vote of the people and the results of the election.” (Hillandale
    Committee Br. at 15.) Hillandale Committee similarly described itself in its motion to intervene as
    “the duly authorized committee which circulated the referendum petitions.” (J.A. at 119.)
    However, Hillandale Committee has presented very little evidence establishing that it is, in
    fact, the “the duly authorized committee which circulated the referendum petitions.” The
    referendum petitions requiring Euclid to place the zoning code ordinances on the ballot were
    submitted on March 1, 2004. Hillandale Committee was not incorporated until October 20, 2004.
    All of the campaign literature opposing the re-zoning which Hillandale Committee attached to
    submissions before the district court bears not the name of “Hillandale Committee, Ltd.,” but
    instead, that of the “Euclid Awareness Committee.” The website of the Euclid Awareness
    Committee claims the credit for gathering and submitting the signatures on the referendum petition.
    Hillandale Committee’s only attempt to explain what appears to be a major obstacle to its
    intervention attempts in this case is the submission of an affidavit from one Rebecca Conway, who
    avers that she has been actively involved in the campaign for a referendum on the rezoning
    ordinances, and that “there was and is a referendum committee composed of six (6) members for the
    Rezoning Ordinances who represents the Hillandale Committee which initially was an
    unincorporated association of individuals, but who later formed the Hillandale Committee Ltd.”
    (J.A. at 327.) Conway does not identify any of the six members by name, nor does she explain what
    part they played in the campaign for a referendum on the rezoning.
    In its reply brief, Hillandale Committee asserts that there was an unincorporated Hillandale
    Committee that “the law recognizes . . . as the legal entity responsible for the filing of the
    referendum petition.” Reply Br. at 13. Hillandale Committee does not offer any documentation to
    support this claim, however. Hillandale Committee asserts that it is the successor to this
    unincorporated group, and has the same legal interests in this action.
    In short, there is a serious question as to whether Hillandale Committee is, in fact, the “duly
    authorized committee which circulated the referendum petitions.” If it is not, it has no basis from
    which to claim a substantial legal interest in protecting the results of the referendum. Therefore, if
    we were inclined to reverse the district court’s denial of Hillandale Committee’s motion to intervene
    and the entry of the consent judgment, the case would first have to be remanded for further factual
    findings related to Hillandale Committee’s identity. However, because, for the reasons that follow,
    we would not conclude that Hillandale Committee had a substantial legal interest in the litigation
    between Providence and Euclid even if it were perfectly clear that Hillandale Committee is what it
    claims to be, no such remand is necessary.
    D.      Hillandale Does Not Have a Substantial Legal Interest in “Protecting” the
    Results of the November 2, 2004 Referendum
    The district court determined that Hillandale Committee’s motion to intervene was “mooted
    by the November 2, 2004 general election because the zoning ordinances at issue here were included
    on the ballot in that election . . . . Because the zoning ordinances appeared on the general election’s
    ballot, the voters clearly exercised their referendum rights.” (J.A. at 208.) The district court
    No. 04-4542           Providence Baptist Church, et al. v. Hillandale Committee                 Page 7
    concluded that Hillandale Committee had no cognizable legal interest in the subject matter of the
    litigation between Providence and Euclid.
    We agree. Hillandale Committee argues that the district court erred in failing to recognize
    its interest in “protecting the vote of the people and the results of the election.” However, it is
    Hillandale Committee which errs in failing to recognize that any interest it had in this case sufficient
    to permit intervention ended when the election took place on November 2, 2004.
    We will assume for purposes of this issue that Hillandale Committee is what it claims to be:
    “the duly authorized committee which circulated the referendum petitions.” The referendum petition
    took no position on the merits of the referendum; rather, it simply asked that the ordinance rezoning
    Providence’s land be submitted to the electors for their approval or rejection. As such, Hillandale
    Committee had no interest in the outcome of the election or in any negotiations between Euclid and
    Providence after the election was held. In contrast to the cases cited by Hillandale Committee in its
    brief, this case raises no issue as to the validity of the election. Cf. State ex rel. Comm. for the
    Referendum of Ordinance no. 77-01 v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections, 
    774 N.E.2d 239
    (Ohio 2002)
    (referendum petition committee permitted to intervene as a respondent in case challenging validity
    of signatures on referendum petition); State ex rel. Ryant Commt v. Lorain City Bd. of Elections, 
    712 N.E.2d 696
    (Ohio 1999) (intervention permitted in case challenging validity of petition signatures).
