V&M Star, LP v. Centimark Corporation ( 2010 )


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  •                       RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
    Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
    File Name: 10a0054p.06
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
    _________________
    X
    -
    V&M STAR, LP,
    -
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    -
    -
    No. 09-3249
    v.
    ,
    >
    -
    Defendant-Appellee. -
    CENTIMARK CORPORATION,
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    N
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Ohio at Youngstown.
    No. 07-03573, George J. Limbert, Magistrate Judge.
    Submitted: October 22, 2009
    Decided and Filed: February 24, 2010
    Before: DAUGHTREY, GILMAN, and KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judges.
    _________________
    COUNSEL
    ON BRIEF: Janice T. O’Halloran, STEFANSKI & ASSOCIATES, LLC, Youngstown,
    Ohio, Daniel J. Buckley, Eric W. Richardson, VORYS, SATER, SEYMOUR AND PEASE
    LLP, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellant. John P. Liekar, Jr., YUKEVICH, MARCHETTI,
    LIEKAR & ZANGRILLI, P.C., Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, for Appellee.
    _________________
    OPINION
    _________________
    RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge. The present case involves a lawsuit
    brought by V&M Star, LP against Centimark Corporation. Summary judgment was granted
    in favor of Centimark by the district court, and V&M now appeals. For the reasons set forth
    below, we REMAND the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with
    this opinion.
    1
    No. 09-3249          V&M Star, LP v. Centimark Corp.                                    Page 2
    V&M alleges that jurisdiction exists in this case pursuant to the diversity-jurisdiction
    provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Under this provision, there must be complete diversity such
    that no plaintiff is a citizen of the same state as any defendant. Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche,
    
    546 U.S. 81
    , 89 (2005). In its jurisdictional statement for this appeal, V&M does not
    mention what state it or Centimark is a citizen of, remarking only that “[t]he district court
    had jurisdiction of this matter under” § 1332. Centimark failed to include a jurisdictional
    statement in its brief, thus indicating its satisfaction with V&M’s statement. See Fed. R.
    App. P. 28(b). We must therefore rely on the district court record to determine whether
    diversity jurisdiction in fact exists.
    The parties’ pleadings reveal that Centimark is a Pennsylvania corporation
    headquartered in Canonsburg, Pennsylvania, meaning that it is a citizen solely of
    Pennsylvania. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (stating that a corporation is a citizen of
    potentially two states—the state where it is incorporated and the state where its principal
    place of business is located). V&M is a limited partnership, however, and “[f]or purposes
    of determining diversity jurisdiction, a limited partnership is deemed to be a citizen of every
    state where its general and limited partners reside.” Hooper v. Wolfe, 
    396 F.3d 744
    , 748 (6th
    Cir. 2005) (emphasis in original); see also Federal Procedure, Lawyer’s Edition § 1:165
    (Thomson Reuters 2009) (“A limited partnership is a citizen of each state in which its
    general and limited partners, including general and limited partners who are partners of other
    partners in [a] multi-tiered structure, hold citizenship.”).
    In its second amended complaint, V&M explained that its partners include two
    limited liability companies and one “French S.A.R.L.” This statement creates a further layer
    of complexity because limited liability companies “have the citizenship of each partner or
    member.” Delay v. Rosenthal Collins Group, LLC, 
    585 F.3d 1003
    , 1005 (6th Cir. 2009).
    As explained in Delay, “because a member of a limited liability company may itself have
    multiple members—and thus may itself have multiple citizenships—the federal court needs
    to know the citizenship of each ‘sub-member’ as well.” 
    Id. Unfortunately, V&M
    failed to provide the citizenship of the members of its partner
    LLCs. It simply noted that one of the LLCs had no members that “had a physical presence
    in Pennsylvania,” and made no mention of the membership of the other LLC. Even V&M’s
    No. 09-3249         V&M Star, LP v. Centimark Corp.                                    Page 3
    contention as to the first LLC is legally incomplete because, for example, a member of an
    LLC could be a corporation that is organized under the laws of Pennsylvania (and thus
    would be a Pennsylvania citizen), despite it having no physical presence there.
    Furthermore, the citizenship of V&M’s “French S.A.R.L.” is unclear for diversity-
    jurisdiction purposes. “SARL is the French abbreviation for a term used to describe a private
    company similar to an American limited liability company.” Sloss Indus. Corp. v. Eurisol,
    