    The referendum at issue in this case took place and was certified without incident. Any
    substantial legal interest held by “the duly authorized committee for a referendum which circulated
    the referendum petitions” was terminated when the referendum was held and the results certified.
    Hillandale Committee’s alleged advocacy in getting the zoning ordinance on the November 2004
    ballot does not suffice to make it a “real party in interest in the transaction which is the subject of
    the proceeding” – the negotiated settlement between Providence and Euclid. Mich. State AFL-CIO
    v. Miller, 
    103 F.3d 1240
    , 1246 (6th Cir. 1997). Rather, its interest in the negotiated settlement is
    “so generalized it will not support a claim for intervention of right.” Athens Lumber Co., Inc. v. Fed.
    Election Comm’n, 
    690 F.2d 1364
    , 1366 (11th Cir. 1982).
    In any event, even if Hillandale Committee was a “real party in interest,” it could not
    intervene to challenge the negotiated settlement because “concerns for state autonomy . . . deny
    private individuals the right to compel a state to enforce its laws.” Diamond v. Charles, 
    476 U.S. 54
    , 65 (1986) (rejecting an individual’s attempt to intervene in a lawsuit challenging the
    constitutionality of an Illinois abortion regulation, where the state acquiesced in the court’s ruling
    of unconstitutionality). We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of Hillandale’s motion to
    intervene.
    III.   Hillandale’s Lack of Standing to Appeal the Entry of the Consent Judgment
    We decide this issue because our March 15, 2005 order clearly stated that this panel would
    “decide whether the appellant’s interest in the litigation equates to Article III standing for the
    purposes of pursuing an appeal of the consent judgment or whether the appeal is moot because no
    effective relief can be granted.” However, we note our dissatisfaction with Hillandale Committee’s
    failure to address this issue except for a passing reference in its reply brief.
    The Supreme Court has held that for an intervenor to continue litigation by pursuing an
    appeal when the party on whose side it has intervened has not appealed, the intervenor must have
    standing in its own right. Diamond, 
    476 U.S. 68
    (1986). See also 
    Perry, 16 F.3d at 690
    . If
    Hillandale Committee does not have standing to appeal the consent judgment, then this appeal would
    be moot even if we had determined that Hillandale should have been permitted to intervene, because
    without standing to appeal the final judgment there is no effective relief available to Hillandale. See
    Nat’l Post Office Mailhandlers v. U.S. Postal Serv., 
    751 F.2d 834
    , 843 (6th Cir. 1985).
    No. 04-4542           Providence Baptist Church, et al. v. Hillandale Committee                Page 8
    As we noted in our order of March 15, 2005, the issue of whether Hillandale Committee has
    standing to appeal from the entry of the consent judgment is closely related to the question of whether
    it should have been permitted to intervene. However, there is not perfect overlap between the
    requirements for intervention under Rule 24(a) and the requirements for Article III standing; indeed,
    the requisite showing for Article III standing is more rigid in certain of its requirements. At a
    minimum, a party seeking to establish Article III standing must show: 1) “‘an injury in fact’ – an
    invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) ‘actual or
    imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical,’” 2) a causal connection between the injury and the
    conduct complained of, and 3) a likelihood of redressability by a favorable judgment. Zurich Ins.
    Co. v. Logitrans, Inc., 
    297 F.3d 528
    , 531 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Kardules v. City of Columbus, 
    95 F.3d 1335
    , 1346 (6th Cir. 1996)).
    It is possible to have standing to intervene in a lawsuit, but not have Article III standing to
    bring an independent appeal. 
    Perry, 16 F.3d at 690
    . This is so because the “injury in fact”
    requirement is stricter than the “substantial interest” inquiry. The “‘injury in fact’ requirement
    mandates that the party allege ‘such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy’ as to warrant
    his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction.” 
    Id. (citations omitted)
    (emphasis in original).
    As Hillandale Committee’s interest in protecting the results of the referendum is not
    sufficiently particularized to satisfy the requirement of a substantial interest for intervention
    purposes, then it is clear that the alleged “injury in fact” is not of “such a personal stake” as to
    permit a finding that Hillandale Committee has standing to challenge the entry of the consent
    judgment See 
    id. We therefore
    hold that Hillandale Committee does not have standing to challenge
    the consent judgment. This holding also provides an additional ground for affirming the district
    court’s denial of the motion to intervene, because it leaves Hillandale Committee with no effective
    relief as an intervenor.
    For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of the motion to intervene
    and DISMISS Hillandale Committee’s appeal from the entry of the consent judgment for lack of
    standing.