    488 F.3d 922
    , 924 n.2 (11th Cir. 2007). Our research has revealed only one case discussing
    the citizenship of a S.A.R.L. for diversity-jurisdiction purposes. See Indus. Fuel Co., Inc.
    v. Invista S.A.R.L., LLC, No. 5:06CV40-V, 
    2008 WL 619189
    (W.D.N.C. Feb. 5, 2008). In
    that case, the district court analyzed the potential citizenship of a Luxembourg S.A.R.L. 
    Id. at *1-*4.
    According to the court, “[t]he parties assert that there is no authority considering,
    much less deciding, whether a S.A.R.L. created under the laws of Luxembourg is to be
    treated as a corporation or a limited liability company for diversity purposes, and the
    undersigned is aware of none.” 
    Id. at *3.
    The court in Industrial Fuel therefore evaluated what the potential citizenship of the
    entity would be under both forms—as a corporation and as an LLC. 
    Id. Because the
    S.A.R.L. did not have the same citizenship as the other party under either analysis, the court
    concluded that diversity jurisdiction existed. 
    Id. at *3-*4.
    In the present case, however,
    V&M has provided no information about its member S.A.R.L. beyond its being “French,”
    leaving us unable to determine the S.A.R.L.’s citizenship either as a corporation or as an
    LLC.
    The district court was alerted to this diversity-jurisdiction issue by Centimark’s
    motion to dismiss V&M’s first amendment complaint. Centimark’s motion asserted that
    V&M’s allegations at the time were “insufficient to establish diversity jurisdiction” because
    V&M “failed to plead the . . . citizenship of its limited partners.” V&M filed a second
    amended complaint in response to the motion, which named its limited and general partners
    but did not properly explain its partners’ citizenship. This information apparently satisfied
    Centimark. The district court then denied the motion to dismiss as moot, noting that
    Centimark no longer contested diversity jurisdiction.
    No. 09-3249            V&M Star, LP v. Centimark Corp.                                 Page 4
    But the district court had an obligation to go further, despite Centimark having
    waived the issue. See Wis. Dep’t of Corrs. v. Schacht, 
    524 U.S. 381
    , 389 (1999) (“No party
    can waive the defect [concerning diversity jurisdiction] or consent to jurisdiction. No court
    can ignore the defect; rather, a court, noticing the defect, must raise the matter on its own.”
    (internal citations omitted)). The court should have insisted that V&M establish the
    citizenship of its partner LLCs, including any “sub-members,” see 
    Delay, 585 F.3d at 1005
    ,
    and conducted an inquiry into the citizenship of the French S.A.R.L. As it stands, the
    current jurisdictional allegations are fatally incomplete, leaving us uncertain that diversity
    jurisdiction exists.
    We conclude that the case should be remanded to the district court with instructions
    to resolve the jurisdictional issue by determining V&M’s citizenship. We base our decision
    to remand on two factors: (1) the complexity of the jurisdictional facts in this case, because
    of the members and sub-members (and potential sub-sub-members) that comprise V&M; and
    (2) the fact that no controlling precedent exists regarding how to determine the citizenship
    of a French S.A.R.L for diversity-jurisdiction purposes. In such unusual circumstances, we
    have determined that the matter would be best addressed by the district court in the first
    instance.
    For all of the reasons set forth above, we REMAND the case to the district court for
    further proceedings consistent with this opinion.